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 Origen has traditionally been famous for his universalism, but many scholars now 
express doubt that Origen believed in a universal and permanent apocatastasis. This is 
because many scholars are convinced that Origen’s teaching on moral autonomy (or 
freedom of choice) is logically incompatible with the notion that God foreordains every 
soul’s future destiny. Those few scholars who do argue that Origen believed in both 
moral autonomy and universal salvation either do not know how to reconcile these two 
views in Origen’s theology, or their proposed “solutions” are not convincing. 
 In this dissertation I make two preliminary arguments which allow the question of 
logical compatibility to come into focus. First, I argue that vague phrases such as “free 
will” or “freedom of the will” are not helpful descriptions of Origen’s thought, but 
instead we must understand the careful and technical way Origen defined moral 
autonomy. Second, I make the argument that Origen did, in fact, believe in a universal 
and permanent restoration of all fallen souls (the apocatastasis), and that this restoration 
was predetermined and foreordained by God. These two arguments introduce the follow-
up question: how does Origen think it is possible for God to achieve this predetermined 
outcome of cosmic history, an outcome completely facilitated through the free and 
contingent decisions of creatures, without God somehow coercing those who might 
choose to consistently resist him? 
 My aim is to demonstrate that Origen reconciled his belief in universal salvation 
and moral autonomy by drawing upon his multi-layered understanding of God’s 
foreknowledge in order to show how God uses his foreknowledge in the planning of 
salvation-history. Careful analysis of key passages reveals Origen’s belief that God not 
only foreknows our future choices, but that God also knows what free choices creatures 
would make in any hypothetical situation. Therefore, I argue, Origen believed that God 
preselects and arranges into a future timeline only those free choices of creatures which 
God foresees would eventually result in a universal restoration. In this way God is able to 
infallibly bring about the foreordained apocatastasis without violating moral autonomy 
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The history of Christian universalism is complicated by the fact that the label does 
not refer to a specific doctrine in the abstract.1 Rather, individual authors who teach this 
concept understand universal salvation to entail distinctive features and requirements. 
Despite the diversity found within this term, however, objections to “universalism” have 
often been one-dimensional. In modern times, one of the most common objections to 
universal salvation is that it is somehow incompatible with the idea of free will, in the 
sense that a divinely foreordained universal salvation must deny people the autonomy to 
choose their own destiny.2 This charge stems from the common intuition that salvation is 
something that must be willingly entered into, without force or compulsion, and therefore 
any foreordained and infallible plan by God which insists upon this telos would not 
respect a person’s hypothetical choice to refrain from salvation. This common intuition 
recognizes that God may universally desire all to be saved without any subsequent threat 
to free will, but any sense in which this destiny is predetermined and unchangeable 
                                                          
1 The term universalism is frequently used in discussions regarding how open and accessible a 
religion is to wider segments of the world’s population – i.e. the extent to which certain religions are 
inclusive of all people groups, or whether participation in a religion requires membership to a particular 
ethnicity or sociological group. For a helpful orientation on the (often ill-defined) terminology used in such 
discussions, see Anders Runesson, "Particularistic Judaism and Universalistic Christianity? Some critical 
remarks on Terminology and Theology," Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and Judaism 1 (2000). I am 
not using the term “universalism” in this sense. Instead, I am referring to the eschatological belief found 
among some Christian theologians that all people who have ever lived will eventually enjoy God’s 
salvation (however they might construe that final state). On the distinction between universalism as 
universal mission/conversion and universal salvation, cf. Alan F. Segal, "Conversion and Universalism: 
Opposites that Attract," in Origins and Method: Towards A New Understanding of Judaism and 
Christianity: Essays in Honour of John C. Hurd, ed. Bradley H. McLean, JSNTSup (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 
1993), 175, passim. 
Of course, when speaking of universal salvation there are also universalist theologies which do not 
rest upon a foundation of the Christian understanding of God – the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ (e.g. Buddhist or Islamic universalism). Here and throughout I use the term “universalism” (and its 
synonyms) to refer to Christian understandings of universal salvation. Unique features of Origen’s 
universalism will be detailed in Chapter 4. 
2 Another major criticism often levied against the idea of universal salvation is that it is not the 





appears to undercut moral autonomy; the common intuition insists that morally free 
creatures must possess the right (at least in principle) to decide for themselves that they 
do not want to be saved.3 
Given the popularity of this critique, it is unsurprising that modern scholarship 
has also levied this objection against the most famous universalist in Christian history, 
the 3rd century teacher and theologian Origen of Alexandria. In one sense, charging 
                                                          
3 The roots of this common intuition can be traced back at least as early as Greco-Roman debates 
on various forms of fatalism. Some philosophers took issue with the idea of fixed future events and 
believed this would undercut any sense of moral responsibility. The most famous example of this argument 
is often called the “Idle (or lazy) Argument” (ἀργὸς λόγος), which has been preserved in Cicero's On Fate 
28-9, and Origen’s Contra Celsum II.20 (this argument will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2). 
Some philosophers disavowed the possibility of God having foreknowledge of future events because it was 
thought that any sense of a fixed future eliminates moral responsibility in the present. Cf. Susanne Bobzien, 
Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 180-233. The 
common intuition that the fixed event of universal salvation contradicts moral freedom can be found in 
modern times as well. In the 19th century universalists were regularly on the defensive against this critique. 
See, for example, the comments made by Rev. G. H. Emerson in 1872: “Now here is the gross injustice 
which is made to tell with serious effect to the prejudice of the Universalist faith: everywhere orthodoxy 
makes Universalism obnoxious to an objection which, if it has any force, tells with equal pertinence against 
itself . . . That principle, as we have seen, is this: Certainty of salvation implies a lack of power to refuse it. 
That principle is a specious absurdity” – G. H. Emerson, "A Popular Objection to Universalism Reviewed," 
in The Universalist Quarterly and General Review, ed. Thomas B. Thayer (Boston: Universalist Publishing 
House, 1872), 443-44 (emphasis added). Today, many writers continue to rely on this common intuition as 
a way to discredit universalism – e.g. John Sanders, "A Freewill Theist's Response to Talbott's 
Universalism," in Universal Salvation? The Current Debate, ed. Robin Parry and Christopher H. Partridge 
(Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster Press, 2003). Even theologians who do not wish to attack the idea of 
universal salvation, in that they admit to being attracted to the notion, nevertheless also articulate this same 
intuition. Notable examples include Hans Urs von Balthasar (Roman Catholic) and Kallistos Ware (Eastern 
Orthodox). Bishop Ware, for example, calls the argument from free will the strongest argument against 
universal salvation. He writes: “If the strongest argument in favor of universal salvation is the appeal to 
divine love, and if the strongest argument on the opposite side is the appeal to human freedom, then we are 
brought back to the dilemma with which we started: how are we to bring into concord the two principles 
God is love and Human beings are free? . . . Our belief in human freedom means that we have no right to 
categorically affirm, ‘All must be saved.’ But our faith in God’s love makes us dare to hope that all will be 
saved” – Kallistos Ware, "Dare We Hope for the Salvation of All?," in The Inner Kingdom (Crestwood, 
New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2000), 214-15. Balthasar reflects a similar attitude in: Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, Dare We Hope "That All Men Be Saved"? with a short Discourse on Hell [original title: 
Was durfen wir hoffen?] (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988). This common intuition is not relegated to 
one branch of Christianity but can be found among Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant writers.  
Additionally, it should be noted that there is another trajectory of universalism which shares the 
common intuition and admits the incompatibility between freedom of choice and universal salvation, yet at 
the same time this tradition upholds the truth of a fixed universal salvation. Friedrich Schleiermacher is 
probably the most famous example of this category. Schleiermacher linked predestination with universal 
salvation, and taught that the entire human race has been predestined for salvation through Christ – cf. 
Anette I. Hagan, Eternal Blessedness for All? A Historical-Systematic Examination of Schleiermacher's 
Understanding of Predestination, ed. K. C. Hanson, et al., Princeton Theological Monograph Series 





Origen with undercutting moral freedom may seem surprising given Origen’s constant 
insistence on the reality of free choice. After all, throughout his entire life the great 
teacher of Alexandria fought against fatalistic theologies which he described as 
dangerous threats to human moral responsibility and utterly incompatible with the 
Christian faith. It is not without cause that Henri Crouzel once called Origen the 
“theologian par excellence of free will.”4 Origen insisted that the doctrine of moral 
responsibility was a foundational and crucial feature of the Church’s Regula. To 
compromise on this point would destroy Christianity itself given that the truth of moral 
autonomy safeguards the two foundational pillars of Christian theology – the justice and 
the love of the one God. Yet, despite widespread agreement among scholars today that 
Origen ranks among the greatest upholders of free will, many continue to question the 
logic of his thought, either by suggesting that Origen contradicts himself by believing in 
universal salvation, or by concluding that despite appearances, he must not have been a 
universalist after all, given his firm belief in free will.5 This dissertation will examine 
Origen’s doctrines of moral autonomy and universal salvation in order to demonstrate 
that Origen upheld the integrity of both in a logically consistent manner. As such, this 






                                                          
4 Henri Crouzel, Origen, trans. A.S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Publishers, 1989), 195. 
5 The variety of scholarly interpretations regarding Origen’s universalism will be outlined in 






Origen’s doctrines of moral autonomy and divine providence cannot be easily 
summarized as they permeate nearly every facet of Origen’s theology.6 For Origen, the 
entirety of the moral quest is the constant interplay between divine providence and moral 
autonomy. Therefore, it is important to note at the outset that the scope of this study will 
be tightly focused in the following ways: First, numerous aspects of Origen’s theology 
continue to be debated today, and this is especially true regarding certain features of 
Origen’s eschatology. I will note controversial topics in footnotes as they arise, but I will 
reserve detailed textual examination only for those topics which directly pertain to my 
central argument.  
Second, I will note possible background sources for Origen’s doctrines of moral 
autonomy and divine providence, but only insofar as this allows us to better understand 
Origen on his own terms. I do not intend to undertake the monumental task of tracing the 
development of the “freedom of the will” up through the third century AD, nor do I 
intend to give a detailed accounting for the large diversity of views regarding divine 
providence in Jewish and Greco-Roman literature. Such examinations would take several 
volumes. Where applicable, I make note of work that has already been done on these 
topics.  
Finally, it is outside the scope of this study to pronounce judgment on the 
orthodoxy or heterodoxy of Origen’s views on the aspects of his theology under question. 
The matter of historical ecclesial condemnation of Origen has been complicated by false 
                                                          
6 In his magisterial book Hal Koch demonstrated that the two threads which are imbedded in all of 
Origen’s thought are pronoia and paideusis, or divine providence as God’s educational strategy for 
restoration – Hal Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum 





trails, hostile witnesses, unfair characterizations, unnamed anathemas (as in the case of 
the Fifth Ecumenical Council), and perhaps most importantly, the question of the extant 
texts and the reliability of their translations (see below). Suffice to say, it should be 
remembered that Origen himself expressed a firm and uncompromising desire to stay 
within the bounds of the Church’s Rule of Faith.7 Origen was convinced that any topics 
which had not yet been settled by the larger Church were open subjects for discussion.8 It 





                                                          
7 E.g. In his preface to First Principles Origen writes: “…and yet the teaching of the church, 
handed down in unbroken succession from the apostles, is still preserved and continues to exist in the 
churches up to the present day, we maintain that that only is to be believed as the truth which in no way 
conflicts with the tradition of the church and the apostles” – PArch preface 2 (Butterworth 2; SC 252, 78). 
Citations from Peri Archon are from the most recent critical edition by Henri Crouzel and Manlio 
Simonetti, Origèn: Traité des Principes, 4 vols., Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Cerf, 1978-84). Citations will 
list SC volume and page (for additional information see the bibliography). Unless otherwise noted, all 
English translations are from G. W. Butterworth, Origen: On first principles: being Koetschau's text of the 
De principiis (Cloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith Pub., 1973). The critical editions of Origen’s other writings 
(predominately from Sources Chrétiennes) will be listed in footnotes as they are cited. To aid the reader, I 
relist the critical edition information once per chapter as each work is cited. I follow the same pattern for 
those modern works which appear in multiple chapters. 
8 Origen frequently contrasts doctrinal absolutes with proposals, suggestions, and speculation. 
While Origen insists upon doctrines that are part of the Church’s Rule of Faith, he exercises more modesty 
on other subjects. The following is a typical example of the way Origen speaks when he moves beyond 
established dogma: PArch 2.6.7 – “In the meantime, these are the thoughts which occur to us at the moment 
in our discussion of such very difficult subjects as the incarnation and deity of Christ. If there be anyone 
who can discover something better and prove what he says by clearer statements out of the holy scriptures, 
let his opinion be accepted in preference to mine” (Butterworth 115; SC 252, 324). 
9 For a helpful overview of the condemnations of Origen through the first Origenist controversy, 
see Elizabeth A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an early Christian Debate 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). The condemnations of Origen are further complicated by 
the messy interpersonal disagreements between several “big” personalities such as Jerome and Rufinus who 
in today’s colloquial vernacular might fairly be described as “frenemies”. One big issue is that the main 
participants in the debate over Origen’s orthodoxy could not even agree on what Origen himself had taught. 
Disagreements over translation methodology played a central role in the controversy. On the different 
translation philosophies of Jerome and Rufinus, see Catherine Chin, "Translation as Origenism," Journal of 






All discussions pertaining to the logic of Origen’s beliefs and theology raise 
important methodological concerns. First, I am working under the assumption that 
Origen’s writings may be viewed synthetically. Some have argued otherwise. For 
example, in an appendix to his Origène et la philosophie Henri Crouzel writes that it is 
utterly wrong to speak of a “system,” and that Origen never developed his theology to the 
point of systematic coherence. Thus, we should expect contradictions to be found 
throughout Origen’s writings.10 To some degree I am sympathetic with this concern. For 
instance, in his homilies and commentaries Origen frequently lists several possible 
interpretations for a passage of Scripture, any of which could be valid and perhaps even 
be valid at the same time, so long as they do not contradict the Church’s Rule of Faith. 
However, despite Origen’s tendency to be generous in his exegetical explorations, I do 
not believe that Origen’s views concerning divine providence and human moral 
autonomy fit this category. Nor do I believe that attempting to understand how they fit 
together is somehow imposing a foreign “system” on something never intended for it. In 
this, I am following other scholars who also recognize the validity of a synthetic 
treatment of Origen by finding key concepts in his theology which appear to organize his 
thought.11 Of course, Origen’s consistency on these topics will need to be demonstrated 
                                                          
10 Henri Crouzel, "Origène est il un systematique?," in Origène et la philosophie (Paris: Aubier, 
1962), 179-215. Cf. Herbert Musurillo, "The Recent Revival of Origen Studies," Theological Studies 24, 
no. 2 (1963): 256-57. Musurillo agrees with Crouzel’s assessment. J. Chênevert also argues that Origen’s 
scattered comments should not be forced into a ‘systematic’ mold – Jacques Chênevert, L’ Église dans le 
commentaire d’Origène sur le Cantique des Cantiques, Studia: travaux de recherches (Bruxelles: Desclee 
de Brouwer, 1969), 141. 
11 E.g. David Balas synthesized Origen’s thought using the concept of participation – David L. 
Balas, "The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought: Christian Transposition of a Theme 
of the Platonic Tradition," in Origeniana. Premier colloque international des études origéniennes, ed. 
Henri Crouzel, G. Lomiento, and J. Rius-Camps (Bari: Istituto di letteratura cristiana antica, Università di 
Bari, 1975), 274. John Clark Smith synthesized Origen’s thought on the subject of conversion – John Clark 





by careful analysis of the relevant texts, rather than merely assumed. This dissertation 
will reveal that Origen’s theology of divine providence and moral autonomy fit together 
with logical (and theological) consistently. 
A second point of concern pertains to how the modern scholar should approach 
the surviving texts by Origen. Origen was one of the most prolific writers of the early 
Church. Referring to a work by Eusebius of Caesarea, Jerome mentions that Eusebius 
knew 2000 treatises written by Origen, while Jerome drew up his own list of 800 titles.12 
Epiphanius estimated that there were 6000 works written by Origen.13 Unfortunately, 
because of later condemnations most of Origen’s writings are lost to history. Of those 
that survive, the majority of texts have only been preserved in the Latin translations of 
Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411 AD).14 Distrust of Rufinus’ abilities as a translator go all 
the way back to the arguments between Rufinus and another (in)famous translator of 
Origen, Jerome. Indeed, there are good reasons to suspect the accuracy of Rufinus’ 
translations. First, Rufinus himself invites comparison of his work by admitting that he 
took a number of liberties when translating Origen’s Greek for a Western audience. For 
example, in his preface to his translation of Origen’s First Principles Rufinus writes: 
…in my translation I would follow as far as possible the rule observed by 
my predecessors and especially by the man whom I mentioned above. For 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Crouzel himself seems to have softened his stance on this debate a few years later when he stated that 
Origen’s theology supports synthetic approaches – Henri Crouzel, "Qu’a voulu faire Origène en composant 
le Traité des Principes?," Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 76 (1975): 258. 
12 Eusebius’ list is now lost. Jerome mentions this in Adv. Rufinum 2.22. 
13 Epiphanius, Adv. haer. 64.63. Cf. John A. McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 26. 
14 For a list of Origen’s works as they survive in either Greek or Latin, as well as their modern 
editions, see Maurits Geerard and Friedhelm Winkelmann, Clavis patrum graecorum: Patres antenicaeni, 
Clavis patrum graecorum (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1983), 141-86. For a helpful guide and listing of 
Origen’s critical editions (PG, GCS, SC), see McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen: 41-44. On 
the dating of Origen’s works see R.P.C. Hanson, Origen's doctrine of tradition (London: SPCK, 1954), 1-
30; Pierre Nautin, Origène : sa vie et son oeuvre (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), especially ch. 10 
"Chronologie", 363-412; Johannes Quasten, The Ante-Nicene Literature After Irenaeus, Volume 2, 





he, when translating into Latin more than seventy treatises of Origen, 
called Homilies, and also a number of his commentaries on St. Paul’s 
epistles, both of which are known to contain in the original a good many 
statements likely to cause offense, so smoothed over and emended these in 
his translation, that a Latin reader would find in them nothing out of 
harmony with our faith. His example, therefore, I am following to the best 
of my ability; if not with an equal degree of eloquence, yet at least 
observing the same rules, and taking care not to reproduce such passages 
from the books of Origen as are found to be inconsistent with and contrary 
to his true teaching.15 
 
It is important to appreciate why Rufinus altered and smoothed over certain 
“problematic” passages. Rufinus was convinced that heretics had altered some of the 
Greek copies of Origen in order to give greater authority to their heretical views, and he 
also believed that disingenuous persons had intentionally corrupted Origen’s texts in 
various places in order to malign Origen’s good name.16 So, for example, Rufinus notes 
the following about his translation of First Principles: 
Wherever, therefore, I have found in his books anything contrary to the 
reverent statements made by him about the Trinity in other places, I have 
either omitted it as a corrupt and interpolated passage, or reproduced it in a 
form that agrees with the doctrine I have found him affirming elsewhere. 
If, however, speaking as he does to men of knowledge and discernment, 
he has occasionally expressed himself obscurely in the effort to be brief, I 
have, to make the passage clearer, added such remarks on the same subject 
as I have read in a fuller form in his other books, bearing in mind the need 
                                                          
15 PArch Preface of Rufinus 2 (SC 252, 70; Butterworth lxii-lxiii). 
16 PArch Preface of Rufinus 3 (SC 252, 70; Butterworth lxiii): “The cause of these variations I 
have explained to you more fully in the Apologeticus, a work written by Pamphilus in defence of Origen’s 
books, to which I added a very brief tract, showing, as I think, by clear proofs that these have been 
corrupted in many places by heretics and evilly disposed persons. This is especially the case with the books 
which you are now pressing me to translate, namely those entitled Peri Archon…” Rufinus gives a similar 
complaint of foreign interpolations (interpolare) in the preface to his translation of Origen’s Commentary 
on Romans. Even in his own lifetime, Origen wrote that one heretic corrupted a debate they had together 
while another heretic wrote something in Origen’s name. This is found in Origen’s letter To Friends in 
Alexandria which is preserved by both Jerome and Rufinus: Jerome, Apologia adversus libros Rufini 2.18 
and Rufinus, De adulteratione librorum Origenis 7.1-67. Both Jerome and Rufinus report Origen's words 
in nearly the same way, and therefore it is safe to assume its authenticity. Discussion and translation of this 
letter may be found in Henri Crouzel, "A Letter from Origen to 'Friends in Alexandria,'" in The Heritage of 
the Early Church: Essays in Honor of George Vasilievich Florovsky ed. D. Neiman and M. Schatkin 





of explanation. But I have said nothing of my own, simply giving back to 
him his own statements found in other places.17 
 
Many scholars acknowledge that Rufinus supplied certain post-Nicene glosses in his 
translation work.18 Rufinus not only admits to altering certain passages in his translation 
for the sake of orthodoxy, but he also admits to frequently abbreviating the original 
Greek. The best example of this is Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s Commentary on 
Romans. In his preface to this work Rufinus states that he attempted to compress the 
original fifteen Greek books in half.19 
For these reasons, it is understandable that the scholarly consensus once held 
Rufinus to be an unreliable translator. Hal Koch, for example, insisted that Rufinus’ 
translation of First Principles could not be trusted.20 A turning point on scholarly opinion 
of Rufinus’ abilities and integrity came about in 1941 with the discovery of new Greek 
fragments of Origen, called the Tura papyri.21 These fragments have allowed scholars to 
compare passages from the Latin translations against the Greek originals, and the results 
of this analysis have largely exonerated Rufinus. While it is true that Rufinus does alter 
                                                          
17 PArch Preface of Rufinus 3 (Butterworth lxiii; SC 252, 72). 
18 For a helpful discussion on Rufinus’ general reliability, see the Introduction in Ronald E. Heine, 
Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, FOTC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1982), 27-39. 
19 ComRm Preface of Rufinus lines 16-19 (Bammel 36; Scheck 1.51-52). Rufinus translated this 
work at the request of a monk named Heraclius, and it was Heraclius who requested that Rufinus abridge 
the commentary so drastically, given the great length of the original. Citations from Origen’s Commentary 
on Romans (along with page numbers) are from the critical edition by Caroline P. Hammond Bammel, Der 
Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung Rufins, 3 vols., vol. 1, 2, 3, Aus 
der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel (Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany: Herder, 1990-1998). Unless 
otherwise noted, all English translations (listed by volume and page) are from Scheck’s 2-volume work: 
Thomas P. Scheck, Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5, FOTC (Washington 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001); Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans 
Books 6-10, FOTC (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002). 
20 Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus: 
322. 
21 For the publication and analysis of the Greek papyrus fragments see Jean Scherer, Le 
commentaire d’Origène sur Rom. III.5-V.7 d’après les extraits du papyrus Nᵒ 88748 du Musée du Caire et 






some of Origen’s Trinitarian remarks (as he admits to doing), he appears to be a reliable 
interpreter on most other subjects. This is especially true regarding the subjects examined 
in this dissertation. J. M. Rist’s study of Origen’s free will arguments in First Principles 
reveal Rufinus’ faithfulness in translating Origen on the concept of free will or moral 
autonomy.22 On the topic of Origen’s universalism, there are passages in both the Greek 
and Latin translations which attest to Origen’s belief in the concept. Moreover, if Rufinus 
had thought to alter such passages, he would not have strengthened Origen’s discussion 
of the apocatastasis but rather would have tempered or downplayed it. Given that certain 
features of Origen’s teaching on the apocatastasis were already under attack by Jerome 
and others, Rufinus certainly felt pressure to modulate Origen’s remarks in First 
Principles and the Commentary on Romans.23 There would be no good reason for 
Rufinus to have manufactured such teachings. As we will see in Chapter 4, many of these 
teachings are clearly preserved in his translations, and therefore it is safe to conclude that 
Rufinus is presenting Origen’s own voice on this topic. Thus, the prevailing consensus 
today among Origen scholars is that Rufinus is an important source for Origen’s thought, 
despite his occasional emendation on certain issues such as the subordination of the Son. 
I am likewise proceeding on the basis that Rufinus’ translations are largely trustworthy 
on the topics most relevant to this dissertation – Origen’s teachings on moral autonomy 
                                                          
22 John M. Rist, "The Greek and Latin Texts of the Discussion on Free Will in De principiis, Book 
III," in Origeniana: Premier colloque international des etudes origéniennes, ed. Henri Crouzel, G. 
Lomiento, and J. Ruis-Camps (Bari: Istituto di letteratura cristiana antica, Università di Bari, 1975), 111. 
23 E.g. when translating the Greek of PArch 2.10.8, Koetschau believes that Rufinus omits the 
following line: “There is a resurrection of the dead, and there is punishment, but not everlasting” 





and universal salvation. Thus, although I use the original Greek whenever possible, I also 
make use of Rufinus’ translations for understanding Origen’s thought.24  
 
Chapter Overviews 
 Chapter 1 outlines the current state of the question regarding the compatibility of 
Origen’s theology of universal salvation and freedom of choice in matters of faith and 
repentance. This chapter will highlight the wide confusion among scholars surrounding 
this topic. Some scholars have called Origen logically inconsistent or paradoxical, while 
other scholars have essentially redefined his universalism in order to erase or smooth 
over the supposed incompatibility with freedom of choice. I make note of a few scholars 
who have recently defended Origen from such charges, but I argue that their explanations 
lack sufficient explanatory power or textual evidence. This chapter poses the central 
question of the dissertation. 
 Chapter 2 analyzes Origen’s understanding of moral autonomy or freedom of 
choice. Any question of Origen’s inconsistency between freedom of choice and God’s 
sovereign decision to save all people necessarily hinges upon correctly understanding 
what Origen means by freedom of choice, given that this phrase means very little in the 
abstract. Different authors stipulated different requirements for a choice to be considered 
free and unforced. Origen was one of many participants in this philosophical and 
theological conversation, a conversation which was an ongoing feature of the intellectual 
landscape in the 3rd century. Origen’s discussions on moral autonomy were frequently 
reactionary arguments to opposing viewpoints, and so Chapter 2 also surveys the 
                                                          
24 Studying Rufinus’ translations has an additional benefit in that it is useful for understanding the 





viewpoints that Origen sought to correct. I make note of Origen’s well-known reliance on 
Stoic categories of the mechanics of choice, but I also highlight key differences. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 focus on Origen’s theology of divine providence, with the goal 
of demonstrating the role universal salvation plays in Origen’s theological system (or 
salvation-history). My argument in this dissertation relies on specific features of Origen’s 
concept of cosmic / salvation-history and how divine providence directs and unfolds that 
history. Therefore, Chapter 3 provides an overview of Origen’s vision of salvation-
history by looking at the chronological stages that lead up to the last stage – the final 
restoration of all rational souls, or the apocatastasis. The importance of Chapter 3 is in 
establishing the contours of God’s salvation-history and showing that all things within the 
historical timeline are directed towards a specific end. Origen’s vision of cosmic history 
is idiosyncratic, and so Chapter 3 will provide a helpful foundation from which to 
establish the arguments of the remaining chapters. 
 Chapter 4 continues the analysis of Origen’s vision of salvation-history, but it 
focuses exclusively on the final stage – the apocatastasis. Specifically, in this chapter I 
defend three claims: First, I argue that although Origen appears to give conflicting 
statements regarding universal salvation, he nevertheless holds a belief in a final and 
permanent restoration of all rational souls. Second, I argue that Origen’s universalism 
constitutes a soteriology which can be described as a form of divine predeterminism and 
foreordination. Third, I argue that Origen’s universalism amplifies his theology of God’s 
grace. 
 Chapter 5 answers the principle question of the dissertation: how does Origen 





unavoidable soteriological end? In other words, how does Origen escape the charge of 
fatalism? The structure of Chapter 5 is organized around a series of different passages 
from Origen’s corpus, which are scrutinized in light of the conclusions of the previous 
chapters (and in light of each other). When read together, these key texts reveal that 
Origen was, in fact, aware that universalism appears to stand in conflict with freedom of 
choice, but that Origen believed there was a way to uphold the integrity of both. He is 
able to do so by appealing to a nuanced type of divine (fore)knowledge. Origen believed 
that God’s intimate knowledge of each person’s soul not only gives God the ability to 
foreknow how each person will choose in the future, but that it also gives God the ability 
to know how each person would freely choose in any hypothetical situation, whether or 
not such a situation is ever realized in history. Even before God ever creates souls, and 
thus before the start of temporal history, God foreknows what critical situations each 
fallen soul will need to find itself in, such that each soul will freely make the choices 
necessary to arrive at a final restoration. On the basis of this knowledge God then creates 
a historical timeline which actuates his plan of salvation and induces his creatures to 
freely arrive at a final restoration. The chief role of divine providence is in creating this 
plan and then actuating it in history. While providence exercises absolute control over the 
telos of history, which includes the destiny of each soul, at no point in time does divine 
providence undercut or threaten individual freedom of choice, as Origen defines the 
concept.  
Finally, the conclusion first summarizes the main arguments made in the 
dissertation, and then looks ahead by suggesting several important implications of this 





CHAPTER ONE  
STATE OF THE QUESTION 
Introduction 
 One of the most discussed features of Origen’s theology is his view of universal 
salvation, a final restoration of all rational souls called the apocatastasis. Origen is 
similarly well-known for his teachings on moral autonomy and moral responsibility. The 
attempt to integrate Origen’s views on moral autonomy with his views on universal 
salvation has resulted in uncertainty in modern scholarship. At question is not the 
cooperation between divine providence and moral autonomy in general. After all, the 
entirety of Origen’s cosmic drama is concerned with how divine providence acts and 
reacts with respect to creaturely moral decisions. The constant cooperation between 
God’s choices and the choices of creatures is relatively straightforward most of the time; 
Origen understands that virtually everything that happens regarding rational beings 
during their lives may be traced to divine providence.25 But two specific intersection 
points have troubled scholars. These may be posed as two related questions: first, how 
does Origen think that God will infallibly and necessarily save all rational souls in the 
final restoration without violating the exercise of their moral autonomy? Second, how can 
Origen be confident that the final restoration will be permanent if creatures retain their 
moral autonomy in the apocatastasis?  
                                                          
25 E.g. PArch 2.11.5 (Butterworth 150; SC 252, 404-406). The most recent critical edition of Peri 
Archon is by Crouzel and Simonetti, Origèn: Traité des Principes. Unless otherwise noted, all English 
translations from Peri Archon are from Butterworth, Origen: On first principles: being Koetschau's text of 





 Partly because of the confusion on these topics, the typical view – that Origen 
believed in universal salvation – has been questioned in recent years. This has taken place 
alongside a general reexamination of Origen’s theology by scholars in the past century.26 
Many of the old anathemas against Origen are now considered dubious claims originating 
from unfriendly witnesses.27 However, despite their acknowledgment of the unfair 
criticism that has been directed at Origen, many scholars continue to reaffirm the 
traditional view regarding Origen’s universalism.28 Those scholars who uphold the 
traditional view – that Origen held a firm belief in universal salvation – find themselves 
faced with questions regarding Origen’s theological consistency: how does God’s 
foreordination of universal salvation not undercut the integrity of creaturely moral 
autonomy and self-determination? On the surface, the combination of moral autonomy 
and universalism may seem paradoxical, for how can creaturely free choice be upheld in 
the context of a foreordained universal salvation? How, precisely, does Origen uphold the 
integrity of moral autonomy if no creature may choose to rebel against God forever? Did 
Origen lapse into incoherence or inconsistency on these points?  
It is important to note that these questions cannot be sidestepped as if they are 
merely modern concerns which have been unfairly hoisted back in time upon Origen’s 
                                                          
26 This reexamination has frequently been called a ‘reappraisal and rehabilitation’ of Origen, and 
is largely attributed to efforts by Henri de Lubac. For an overview of de Lubac’s project and the 
reexamination of Origen in general, see A. Edward Siecienski, "(Re)defining the Boundaries of Orthodoxy: 
The Rule of Faith and the Twentieth-Century Rehabilitation of Origen," in Tradition & The Rule of Faith in 
the Early Church ed. Ronnie Rombs and Alexander Hwang (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2010). There are good reasons to be suspicious of those who call the recent reexamination 
of Origen a “recovery.” Twentieth century scholarship on Origen has, for some reason, ignored scholarship 
from the 18th and 19th centuries. For more on this point, and specific examples of Origen’s influence in the 
18th and 19th centuries, see Michel Barnes, "May I Return to the Beginning? The Western Doctrine of 
Universal Salvation in English Language Protestant Theology, 1690-1889," (forthcoming 2018). 
27 For a helpful overview on the condemnations of Origen, as well as Origen’s attempts to defend 
his orthodoxy, see Cyril Richardson, "The Condemnation of Origen," Church History 6, no. 1 (1937). 






theology.29 On the contrary, such questions were neither foreign nor irrelevant to 
Origen’s own project, and Origen’s writings reveal his own concern regarding this 
issue.30 I will show that this is the primary reason, after all, why Origen hid this feature of 
his theology from most Christians. He believed this teaching would be misunderstood in 
dangerous ways, and that many Christians would naturally presume that any form of 
teleological foreordination ruled out moral responsibility in the present life.31 Thus, it is 
appropriate to investigate whether Origen was theologically consistent on this point, and 
how he understood moral autonomy to cooperate with divine foreordination at precisely 
these two points in the economy of salvation.  
 
                                                          
29 I am not suggesting that modern concerns and modern philosophical debates have not 
contributed to the degree of interest or concern over these questions, for I do believe modern 
presuppositions are at work in the scholarly discussion – often subconsciously so. The point is, rather, that 
this concern is not wholly a modern imposition, given that Origen was aware that the two views might 
appear contradictory. Modern philosophers continue to debate whether the idea of a predetermined 
universalism (universal salvation) is compatible with moral autonomy. Or, to be more precise, the debate 
concerns which versions of moral autonomy are compatible with such a concept and which ones are not. 
Cf. Michael Murray, "Three Versions of Universalism," Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999): 58-59. 
30 E.g. Phil 23.10.21-28 (Lewis 183; SC 226, 162-164): “Thus it is good that God Who ordereth 
[οἰκονομῶν, referring to God’s οἰκονομία] all things for the best, with good reason hides the future from 
our eyes. For the knowledge of the future makes us relax in the struggle against wickedness, and the 
apparent certainty of wickedness enervates us, and the result is that because we do not wrestle against sin 
we soon become subject to it. And at the same time it would be an obstacle in the way of a man’s becoming 
good and upright, if the knowledge that he will certainly some day be good reached him beforehand” 
(emphasis added). Citations from the Philocalia 21-27 are from the critical edition by Junod (listed by 
chapter, section, and line): Éric Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre, Sources Chrétiennes 
(Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1976). English translations are by George Lewis, The Philocalia of Origen: A 
compilation of selected passages from Origen's works made by St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Basil of 
Caesarea (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1911). 
31 Not only did he refrain from teaching this doctrine to most Christians, but at times when Origen 
does teach it he immediately appears defensive. When he alludes to the final salvation of all, he takes care 
to supplement his view with an insistence that all of this will be done without coercion. Origen is aware 
that any discussion of universal salvation is close enough to notions of fate and fatalism that the two can be 
easily confused. He seems aware of the implied awkwardness and tension that surrounds any concept of a 
predetermined end. See the discussion on Origen’s pedagogical strategy and his role as “a wise steward of 





Status Quaestionis and Literature Review 
Scholarly treatment on this issue has often operated (perhaps unknowingly) with a 
scholar’s presupposition that teleological foreordination (events which have been 
predetermined by God) and moral autonomy are prima facie opposite claims.32 One early 
example of this pattern is Charles Bigg. As part of his Bampton Lectures in 1886 Charles 
Bigg framed Origen’s teachings of human moral freedom and his teachings on 
universalism as beliefs in tension. Bigg writes: “Indeed the Alexandrine doctrine of 
Volition is such, that it is hard to reconcile with the hope of final unity.”33 Bigg further 
argued that Origen held to a ‘qualified universalism’ – which is to say, while God would 
eventually restore all sinners in a final restoration, not everyone would experience the 
final state in the same way. Some, for example, would be excluded from the Beatific 
Vision.34 Bigg notes,  
The purified spirit will be brought home; it will no longer rebel; it will 
acquiesce in its lot; but it may never be admitted within that holy circle 
where the pure in heart see face to face . . . Man tramples on God’s 
goodness here; he may scorn and defy it for ever.35  
 
Bigg is motivated to qualify Origen’s universalism in this way because by doing so he 
feels he can reconcile the foreordained end with human moral autonomy:  
Neither Clement nor Origen is properly speaking a Universalist. Nor is 
Universalism the logical result of their principles. For if the goodness of 
                                                          
32 By way of contrast, anyone open to compatibilism would not assume any tension in advance. 
33 Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria: Being the Bampton Lectures of the Year 
1886 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913), 232. 
34 Bigg notes that after the final restoration “there is no further change, but the soul remains secure 
in the fulness of intellectual fruition. Yet not all alike. To the Beatific Vision none can be admitted save the 
pure in heart. Though all other chastisements ease, when their object is fulfilled, the poena damni may still 
endure. Star differeth from star in glory. There are many mansions, many degrees . . . If we do not 
misinterpret these expressions, they appear to mean, that the soul by sin may lose capacities, which can 
never be wholly regained, and in this sense at least Origen teaches the eternity of punishment” – ibid., 233-
34. 





God drew them in one direction, the Freedom of the Will, their negative 
pole, drove them with equal force in the other.36 
 
By categorizing moral autonomy and foreordination as opposites, Bigg must ultimately 
sacrifice one of Origen’s theological doctrines in order to maintain the other; he preserves 
moral autonomy, while universalism gets sacrificed through redefinition.37 
 Writing in 1938, the Norwegian theologian Einar Molland expressed a similar 
concern regarding the consistency of Origen’s theology. Specifically, Molland 
maintained that Origen’s teachings on universalism and free will constituted separate and 
competing lines of thought: 
Origen’s Christian philosophy required that history should one day have 
an end, and that this end should be ἀποκατάστασις πάντων. This is one 
line of thought in his theology. But there is also another line of thought in 
it which makes the attainment of perfection an aim which can scarcely 
ever be realized. That is a line starting from the idea of free-will. When 
carried to its most extreme consequences, this line of thought must lead to 
a denial of the possibility of eternal, imperishable perfection . . . Free-will 
can never fall away. But then the restitution of all things to primeval 
perfection becomes doubtful.38 
 
Molland argued that in First Principles Origen developed these two competing lines of 
thought with “audacity” and “sincerity”, but when taken to their logical conclusions, they 
are revealed to be contradictory.39 Molland did not offer any definitive explanation for 
the questions he raised, and so it is unclear whether he viewed Origen as a universalist 
                                                          
36 Ibid., 292. 
37 Sebastian Guly has recently promoted an argument similar to that of Bigg, in that souls 
supposedly experience different levels of beatitude in the final restoration – Sebastian Guly, "The Salvation 
of the Devil and the Kingdom of God in Origen's Letter to Certain Close Friends in Alexandria," in 
Origeniana Decima: Origen as Writer, ed. Sylwia and Henryk Pietras Kaczmarek, Bibliotheca 
Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2011). My critique of Guly’s 
argument may be found below in Chapter 4 (note 500). 
38 Einar Molland, The Conception of the Gospel in the Alexandrian Theology (Oslo: I kommisjon 
hos J. Dybwad, 1938), 161. 
39 “In the De principiis he follows his two lines of thought to their utmost consequences, one 





who was inconsistent about free will, or whether the tension led him to doubt Origen’s 
universalism altogether.40 
Following the examples of the two previous scholars, Jean Daniélou framed 
Origen’s theology as a theology in tension. Thus, in 1948 Daniélou posed the troubling 
question: “But how is this re-establishment to be reconciled with freedom?”41 In his 
discussion on this point Daniélou claimed that any firm insistence on universal salvation 
acts as a kind of physical necessity upon moral agents.42 He also recognized that Origen 
himself was aware of this potential awkwardness.43 Unlike Bigg, Daniélou did not take 
the further step of redefining Origen’s universalism in order to alleviate the tension, but 
instead he chose to let the tension remain. Although he praised Origen and insisted that 
Origen’s doctrine of apocatastasis differed from that which was later condemned by the 
Fifth Ecumenical Council at Constantinople, Daniélou admitted that Origen’s theology 
reveals an inner inconsistency on this point:  
Origen saw clearly enough, then, that there were two things involved – 
God’s love and man’s freedom. But his attempts to reconcile them led him 
to put forward two theses, one of which – the metaphysical necessity of 
the ultimate elimination of evil – safeguards God’s love but destroys 
                                                          
40 On the related question as to whether the apocatastasis (once reached) can be permanent, given 
the ongoing reality of moral autonomy, Molland suggested that Origen may have changed his mind on this 
issue between the writing of his earlier First Principles and his later Commentary on Romans. In First 
Principles Origen appears to believe that after the apocatastasis is reached, additional falls are possible 
(perhaps even necessary) because creatures continue to have free will. In the Romans commentary, 
however, Origen explicitly rejects the possibility of further falls despite a similar insistence on the ongoing 
permanence of free will – ibid., 162-64. The question of whether Origen viewed the apocatastasis as a one-
time event or a repeating event will be explored in Chapter 4. 
41 Jean Daniélou, Origen, trans. Walter Mitchell (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955 [French 
1948]), 289. 
42 “The point that appears questionable in the present instance is the philosophical principle that 
evil must eventually disappear altogether. If that is the case, universal salvation becomes a matter of purely 
physical necessity, and the long duration of the process in no way diminishes the necessity. But that makes 







man’s freedom, while the other – the perpetual instability of the free – 
safeguards man’s freedom but destroys God’s love.44 
 
Daniélou concluded by noting that Origen’s attempts to safeguard both moral freedom’s 
and divine providence’s roles in the apocatastasis resulted in a “certain incoherence” in 
Origen’s theology.45 Like Bigg, Daniélou understood Origen’s view of moral autonomy 
to be incompatible with a doctrine of a certain and infallible universalism. Unlike Bigg, 
Daniélou was willing to let the inconsistency remain. 
 Other scholars have followed Daniélou’s example in describing Origen as 
inconsistent on this point. John Sachs (1993) recognized that Origen taught both 
universalism and creaturely moral autonomy, and Sachs argued that of the two, divine 
love seems more powerful.46 Sachs did not know how to make the two beliefs fit together 
without contradiction, and so he concluded that “In the end Origen's statements on this 
matter cannot be brought into a coherent, systematic harmony,”47 and it “cannot be said 
that Origen presents a coherent, systematic doctrine of apocatastasis.”48 Similarly, 
Graham Keith (1999) understood Origen to believe that God would save all souls, yet 
Keith did not know how to reconcile this with Origen’s belief in free choice. Given that 
God must not coerce repentance, Keith remarked, 
It was difficult to square this with the idea that correction would invariably 
be successful; for in the nature of things correction can either be rejected 
or accepted . . . Hence it is not surprising to find some uncertainty and 
even inconsistency in Origen's statements from different contexts.49 
 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 313. 
46 John R. Sachs, "Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology," Theological Studies 54 (1993): 627-28. 
47 Ibid., 628. 
48 Ibid., 629. 






While some scholars questioned the logic of Origen’s thought, other scholars have not 
been comfortable with the idea that Origen was logically inconsistent in his theological 
beliefs. Therefore, in order to relieve Origen’s theology of the assumed tension, some 
scholars have insisted on softening Origen’s views on universalism by calling it merely a 
hypothetical or hopeful universalism. Such scholars often define Origen’s universalism as 
a universal offer of salvation, or a pious hope for the restoration of all – that is, a 
“universalism” without any of universalism’s typical certainty or deterministic 
characteristics. What is noteworthy about such scholarly redefinitions of Origen’s 
universalism is that they do not appear to be grounded upon any direct, textual evidence, 
but rather they are conclusions arrived at based upon a certain understanding of Origen’s 
view of moral autonomy. Writing in 1966, Henry Chadwick was one of the first to adopt 
this approach. Regarding Origen’s view of final salvation, he writes: 
The steps to heaven are a staircase to be climbed, not an escalator; and 
predestination is always interpreted by Origen (as by most of the Greek 
Fathers) in terms of foreseen merits. Therefore, Origen does not affirm 
universal salvation as something we can all comfortably take for granted, 
and it is more his hope than his assured certitude.50 
  
                                                          
50 Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Christian Tradition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), 119. Writing in 1901, William Fairweather may be another (earlier) example of 
this same approach. In some respects, Fairweather is not very clear on this point, and so I mention him here 
only in passing. In one place he insinuates that Origen’s universalism is something Origen hoped for: “Thus 
did Origen cling to the larger hope, although He regarded this as an esoteric doctrine” – William 
Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2006; reprint 
from 1901 edition), 206. Fairweather had greater interest, however, in scrutinizing how Origen handled 
moral autonomy once the apocatastasis had already been achieved. Thus, regarding the permanency of the 
apocatastasis, Fairweather writes: “Another criticism to which, ever since Jerome’s day, this part of 
Origen’s system has been exposed, is that the hope of final harmony is irreconcilable with the doctrine of 
free will. If in the future life the will is still entirely free, what security is there that this ‘final restoration’ 
will be final?” (210-211). Confusingly, Fairweather rejects this criticism while at the same time affirming 
that it is logically sound: “This objection may be logically sound, yet it is unfair to Origen, and 
misrepresents his meaning. Without in the slightest degree infringing upon the inalienable liberty of 
rational creatures, and granting that the soul is free to rebel as long as it chooses, we may yet surely with 
reason decline to infer from our observation of this short life that it will be eternally obdurate” (211). Given 
that he has no actual reasons (that is, textual evidence) by which to make such a claim, it seems fair to 





Chadwick recognized universalism’s deterministic character. He took this a step further 
by suggesting that this sort of teleological determinism essentially entails predestination. 
Consequently, by categorizing universalism as a kind of predestination, Chadwick is led 
to deny that Origen was a universalist, given the fact that Origen disavowed the notion of 
deterministic predestination.51 Thus, while Chadwick did not specifically state that 
universalism was incompatible with moral autonomy, he implied as much. Chadwick’s 
logical steps can be mapped in the following way: 1) Origen rejects the interpretation of 
deterministic predestination because he finds it incompatible with moral autonomy. 2) 
Chadwick defines infallible universalism to be a form of deterministic predestination. 3) 
Therefore, Chadwick argues Origen must not believe in a certain universalism. Like other 
scholars already surveyed, Chadwick assumed that any statements by Origen that seem to 
point to an infallible universal salvation cannot be reconciled with Origen’s views on 
moral freedom, and thus his universalism must be redefined as simply a matter of hope. 
In 1983 Harold Babcock analyzed Origen’s universalism and was similarly led to 
Chadwick’s conclusion (who he cites favorably). Babcock declares:  
There is an unavoidable paradox here, in that eventually the all-powerful 
God would, of necessity as it were, triumph over even the most intractable 
doer. This would appear to place limits on the freedom of the creatures to 
persist in evil.52  
 
Like others, Babcock is convinced that the teleological certainty embedded in the idea of 
Origen’s universalism is inherently at odds with Origen’s teachings on moral autonomy. 
Although he first labels it a paradox, it becomes clear that Babcock is not altogether 
                                                          
51 The weakness of Chadwick’s position is that Origen never conflated predestination and 
universal salvation. Chadwick appears to take Origen’s arguments against predestination as an argument 
against any sort of teleological determinism in general. 
52 Harold E. Babcock, "Origen's Anti-Gnostic Polemic and the Doctrine of Universalism," The 





comfortable with the tension, for he seems to vacillate between calling Origen’s theology 
inconsistent, and redefining Origen’s universalism in order to maintain consistency. 
Thus, at one point he writes: “It is worth noting, as Benjamin Drewery does, that 
Origen’s universalism really extends only to the offer of salvation.”53 But a few lines later 
Babcock asserts:  
Because of the paradoxes which this view created, it might be maintained 
that Origen’s doctrine of free will and universal salvation were produced 
as part of an admirable but not wholly successful attempt to keep together 
a good and loving God, and an unpleasant and imperfect world.54 
 
Although it is not entirely clear what Babcock’s final answer is (whether inconsistency or 
redefinition), his work is nevertheless another illuminating example as to how troubling 
this issue has been for Origen scholars.  
I would suggest that Babcock’s analysis is a helpful illustration in showing how 
many scholars feel pulled in two directions: first, they recognize that the best reading of 
Origen’s writings upholds his belief in a universalism that is infallible and certain (what 
has been the traditional view regarding Origen’s eschatology). And yet, scholars often 
seem to approach Origen’s writings from an anti-compatibilist framework, which 
prompts them to believe that they must, somehow, be reading Origen incorrectly. 
Subsequently, this often results in a rather awkward attempt to try to reinterpret Origen’s 
view in order to mitigate any tension. We may appreciate that such scholars are reticent 
to judge Origen as an inconsistent or incoherent theologian, but frequently the result is 
that Origen’s eschatology gets reimagined into an entirely different theology – a theology 
                                                          
53 Ibid. Drewery does mention, almost in passing, that Origen’s universalism is merely the 
universal offer of salvation. I do not include him in this survey, however, because Drewery does not 
explain why he interprets it in this way. That is, he does not explicitly ground his view on the fact that an 
infallible universalism would be incompatible with Origen’s views of freedom of choice. See Benjamin 
Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace (London: Epworth Press, 1960), 169. 





which not only lacks direct textual support, but which stands in contrast to Origen’s clear 
affirmations of a certain apocatastasis.  
 Henri Crouzel is a further example of this trend. In 1985 Crouzel surmised that 
Origen’s teaching on creaturely freedom of choice renders any judgment of universalism 
problematic. Crouzel notes: 
In any case, if the affirmations of the universality of the apocatastasis 
which some find in his work must be taken in this sense and regarded as 
propositions with dogmatic status, they would be in contradiction with a 
point of capital importance in the synthesis presented by the Treatise on 
First Principles, free will . . . If the free will of man, accepting or refusing 
God’s advances, plays such a role in Origen’s thought, how could he 
become certain that all human and demonic beings, in their freedom would 
allow themselves to be touched and would adhere to God in the 
apocatastasis? If Origen added anything to what Paul said in 1 Cor. 15, 23-
28, it could only be a great hope. Certainty about a universal apocatastasis 
would be in contradiction to the authenticity of the free will with which 
God had endowed mankind.55 
 
Crouzel understands the very notion of “free will” to stand opposed to any sort of 
determinism or future necessity.56 The specific feature of Origen’s view of moral 
autonomy he appeals to is that in any situation, a person must be able to accept or refuse 
God’s advances. Crouzel understands the logical corollary of this to entail at least a 
hypothetical possibility that some wicked souls might choose to resist God forever. This 
is not the only reason Crouzel hesitates from endorsing Origen’s universalism, but it is an 
important one.57 Crouzel is unaware of any answer to the question: ‘If free will is so 
                                                          
55 Crouzel, Origen: 264-65. This translation is based upon Crouzel’s French work in 1985. 
56 In the same year, Crouzel also made this argument at the fourth Origeniana conference. There 
he stated: “Dans son zèle à défendre la bonté du Dieu créateur Peut'e espère-t-il que Dieu et son Verbe se 
feront tellement persuasifs que le règne du Christ qu'il transmettra ensuite à son Père s'étendra sur tous les 
êtres raisonables. Mais il ne peut s'agir ici que d'un grand espoir. Autrement il y aurait contradiction entre 
une apocatastase considérée comme absolument universelle et d'une certaine façon nécessaire et la 
sauvegarde du libre arbiter” – "L'Apocatastase chez Origène," in Origeniana Quarta, ed. Lothar Lies 
(Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 288-89. 
57 Crouzel also notes places throughout Origen’s writings where he seems to deny universal 





important for Origen, how can Origen be sure that all will freely make this choice?’ 
Unable to answer this question, Crouzel decides that Origen must not have held such a 
belief.  
 In a recent book published in 2012, Benjamin Blosser follows Crouzel’s analysis 
and asserts that for Origen, the apocatastasis was more a matter of Christian hope than a 
settled dogma.58 Blosser lists several possible criticisms or controversies regarding 
Origen’s doctrine of the final state, two of which are relevant here: “1) that the final 
apokatastasis is metaphysically necessary, a fait accompli, and 2) that, due to free will, 
the final apokatastasis will never be reached, since there will always be successive “falls” 
from God.”59 Blosser calls these objections “mutually exclusive opposites.” That opposite 
charges are used against Origen in this regard suggests to Blosser a lack of evidence for 
either of them.60 
 It is important to note that Blosser dismisses Daniélou’s claim that universal 
salvation makes nonsense of the idea of human free will: He writes, “This complaint, 
however, seems to underestimate the profundity of Origen’s doctrine of human 
freedom.”61 Although Blosser understands that Origen’s two teachings appear to be in 
conflict, he wishes to affirm both. He does not seem to know how the two fit together, but 
                                                                                                                                                                             
262-64. The most important textual evidence for Crouzel are Origen’s statements about the devil in 
Origen’s letter To Friends in Alexandria. In 2011 Sebastian Guly argued that Crouzel has misread this 
letter – Guly, "The Salvation of the Devil and the Kingdom of God in Origen's Letter to Certain Close 
Friends in Alexandria." 
58 Benjamin P. Blosser, Become Like the Angels: Origen's Doctrine of the Soul (Washington DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 254. 
59 Ibid., 259. 
60 Ibid. I would suggest, however, that these two issues are not exactly mutually exclusive, but are 
in fact linked by the same central concern – moral autonomy. The first objection – that the apocatastasis is 
metaphysically necessary – reveals an underlying concern that moral autonomy is threatened or destroyed 
by such necessity. The second objection – that successive “falls” threaten a permanent apocatastasis – 
reveals an underlying concern that moral autonomy cannot be reconciled to the idea of a fixed final end, for 
freedom of choice must allow for the possibility of future falls. Both criticisms, therefore, are posed from a 






he thinks they can do so. His discomfort with this conclusion, however, can be seen in the 
following remarks:  
If Origen sounds more confident in this end than his theology would seem 
to allow, this is not because of some cosmic, mechanistic law of necessity 
that would require it, but perhaps Origen’s vision of hope is far grander 
than our own.62 
 
Despite Blosser’s attempts to uphold both Origenistic teachings, he cannot help but to 
soften the finality and surety of Origen’s universalism into something merely hoped for, 
in order to safeguard moral autonomy.63 
  Mark Scott published an insightful monograph on Origen the same year as 
Blosser (2012). Scott’s detailed analysis confirms the traditional view of Origen’s 
universalism and is a thorough and valuable piece of scholarship.64 From my perspective, 
Scott is among a new wave of Origen scholarship that defends the traditional view 
regarding Origen’s universalism. At the same time, Scott does acknowledge tension 
between Origen’s universalism and his doctrine of moral autonomy. This can be seen 
most clearly in his conclusion, where Scott advances the (now standard) argument that 
                                                          
62 Ibid., 260. 
63 The Orthodox theologian Bishop Kallistos Ware also interprets Origen in this way. Ware 
recognizes Origen’s teachings on the temporary nature of punishment and the final restoration of all souls, 
and yet he concludes that because Origen believed in liberty of choice we must understand Origen’s 
apocatastasis as only a hope – Ware, "Dare We Hope for the Salvation of All?," 201. Later in his text, it 
becomes apparent that Ware’s reading of Origen is informed by Ware’s own philosophical assumptions on 
this point. At one point Ware asks whether or not modern Christians should believe in universal salvation 
today. He writes: “If the strongest argument in favor of universal salvation is the appeal to divine love, and 
if the strongest argument on the opposite side is the appeal to human freedom, then we are brought back to 
the dilemma with which we started: how are we to bring into concord the two principles God is love and 
Human beings are free? . . . Our belief in human freedom means that we have no right to categorically 
affirm, ‘All must be saved.’ But our faith in God’s love makes us dare to hope that all will be saved” – 
ibid., 214-15. Ware is an important example because he is open in his desire for universalism to be true. 
The only reason he refrains from adopting the view is because he is convinced that it is logically 
incompatible with free choice. It is unsurprising, then, that Ware inevitably finds himself softening and 
redefining Origen’s universalism, even after correctly demonstrating Origen’s belief in the cessation of all 
punishment and the restoration of all souls. 
64 Mark S. M. Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford 





the relationship between freedom and providence in Origen’s system is contradictory, 
paradoxical, and raises unresolved questions. Scott writes: 
On the one hand, [Origen] posits our ability to determine our spiritual 
destiny without divine interference. In this sense, he seems to privilege 
freedom over providence. On the other hand, God intervenes to assist the 
fallen souls and designs the universe to facilitate our amelioration. In this 
sense, he seems to privilege providence over freedom . . . He vacillates, 
then, between emphasizing freedom over providence and vice versa . . . In 
the end, his parsing of the relationship between freedom and providence 
can be criticized as paradoxical . . . his doctrine of universalism radically 
alters the biblical conception of hell and undercuts his conception of 
freedom, since it implies that no creature – not even the Devil – can finally 
choose against God. Providence, through its patient, persistent, persuasive 
power, seems to override freedom in the end.65 
 
While Scott affirms Origen’s view of an infallible universalism, he struggles to reconcile 
how it can logically fit with Origen’s view of moral autonomy. The reason for his 
struggle can be traced to an earlier, and very significant claim made by Scott. He writes 
that Origen consistently maintains in his writings the freedom of every rational being, 
including the Devil, “to choose its eternal destiny.”66 When moral autonomy includes the 
power to choose one’s destiny, it appears to compete with God’s providential plans 
regarding the end of all things. This leads Scott to follow Daniélou in suggesting that 
Origen was inconsistent; Scott suggests that Origen must have undercut or overridden his 
own conception of freedom. Moral freedom cannot ultimately be maintained in 
establishing the apocatastasis – rather, providence overrides it. Like many others, Scott 
                                                          
65 Ibid., 162-63. 
66 Ibid., 136 (italics added). Scott offers no textual evidence for this sweeping claim. It is unclear 
to me why Scott would make such a claim, when Origen’s belief in a foreordained universalism suggests 
the opposite conclusion to be true – that one’s eternal destiny is not something controlled by individual 
moral autonomy, but is instead something decided by God in advance. Origen’s discussions of moral 
autonomy and the psychology of free choice focus on the ability (and consequent responsibility) of rational 
creatures to make choices, moment-by-moment and choice-by-choice, as the soul is faced with ongoing 
rational inclinations. Origen never argues that creatures have the power to choose in the present what one’s 
final destiny will turn out to be in the future. In fact, one of the problems of sinful creatures in Origen’s 
system is that we are often unaware what consequences our choices will produce for us – which means we 





understands moral freedom and divine providence to exist in a competitive relationship. 
If one side wins, it must be at the expense of the other. 
 Scott also addresses the secondary issue concerning freedom of choice once the 
apocatastasis has been achieved. On this point Scott affirms (contra Daniélou) that no 
further falls will take place even though moral autonomy will be retained. The 
permanence of the final state is not threatened by freedom of choice, because the soul’s 
union with the Logos will forge an “unbreakable bond” of love.67 When God is all in all, 
souls will permanently, and freely, choose to remain with God. Scott writes: 
“Divinization does not undermine freedom. On the contrary, it is the ultimate expression 
of the soul’s free will to unite itself with God eternally.”68 Scott’s position is an 
interesting one in that he believes that God’s foreordination of universal salvation (and its 
subsequent fruition) undercuts Origen’s view of moral autonomy, but once the final state 
is achieved by God it will necessarily be maintained without a similar threat to moral 
autonomy. As such, Scott’s position serves as a midpoint position to the next group of 
scholars I will survey. 
 Not all scholars have concluded that Origen’s universalism destabilizes Origen’s 
view of moral responsibility. For example, there is a commonplace tradition in modern 
scholarship, found at least as early as the 19th century, which asserts that Origen indeed 
held both views, but the scholars do not venture to explain how Origen might have linked 
them together.69 Only recently a few scholars have ventured specific explanations as to 
                                                          
67 Ibid., 133. 
68 Ibid. 
69 A good example of this attitude can be found in some 19th century universalist apologetics, such 
as articles found within The Universalist Quarterly, a publication founded by Hosea Ballou. For example, 
in 1875 T. J. Sawyer wrote that Origen believed in both the fact of universalism as well as the permanency 
of moral freedom. Sawyer does not attempt to show how these two ideas fit together in Origen’s theology, 





how moral autonomy fits with Origen’s predetermined end of salvation-history. One such 
scholar is P. Tzamalikos. In his 2007 monograph Tzamalikos insists that Origen 
maintained a definite belief in universalism, and he takes issue with those who have 
redefined Origen’s universalism as simply a matter of hope.70 At the same time, he is 
careful to say that Origen’s universalism does not constitute any sort of fatalism.71 
Although it is not fatalistic, Tzamalikos notes that salvation history is nevertheless 
dramatic:  
…a certain end is anticipated and yet any next moment is unpredictable . . 
. History is directed according to the dialectical relation between 
unrestricted creaturely freedom and divine will, with providence 
expressing this will, but not coercing any historical eventuality.72 
 
So how does God achieve universal salvation when God also upholds “unrestricted 
creaturely freedom”, and when God will not coerce “any historical eventuality”? 
Tzamalikos believes the answer lies in the nature of evil, which he elaborates as part of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
his wisdom and goodness: “Is it so difficult to believe, indeed, that every soul may yet learn that perfect 
obedience is the most perfect liberty? . . . Toward this grand result, we believe, the whole force of the 
gospel is trending, and sure we are that it will never rest, never cease to operate, till this object is fully 
attained . . . And this is precisely what Origen believed and taught” – T. J. Sawyer, "Was Origen a 
Universalist?," in The Universalist Quarterly and General Review, ed. Thomas B. Thayer (Boston: 
Universalist Publishing House, 1875), 184-85. Similar descriptions of Origen can easily be found in 
scholarship today, especially by those who only mention Origen’s universalism in passing. This viewpoint 
does not pretend to know how Origen solves the issue, but simply asserts that Origen is confident that God 
will find a way to do it without violating moral freedom if given enough time. For example, Richard 
Bauckham describes Origen this way: “Logically it might seem that Origen's conviction of the inalienable 
freedom of the soul ought to prevent him from teaching both Universalism (for any soul is free to remain 
obstinate for ever) and the final secure happiness of the saved (who remain free to fall again at any time). In 
fact Origin seems to have drawn neither conclusion. Given unlimited time, God's purpose will eventually 
prevail and all souls will be finally, united to Him, never to sin again – Richard Bauckham, "Universalism: 
A Historical Survey," Themelios 4, no. 2 (1978): 48. 
70 “I deem it necessary and worthwhile to assemble some expressive quotations from Cels, 
demonstrating that final abolition of evil was in fact a conviction of Origen, all the more so since there have 
been claims to the contrary.” – Panayiotis Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History & Eschatology, 
Vigiliae Christianae Supplement (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 242. Tzamalikos specifically critiques Crouzel on 
this point on p. 255. 
71 “Considering this evidence, no doubt should remain that Origen did definitely believe that evil 
shall eventually be abolished. On no account, however, does this suggest any all-embracing fatalism of any 
kind, be this moral or historical or existential, or whatever.” – ibid., 243. 





an Aristotelian argument.73 According to Origen, evil is not a substance, but is merely an 
action of a substance; evil is an accident, not an οὐσία. Since God did not create evil, evil 
is non-being: “corruption falls short of existence proper.”74 Tzamalikos then claims that 
this understanding of evil necessarily entails that evil must eventually be extinguished: 
What is ‘non-being’ cannot prevail over ‘being’ forever. Evil is ‘non-
existent’, it is a kind of absence; it is no part of creation. The fact that 
depravity prevails for the time being is an anomaly in the world. Eventual 
extinction of evil is asserted on account of reasons which are ontological, 
not historical or moral.75 
 
Thus, Tzamalikos’ argument hinges on the argument that the non-being of evil somehow 
requires that evil cannot continue indefinitely into the future.76 
  Tzamalikos similarly sees the non-ontological finitude of evil as the answer to our 
second difficult question, for when evil is finally absolved there will not be any 
opportunity to fall away from God again, and all free beings will become what they were 
in the beginning.77 Thus, universal salvation will not only be achieved by logical 
necessity, but it will also be maintained by logically necessity – a necessity which is 
based on the ontological inferiority of evil; the ontological non-existence of evil will 
inevitably lead to its historical non-existence.78 
 In 2013 Ilaria Ramelli wrote a substantial monograph on the doctrine of 
apocatastasis in the early Church, and Origen’s eschatology features prominently 
throughout. In various places Ramelli stresses the point made by Tzamalikos that 
                                                          
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 245. 
75 Ibid., 246. 
76 What is less clear, however, is why Tzamalikos believes this must be so. In other words, it is not 
clear why Tzamalikos thinks the non-being of evil necessarily results in its impermanence. Could not God 
allow evil to exist indefinitely if God wanted to? The “nature of evil” solution will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
77 Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History & Eschatology: 247. 





Origen’s dual emphasis on moral autonomy and universal restoration are not 
contradictory, but are in harmony. For example, she writes: 
Moreover, according to both Bardaisan and Origen, Providence does not 
force rational creatures’ free will, but it acts in harmony with it, and yet 
does not fail to achieve the ultimate telos, apokatastasis.79 
 
Or again, Ramelli insists that universal salvation for Origen and Bardaisan “is respectful 
of each rational creature’s freewill, but it infallibly leads all to salvation, as a 
consequence of the final eviction of evil and as a gift of divine grace.”80  
As far as I can tell, Ramelli utilizes three separate arguments to bolster her claim 
that God upholds moral autonomy in the context of Origen’s infallible and predetermined 
universal salvation.81 The first argument Ramelli introduces follows logic similar to the 
argument of Tzamalikos. Ramelli insists that Origen’s conception of evil as non-being 
and as non-eternal necessitates the eventual destruction of all evil at some point in the 
future, a destruction which includes the evil free choices of creatures.82 She calls this one 
of the main metaphysical foundations for a voluntary apocatastasis.83 Her argument 
seems to be that since evil is not eternal, it must also not be everlasting – that is to say, 
                                                          
79 Ilaria Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: a critical assessment from the New 
Testament to Eriugena (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 113. 
80 Ibid., 119. 
81 These are not presented in any one place but are somewhat confusingly scattered around in 
different areas of her chapter on Origen. The identification and numbering of the arguments are mine, not 
hers – nowhere does Ramelli systematically discuss this question, or list “three” reasons. Rather, at various 
times she addresses the relationship between an infallible universalism and human free will. The reader is 
left unsure as to why these reasons are discussed separately, or how they might harmonize together. 
82 Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: a critical assessment from the New 
Testament to Eriugena: 141f.  
83 Ibid., 114. Cf. 144: “Evil, thanks to Christ and due to its ontological non-subsistence, will 
finally disappear from everyone. The immediate consequence of this, which from the scriptural side is 
foretold in 1 Cor 15:28 and Acts 3:20-21, is that all beings will be restored into the Good, who is 
God…When every evil is definitely reduced to non-being, all beings will return to the Good-God, even 
Satan, who will thus be saved not qua devil, arch-enemy, and death, but qua creature of God, after his 
conversion from evil to the Good (Princ. 1,6,3).” This is consistent with Ramelli’s view in an earlier work 
where she calls the non-eternality of evil the “main metaphysical argument for the apokatastasis in both 
Origen and Gregory” – "Αὶώνιος and αἰών in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa," in Studia Patristica, ed. Jane 





there is no condition or circumstance by which evil could be allowed to exist indefinitely. 
Like Tzamalikos, Ramelli does not state why this is so, only that it must be so.84  
Ramelli’s second explanation for why universal salvation can be assured without 
threat to free will is based on her description of Origen’s psychology as “ethical 
intellectualism.”85 On this view, argues Ramelli, all sins are committed because of a lack 
of knowledge. Therefore, once people have correct knowledge of the truth they will 
always choose the good voluntarily. Indeed, once creatures are given the correct 
knowledge (which God promises to do in this life or the next), sin will become an 
impossibility.86 Ramelli takes the notion of ethical intellectualism even further by 
claiming that in Origen’s view evil choices are not actually free at all, but that freedom of 
choice requires “purified intellectual sight.”87 Given this definition of moral autonomy, 
there is no tension with a predetermined universal salvation, for God needs only to supply 
the missing knowledge to sinners and they will no longer be able to sin, for they will have 
no desire to sin. In the same way, this explanation would also demonstrate how the 
permanency of the apocatastasis does not threaten moral autonomy, for no rational 
                                                          
84 Ramelli is correct to note that evil, “when it is chosen no longer by anyone, will vanish 
according to its ontological non-subsistence” – The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: a critical 
assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena: 142. But Ramelli does not explain why this must 
logically come to pass. She does not entertain the possibility, for example, that God might allow evil 
choices of creatures to continue for as long as creatures choose to make them. It is not clear why God could 
not allow evil choices to exist everlastingly, given that God already allowed them to enter the world. If 
Ramelli bases her assertion simply on the fact that Origen understands Scripture to teach the ultimate end 
of evil (e.g. 1 Cor. 15:22-28), and for this reason evil must certainly perish, then the argument is 
insufficient, for such an answer is merely a tautology or a restatement. See my discussion on this point 
below. 
85 Ibid., 113. Cf. Ibid., 178-79. 
86 “Once all have obtained a clear knowledge of the truth and the Good, i.e. God – by learning in 
the other world, if necessary, what was not learnt in this – all will voluntarily adhere to the Good” – ibid., 
113. “If one’s intellect is illuminated, and achieves the knowledge of the Good, one will certainly adhere to 
the Good” – ibid., 178. 
87 Ibid. “A choice for evil is not really free: it results from obnubilation, ignorance, and passion. 
This is why Origen was convinced that divine providence will bring all logika to salvation by means of 
education and rational persuasion, instruction and illumination – or fear of punishments, but only initially, 
when reason is not yet developed, and not by means of compulsion, since the adhesion to the Good must be 





creature would (or could) voluntarily choose to fall away once they enjoyed perfect 
knowledge. 
 Ramelli’s third explanation for how God achieves a necessary, yet voluntary 
universal salvation is based on God’s grace generally, and Christ’s work on the cross 
more specifically: 
Origen – faithful to his notion of reconciliation of providence and human 
free will – forcefully asserts that all logika, including demons, will indeed 
keep their free will forever, but this shall not impede their ultimate 
salvation, because of the universal and eternal effectiveness of Christ’s 
death . . . they will be saved because the force of Christ’s cross is so great 
as to be sufficient to save even them. This salvation will take place, not 
automatically or necessarily, but through conversion, through a healing 
performed by Christ in his capacity as the supreme Physician…88 
 
Of the three reasons Ramelli uses to insist on the compatibility of moral autonomy and a 
preordained universalism, this last one is the least developed. Ramelli discusses a wide-
range of soteriological concepts in Origen’s writings, and rightly demonstrates that 
Origen believed that Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection were necessary for the 
apocatastasis, and that the saving work of Christ was intended for the entire world (no 
rational creature being totally incurable). But Ramelli never explains how the work of 
Christ (or God’s grace in general) is able to infallibly succeed in bringing all people back 
to God voluntarily. 
Despite giving three reasons why universal salvation does not threaten moral 
autonomy, Ramelli concedes that it a mystery as to how the two work together:  
For Origen, the reconciliation between providence (and its outcome, 
apokatastasis) and free will is a weighty philosophical issue; at the same 
                                                          
88 Ibid., 153-54. Cf. Ibid., 190f. Confusingly, Ramelli makes the following remark: “Indeed, in 
Origen’s view, like in Gregory of Nyssa’s afterwards, the eventual apokatastasis entirely depends on Christ, 
and not on a metaphysical necessity or even a physico-cosmological necessity, as in the case of Stoicism” – 
ibid., 190. It is not clear how Ramelli reconciles this statement with her previous statements which 





time he is also aware of the divine mystery: thus, he is certain that these 
two poles are in harmony, but God only knows how this reconciliation 
takes place in each single case.89 
 
Most recently, in 2015 Anders-Christian Jacobsen published a work on Origen’s 
Christology and soteriology. Jacobsen is another example of the recent trend to defend 
the traditional view of Origen’s universalism, and Jacobsen argues against scholars who 
have attempted to re-categorize Origen’s universalism as hypothetical, or simply a matter 
of hope. Instead, Jacobsen strongly argues that Origen believed in a necessary and 
infallible universal restoration.90 Jacobsen then addresses the relevant issue:  
This theology raises another question which we cannot discuss in much 
detail here: If all rational beings are finally to be saved, what will then 
become of the freedom of human beings, of the free will? Is salvation not 
then determined?91 
 
Jacobsen does not specify whether he is referring to the role of moral autonomy in the 
soul’s successful ascent to God, or to the role of moral autonomy in maintaining that final 
state, but his comment is probably referring to both. Jacobsen acknowledges that Origen 
was aware of the problem, and that Origen tried to solve it by “introducing the idea that 
through a very long process God will manage to convince all that they should choose 
salvation voluntarily.”92 However, Jacobsen gives no explanation for how God is 
infallibly able to convince everyone, given freedom of choice.93 
                                                          
89 Ibid., 180-81. 
90 Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Christ-The Teacher of Salvation: A Study on Origen's Christology 
and Soteriology (Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2015), 173. “This means, according to Origen, that even 
the Devil will be saved, and only the death of his soul will be destroyed. If the Devil, who is the lowest of 
all rational beings, will be saved, all rational beings will be saved. It is thus clear that the redemptive work 
of Christ as it is presented by Origen in relation to the destructive work of Adam will result in the final 
salvation of all created, rational beings.” 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Jennifer L. Heckart appears to hold a similar position, although she gives no real explanation 
and speaks about it almost in passing. She writes: “The question of whether or not universal restoration 
violates free will continues to be a stumbling block for scholars, despite Origen’s claim that ‘God does not 





Turning from the role of human autonomy in the ascent to salvation, Jacobsen 
then explicitly mentions the second issue regarding moral autonomy’s role in maintaining 
one’s final salvation. Jacobsen acknowledges that Origen’s answer to the first problem 
“is not yet the entire answer to the question of what will keep the rational beings from 
sinning again.”94 Jacobsen believes the answer to this second point of tension is displayed 
in the power of love:  
If the rational beings love God and their neighbours with all their heart, 
they will not sin again. The salvation of all will thus be final, and this final 
position will not be forced upon the rational beings; they will choose it 
themselves, because love has convinced them.95 
 
Jacobson does not explain how love of neighbor ensures that free choice will always 
choose correctly, only that it will do so. 
This survey reveals a few important trends within the secondary scholarship. 
First, many scholars who study Origen’s universalism and his views on moral autonomy 
believe that these two teachings are logically incompatible. This assumption appears to 
stem from an anti-compatibilist definition of moral autonomy or free choice. As such, 
arguments for Origen’s supposed inconsistency or incompatibility are usually not based 
on any textual evidence from Origen (other than a generic appeal to Origen’s teachings 
on ‘free will’), but rather are inferences made by scholars who a priori believe that the 
very notion of moral autonomy prohibits any foreordained future.96 I did not find a single 
example among the scholars who called Origen inconsistent or contradictory who 
                                                                                                                                                                             
implanted in us; perhaps it is just common sense. We could choose to be eternally separated from God – 
but why in the name of heaven would we?” – Jennifer L. Heckart, "Sympathy for the Devil? Origen and the 
end," Union Seminary Quarterly Review 60, no. 3 (2007): 59-60. 
94 Jacobsen, Christ-The Teacher of Salvation: A Study on Origen's Christology and Soteriology: 
174. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Such a definition of moral autonomy is aligned with certain modern notions of libertarian free 






explained how they were defining the controversial term “free will,” nor did they 
demonstrate that Origen defined it in a way that contradicted his universalism.97 
A second trend this survey illustrates is a tendency among scholars who find the 
concepts of determinism and free will contradictory to recast Origen’s universalism in 
order to escape any threat of logical inconsistency. While a few scholars boldly declare 
that Origen’s theology is internally contradictory or inconsistent, many other scholars 
have reinterpreted Origen’s universalism in such a way so as to erase the perceived 
tension. Scholars like Crouzel acknowledge that Origen seems to be teaching universal 
salvation, but then they back-pedal and say that he must not really have done so. The 
most common way has been to recast Origen’s universalism as something that Origen 
merely hoped for, rather than as something Origen believed as a point of fact, or 
                                                          
97 Two more scholars are important for my project, but I did not discover them until after the final 
stages of my dissertation were complete. The first is the work of H.S. Benjamins: H.S. Benjamins, 
Eingeordnete Freiheit: Freiheit und Vorsehung bei Origenes, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae (Leiden: 
Brill, 1994). Although I discovered this monograph too late to offer substantial interaction with it here, it is 
important to mention it at this point because as I begin to work through the book, Benjamins appears to 
make an argument that is somewhat similar to the one I develop (especially in my Chapter 5). Benjamins 
also recognizes that one idiosyncratic feature of Origen’s theology is that God possesses a peculiar type of 
divine foreknowledge which allows God to pre-select and pre-arrange the free choices of his creatures, 
even while ensuring that such choices stay free – e.g. Ibid., 116-20; 206-08. In one place, however, 
Benjamins appears to back away from the strongest formulation of this claim (a formulation which I will go 
on to argue for in Chapter 5) when he says: “Origenes erläutert jedoch nicht … ob Gott während er das 
Zukünftige durchdenkt zugleich auch weiß, was alles noch möglich sei; oder ob Gott erst alle möglichen 
Welten durchdenkt, daraufhin eine Welt erschafft und dann weiß, was sich ereignen wird. Ersteres liegt der 
Argumentation des Origenes näher, denn nach GK 8 durchdenkt Gott alles Zukünftige und sieht er, was 
sich (tatsächlich) ereignen wird” – ibid., 117n35 (emphasis added). Interestingly, none of the post-1994 
scholarship on this topic that I am familiar with (apart from the exception of Kathleen Gibbons below) even 
mentions Benjamins’ book! 
The second scholar is Kathleen Gibbons whose recent article (December 2016) relates to several 
of the themes in this dissertation wherein she makes a number of insightful points. Again, unfortunately her 
article was published after my dissertation was in its final stage and already under review. I include a quote 
from the article here, however, to illustrate an area of overlap: “On [Origen’s] account of moral 
development, God arranges events so that human beings will end up in precisely those circumstances which 
will eventually render their previously defeated spiritual desires necessitating motivations in the 
circumstances in which they are necessitating. In the absence of such divine intervention, one might never 
find oneself in the circumstances necessary to provoke the required reflection” – Kathleen Gibbons, 
"Human Autonomy and its limits in the Thought of Origen of Alexandria," The Classical Quarterly 66, no. 
2 (2016): 687. Gibbons does not develop this argument, however, and she appears to rely directly on 





something that Origen believed was foreordained.98 The problem with this approach is 
that it is a serious misreading of Origen. In fact, it discredits the exegetical arguments 
Origen used as the basis for his discussions of universal salvation.99 Often the only 
evidence offered to defend this redefinition is that Origen’s views on freedom of choice 
cannot allow for a predetermined end, and thus Origen cannot mean what he appears to 
mean. In other words, the evidence is the assumption that philosophically and 
definitionally, the presence of genuine moral autonomy cannot ever guarantee a universal 
salvation. 
There is much to admire in scholars who allow Origen’s teachings on 
universalism and moral autonomy to stand without judging him of inconsistency. 
Furthermore, the recent trend by scholars who uphold Origen’s belief in a certain and 
foreordained universal salvation rather than softening it into merely an eschatological 
hope is an appreciated movement.100 However, few of these authors discuss how 
universalism and freedom of choice fit together in Origen’s theology. While Tzamalikos 
and Ramelli do offer “solutions,” their arguments are problematic.  
For instance, both Tzamalikos and Ramelli insist that despite a preordained 
universal salvation, moral freedom is safeguarded given that evil must logically be 
                                                          
98 Often these scholars will keep the word “universalism” in their description of Origen’s theology 
in order to retain continuity with older Origen scholarship, but qualify it with an adjective (like “hopeful” 
or “potential”) that radically alters its traditional meaning. 
99 This is especially true for Origen’s understanding of 1 Cor. 15:22-28, which features 
prominently in most of Origen’s assertions of universal salvation. Origen understood Paul’s statements to 
be prophecy, and therefore an event God would infallibly fulfill. 
100 This trend will be discussed in Chapter 4. The words of R.P.C. Hanson remain relevant here: 
“The fact is that universalism in Origen’s thought is a necessary conclusion from his basic premises, and 
not, as it is in most modern thought, a ‘larger hope’ grounded in a strong belief in God’s love and a kindly 
feeling toward all humanity, however degraded. In Origen’s view for God to fail in reconciling into their 
original state as pure spirits wholly obedient to his will any beings at all, even only one or two, would be 
for God, the single, simple, primal, unalterable One, to compromise himself with change and becoming and 
corruption. This is inconceivable, and therefore all must be saved” – R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event: a 






exterminated in the future. If evil must disappear because of its very nature, God needs 
only to ensure that the sufficient amount of time passes within his plan of salvation in 
order to achieve universal salvation without violating moral autonomy. But such a view 
suffers from a couple weak points. First, it fails to appreciate that Origen speaks about 
evil in a variety of ways. It is true that sometimes Origen describes evil as non-being,101 
but other times he understands evil to simply be the opposite of the good. Tzamalikos and 
Ramelli appear to interpret Origen’s view of evil as similar to that of Augustine, who 
defined evil as a privation or lack, but as Bostock has demonstrated, Origen’s view does 
not neatly fit into this category.102 Tzamalikos and Ramelli’s “metaphysical argument” 
about the non-being of evil relies too heavily on defining Origen’s views of evil into an 
ontological category.  
The second weakness in this solution is that even if evil is defined in this way, it 
is unclear why evil must be eliminated (logically speaking) at some point in the future. 
The fact that evil is ontologically inferior does not seem to logically entail evil’s eventual 
disappearance. Evil exists throughout salvation-history precisely because God permits it 
to exist, as a necessary corollary to the exercise of morally autonomous creatures. So long 
as God’s permissive attitude toward moral autonomy is maintained, it is unclear why evil 
must necessarily be extinguished. Granted, one may say (as Origen does) that evil must 
be extinguished because Scripture prophesies that it will be so. But Tzamalikos’ 
                                                          
101 E.g. ComJn 2.13 – cf. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: a critical assessment 
from the New Testament to Eriugena: 141. 
102 Gerald Bostock, "Satan – Origen’s Forgotten Doctrine," in Origeniana decima, ed. H. and 
Kaczmarek Pietras, S. (Leuven: Peeters, 2011). “Origen’s understanding of evil is in marked contrast to 
that of Augustine with his fateful defence of the privation boni theory. For Origen evil, in all its forms, is 
not an absence of the good but its opposite . . . It should be carefully distinguished from the non-existent – 
a distinction which appears in the Pseudepigrapha. For Origen evil exists even though, as the opposite of 
the good which is identical with true being, it participates in non-being. Origen has a clear recognition and 






argument is not simply that evil will be extinguished as a matter of prophecy, but that by 
its very nature evil cannot not be extinguished.103 This conclusion reaches too far. We can 
make this point clear by substituting “sinful choices” for the term “evil”. To say that 
moral autonomy is upheld in the apocatastasis because sinful choices must eventually 
disappear does not explain why all sinful choices must disappear. Tzamalikos and 
Ramelli appear to be arguing on the basis of a tautology, given that the absence of sinful 
choices is a defining feature of the apocatastasis. The extinction of evil does not explain 
how the apocatastasis can be achieved without violating autonomy, because the question 
is how God can eliminate all evil choices without violating autonomy. 
Ramelli also believes that God can ensure a voluntary apocatastasis in Origen’s 
system because Origen is an ethical intellectualist.104 But Origen’s descriptions of moral 
autonomy do not fit precisely into the Socratic mold. For instance, Ramelli does not 
mention some of the idiosyncrasies of Origen’s views on moral psychology, such as how 
a person who enjoys the correct knowledge of the truth, which is mediated through the 
rational impressions (desires) of the spirit, can choose to align instead with the rational 
                                                          
103 Harnack also spoke about evil in Origen’s system in this manner, if not as strongly as 
Tzamalikos and Ramelli. Harnack stated: “Evil, however, and it is in this idea that Origen’s great optimism 
consists, cannot conquer in the end. As it is nothing eternal, so also is it at bottom nothing real . . . For this 
very reason the estrangement of the spirits from God must finally cease” – Adolph Harnack, History of 
Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, 6 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), 311. 
104 Ramelli may be following Hal Koch on this point. In his seminal monograph published in 1932 
Koch affirmed Origen’s belief in universal salvation, and he also stated that human freedom of choice put 
limits on God’s providence so that God’s only recourse was through education: “Daher beschränkt sich die 
Vorsehung im eigentlichen Sinne nur auf das Verhältnis Gottes zu den freien Vernunftwesen; insoweit Gott 
alles andere schafft und sich dessen annimmt, tut er dies nur mit Hinblick auf den Nutzen, den es für das 
Geschöpf κατ᾿ ἐξοχήν haben kann. Wenn aber die Vorsehungslenkung Gottes in erster Linie darauf 
ausgeht, die Seelen zurückzuführen, und wenn diese gleichzeitig als eine Art character indelebilis die 
Freiheit haben, selbst zu wählen, dann gibt es nur einen Weg nämlich den der Erziehung” – Koch, Pronoia 
und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus: 30-31. Koch wrote as if 
Origen’s only confidence in universal salvation (his “optimism”) stems from the idea that the creature is 
entirely rational: “Dass die Erziehung wirklich gelingen wird, dass die Menschen - und dasselbe gilt den 
übrigen λογικὰ ζῷα - nicht beharren werden, Gott zu trotzen und sich fortzuwenden, sondern dass sie aus 
eigenem, freiem Willen zuletzt das Gute wählen werden, davon ist Origenes überzeugt. Er ist entschieden 
Optimist. Dies hängt damit zusammen, dass das Geschöpf nicht nur frei, sondern zugleich vernünftig, 





desires coming from the body.105 Ramelli is correct that the soul makes its choice on the 
basis of intellectual impressions or desires. But there is never a singular intellectual desire 
that states “this is the good and true choice.” Instead, there are two competing rational 
desires from spirit and body, both of which say, “This is the good and true choice.”106 
Rational creatures have a soul which stands mid-way between competing rational 
inclinations. 
Nor does Ramelli seem to acknowledge the central role of habits in Origen’s view 
of moral psychology. For instance, Origen writes:  
We affirm that every rational soul is of the same nature, and deny that any 
wicked nature has been made by the Creator of the universe; but we think 
that many men have become evil by upbringing and by perversion and by 
environment, so that in some people evil has become second nature. We 
are convinced that for the divine Logos to change evil which has become 
second nature is not only not impossible, but is not even very difficult, if 
only a man admits that he must trust himself to the supreme God and do 
every action by reference to His good pleasure . . . And if for some it is 
very hard to change, we must say that the cause lies in their will [τὴν 
συγκατάθεσιν αὐτῶν], which refuses to accept the fact that the supreme 
God is to each man a righteous Judge of every past action done in this life. 
Determination and application can achieve much even with problems 
which appear very difficult, and, if I may exaggerate, which are all but 
impossible.107 
                                                          
105 Origen’s lengthy discussion of Romans 7 is particularly relevant here. Origen interprets Paul to 
be speaking in the persona of a weak Christian when he says that he ‘does not do what he wants to do and 
he does do what he does not want to do’ – ComRm VI.9 (Scheck 2.35-43; Bammel 506-518). The entire 
point of Origen’s discussion here is, contra Ramelli, that knowing the right choice to make does not 
guarantee our performance of that choice. E.g. “[Paul teaches that dying to sin is arduous work for,] He 
seems to teach that it is not realized immediately in one’s actions, as soon as one wills this and purposes to 
do good. On the contrary, the force of habit is so great and the enticement of the vices is so strong that 
when the mind is already aiming for virtue and has determined to serve the law of God, nevertheless the 
desires of the flesh may persuade it to serve sin and submit to its laws” – ComRm VI.10 (Scheck 2.44; 
Bammel 519). Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Romans (along with page numbers) are from the 
critical edition by Bammel, Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung 
Rufins, 1, 2, 3. Unless otherwise noted, all English translations (listed by volume and page) are from 
Scheck’s 2-volume work: Scheck, Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5; Origen: 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 6-10. 
106 This will be demonstrated in Chapter 2. 
107 Cels 3.69 (Chadwick 174; SC 136, 158.16). Cf. ComRm VI.9 (Scheck 39; Bammel 511): “For 
the weakness in those who receive the beginnings of a conversion is of such a nature that when anyone 
wants to do all at once everything that is good, the accomplishment of this may not immediately follow the 






The project of moral progress requires knowledge of the truth, to be sure, but Origen 
writes that moral change often requires a great deal more for sinful creatures. It is not 
enough for creatures who have been habituated to sin to learn the truth, and it often takes 
effort, striving, determination, and forceful action in order to counteract the effects of 
previous sins on the mechanism of choice.108 Ramelli’s description of Origen’s moral 
psychology as simply “ethical intellectualism” is incomplete, and does not encompass his 
wide-ranging remarks on the subject. One more example may be mentioned: Ramelli’s 
model would not explain why Origen viewed moral descent to be a common occurrence. 
Demons may progress upwards, and angels may progress downwards. This type of ever-
shifting moral movement along an ontological spectrum does not fit into a strict mold of 
“ethical intellectualism,” for why would rational creatures keep gaining knowledge and 
then lose it again? Is moral degeneration to be blamed on faulty memory?  
Ramelli is right that Origen emphasizes rational pedagogy as necessary for the 
soul’s ascent back to God, as well as the fact that correct choices are based in wisdom: 
“for in no other way can the soul reach the perfection of knowledge [scientiae 
perfectionem] except by being inspired with the truth of the divine wisdom.”109 But 
Ramelli overstates the case. A remark by Hans Jonas is helpful here: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
he resolves this in his will; but since the vice of wrath has been dominant in him due to continuous practice 
and long-standing habit, it opposes even the will and purpose…”  
Citations of Contra Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Marcel Borret, Origène: 
Contre Celse - Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes, 4 vols., Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Cerf, 
1967-69). Unless otherwise noted, any English translations of Contra Celsum are from Henry Chadwick, 
Origen: Contra Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953; repr., 
1965). 
108 Tom Greggs correctly notes that “Salvation is necessary, according to Origen, because while 
souls have the capacity for reason, they may or may not engage actively in the pursuit of it” – Tom Greggs, 
"Apokatastasis: Particularist Universalism in Origen," in All Shall Be Well: Explorations in Universalism 
and Christian Theology, from Origen to Moltmann, ed. Gregory MacDonald (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 
2011), 32. 





Ultimately, “good” and “evil” are for Origen the only primary categories 
of mental action – a thoroughly different picture from that drawn by 
ancient philosophy with its main stress on the polarity of ignorance and 
knowledge . . . The gnostic speculation that flourished before Origen had 
interpreted the fall and rise underlying the cosmic drama in terms of the 
loss and recovery of knowledge, in this respect staying closer to the 
classical tradition. In its place Origen puts corruption and correction of the 
will, and the responsibility of each subject for its place on the cosmic 
scale. Secondarily, it is true, the fallen orders are, for Origen too, as many 
limitations of knowledge, and the rise to a higher order brings with it also 
a rise in knowledge. But the rise is not achieved through knowledge: it is 
sanctity of will that leads to the higher order and thereby also to the 
knowledge coordinate with it.110 
 
Knowledge alone does not ensure holiness and ascent in Origen’s view, and for this 
reason even wise men must guard themselves against temptations and practice active 
resistance to them. Similarly, not all ignorance stems from lack of instruction.111 On the 
other hand, Ramelli’s view of ethical intellectualism is more promising when one looks at 
the final state and how rational creatures voluntarily persevere in the final apocatastasis 
without the possibility of future falls. In the final union with God, when all thoughts are 
of the Good (God), Origen understands sin to be impossible since every desire is focused 
on the Good. At that time, rational souls will have perfect knowledge, and Origen 
understands this to be the key reason as to how moral autonomy is upheld within a 
permanent apocatastasis. However, this cannot explain the ascent of the soul before it 
reaches its final end, because every moment prior to the final state the soul does not enjoy 
perfect knowledge. 
 
                                                          
110 Hans Jonas, "Origen’s Metaphysics of Free Will, Fall, and Salvation: A ‘Divine Comedy’ of 
the Universe," in Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
PrenticeHall, 1974), 313-14. 
111 Quoting Crouzel, H.-J. Horn contrasts Origen’s view with that of the strict ethical 
intellectualist: “Cette ignorance du pécheur n’est pas le manque d’instruction. C’est un refus conscient de la 
vérité, laquelle consiste en connaissance de soi. Celui qui n’est pas prêt à se connaître ne verra pas en lui-
même la participation à l’image de Dieu” – H.-J. Horn, "Ignis Aeternus. Une interprétation morale du feu 






 I have demonstrated that there is a great deal of scholarly uncertainty over 
Origen’s universalism given Origen’s emphasis on moral autonomy. Some scholars have 
accused Origen of being inconsistent or paradoxical. Other scholars have offered a 
distorted presentation of Origen’s teachings on universal salvation so that his eschatology 
better aligns with a broad (and frustratingly ill-defined) concept of human “free will.” A 
few scholars have attempted to make the case that both prongs of Origen’s theology fit 
together within his system in a logical way. However, the proposed solutions suffer from 







ORIGEN’S UNDERSTANDING OF MORAL AUTONOMY 
Introduction 
 Origen’s view of universal salvation does not undercut his view of moral 
autonomy, and this is due in large part to how Origen defines moral autonomy – the 
subject of this chapter. The next chapter will provide an overview of Origen's doctrine of 
providence, and Chapter 4 will highlight Origen’s universalism as the central feature of 
divine providence. Chapter 5 will then explain how moral autonomy and universal 
salvation fit together in Origen’s theology. The structure of this chapter is as follows: Part 
1 will consider the context of Origen's arguments for moral autonomy by reviewing his 
main opponents. Part 2 will present Origen's own anthropological views as they relate to 
moral choices, first by analyzing his tripartite biblical model, and second by analyzing 
the vocabulary and models which he borrows from Greek philosophy. Here I also note 
where Origen modifies the terminology and categories he inherits from his sources. 
 
Part 1 – Origen’s Theological Opponents 
Origen's “Gnostic” Opponents 
 Debate on the topic of moral autonomy had been taking place for centuries before 
Origen’s time.112 However, the old debate took on new intensity among Christian circles 
                                                          
112 Many scholars have attempted to trace the development of moral autonomy, including the 
development of the notion of a (free) will: Neal Ward Gilbert, "The Concept of Will in Early Latin 
Philosophy," Journal of the History of Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1963); Albrecht  Dihle, The Theory of Will in 
Classical Antiquity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982); Charles H. Kahn, 
"Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine," in The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later 
Greek Philosophy, ed. John M. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); 





in the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD due in large part to the growing popularity of various 
gnostic theologies. The gnostic threat to the Church's Rule of Faith prompted Origen to 
describe this question as a problem of the “utmost possible urgency” at the beginning of 
his treatise on moral freedom in First Principles.113  Unsurprisingly then, Origen's 
arguments for human moral autonomy were often polemical arguments and so to help us 
understand Origen's view of free choice it will be valuable to understand the views which 
so alarmed him. Because of the scarcity and fragmentary nature of surviving texts by 
“gnostics,” as well as the polemical nature of the writings in which these fragments are 
contained, it is difficult to ascertain a clear picture of the beliefs of the various groups 
who were labeled gnostics.114 Contemporary re-evaluations of all things labeled “gnostic” 
is a necessary and ongoing project.115 For this study’s purposes, however, it is less 
                                                                                                                                                                             
no. 2 (1998); Richard Sorabji, "The concept of the will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor," in The Will 
and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, ed. Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2003); Michael Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
 113 Origen begins Book 3 by writing that the Church’s teaching on God’s judgment “assumes that 
they acknowledge that deeds worthy of praise or blame lie within our own power [τὸ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν] – let us now 
discuss separately a few points on the subject of free will [αὐτεξουσίου], a problem of the utmost possible 
urgency [ἀναγχαιοτάτου ὠς ἔνι μάλιστα προβλήματος]” – PArch 3.1.1 Greek (Butterworth 157; SC 268, 16-
18). Citations from Peri Archon are from the most recent critical edition by Crouzel and Simonetti, Origèn: 
Traité des Principes. Citations will list SC volume and page (for additional information see the 
bibliography). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations are from Butterworth, Origen: On first 
principles: being Koetschau's text of the De principiis. Critical editions of Origen’s other works will be 
noted throughout as they are cited. For a helpful guide and listing of Origen’s critical editions (PG, GCS, 
SC), see McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen: 41-44. For other (non-Origen) works that I cite 
only in passing, I do not give full bibliographic information but only standard section citations. 
 114 For a survey of evidence on our sources and fragments for Valentinus, see Einar Thomassen, 
The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the 'Valentinians' (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 417-90. For a similar survey for 
the followers of Valentinus, see ibid., 491-508. For overviews of various other factions which have been 
linked with a gnostic label, see the helpful introductory essays in Marvin Meyer, ed. The Nag Hammadi 
Scriptures (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).  
 115Michael A. Williams, Rethinking "Gnosticism" : an argument for dismantling a dubious 
category (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism? 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003); Antti Marjanen, "Gnosticism," in 
The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the 'Valentinians'; 
David Brakke, The Gnostics : myth, ritual, and diversity in early Christianity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 





important to reconstruct what various “gnostics” actually believed about moral autonomy 
than it is to note what Origen understood them to believe. Origen interacted with a wide 
swath of issues pertaining to gnostic theologies, most of which need not concern us 
here;116 it was the gnostic understanding of soteriology and human anthropology that 
prompted Origen's urgent arguments for moral freedom.117 
  Origen singles out certain leaders of gnostic factions by name, and he sometimes 
lumps together and condemns a trio of names – Marcion, Valentinus, and Basilides.118 
Valentinus was probably the most influential of the trio. According to Irenaeus he was 
active in Rome from the 130s to about 160, and his ideas continued to spread after his 
death.119 Scholars generally recognize two main branches or trajectories of his school, 
one located in the east and one in the west.120 Origen also critiques the views of a student 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 A similar re-examination of Marcion and his teachings is underway: John Barton, "Marcion 
Revisited," in The Canon Debate, ed. Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders (Peabody: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 2002); Christoph Markschies, "Die valentinianische Gnosis und Marcion - einige neue 
Perspektiven," in Marcion und seine kirchengeschichtliche Wirkung/ Marcion and His Impact on Church 
History, ed. Gerhard May and Katharine Greschat (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002); Sebastian Moll, The 
Arch-heretic Marcion, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2010). 
116 There is a significant amount of debate among scholars as to how to categorize Origen’s 
relationship to gnosticism – whether Origen was deeply influenced by a gnostic structure of thinking, 
whether he developed a Christian model of gnosticism, or whether Origen was not significantly influenced 
by gnostic models in his own theology. For orientation on this debate, see Christoph Markschies, 
"Gnostics," in The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. John McGuckin (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2004). 
117 While Origen elevates and prioritizes the “gnostic” threat to moral autonomy, he also criticizes 
a variety of other threats to moral autonomy, which will be mentioned below. 
 118 E.g. PArch 2.9.5 (SC 252, 360-362); HomEzek 7.4.30-32 (SC 352, 260; Scheck 103). This trio 
of names sometimes functioned as Origen’s common parlance for all gnostic deterministic systems. Origen 
does not seem to display a significant amount of familiarity regarding specific details of many gnostics. 
Christoph Markschies remarks that “the only gnostic teacher whom Origen cited in any detail, and with 
whom he disputed systematically, was Heracleon” – Markschies, "Gnostics," 104. Citations from Origen’s 
Ezekiel homilies are from the most recent critical edition (by homily, section, and line): Marcel Borret, 
Origène: Homélies sur Ézéchiel, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1989). All English 
translations are by Thomas P. Scheck, Origen: Homilies 1-14 on Ezekiel, Ancient Christian Writers 
(Mahwah, NJ: The Newman Press / Paulist Press, 2010). 
 119 Irenaeus, Haer. 3.4.3.  Cf. Einar Thomassen, "The Valentinian School of Gnostic Thought," in 
The Nag Hammadi Scriptures, ed. Marvin Meyer (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 790. 
 120 Only a few fragments from Valentinus remain, and these are difficult to interpret given their 





of Valentinus named Heracleon, with whom he appears to be the most familiar.121 
Throughout his commentary on the Gospel of John, Origen quotes Heracleon's exegesis 
at length before offering his counter-interpretation of the Gospel (or his occasional 
agreement with Heracleon on a point of interpretation).122 In particular, in a number of 
places Origen takes issue with Heracleon's grouping of humans into a tripartite humanity 
of three distinct natures.123 This anthropological belief appears to be a feature of the 
Valentinian School in particular, although current research into the original fragments of 
Valentinus suggest that Valentinus himself may not have taught a doctrine of “fixed 
natures.”124 Regardless, later western Valentinians would do so (including Heracleon).125 
This anthropological doctrine of fixed natures prompted a forceful backlash from 
orthodox Christians and was a major catalyst for the explosion of late 2nd century 
Christian proclamations on free moral choice in matters of ethics and faith. 
                                                          
 121 Origen calls Heracleon a disciple of Valentinus in ComJn 2.100 (SC 120, 270). Cf. Clement, 
Strom. 4.9.71.1. Citations from Origen’s Commentary on John (by book and section) are from the most 
recent critical edition: Cécile Blanc, Origène: Commentaire sur Saint Jean., 5 vols., Sources Chrétiennes 
(Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1966-1992). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations from ComJn are 
from Heine’s 2 volume set: Ronald E. Heine, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, Books 1-10, 
FOTC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1989); Commentary on the Gospel 
According to John, Books 13-32, FOTC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1993). 
 122 Virtually all we have of Heracleon's gospel commentary are the fragments preserved by Origen 
in ComJn. For an analysis of these fragments, see A.E. Brooke, The Fragments of Heracleon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1891). 
 123 ComJn 20.168-170 (SC 290, 238-240); 20.198-219 (SC 290, 254-264). For a discussion of the 
exegetical arguments Origen used against Heracleon on this point, see Jeffrey A. Trumbower, "Origen's 
Exegesis of John 8:19-53: The Struggle with Heracleon over the idea of Fixed Natures," Vigiliae 
Christianae 43, no. 2 (1989). 
 124 Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the 'Valentinians': 489. 
 125 ComJn 13.64: “We too would agree, then, if he were admitting that she had free choice and not 
hinting that her nature was more excellent. But if he is referring the cause of her consent to her natural state 
[φυσικῇ κατασκευῇ], as something not present in all people, his argument must be refuted” (Heine 82; SC 
222, 64). Cf. Tripartite Tractate 118.14-36. For an opposing view regarding Heracleon, see Harold 
Attridge, "Heracleon and John: Reassessment of an Early Christian Hermeneutical Debate," in Biblical 
Interpretation: History, Context, and Reality, ed. Christine Helmer and Taylor Petrey (Atlanta: Society of 






 We may briefly summarize the heresiologist understanding of the gnostic view. 
This belief held that humanity is divided into three classes: the spiritual, the psychic, and 
the material or fleshly, and that these classes refer to fixed states of human nature.126 The 
spiritual are those who are “born from above”, and as such are predestined for ultimate 
salvation because of the spiritual seed that resides within them. On the other hand, the 
material are “born from below” and are thus incapable of salvation; their nature precludes 
it. The psychic class of humanity alone is capable of choice, and therefore is capable of 
either salvation or damnation.127 Alongside other heresiologists of the day such as 
Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, Origen found this idea to be deeply 
troubling and squarely at odds with the Church’s Rule of Faith.128 He believed that such 
an anthropology would prima facie render senseless moral accountability: why praise the 
spiritual since they cannot do otherwise than they do, and why blame the material, who 
also are incapable to do otherwise than they do? Clement had earlier claimed that the 
gnostic view destroyed προαίρεσις (“choosing,” or “free decision”),129 and Origen 
                                                          
 126 Spiritual (πνευματικοί), psychical (ψυκικοί), and fleshly or hylic (σαρκικοί / ὑλικοί). Perhaps 
the most well-known text which divides humanity into these three classes is the Tripartite Tractate 
(118.14-119.27). Cf. Irenaeus Haer. 1.6.2; Clement of Alexandria Strom. 4.13.89.4. 
127 E.g. Tripartite Tractate 119: “Now, the spiritual kind will receive complete salvation in every 
respect. The material kind will perish in every respect, as happens to an enemy. The psychical kind, 
however, since it is in the middle by virtue of the way it was brought forth as well as by virtue of its 
constitution, is double, being disposed to good as well as to evil, and the issue that is reserved for it is 
uncertain…” – English translation by Einar Thomassen in Meyer, The Nag Hammadi Scriptures, 93-94. 
 128 Lohr points out that the “cliché of gnostic determinism”, or the belief that some people are 
saved by their nature is first found in Irenaeus, but then is picked up by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and 
others: Winrich Alfried Löhr, "Gnostic Determinism Reconsidered," Vigiliae Christianae 46, no. 4 (1992): 
381. 
 129 Clement, Strom 2.10.1-2; 2.11.2. Cf. Strom 2.7.36.2-4; 2.20.115.2; 4.13.89.1-90.4; 5.3.3-4. 
Peter Karavites notes that Clement employs a wide variety of expressions in his discussions on matters of 
moral autonomy and free choice, including τὸ αὐτεξούσιον – Peter Karavites, Evil, Freedom, and the Road 
to Perfection in Clement of Alexandria, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 109-38. 
Cf. Matyáš Havrda, "Grace and Free Will According to Clement of Alexandria," Journal of Early Christian 
Studies 19, no. 1 (2011). 
 Aristotle had already distinguished between “willing” (βούλεσθαι) and “choosing” (προαίρεσις). 
According to Aristotle “Willing” is more general, and “choosing” is a special type of willing. We may will 





similarly claimed that it destroyed τὸ αὐτἐξούσιον (“autonomous action”).130 In short, 
along with other Christian voices Origen denounced such views as unbiblical and 
squarely at odds with the idea of a just God.131 To describe this phenomenon in modern 
terms, we might say that these Christian authors were wary of any deterministic-sounding 
anthropology132 (i.e. something outside of one’s choice or decision which predetermines 
one’s outcome, such that no amount of one’s effort or difference in one’s choices can 
alter it).133  
It is questionable whether the other two names of Origen's trio rightfully earned 
their place next to Valentinus as the targets of Origen's ire concerning “deterministic” 
anthropology.134 Basilides was another early gnostic, but less is known about him, and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
however, is a special type of willing which is entirely up to us (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) and in our own power – Frede, A 
Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought: 26-27. Cf. EN 1113a10-12. 
 130 PArch 3.1.8 Greek: “Now these passages are used by some of the heretics [τῶν ἑτεροδόξων], 
who practically destroy free will [τὸ αὐτεξούσιον] by bringing in lost natures [τὸ φύσεις εἰσάγειν 
ἀπολλυμένας], which cannot receive salvation, and on the other hand saved natures, which are incapable of 
being lost [ἀνεπιδέκτους τοῦ σῴζεσθαι, και ἑτέρας σῳζομένας, ἀδυνάτως ἐχούσας πρὸς τὸ ἀπολέσθαι]” 
(Butterworth 169; SC 268, 48). Cf. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity: 152. Origen also uses 
the traditional term τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν but he appears to favor τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. Origen’s usage of these terms will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
131 The question of what trajectory in 2nd century Christianity best “deserves” the title Christian is 
argued by numerous scholars. For my purposes, the Tradition that flows through Irenaeus, Tertullian, and 
Origen – all these sharing a strong emphasis on the Rule of Faith – is “Christian”. 
132 The term “determinism” is a recent label; the OED traces the first occurrence to a work in 1846 
– "determinism, n.,"  in Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, March 2017). 
However, it is generally accepted by scholars today that deterministic thought interested philosophers in 
early antiquity even if it was not labeled as such – Dorothea Frede, "Stoic Determinism," in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 180. Frede 
identifies the most common “determinisms” as “physical determinism,” “ethical determinism,” “logical 
determinism,” and “teleological determinism” (180). I will use the term “determinism” and “deterministic” 
throughout, but I am sensitive to the ambiguity of the modern term and so I will try to highlight the 
differences between ancient views which are often described with the label of determinism. 
133 This is also why Origen was against the causal determinism of the Stoics (along with their 
corresponding view of identical repeating world-cycles), for he was convinced that this left no room for 
moral autonomy. E.g. PArch 2.3.4 (SC 252, 258-260). Cf. Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early 
Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic 
Philosophy; Frede, "Stoic Determinism."; Ricardo Salles, The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2005); Richard Taylor, "Determinism, A Historical Survey," in 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Donald M. Borchert (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006). The 
Stoic view, including Stoic “character determinism”, will be discussed below. 
 134 By the late 240s when he responds to Celsus, Origen appears to be more precise in attributing 





only a few fragments of his writings survive today. In book 3 of Stromata, Clement 
writes that Basilides' views on faith are a danger to free choice given Basilides' belief that 
faith accompanied human nature.135 Clement insists that such a view means that faith is 
no longer the direct result of free choice since there is a natural advantage for it. He goes 
on to give an analogy of an inanimate thing being pulled on the puppet strings of one's 
natural powers. Yet, at the same time, Clement concedes that followers of Basilides also 
regarded faith as a choice even while regarding it as natural.136 It is not clear how the 
mechanics of this were supposed to work, nor is it clear how this view might be different 
from valentinian views like that of Heracleon.  
 The third person grouped together in Origen's trio of names is Marcion.137 
Marcion was no “gnostic”, although it is easy to see why he was often lumped together 
with them by mainstream “Rule of Faith” Christians.138 His belief in two Gods was seen 
as the worst type of heresy and it would have sounded gnostic to monotheistic 
Christians.139 Despite similarities with some gnostics, however, Sebastian Moll has 
argued that Marcion refused any notion of predestination, including the idea of fixed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Interestingly, in that text there is also no mention of the middle category, the ψυκικοί. Citations of Contra 
Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Borret, Origène: Contre Celse - Introduction, Texte 
Critique, Traduction et Notes. Unless otherwise noted, any English translations of Contra Celsum are from: 
Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum. 
 135 Clement, Strom 3.2. 
 136 Clement, Strom 3.2. Cf. Strom 2.8.36.1; 2.10.1-11.2; 5.1.3.3-4. 
137 Clement, Strom 2.8.39.1; 3.2.12.1-13.1; 3.3.21.2; 3.4.25.1-2; 4.8.66.4; 5.1.4.2-4. 
138 Moll argues that given the paucity of evidence, it is an open question whether Marcion was 
influenced by early gnosticism, or whether gnosticism developed from Marcion's ideas. See discussion in: 
Moll, The Arch-heretic Marcion. Moll writes that “there is hardly any real evidence for an elaborate dualist 
Gnostic system before the time of Marcion” (75). 
 139 “Marcion, like the Gnostics, preached more than one God, and to his orthodox opponents this 
was the greatest heresy of all, making any further differentiation marginal” – ibid., 74. Moll also corrects 
older scholarship on Marcion which ever since Harnack had taken for granted that Marcion believed in a 
just God and a good God. Moll demonstrates that there were actually two stages in the development of 
marcionite doctrine. First, Marcion himself believed in an evil God and a good God, while later followers 
of Marcion adapted this dualistic model into a tripartite model composed of a just God, a good God, and 
evil matter – see ibid., 47-76. Origen does not appear to be familiar with the later stage of marcionite 






natures, or that of a divine seed living in only a certain group of people.140 Marcion is 
nevertheless important for our purposes because of the radical way he changed the nature 
of early Christian reflection on God's sovereignty. Before Marcion, the claim that God 
was the creator was not a contentious claim. However, given Marcion’s teaching that the 
Old Testament God was an evil deity,141 all morally questionable acts by God in the Old 
Testament came under new scrutiny. Thus, W.J.P. Boyd rightly notes that “whereas for 
St. Paul, as well as his Jewish readers, an appeal to the sovereignty of God was an 
unanswerable argument, it was no longer so in Origen’s day...”142 God became more 
vulnerable to criticism than ever before, and so Christians became increasingly focused 
on apologetics; they went to greater lengths attempting to explain God's more confusing 
and disquieting actions such as the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart. It may have been 
sufficient for Paul to say simply “Has the potter no right over the clay?”; by Origen’s 
time, however, it became necessary to give a fuller answer to how God could harden 
Pharaoh’s heart and yet remain just and good. Consequently, by Marcion’s time 
predestinarian passages in Paul became relevant in a new way. They could not be set 
aside as mysterious passages of uncertain meaning, but rather had to be reckoned with 
and quickly neutered of their potential ability to threaten God's justice, for this potential 
was pounced upon by marcionite preachers in their attempt to win converts from the 
Church.143  
                                                          
 140 ibid., 74. 
141 Cf. above footnote 139. 
 142 W.J.P. Boyd, "Origen on Pharaoh's hardened heart: a study of Justification and Election in St. 
Paul and Origen," in Studia Patristica 7, ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen 92 (Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1966), 436.  
 143 It is worth mentioning again that there is not sufficient evidence to state whether 
Valentinianism was directed against Marcion, or the other way around. But there is scant evidence for any 
dualist gnostic system before Marcion, cf. Moll, The Arch-heretic Marcion: 74-75. It appears safe to say, 





 Recently, the predestinarian character of other forms of gnosticism has been 
challenged by contemporary scholarship as well. There is reason to believe that some 
gnostics did not think that salvation by nature necessarily excluded free decision.144 
While investigating the history of these groups constitutes a necessary and ongoing 
project, as noted above, what is relevant here are Origen's arguments against any form of 
predestinarian or fixed-nature anthropology, and how this affected his own understanding 
of free choice in the matters of ethics and faith. Origen and other heresiologists 
understood that any conception of God's salvation which was dictated by (or prevented 
by) one's own created nature was a clear denial of human moral autonomy. The presence 
of gnostic-leaning churches prompted almost continual arguments from Origen on moral 
autonomy which spanned his entire writing career.145 Around 218 Origen began work on 
his Commentary on Genesis, in which he discussed human free choice in the context of 
fate, astral determinism, and God's foreknowledge;146 in the early 220s Origen wrote his 
                                                                                                                                                                             
gnostic groups. After all, while gnostics were forming schools, Marcion was forming a church, a church 
which won its converts directly from Christian churches – cf. E.C. Blackman, Marcion and his Influence 
(London: SPCK, 1948), 1. Justin Martyr states that Marcion made converts from every nation (1 Apol. 
26.5). Tertullian notes (with typical rhetorical flourish) that Marcionites make churches like wasps make 
combs (Adv. Marc. 4.5). 
 144 E.H. Pagels is probably the most famous scholar to argue this point, see E.H. Pagels, "The 
Valentinian Claim to Esoteric Exegesis of Romans as Basis for Anthropological Theory," Vigiliae 
Christianae 26, no. 4 (1972). On the other hand, Dihle disagrees with Pagels and insists that orthodox 
Christians were correct in their understanding of gnostic teaching on this point – see Dihle, The Theory of 
Will in Classical Antiquity: Appendix II: 150-57. 
145 On the dating of Origen’s works see Hanson, Origen's doctrine of tradition: 1-30; Nautin, 
Origène : sa vie et son oeuvre: see ch. 10 "Chronologie", 363-412; Quasten, The Ante-Nicene Literature 
After Irenaeus, Volume 2: 37-43. 
 146 While gnostic determinism was the most immediate threat, Origen was concerned with any 
deterministic framework which he believed contradicted moral autonomy. He argues against astral 
determinism in his Commentary on Genesis – e.g. Phil 23.1.7-15: “…many who are supposed to have 
embraced the Faith are distracted at the thought that human affairs may be governed by necessity, and 
cannot possibly be otherwise than is ruled by the stars in their different groupings. And a consequence of 
this opinion is the complete destruction of Free Will [ἐφ ἡμῖν]; and a further result is that praise and blame 
are unmeaning…” (Lewis 173; SC 226, 132). The only portions of Origen’s Commentary on Genesis to 
survive are those preserved in the Philocalia. Citations from the Philocalia 21-27 are from the critical 
edition by Junod (listed by chapter, section, and line): Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre 
arbitre. English translations are by Lewis, The Philocalia of Origen: A compilation of selected passages 





famous defense of moral freedom in First Principles Book III;147 in the 230s Origen 
further nuanced his position on human autonomy in his treatise On Prayer, and in the 
240s Origen liberally discussed the issue all throughout his Commentary on the Epistle to 
the Romans. 
 
Early Christian Predestinarians 
 While most of Origen's energy on the topics of moral autonomy was directed to 
those he deemed to be outside of the church catholic, Origen also developed arguments 
for moral autonomy which were directed at people within the church – these were 
Christians who took a literalist approach to predestinarian passages in Scripture.148 My 
argument is that a careful analysis of Origen's anti-deterministic exegesis produces 
evidence of an early tradition of predestination within the Church catholic.149 It is 
necessary to investigate the nature of this group for at least two reasons. First, this 
exegetical tradition serves as an important counterexample to the opinion of some 
scholars today that the early church was unanimous in upholding free will in the matters 
of faith.150 The pre-Augustinian church was more diverse on this topic than contemporary 
authors often realize.151 Second, it is important to realize that Origen defends free choice 
                                                          
 147 Nautin argues for a later date, around 229 – Nautin, Origène : sa vie et son oeuvre: 368-71. 
 148 I am setting aside the modern debate over whether various gnostic groups or schools should 
also be called “Christian” (Origen clearly did not think they should be). Regardless of one's leaning on that 
question, Origen knows of a predestinarian view within the Church that he views as misguided rather than 
heretical. 
 149 An earlier version of this section was read as a paper at the Pappas Patristic Conference in 
Boston (March 2011). I wish to say thank you to the participants who discussed the paper with me, 
especially Jesse Hoover who delivered a helpful response paper. 
 150 E.g. Alister McGrath writes: “The pre-Augustinian theological tradition is practically of one 
voice in asserting the freedom of the human will” – Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34.  
 151 Origen himself serves as another counterexample to this prevailing opinion, given that he 
formulated a view of human faith and divine providence that might be described as a type of compatibilism 





in more than one way, for Origen’s arguments against the predestinarians differ from the 
arguments he uses against the gnostics. Each type of argument that Origen employs helps 
to illuminate characteristics of his own doctrine of moral autonomy. 
 As far as I can tell, the first time Origen alludes to an incorrect Christian 
deterministic reading occurs in First Principles Book III, where Origen offers a robust 
defense of moral autonomy as a central teaching of Scripture. Scripture consistently 
teaches that freedom of choice is true, Origen argues, despite the fact that several 
passages appear to suggest otherwise. Unsurprisingly, Origen uses this as an opportunity 
to oppose the gnostic doctrine of fixed natures, and throughout Book III his preferred 
label for those who hold such a view is “heretics” (τῶν ἑτεροδόξων).152 However, there 
are also several places where Origen refers to an alternate deterministic reading of 
Scripture, and here he uses the milder term “opponents” (ὁ ἐξ ἐναντίας) instead of 
“heretics.”153 In another place, after introducing Romans 9 Origen remarks that “these 
passages are in themselves sufficient to disturb ordinary people [τοὺς πολλοὺς] with the 
thought that man is not a free agent, but that it is God who saves and destroys whom he 
will.”154 Origen’s language here suggests that he is aware of a belief held by some within 
the Church which viewed soteriology in predestinarian terms because of passages like 
Romans 9. Throughout his discussion, Origen is careful not to conflate this view with the 
gnostic view of fixed natures. In fact, for almost every challenging passage that Origen 
                                                                                                                                                                             
case, McGrath’s expression “freedom of the human will” (see preceding footnote) suffers both from 
anachronism (given that most authors before Augustine did not believe in the separate mental capacity 
called “will”), and from ambiguity. That is to say, while it is true that practically everyone was concerned 
with moral autonomy, authors understood the concept of moral autonomy to mean different things and 
require different features. They did not speak with one voice. 
152 E.g. PArch 3.1.8 Greek (SC 268, 48; Butterworth 169). 
 153 PArch 3.1.16: “Now our opponent will say…” (Butterworth 188; SC 268, 94). 
154 PArch 3.1.7: “Ταῦτα γὰρ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὰ ἱκανά ἐστι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκταράξαι ὡς οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ 
ἀνθρώπου αὐτεξουσίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ σῴζοντος καὶ ἀπολλύντος οὓς ἐὰν αὐτος βούληται” (Butterworth 168; 





introduces throughout this section of Book III he responds to each deterministic group 
with a different counter-argument. For example, when Origen brings up Romans 9:16-21 
and Philippians 2:13 (“to will and to work are of God”), his opening statements introduce 
both of the false interpretations which he plans to address:  
Now the objectors say: If it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that 
runneth, but of God that hath mercy, then salvation does not come from 
what lies in our power but from the constitution we have received from 
him who constituted us what we are or from the will of him who has 
mercy when he pleases.155 
 
The “or” in this passage distinguishes two different deterministic interpretations of the 
same passage – one by the “fixed natures” group and the other by a group I’ll simply call 
the predestinarians. These are not complementary deterministic readings; in fact, they are 
competing interpretations of the same text. One reading locates the predetermining cause 
of salvation in one's prior nature (κατασκευῆς), and thus people are saved on account of 
who they were/are. However, the other reading locates the predetermining cause of 
salvation not in the people themselves, but in the inscrutable and seemingly-arbitrary will 
of God, given that God chooses to bestow mercy on only a subset of a singular mass of 
people who stand in need of salvation. The chosen people are not saved on account of 
anything inside of them or on account of their constitution, which is precisely what 
makes God’s decision to give mercy inscrutable. Nevertheless, Origen addresses these 
groups together because their divergent viewpoints, if true, have in common the 
implication that one’s moral choices do not contribute to salvation. Thus, Origen finds 
                                                          
155 PArch 3.1.18: “Οἱ γὰρ ἐπιλαμβανόμενοί φασιν εἰ μὴ τοῦ θέλοντος μηδὲ τοῦ τρέχοντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 
ἐλεοῦντος θεοῦ, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν τὸ σῴζεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ κατασκευῆς τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τοιούσδε 
κατασκευάσαντος γεγενημένης ἢ ἐκ προαιρέσεως τοῦ ὅτε βούλεται ἐλεοῦντος” (Butterworth 195-196 





both groups guilty of impugning God's fairness, and he believes that his own exegesis of 
the passage will be sufficient to negate both competing views.  
However, we should note that Origen understands that each group impugns God's 
fairness in a different way. The “fixed-nature” view portrays God as being an unfair 
Creator, given that he created certain people with an advantage (or disadvantage) from 
the outset. On the other hand, the predestinarian view portrays God as being an unfair 
distributor of mercy (an unfair Savior) by only directing it to a subset of all of the people 
who are in need of it. 
 After his introductory statements, Origen then turns to Philippians 2:13 and first 
engages the predestinarians:  
Now some say . . . since to will and to work are from God it is not we who 
have done the excellent deeds; we seemed to do them (ἀλλ᾿ ἡμεῖς μὲν 
ἐδόξαμεν), but it was God who bestowed them on us, and so even in this 
we have no free will (αὐτεξούσιοι). In reply to this we must say...156  
 
Origen critiques this view by saying it is based on an incorrect interpretation of Paul; 
Paul is not trying to say that God is responsible for the specific choices we make, but 
rather that God is the one who grants us the ability to “will in general and to work 
general.”157 Origen then critiques the predestinarian interpretation of Romans 9:16-21 by 
suggesting that prior choices by the soul are responsible for a person’s designation as a 
vessel of honor or dishonor, rather than some arbitrary and unfair decision by God.158 It is 
only at the end of this discussion, however, that Origen mentions that Paul is talking 
about a single lump of clay that the potter forms in different ways, and that this implies 
                                                          
156 PArch 3.1.20 Greek (Butterworth 200-201 emphasis added; SC 268, 124). 
157 PArch 3.1.20 Greek: “Ἀλλὰ τὸ καθόλου θέλειν τὰ καθόλου ἐνεργεῖν” (Butterworth 201; SC 268, 
126).  





that “every soul in God’s hands is of one nature [μιᾶς φύσεως].”159 This signals a shift in 
the logic and structure of Origen’s counter-argument regarding the biblical passages in 
question. This is made clear a few lines later when we see Origen pivot to address the 
fixed-nature view. Having dismantled the predestinarian view, Origen continues: “To 
those, however, who bring in diverse natures and use this passage in support we must 
answer as follows.”160 He then proceeds to analyze the troublesome Pauline passages, but 
this time with the intention of attacking the view of fixed-nature determinism. The type 
of counter-arguments Origen produces here differ from those he used against the 
predestinarians. Here he focuses on demonstrating that moral progress and moral regress 
are possible for everyone – that is, people who are currently vessels of dishonor can 
become vessels of honor, and vice-versa, which means that no one is trapped into a 
certain state because of their constitution.161  
 All of this indicates that Origen is aware of a group of Christians who are distinct 
in his mind from the gnostics; they are Christians who nevertheless advocate a 
deterministic (predestinarian) theology of God’s grace in matters of final salvation.162 
While the deterministic schema of the gnostics was based on the presence of a certain 
                                                          
159 PArch 3.1.22 Greek (Butterworth 205; SC 268, 138). 
160 PArch 3.1.23 Greek: “Τοῖς δὲ φύσεις εἰσάγουσι καὶ χρωμένοις τῷ ῥητῷ ταῦτα λεκτέον” 
(Butterworth 206; SC 268, 140). 
161 PArch 3.1.23-24 Greek (Butterworth 206-210; SC 268, 140-150). 
 162 Another place in First Principles where Origen appears to be addressing a predestinarian 
exegetical tradition is PArch 3.1.15: Speaking of Ezek. 11:19-20, Origen offers the predestinarian 
viewpoint which insisted that “if we ourselves do nothing to implant within us the ‘heart of flesh’, but it is 
the work of God, then to live a virtuous life will not be our work, but something due entirely to the divine 
grace [θεία χάρις]…Now this is what will be said by the man who, arguing from bare words, would destroy 
our free will [τὸ ἐφ ἡμῖν ἀναιρῶν]...” (Butterworth 186-87; SC 268, 90). Origen is not addressing the 
“fixed-nature” determinists here, but is instead arguing against those who link a predestined final salvation 
with God’s gift of grace. This group presumes that people are a homogenous group of sinners who are not 
already pre-categorized by different fundamental natures – that is to say, all people are alike in that they 
have ‘stony hearts.’ Salvation requires a change in status to a ‘heart of flesh’, but this is something that is 
granted to certain people by God’s mercy. Thus, Origen understands that on the gnostic view the elect were 
already born different from the rest, while the predestined elect are transformed at some point in life in 





essence or substance in the individual (πνεῦμα), the deterministic schema of the 
predestinarians was based on the arbitrary-sounding decision by God to have mercy on 
only some persons out of the singular mass of humanity.163 
 Origen was already aware of this current predestinarian reading of biblical texts in 
the 220s given his careful responses in First Principles. By itself this conclusion is 
admittedly tentative.164 But by the time Origen wrote the treatise On Prayer a decade 
later, we see Origen interacting with this predestinarian tradition more directly. Origen 
wrote this treatise to answer troubling questions which had been posed to him by his 
sponsor and promoter Ambrose, along with Ambrose’s sister (or possibly wife) Tatiana 
(PEuch 2.1).165 When Origen quotes from their initial letter it is clear that Ambrose and 
Tatiana were bothered by a popular Christian belief about prayer which stated, in 
                                                          
 163 Some might wonder if the second group Origen was addressing here were Marcionites. After 
all, Origen was very concerned to defend the Christian God against the marcionite view that the Creator 
God is capricious. However, we know Origen does not have Marcionites in mind here for several reasons. 
The Marcionites believed the Old Testament God to be bad and capricious, while the New Testament God 
alone is good, but many of the deterministic passages Origen is discussing in this section come from the 
New Testament. In fact, Origen takes care to distinguish the Marcionite view from the predestinarian view 
in PArch 3.1.16, even if he does not mention Marcion by name. He states: “In the first place we must note 
the passage as an argument against the heretics, who hunt out similar passages from the Old Testament, in 
which there is revealed, as they are bold enough to say, the cruelty of the Creator or his revengeful and 
punitive attitude . . . their sole purpose being to deny that there is goodness in him who formed the world. 
With the New Testament, however, they do not deal in a similar way, nor even candidly, but pass over 
statements closely resembling these which they consider open to criticism in the Old Testament” 
(Butterworth 189; SC 268, 96-68). The Marcionites interpreted these NT passages (if they included them at 
all) in such a way that neutered them of any deterministic force in order to prevent any charges of 
capriciousness to the NT God. Conversely, the group Origen addresses in this section emphasizes New 
Testament determinism. We may also recall Moll’s assertion that Marcion refused any notion of 
predestination – Moll, The Arch-heretic Marcion: 74. 
164 After all, Origen is well-known for approaching difficult biblical texts by first suggesting a 
variety of possible meanings before arguing for a particular interpretation. If our evidence was limited to 
First Principles it would be difficult to rule out the possibility that Origen was simply using a rhetorical 
technique. 
165 PEuch 2.1 (GCS II, 298.18-19). Citations from Origen’s On Prayer are from the Berlin-Leipzig 
critical edition (GCS), and are listed in the format of Origenes Werke volume (II), page number and line 
number: Paul Koetschau, Buch V-VIII gegen Celsus, Die Schrift vom Gebet, Die griechischen christlichen 
Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1899). Unless otherwise 
noted, English translations are from Rowan Greer, Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First 
Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers, The 





essence, that prayer was unnecessary because God foreknows everything that will come 
to be; what God foreknows must therefore happen by necessity.166 Origen demonstrates 
his own familiarity with this belief, because before moving to critique it he first offers an 
expanded outline of the view. Origen’s expanded description includes many corollary 
arguments that appear to have been used as further evidence for that position: “Well then, 
here are the arguments of those who set prayers aside – obviously, I mean those who 
establish God over the universe and say that providence [πρόνοιαν] exists…”167 
Throughout this discussion there is no mention of fixed-nature determinism, nor any 
mention of Marcion, Valentinus or Basilides. In fact, in the above quote Origen makes 
sure that Ambrose realizes he is not presenting gnostic arguments by carefully 
mentioning he is only referring to those who actually uphold the one God's sovereignty 
over all creation – that is to say, he is speaking about a view found within the Church.  
 Origen's expanded outline and description of this exegetical tradition features a 
double-predestination reading of Romans 9.168 Divine election plays a central role in this 
schema in that it is impossible for the elect to fall away, and it is impossible for the non-
elect to become elect.169 We may gather from this presentation that Origen, Ambrose, and 
Tatiana were all aware of a belief held by some Christians (probably at a popular level as 
                                                          
166 PEuch 5.6 (GCS II, 311.8-13; Greer 92): “Let the argument I have been stating in the preceding 
discussion be stated in the words of the letter you have written me. ‘First, if God foreknows what will come 
to be and if it must happen [εἰ προγνώστης ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς τῶν μελλόντων, καὶ δεῖ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι], then prayer 
is vain. Second, if everything happens according to God’s will [βούλησιν θεοῦ] and if what He wills is fixed 
and no one of the things He wills can be changed, then prayer is vain.’” 
167 PEuch 5.2 (GCS II, 308.23-26; Greer 91). Origen’s full presentation of the predestinarian view 
is found in 5.2-5 (GCS II, 308-311; Greer 91-92). 
 168 PEuch 5.4 (GCS II, 309.29-310.6; Greer 91-92): If all people are categorized like Jacob and 
Esau, then all people are either set apart or estranged from the womb. If so, then “it is in vain that we ask 
for forgiveness of sins . . . For if we are sinners, we have been estranged from the womb. And if we have 
been set apart from our mother’s womb, the noblest things will come our way even if we do not pray.” 
 169 PEuch 5.5 (GCS II, 310.16-20; Greer 92): “Well then, any one of them has been chosen ‘before 
the foundation of the world,’ and it is impossible that he should fall away from his election [τῆς ἐκλογῆς]. 
Therefore, he needs no prayer. Or if he has not been chosen or predestined [ἢ οὐκ ἐξείλεκται οὐδὲ 





it does not seem to be associated with any school or personality), which held a strict 
predestinarian interpretation of divine grace. On some level Ambrose and Tatiana may 
have found such arguments compelling, even if troubling, which would explain the 
reason for their letter in the first place. Julia Konstantinovsky writes that the people 
Origen refers to in this passage belong to a gnostic faction.170 But there is no textual 
evidence to support this claim. Rather, Origen appears to treat them as Christians (albeit 
misguided ones), for they view both the Old and New Testaments as Scripture, they 
believe in the one God who is the main actor in both Testaments, and that belief plays a 
central role in their argument for God’s deterministic grace of election. Their 
deterministic soteriology is of a different category from one that centers on a fixed 
constitution; this determinism is instead linked with the grace of election given arbitrarily 
to some people within a singular class of fallen humanity.171 
                                                          
170 Julia Konstantinovsky, "Prayer," in The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. John McGuckin 
(Louisville: John Knox Press, 2004), 175. 
 171 Ronald Heine is correct to point out similarities in the arguments reproduced by Ambrose and 
Tatiana with those found among Greek philosophers – Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service 
of the Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 161. By the 2nd century there were standard 
arguments and counter-arguments relating to God's providence, foreknowledge, and fatalism. However, it 
would be a mistake to miss the uniquely Christian character of the arguments here (especially the argument 
as expanded by Origen). While Origen’s arguments are similar to those he uses elsewhere when defending 
God’s foreknowledge from the charge of fatalism, Origen is not specifically confronting Greek 
philosophers or Greek arguments here. The determinism advocated by the faction referred to in On Prayer 
is thoroughly biblical in nature (or at least insists that it is), and it stems directly from specific exegetical 
arguments. Heine does admit that it is possible Origen, Ambrose and Tatiana “may have known these 
arguments from Christian sources”, and then he offers as a possibility the gnostic Prodicus, who was 
known to Clement (Strom. 7.7.41) – ibid. It is true that Strom. 7.7 says that followers of Prodicus objected 
to the necessity of prayer, but Clement does not tell us why they objected. Despite this modest similarity to 
the argument in On Prayer, there is reason to believe that Heine's suggestion is probably wrong. Tertullian 
knows Prodicus as a follower of Valentinus who believed in a multiplicity of gods (Scorpiace 15; adv. 
Prax. 3), which does not fit the character of the predestinarian group described in this passage. In addition, 
when Clement mentions the group of Prodicus he describes them as believing they are by nature children of 
the first God (Strom. 3.4). This would put them closer to the camp of the “fixed-nature” determinists rather 
the predestinarian determinists who only believed in one God. 
 Ph. J. Van Der Eijk is the only scholar I have found who calls the faction referred to in PEuch 
“Christian”: “Aus dieser Tatsache, sowie aus der typisch christlichen Zergliederung der göttlichen Pronoia 
in, einerseits, Vorherwissen und Vorsorge und, andererseits, Vorherbestimmung, geht deutlich hervor, dass 





 A final passage from the Philocalia is helpful in understanding this exegetical 
tradition. Speaking of the famous episode where God hardens Pharaoh's heart, Origen 
writes: 
And to ordinary believers [Τοῖς δὲ πιστεύειν νομιζομένοις] it sounds very 
harsh to say, “The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh.” For readers who 
are convinced that there is no other God but the Creator, think that God 
arbitrarily [ἀποκλήρωσιν], as it were, has mercy on whom He will have 
mercy, and hardens whom He will, when there is no reason why one man 
should have mercy shown him by God, and another be hardened by Him. 
And others, better advised than these, say they look upon Scripture as 
containing many secrets [πολλὰ κεκρύφθαι], and that they do not on that 
account turn aside from the sound faith; and one of the secrets 
[ἀποκεκρυμμένων] they hold to be the true account of this portion of 
Scripture. Others, alleging that there is a God other than the Creator, will 
have Him to be just but not good...172 
 
Here Origen reflects a greater familiarity of Christian predestinarians than in the previous 
texts given that he now knows of two different arguments used by two different groups. 
The first group of readers are those we have seen Origen speak of in First Principles and 
On Prayer. They are ordinary and uninformed believers who reluctantly feel led to 
believe that the Bible teaches “random” (ἀποκλήρωσιν) predestination. Origen makes it 
clear that these interpreters believe in only one God. The reason he makes note of that 
here (when he does not always do so) is because the passage in question is from the Old 
Testament instead of the New, and Origen does not want his readers to think he is 
referring to the gnostics or to Marcionites who frequently pointed to such passages in the 
Old Testament as evidence of a second (and perhaps capricious) deity. Origen's 
clarification lets us know that we are not dealing with regular heretics here, but simply 
misinformed Christians. The second group of predestinarian Christians Origen refers to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
"Origenes' Verteidigung des freien Willens in de Oratione 6, 1-2," Vigiliae Christianae 42, no. 4 (1988): 
340. See also ibid., 342. 





are better educated, and yet they nevertheless continue to believe in God's predestination 
as if it were a secret doctrine hidden in the Bible.173 Again, we know Origen is not 
speaking of gnostic heretics when he admits that these people desired to stay within the 
boundaries of the Church's Rule of Faith (“sound faith” – “ὑγιοῦς πίστεως”).174 
 To summarize, I am arguing that Origen is a witness (albeit hostile) to the 
existence of a non-gnostic deterministic form of Christianity that stretches over thirty 
years of his career.175 Origen is convinced that this tradition holds a view which 
contradicts moral autonomy and moral responsibility. From Origen’s descriptions, this 
group differs from gnostic determinists in that the determining factor of salvation is based 
in the arbitrary will of God and not on a created substance found within a subset of 
people. What the predestinarians and the gnostics do have in common, however, is that 
both of their views result in a kind of moral fatalism.176 The view of the predestinarians is 
                                                          
 173 Interestingly, this attitude is reminiscent to Origen’s own attitudes regarding certain doctrines 
which he felt were too dangerous to be taught to ordinary Christians – most notably Origen’s beliefs 
regarding the non-eternality of divine punishment. This will be discussed below in chapter 4 in the context 
of Origen's belief in a foreordained and infallible final restoration (the apocatastasis), and Origen’s self-
identification as a “wise steward of the word” who regularly conceals such a doctrine. Cf. Tom Greggs, 
"Exclusivist or Universalist? Origen the 'Wise Steward of the Word' (CommRom. V.1.7) and the Issue of 
Genre," International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 3 (2007).  
174 Junod interprets this second, “better educated” group to be gnostics: Cette divergence 
importante conduit à deux attitudes qu'Origène réprouve avec la même énergie : celle des gnostiques qui 
croient comprendre et celle des «simples» qui ne cherchent pas à comprendre parce qu'ils voient des 
mystères insondables partout – Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre: 271n2. However, 
Origen’s language suggests otherwise. First, Origen begins by describing people who fall under the 
category of only believing in one God, and only then moves to describing those who believe in an 
additional God when he begins to talk about the followers of Marcion (a “just” God as well as a “good” 
God). The “better educated” group is grouped with those who believe in only one God. Second, Origen 
does not link fixed-nature determinism to this group, but rather implies that it is specifically the “arbitrary 
mercy” which constitutes a secret biblical doctrine. Therefore, it seems that the main point of distinction 
between the lesser and better educated predestinarians (besides education) is simply the degree to which 
they were bothered by the doctrine. Ordinary Christians believed the doctrine to be true but also “harsh,” 
while the better educated Christians simply viewed it as mysterious. 
175 With the possible exception of Van Der Eijk, I am not aware of any other scholar who makes 
this argument. Van Der Eijk calls this group “Christian” based on their use of Christian terms such as 
“predestination” – see above n171. 
176 The fatalistic arguments of the predestinarians (at least in the way that Origen represents them) 
highlights a certain naiveté in regards to the current philosophical arguments about God's foreknowledge. 





also distinct from Stoic causal determinism, different from Marcion's capricious and 
arbitrary Old Testament God, and different from astral determinism.177 Origen felt a need 
to confront this exegetical tradition within the Church as early as the 220s in First 
Principles, and again in the 230s with his treatise On Prayer, and in the 240s Origen 
continued to allude to it in places throughout his Commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans.178 
                                                                                                                                                                             
foreknowledge logically leads to fatalism. This type of approach was discussed at least as early as the 2nd 
century BC with Carneades, and became known as the idle argument (ἀργὸς λόγος), an argument which has 
its own history and trajectory. Chrysippus (along with Origen and others) considered the argument a 
sophism and gave a famous rebuttal to it which is preserved in Cicero's On Fate 28-9, and Origen’s Contra 
Celsum II.20 (Chadwick 86; SC 132, 338). Bobzien believes that Origen’s refutation of the idle argument is 
indebted to the Stoics – Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy: 180-81. The 
predestinarians do not engage with any of the (by this time standard) counterarguments to the idle 
argument, but seem to take its fatalistic conclusions for granted. For more information on the history of the 
idle argument and its rebuttals, see ibid., chapter 5: 180-233. Cf. below Chapter 5 for Origen’s discussion 
of foreknowledge, and the distinction he makes between future events which happen by “necessity” and 
future events which will “certainly happen”, but not by necessity. 
177 Origen speaks in similar ways about “simple” Christians who are persuaded by or bothered by 
astral determinism – e.g. Phil 23.1.7-15 (SC 226, 132). Cf. Junod’s helpful description at the beginning of 
Phil 23: “L’astrologie avait fait de si nombreux adeptes à l’intérieur même de la communauté chrêtienne 
d’Alexandrie qu’Origêne estime indispensable de consacrer de longs développements à sa refutation. Le 
théologien alexandrin précise plus loin qu’il destine ses explications aux hommes «ébranlés» (§ 20, li. 3) 
par les astrologues, quoique lecteurs de l’Écriture. Ces chrétiens qui subissent l’influence de doctrines 
étrangères ou opposées à la pure foi sont souvent désignés sous le nom de «simples» – Junod, Origène: 
Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre: 132n2. 
Astral determinism shares certain features with predestinarian determinism – most notably that 
those Christians who were persuaded by such views tended towards a kind of fatalism. The viewpoints 
differ in the cause of the predetermination, and perhaps also in the degree or scope of the predetermination; 
that is, the predestinarians seemed more concerned with the inability of people to choose their ultimate fate 
(salvation or damnation), while the astral determinists believed that all events everywhere (even the 
behavior of animals) were fixed in advance by the stars. For example, in First Principles Origen sometimes 
describes the argument of his “opponents” as saying only that “salvation does not lie in their power; and if 
this is so, we are not free as regards salvation and destruction” – PArch. 3.1.16 (Butterworth 188, 
emphasis added; SC 268, 96). The opponents referred to in Origen’s treatise on prayer, however, do appear 
to be drawing deterministic inferences which go beyond matters of final salvation (e.g. at least in regards to 
the efficacy of petitionary prayer). 
 178 The Romans references may be found in ComRm VII.6.1-133 during Origen’s discussion of the 
predestination found in Romans 8:30 (Bammel 587-593; Scheck 2.87-92). E.g. “…if to this popular 
understanding [of foreknowledge] is applied that which says that ‘those whom he called, these he also 
justified,’ we shall be opening a huge window to those who deny that it lies within man’s power to be 
saved. For they say: If it is those whom God has foreknown that he has also predestined…” – VII.6.17-21 
(Scheck 2.87-88; Bammel 588). And a short while later Origen again alludes to this Christian reading of 
predestination when he says: “We can still say the following in answer to those who raise questions of this 
sort against us...” – VII.6.105-107 (Scheck 2.91; Bammel 592). Citations from Origen’s Commentary on 
Romans (along with page numbers) are from the critical edition by Bammel, Der Römerbriefkommentar 





Origen's Hermeneutic: God's Fairness and Goodness 
 I have outlined Origen’s main theological opponents on the topic of moral 
autonomy for two reasons. First, it is important to see that pre-Augustinian views on 
grace and moral autonomy were not as homogenous inside the Church as some scholars 
have claimed. Second and more importantly, it is helpful to recognize that Origen did not 
utilize only one type of argument against deterministic theologies, as if determinism in 
general was a single category which he found problematic. Instead, he employed different 
arguments against various viewpoints which modern scholars often describe as 
“deterministic.”179 It is helpful to compare Origen's reactions to these different views 
because it highlights what Origen viewed to be of primary importance on the topic of 
moral autonomy. The above analysis reveals that Origen’s defense of moral autonomy 
was not born out of any discomfort Origen may have had with fixed or foreordained 
events (even foreordained events concerning salvation).180 Instead, Origen's defense of 
moral autonomy derives from his desire to safeguard two specific principles: the justice 
and the goodness of God. The details of fixed-nature determinism differ from those of 
Christian predestinarianism, but Origen insists that at their root they both suffer from the 
same fatal flaw: they both lead to moral fatalism, which destroys any possibility for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
translations (listed by volume and page) are from Scheck’s 2-volume work: Scheck, Origen: Commentary 
on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5; Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 6-10. 
179 As mentioned earlier, here we must remember that the word “determinism” is a modern label. 
Using the term anachronistically has both a benefit and a weakness. It is helpful insofar as it allows modern 
authors to identify a common-denominator feature of many different views in antiquity which early 
Christians found problematic: each of these views was thought to undercut moral autonomy and moral 
culpability precisely because events were unalterable and foreordained by some external force or causal 
chain of necessity. The weakness in labeling an ancient view “determinist” is that it tends to overshadow 
the unique features of the view in question, as well as the different exegetical arguments Christians used to 
combat each one. Cf. above n132 on my usage of the term “determinism.” 
 180 On the other hand, someone like Alexander of Aphrodisias was motivated to defend moral 
autonomy because of his discomfort regarding fixed future events (see discussion below). It is necessary to 
emphasize this point now given my argument in Chapter 4 that Origen himself maintains his own unique 
species of deterministic eschatology (in the sense of a fixed and foreordained destiny) through his belief in 





moral responsibility. If moral responsibility is not real, then God can be neither good nor 
just, given that God commands people to be morally responsible. God commands people 
throughout the Scriptures to do or not to do certain things, and then God rewards or 
punishes people accordingly. To suggest that God rewards or punishes people for 
commands which they are powerless to perform or not perform is to sabotage beyond 
repair any notion of God's fairness.181 Origen includes this as part of the Church's Rule of 
Faith: 
This also is laid down in the Church's teaching, that every rational soul is 
possessed of free will and choice [liberi arbitrii et uoluntatis]...There 
follows from this the conviction that we are not subject to necessity 
[necessitati esse subiectos], so as to be compelled by every means, even 
against our will [etiamsi nolimus], to do either good or evil.182 
 
This dual emphasis on God’s justice and God’s goodness permeates Origen's thought. It 
is not simply a recurring theme throughout all of Origen's writings, but it serves as a 
hermeneutical lens Origen uses to judge between possible interpretations of biblical texts. 
We must keep this point in mind as we discuss Origen's own views concerning freedom 
of choice and divine providence. Whatever description we give to Origen's theology, we 
must test it for accuracy against these two principles. In the remainder of this chapter we 
will see that these principles act as the cornerstone for Origen's doctrine of free moral 
choice, and in the next chapter we will see that they also serve as the cornerstone for his 
doctrine of God’s providence. 
 
                                                          
181 This fact by itself – that God has issued such commands – constituted sufficient proof for 
Origen that humans had moral responsibility – cf. PArch 3.1.6 (SC 268, 32-40). 





Part 2 – Origen’s View of Moral Autonomy 
Revelation and Philosophy: Origen's Dual Supports for Moral Autonomy 
 Origen’s acumen with a wide variety of philosophical traditions has been well-
documented.183 Origen believed that reason strengthens what can be known from divine 
revelation,184 but Origen distinguished himself from both Platonists and Stoics by 
insisting that reason alone was insufficient; revelation was needed.185 Origen stressed the 
point that Scripture affirms moral autonomy on almost every page. At the same time, we 
                                                          
 183 E.g. Henri Crouzel, Origene et la philosophie (Paris: Aubier, 1962), 179-215.; Origen: 156-63.; 
Daniélou, Origen: 250 ff.; Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Christian Tradition: 95-123.; Gilles 
Dorival, "L'apport d'Origène pour la connaissance de la philosophie grecque," in Origeniana Quinta, ed. 
R.J. Daly (Louvain: 1992), 198-216. 
 184 Origen viewed reason and divine revelation to be mutually supportive, e.g. PArch 4.1.1: “Now 
in our investigation of these important matters we do not rest satisfied with common opinions and the 
evidence of things that are seen, but we use in addition . . . testimonies drawn from the scriptures which we 
believe to be divine…” (Butterworth 256; SC 268, 256-258). Origen's attitude regarding the relationship 
between Scripture and philosophy is perhaps best seen in his letter to his student Gregory Thaumaturgus (or 
Gregory the Miracle-Worker), which is preserved in the Philocalia (and cited as EpistGreg). Crouzel 
produced a critical edition of EpistGreg in the Sources Chrétiennes, and all citations are from his text – 
Henri Crouzel, Grégoire le Thaumaturge: Remerciement a Origène suivi de La Lettre d'Origène a 
Grégoire, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1969). English translations are from Lewis, The 
Philocalia of Origen: A compilation of selected passages from Origen's works made by St. Gregory of 
Nazianzus and St. Basil of Caesarea. In this letter Origen calls philosophy the handmaiden to Christianity, 
just as philosophers call music, grammar, and rhetoric the handmaidens (auxiliaires) to philosophy (Lewis 
57; SC 148, 188). Origen urges Gregory to plunder the riches of the philosophers for his own use, just as 
God told the Israelites to plunder the riches of the Egyptians to produce the holy ark of the covenant (Lewis 
57-58; SC 148, 188-190). At the same time, Origen urges Gregory to be careful and to remember that 
Gregory's goal or object should be Christianity and not philosophy, given that philosophy can be used 
incorrectly or for heretical ends (Lewis 58-59; SC 148, 188-192). 
185 A central tenant in both Platonism and Stoicism was the belief that the cosmos was a 
completely rationally structured system which could not be otherwise, and therefore it was able to be 
understood through rational inquiry. George Boys-Stones helpfully demonstrates how such a view is at 
odds with Origen's Christianity: “The problem starts from the fact that this kind of approach to the world 
has built into it the assumption that the world is regular, everlasting (if not eternal), and that it could not 
have been otherwise in any significant manner...For, in Origen's view, a world so narrowly circumscribed 
by its causal principles that it could not have been otherwise is a world in which there is no room for moral 
autonomy; and if so, then it is a world which has no purpose, no reason to exist, at all” – George Boys-
Stones, "Human Autonomy and Divine Revelation in Origen," in Severan Culture, ed. Stephen Harrison 
Simon Swain, Jaś Elsner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 490-91. Origen insisted that the 
current world did not have to be as it is – it could have been different, or it might not have been at all. This 
means that human reason has limits. The holy Scriptures were a necessary secondary revelation which were 





may note at least three reasons why Origen used philosophy to enhance Scripture's 
teaching on this topic.186 
 First, Origen thinks that contemporary philosophy does not simply agree with the 
Bible's message, but that it strengthens the Bible's message. Whereas the Bible implies 
                                                          
186 When I speak of Origen using “Scripture’s teaching” as the primary source for his theology I 
do not mean to suggest that Origen used Scripture in a vacuum, for Origen inherited an exegetical tradition, 
with significant roots in 2nd Temple Judaism. Origen was exposed to a great diversity of views from 2nd 
Temple texts. Importantly, this diversity included Jewish views on fate, providence, and moral autonomy. 
In fact, there is evidence to suggest that the topic of moral autonomy was one of the defining elements or 
points of demarcation among various Jewish groups. For example, Josephus summarized the main Jewish 
factions according to their opinions regarding fate (by which he was probably referring to divine 
providence but using Roman nomenclature). There are four places where Josephus used beliefs on fate 
(providence) to distinguish between the Pharisees, Sadducees, and the Essenes: Wars of the Jews ii.119-66; 
Antiquities xiii.171-3; Antiquities xiii.288-98; and Antiquities xviii.11-25. D.A. Carson has written a 
helpful study on the various tensions between moral autonomy and divine providence found in the Old 
Testament and 2nd Temple texts, and his study highlights the wide spectrum of views – D. A. Carson, 
Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 
1981). More recently Gabriele Boccaccini has likewise emphasized the diversity of views in 2nd Temple 
Judaism, or what he calls “genealogies of subjects” – Gabriele Boccaccini, "Inner-Jewish Debate on the 
Tension between Divine and Human Agency in Second Temple Judaism," in Divine and Human Agency in 
Paul and his Cultural Environment, ed. John M. G. Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole (New York: T&T 
Clark, 2006), 10. Boccaccini discusses the “Zadokite worldview” which emphasized human accountability 
and appeared to limit the scope of divine providence, Enochic Judaism, which stressed that evil came from 
fallen angels, and so humans are more victims than they are perpetrators, Sapiential Judaism, which 
stressed that all human beings have the capacity to do good and that God is never the cause of falling away 
(13), and finally the theology of the Essenes which, to a large degree, was deterministic in character (18-
21). Cf. Francis Watson, "Constructing an Antithesis: Pauline and other Jewish Perspectives on Divine and 
Human Agency," in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment, ed. John M. G. 
Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole (New York: T&T Clark, 2006). 
In his technical discussions on the topic Origen prefers to use Greek terminology and categories 
when explaining moral autonomy, and so it is not always clear which aspects of the Scriptural tradition he 
is most indebted to (one exception, however, is Origen’s rather explicit use of “Two Ways” theology, 
which will be discussed below). The boundary between Jewish and Greek thought is blurred, and Philo’s 
influence on Origen’s theology is the best illustration of this. For a specific example of Philo’s influence on 
Origen, see the discussion below in Chapter 3 on the pre-existence of souls. On Philo’s influence on Origen 
in general, see David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey, Compendia Rerum 
Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum: Jewish Traditions in Early Christian Literature (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1993); Annewies Van den Hoek, "Philo and Origen: a Descriptive Catalogue of their Relationship," 
The Studia Philonica Annual 12(2000); Hans Georg Thümmel, "Philon und Origenes," in Origeniana 
Octava, ed. Lorenzo Perrone (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003); Justin M. Rogers, Didymus the 
Blind and the Alexandrian Christian Reception of Philo, ed. Thomas H. Tobin, Studia Philonica 
Monographs (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature Press, 2017), 31-34; 166-71. For an examination of 
Origen’s relationship with the Judaism of his time, including his sources and contacts, see N.R.M. De 
Lange, Origen and the Jews: Studies in Jewish-Christian Relations in Third-Century Palestine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 15-28; Paul Blowers, "Origen, the Rabbis, and the Bible: Toward a 
Picture of Judaism and Christianity in Third-Century Caesarea," in Origen of Alexandria: His World and 
His Legacy, ed. Charles Kannengiesser and William L. Petersen (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988); Michael G. Azar, Exegeting the Jews: The Early Reception of the Johannine "Jews", 





moral accountability, philosophy has the power to demonstrate its workings in detail. 
Origen wants to marshal as much evidence as he can to buttress his attack against the 
gnostics, for he felt the urgency of their threat could not be ignored. 
  The second reason Origen employs philosophy in his explanation of moral 
autonomy is related to the first. Although Origen implies that the Bible should be 
sufficient for teaching the reality of moral responsibility, he also admits that there are 
some places in Scripture which appear to suggest otherwise (e.g. Romans 9).187 Since at 
times Scripture appears to speak with two voices on this topic (at least on a superficial 
level), Origen often finds himself trying to convince Christians that one interpretation is 
more valid than the other. As such, arguments from philosophy can help adjudicate one 
reading of Scripture over another; external evidence helps solve the internal exegetical 
debate. 
 The third reason Origen underscores the agreement between revelation and 
philosophy on this topic is for an apologetic purpose. It is a signal to non-Christian 
philosophers that Christianity is true and should be respected. It is Origen's way of 
saying: “our divine revelation from God teaches the very same thing that your 
philosophers have recently figured out; Christianity is legitimate!” Contra Celsum may 
be the best example of this strategy. Origen's message there boils down to the following: 
not only is it wrong to believe that Christians are irrational, but in fact Christians often 
know Greek philosophy better than their pagan counterparts (certainly better than 
                                                          
187 PArch 3.1.6-7: “Indeed, there are in the scriptures ten thousand passages which with the utmost 
clearness prove the existence of free will. But since certain sayings from both the Old and the New 





Celsus).188 At the same time, it is important to remember that Origen does not feel 
constrained by the philosophical arguments he borrows. As we will see, Origen is not 
afraid to alter standardized expressions and arguments from Greek philosophy to support 
his own Christian ends. 
 
Origen's General Anthropology: the “Tripartite Person” and the “Dual Nature” 
 Origen derives his belief in moral autonomy from the scriptures, and he also 
emphasizes his willingness to plunder Greek philosophy to strengthen his belief 
whenever possible. Now we may begin to outline his anthropology. First, I will discuss 
Origen’s view of the human person in general (he derives this from Scripture), and then 
in the next section I will examine how Origen understands the mechanics of choice to 
operate within that anthropology. Here Origen largely inherits his view from Stoicism, 
yet he also adapts it in significant ways. 
 To understand Origen’s tripartite anthropology we must start at the beginning of 
cosmic history as Origen understands it.189 In the primordial state of existence190 Origen 
                                                          
 188 This is why Origen does not merely call Celsus wrong, but he calls him a “bad philosopher” 
(ἀφιλόσοφον) – e.g. Cels II.40 (Chadwick 98; SC 132, 378). In this Origen is merely following the example 
of earlier apologists such as Quadratus, Aristides, Justin Martyr, Tatian, and Athenagoras. On the writings 
of the Apologists see Quasten, The Beginnings of Patristic Literature, Volume 1: 186-253. For a helpful 
summary of Contra Celsum see E. Barnikol, "Celsus und Origenes," Texte und Untersuchungen 77 (Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, 1961), 124-27. 
 Origen frequently defends Christianity from Celsus’ accusation that Christians stole ideas from the 
Greek philosophers. For example, on the subject of “holy land”, Origen writes: “It has been our object to 
show that we did not take the idea of the holy land from the Greeks or from Plato. But since the Greeks 
were more recent, not only than Moses who was of the greatest antiquity…” – Cels VII.30 (Chadwick 418-
419; SC 150, 80-82). On the priority of Moses over Greek philosophy, cf. Cels IV.21 (Chadwick 197-198; 
SC 136, 232-234). 
189 Origen gets the tripartite schema from Paul in 1 Thess. 5:23 – see ComRm I.12.14-18 (Bammel 
69). Origen's discussion of the tripartite person may also be found in PArch 2.8.4 (SC 252, 348); 3.4.2 (SC 
268, 204-206); ComJn 32.218 (SC 385, 278-280); ComRm I.21.40-52 (Bammel 88); VI.1.53-61 (Bammel 
458); Dial 6.23-7.8 (SC 67, 68-70). For more on Origen's general anthropology, see Henri Crouzel, 
"L'anthropologie d'Origène dans la perspective du combat spirituel," Revue d'ascètique et de mystique 
31(1955); Jacques Dupiuis, L'esprit de l'homme" : etude sur l'anthropologie religieuse d'origene, Museum 





believes that God created rational and incorporeal beings called Minds or Intelligences 
(νοῦς);191 while the νοῦς is incorporeal, properly speaking, it nevertheless cannot exist 
without being attached to a corporeal body, for only the Trinity can exist as fully 
immaterial.192 Thus, even in the soul’s pre-earthly life it had a body (albeit not an earthly 
body).193 God also created rational beings with a spiritual element (the πνεῦμα). Origen 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Heraclides are from the critical edition (by volume and page): Jean Scherer, Entretien D'Origène avec 
Héraclide, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1960). All English translations are from 
Robert Daly, Origen: Treatise on the Passover ; And, Dialogue of Origen with Heraclides and His Fellow 
Bishops on the Father, the Son, and the Soul, ACW (New York: Paulist Press, 1992). 
190 In a recent book Mark Edwards tries to overturn the long-standing view in Origen scholarship 
that Origen believed in the pre-existence of souls (Edwards allows pre-existence only in a sort of technical 
in utero sense): Mark J. Edwards, Origen Against Plato (Aldershot/Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 91f. 
Marguerite Harl had also suggested that the pre-existence Origen refers to is simply the existence of beings 
in God's foreknowledge, but before their actual creation – Marguerite Harl, "La préexistence des âmes dans 
l'œuvre d'Origène," in Origeniana Quarta: Internationalen Origenskongresses, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck: 
Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 253. Most scholars, however, continue to hold the position that Origen did 
understand souls to exist before the creation of the material world. Origen explicitly affirms this position in 
the following places: PArch 2.1.3 (SC 252, 240); 2.8.3 (SC 252, 344-346); 2.8.4 (SC 252, 348); 3.3.5 (SC 
268, 194); Cels V.29 (SC 147, 86-88). For orientation on the current state of this debate, see Blosser, 
Become Like the Angels: 158f. I will discuss Origen’s views regarding the pre-existent state of souls in 
Chapter 3. 
191 Rufinus translates this in various ways – e.g. PArch 2.9.1: “We must suppose, therefore, that in 
the beginning God made as large a number of rational and intelligent beings [rationabilium creaturarum 
uel intellectualium], or whatever the before-mentioned minds [mentes] ought to be called, as he foresaw 
would be sufficient” (Butterworth 129; SC 252, 352). 
192 PArch 1.6.4: “…we believe that to exist without material substance and apart from any 
association with a bodily element [subsistere sine corporibus] is a thing that belongs only to the nature of 
God, that is, of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit” (Butterworth 58; SC 252, 206); PArch 2.2.2: “But 
if it is impossible by any means to maintain this proposition, namely, that any being, with the exception of 
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, can live apart from a body, then logical reasoning compels us to believe 
that, while the original creation was of rational beings [rationabiles naturas], it is only in idea and thought 
that a material substance [materialem substantiam] is separable from them, and that though this substance 
seems to have been produced for them or after them, yet never have they lived or do they live without it; 
for we shall be right in believing that life without a body is found in the Trinity alone” (Butterworth 81; SC 
252, 246-248). Some scholars doubt the authenticity of these passages and attribute them to Rufinus’ 
attempts to adjust Origen’s view into a more orthodox presentation. For more on this debate see below, 
n193. 
193 This continues to be one of the most contested claims in Origen scholarship, for many scholars 
believe that Origen understood pre-existent souls to be completely incorporeal, with bodies only being 
added later at the time when souls were placed into the material cosmos. Additionally, this debate typically 
goes hand-in-hand with a parallel debate over whether Origen believed souls would retain their bodies after 
the resurrection or within the future apocatastasis (cf. below n201). Crouzel has been the most famous 
advocate of the position that souls were always joined to corporeal bodies. Through his many publications 
Crouzel forcefully argued that Origen affirmed the continuity of embodied souls in both his protology and 
his eschatology, and as a result this has been the dominant view among scholars ever since – see, for 
example, Crouzel, "L'Apocatastase chez Origène." Nevertheless, a few significant scholars continue to 
advance the argument that Origen believed souls were initially created without any corporeal bodies, and 





does not always differentiate clearly between the spirit and soul, but he links the spirit 
aspect with a person’s conscience; it is where positive motivations towards the good are 
found.194 Not to be confused with the Holy Spirit, the spirit is the divine element within 
rational creatures, and it is rightly called an aspect of the person.195  
                                                                                                                                                                             
final moment when God is all in all – e.g. Róbert Somos, "Origenian apocatastasis revisited?," 
Cristianesimo nella storia 23, no. 1 (2002); Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil: 
126; Peter W. Martens, "A Fitting Portrait of God: Origen's Interpretations of the "Garments of Skin" (Gen 
3:21)," in Hidden Truths from Eden: Esoteric Readings of Genesis 1-3, ed. Caroline Vander Stichele and 
Susanne Scholz, Society of Biblican Literature (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014); Jacobsen, Christ-The Teacher 
of Salvation: A Study on Origen's Christology and Soteriology: 263-65. Jacobsen, for example, argues that 
Origen's insistence on the equality or lack of diversity in the original creation necessitates “asomatic” 
existence. Without going into too much detail on this point, I would point out that Origen's argument for 
equality during the initial state is meant to be a counterargument to the gnostic teaching of diverse natures, 
and does not seem to be intended as an argument for bodiless existence. I am convinced by Crouzel’s 
position on the basis of several strong arguments, such as the fact that Origen admits that occasionally 
when he talks about incorporeal existence he is merely using a colloquial or common definition of 
“incorporeal” (ἀσώματος, Rufinus – incorporeum) in the sense of invisible or ethereal, and he states that he 
does not mean absolutely or philosophically immaterial – e.g. PArch praef 8 (Butterworth 5-6; SC 252, 86). 
Crouzel covers this particular point in: Henri Crouzel, "La doctrine origénienne du corps ressuscité," 
Bulletin de litterature Ecclésiastique 81 (1980). Another common theme in Origen is that God originally 
created all creatures by “number and measure.” Origen links the idea of number to rational minds and he 
links measure to bodily matter, “for to God there is nothing either without end or without measure” – 
PArch 4.4.8 (Butterworth 323-325; SC 268 420-422). The fact that nothing apart from God can exist 
without measure (without bodily existence of some kind) is further reinforced by the fact that Origen links 
“number and measure” to an allegorical interpretation of God’s original creation of “heaven and earth.” 
Thus, in PArch 2.9.1 Origen interprets “heaven and earth” to refer to God’s first creation of pre-existent 
souls and matter, for he says that the firmament and dry land (that is, the secondary and earthly “heaven 
and earth”) borrow their names from the heaven and earth that were before. Thus, Origen insinuates that 
bodies were created simultaneously with souls in the original pre-existent creation (Butterworth 129-130; 
SC 352-354). Origen similarly affirms that souls will always retain bodies post-resurrection. In PArch 
2.10.3 (Butterworth 141; SC 252, 380-382) Origen states that implanted within our bodies is a “life-
principle” (ratio) which contains the “essence” (subsantiam) of the body. This life-principle is what God 
uses to reconfigure the various stages of the soul’s embodiment, and so it is this life-principle which links 
our earthly body with our resurrection body. This discussion is preserved in Rufinus’ Latin and so may fall 
under suspicion. Therefore, it is significant that a parallel passage is preserved in the Greek in Origen’s 
Contra Celsus. There Origen specifies that although resurrection bodies will be different, nevertheless the 
soul always resides in a tabernacle (the body), a tabernacle which possesses a “seminal principle” (λόγος 
σπέρματος), and “in this tabernacle those who are righteous groan, being weighed down, and desiring not to 
put it off but to be clothed on top of it…” – Cels VII.32 (Chadwick 420, emphasis added; SC 150, 84-86). 
Edwards has written a forceful article where he argues that many of the quotations which insinuate fully 
disembodied souls and which were later ascribed to Origen by his unfriendly critics (e.g. Jerome and 
Justinian) do not logically fit alongside passages we know to be authentically Origen’s – Mark J. Edwards, 
"Origen no Gnostic; or, on the Corporeality of Man," Journal of Theological Studies 43 (1992). 
194 ComRm II.7.48-52: “In my opinion the conscience [conscientiae] is identical with the spirit, 
which the Apostle says is with the soul as we have taught above. The conscience functions like a 
pedagogue to the soul, a guide and companion, as it were, so that it might admonish it concerning better 
things or correct and convict it of faults” (Scheck 2.133; Bammel 137). 
195 Dial 6.23-7.8 (Daly 62; SC 67, 68-70): “We have learned from the holy Scriptures that the 





A subset of these tripartite rational beings fell to the earth to become embodied 
souls (ψυχή) – that is to say, human beings.196 Though still attached to a material body, 
the earthly body is not identical with its primordial form and will one day be restored to 
its glorious and heavenly form in the resurrection.197 Humans on earth remain tripartite: 
body, spirit and soul (σῶμα/corpus, πνεῦμα/spiritus, and ψυχή/anima).198 These are three 
aspects (esse) of the composite individual.199 Crouzel concluded that Origen held this 
tripartite feature to be true of rational creatures at every stage of their existence;200 the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
body…This spirit is not the Holy Spirit, but a part of the human composite.” Crouzel’s remarks about the 
spirit are helpful here: “Distinguished from the Holy Spirit, it is nonetheless a kind of created participation 
in the latter and the latter’s seat when He is present in a man. It is one of the many expressions used by 
Origen approximating to what would later be called sanctifying grace; but it differs from the scholastic 
conception, first in that it is found in every man and not simply in the baptized, second in that it does not 
quit a man when he sins here below: it stays with him in a state of inertia, but as a possibility of 
conversion” – Crouzel, Origen: 88. 
 196 Origen is usually consistent in using νοῦς for individuals both in the prelapsarian past and the 
final future and using ψυχή for the postlapsarian embodied state. But see PArch 2.11.5: “He knew when he 
had gone back to Christ he would learn more clearly the reasons for all things that happen on earth, that is, 
the reasons which account for man, for his soul [anima] or his mind [mente], or whichever of these 
constitutes man...” (Butterworth 150; SC 252, 404). Origen also views the transition of “minds” to “souls” 
to take place along a sliding scale – PArch 2.8.4: “it seems to me that the departure and downward course 
of the mind must not be thought of as equal in all cases, but as a greater or less degree of change into soul, 
and that some minds retain a portion of their original vigour, while others retain none or only a very little” 
(Butterworth 127; SC 252, 348). 
 197 In the ascent towards God after death the person’s body remains, but it develops into a 
“spiritual body” (spiritalis corporis) – PArch 3.6.6 (Butterworth 252; SC 268, 246). Cf. PArch 2.10.1-3 
(SC 252, 374-382); PArch 3.6.7 (SC 268, 250). 
198 Origen also links the three aspects of the person to his threefold interpretation of Scripture: e.g. 
in PArch 4.2.4 Greek (Butterworth 275-276; SC 268, 310-312) Origen explains that in thinking about 
Scripture’s threefold meaning, the flesh corresponds to the obvious meaning (literal and historical) and is 
designed for the simple man, the soul corresponds to the moral meaning and is for those who are making 
some progress, and the spirit corresponds to the mystical and allegorical meaning and is meant for those 
who can understand God’s mysteries. He concludes in this passage by saying, “For just as man consists of 
body, soul, and spirit, so in the same way does the scripture, which has been prepared by God to be given 
for man’s salvation.” 
 199 ComRm I.12.14-18: “Accordingly the Apostle serves God not in the body [corpus] or in the 
soul [anima] but in his best part, in the spirit [spiritus]. For when he writes to the Thessalonians he makes 
known that these three aspects [esse] are in man when he says, ‘May your whole body, soul, and spirit be 
preserved on the day of our Lord Jesus Christ’” (Scheck 1.79; Bammel 69). 
 200 Crouzel, Origen: 91. For an opposing view, see Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the 
Problem of Evil: 126. While I am persuaded by Crouzel, I would suggest that there are two points at which 
Origen appears to make an exception to his general rule of permanent embodiment. First, before souls were 
created they eternally existed in a figurative form within God’s wisdom and foreknowledge (what we might 
call a pre-pre-existence) – see discussion on this point in Chapter 3. A second possible exception is the 
state of souls within the final apocatastasis. It is possible that Origen left as an open question to be explored 





end will be like the beginning, and Origen affirms the three aspects of rational beings will 
be present in the final restoration as well.201 The entire tripartite person needs saving, 
which is made possible because the savior Jesus Christ assumed our tripartite nature as 
well.202 
 Origen defines a soul as an existence capable of feeling and movement,203 which 
is located midway (or as a medium) between the person's body and spirit.204 And it is in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
believe this is the best possible reading of Origen, but I grant that it is a possibility – cf. Gerard Watson, 
"Souls and bodies in Origen's Peri Archon," Irish Theological Quarterly 55, no. 3 (1989): 187-88. The state 
of bodies and souls in the final apocatastasis also raises interesting questions regarding the operation of 
creaturely moral autonomy in the final state. If souls retain bodies in the apocatastasis, why does Origen 
believe they will not use moral autonomy to fall away a second time? Or, if souls and bodies are both 
subsumed into God in the apocatastasis, then in what sense could moral autonomy exist anymore, given 
that independent existence seems to evolve into something different? These questions and the challenges 
they pose for articulating Origen’s view of moral autonomy will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
201 As mentioned above, there is lively debate among scholars whether or not Origen envisioned 
souls to retain their spiritual bodies after their final reunion with God. From my perspective, Origen 
appears to hold the permanence of the spiritual bodies even in this final state, although he stresses their 
non-earthly quality – e.g. PArch 2.10.1-2: “For it is from the natural body that the very power and grace of 
the resurrection evokes the spiritual body, when it transforms from dishonour to glory . . . We indeed 
understand the matter thus: the apostle, when he wished to describe how great were the differences among 
those who rise in glory, that is, the saints, drew a comparison from the heavenly bodies…” (Butterworth 
139-140; SC 252, 376-378). Hennessey has explored Origen’s understanding of the luminous body after 
death, and he concludes that Origen always envisions the soul to be joined to a body of some kind – 
Lawrence R. Hennessey, "Origen of Alexandria: The Fate of the Soul and the Body after Death," The 
Second Century: A Journal of Early Christian Studies 8, no. 3 (1991). Cf. Watson’s Watson, "Souls and 
bodies in Origen's Peri Archon," especially 184-91.  
 202 Dial 7.1-30 (SC 67, 70-72). Origen notes here that the three parts of Jesus (body, soul, and 
spirit) were separated in the passion, but were reunited at the time of the resurrection. Origen’s claim here 
that even the spirit aspect of a person needs to be saved appears to be at odds with Origen’s teaching 
elsewhere that a person’s spirit remains untainted and never convicted of bad deeds (on this point, see 
discussion below on ComRm II.7.48-52). I would suggest that one way to understand Origen’s comments 
here is to remember that Origen’s view of salvation is the successful ascent and restoration of the person to 
God. Thus, even if the spirit aspect is untainted in a moral sense, it nevertheless also remains apart from 
God given its connection to the soul, and therefore along with body and soul it, too, requires ascent and 
restoration. 
 203 Rufinus struggles to make Origen understandable here – PArch 2.8.1: “For soul is defined thus, 
as an existence possessing imagination and desire, which qualities can be expressed in Latin, though the 
rendering is not so apt as the original, by the phrase, capable of feeling and movement [Definitur namque 
anima hoc modo, quia sit substantia φανταστικὴ et ὁρμητική, quod latine, licet non tam proprie 
explanetur, dicit amen potest sensibilis et mobilis]” (Butterworth 120; SC 252, 338). 
 204 PArch 2.8.4: “…it appears as if the soul were some kind of medium [medium] between the 






the relationship of these three aspects that the tripartite human205 experiences spiritual 
battle.206 Both the spirit and the body have certain inclinations: the spirit desires, and the 
body lusts.207 These inclinations are not to be confused with Platonic passions, for Origen 
thinks of them as rational urges, or cognitive thoughts.208 Body and spirit always have 
                                                          
205 Although the tripartite language is suggestive, Origen does not see his tripartite view as the 
same as Plato's view; in PArch 3.4.1 Origen introduces Plato's theory of a tripartite soul (rational, appetite, 
and passion) and states that he does “not observe [it] to be strongly confirmed by the authority of divine 
scripture” (Butterworth 230-231; SC 268, 200). Blosser believes that the view Origen dismisses in this 
passage is not so-much that of Plato's, but rather a view from later in the Platonic tradition (he calls it 
“Middle Platonic”) – Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 26-29, especially n34. An interesting exception 
where Origen entertains the Platonic tripartite model can be found when he discusses the four visages of the 
cherubim in Ezekiel: HomEzek 1.16.9-25 (SC 352, 94-96; Scheck 44-45). Here Origen suggests that the 
first three faces might represent a tripartite soul in the Platonic sense (man – rational, lion – 
anger/spiritedness, calf – concupiscent), with the fourth face of the eagle denoting the governing spirit of 
the soul which rules over the other three. Origen does not appear to have used this alternate model beyond 
this particular instance. Cf. Angela Russell Christman, "What did Ezekiel See?": Christian Exegesis of 
Ezekiel's Vision of the Chariot from Irenaeus to Gregory the Great (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 104. 
206 Cf. ComRm V.3 (Scheck 1.338; Bammel 404): [Origen says that currently God is not yet “all in 
all” and so the present time] seems not so much a time of reigning as of war. Through this war the future 
kingdom is being striven for.” 
 207 ComRm I.21.40-52 (Scheck 1.94; Bammel 88): “Either [the soul] gives assent to the desires of 
the spirit or it is inclined toward the lusts of the flesh.” 
 208 This is a contested point. Blosser, for example, appears to understand the desires of the flesh to 
be irrational only –  Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 32-33; 114. However, in PArch 3.3.4 Origen writes 
that the soul can be influenced by either good or bad spirits, which implies rational and cognitive 
influences (good spirits operate from within the arena of the person’s spirit, while bad spirits operate from 
within the arena of the person’s body). Evil spirits, for example, “deprave the soul, while it still thinks and 
understands, through harmful suggestion by means of different kinds of thoughts and evil inducements [uel 
cum sentientem quidem et intellegentem animum cogitationibus uariis et sinistris persuasionibus inimica 
suggestione deprauant]” (Butterworth 227; SC 268, 192). PArch 3.4.1 describes temptations as coming 
from the “wisdom of flesh and blood [prudentia carnis et sanguinis]” (Butterworth 230; SC 268, 198). 
Origen does speak at times of sin as a type of irrationality – e.g. PArch 2.10.8: The “outer darkness” is “a 
description of those who through their immersion in the darkness of deep ignorance have become separated 
from every gleam of reason and intelligence [rationis et intellegentiae]” (Butterworth 145; SC 252, 392). 
However, Origen understands irrationality in such contexts to be understood as failure to act in accordance 
with true reason, rather than an assertion that some impulses are nonrational in general. As will be 
demonstrated below, Origen follows the standard Stoic model of psychology as well as Stoic technical 
vocabulary when he describes the mechanics of choice, and this further suggests that he, like the Stoics, 
recognizes the passions (or emotions) to be rational impulsive-impressions. According to the Stoic model 
these impulsive-impressions are rational in the technical sense that they are not nonrational (i.e. they reflect 
rational beliefs, because in rational animals all impressions and impulses carry propositional content and 
cognitive character). Julia Annas helpfully distinguishes between the two senses of the word 'irrational' in: 
Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Los Angelos: University of California Press, 1994), 78-81, 
103f. She writes: “Our normal talk of 'irrational' impulses suggests that they are not rational at all; but for 
the Stoics ordinary language is just wrong here, for there can be no such thing as a totally nonrational 
impulse” (106). Passions may be disobedient to the dictates of reason, and therefore may be called 
irrational but this must only be taken in a normative sense – that is to say, the impulse went against right 
reason. But even in such cases the impulses are reasoned since impulses just are the reasoning that leads to 





desires which are at odds with one another, one to vice and the other to virtue. The soul, 
on the other hand, is indifferent in character and is therefore receptive of either virtue or 
vice.209 The soul feels the persuasive tug of both spirit and body, and must make the 
choice of whether to join (iungere) with the spirit and become one with the spirit, or to 
join with the body and become one with the body.210 Thus, the source of a person's moral 
judgment (choice) resides only in the soul which is stationed between the other two 
aspects (esse) – it is the soul which must finally choose between the competing 
inclinations.  
 Origen further distinguishes between the desires and the actions of the spirit and 
body. As mentioned above, the desires of the spirit and body are always at odds with one 
another; they are never in alignment. However, the actions of the spirit and body are not 
necessarily at odds. This seems to work in the following way: once the soul chooses to 
align with the spirit we might call it the spirit's action, and once the soul aligns with the 
body we can call it the body's action. Some actions taken by the spirit extend to the body. 
Origen uses the example of chastity: if chastity begins in the “inner man” (spirit), then it 
will by necessity follow in the “outer man” (body), for a man who chooses chastity 
according to his heart cannot then commit adultery with his body. On the other hand, if 
chastity begins in the outer man, it does not necessarily follow that the man will be pure 
                                                                                                                                                                             
entails an assent (though not always a conscious one) because all perceptions are in the language of thought 
(78). Perceptions necessarily will be the product of the rational character, habits, and one's experiences up 
to that point (81). Perhaps it might be better expressed in English by saying that while all impulses are 
reasoned, not all are therefore reasonable. 
 209 ComJn 32.218 (Heine 383; SC 385, 278-280): “I have noticed a distinction between soul and 
spirit in all Scripture. I observe that the soul is something intermediate and capable of both virtue and 
evil…” 
 210 ComRm I.7.41-60 (Scheck 1.71; Bammel 58); ComRm I.21.40-52 (Scheck 1.94; Bammel 88). 
Cf. ComRm VIIII.25.5-11 (Scheck 2.222; Bammel 748): “…sometimes a man is identified through the 
soul, sometimes through the flesh, sometimes through the spirit. And when man needs to be identified by 
the better aspect, as one who ought to be understood as spiritual, he is called spirit; when, by his inferior 





in heart, even if he remains physically chaste.211 Thus, Origen notes that it is possible to 
be good externally and bad internally, but it is not possible to be good internally and bad 
externally. 
 At times Origen departs from this tripartite model to speak of individuals 
possessing a dual aspect. When Origen does so he is not contradicting his tripartite 
anthropology, but rather he is focusing on the two tendencies within the soul. The upper 
and better tendency of the soul refers to the intellect or the governing power of the soul. 
The lower and worse tendency of the soul refers to something that was added to the νοῦς 
after the primordial fall, and it is the source of passions and other temptations from the 
body.212 This is what Origen is referring to when he uses the more pejorative word σάρξ / 
carnis, as in desires or incentives of the flesh.213 This term denotes the unhealthy 
attraction of the soul towards fleshly desires, and should be distinguished from the body 
itself which has its own natural desires and functions that are not evil in and of 
themselves. The competing tendencies of the soul toward the spirit and body may be 
thought of as the inner man and outer man within each person.214 The two creation 
accounts in Genesis symbolize this dual nature of the person: our inward person (or soul 
                                                          
 211 ComRm II.9.579-592 (Bammel 175; Scheck 1.163-164). 
 212 Crouzel, Origen: 88-89. Cf. Stephen Bagby, "Volitional Sin in Origen's Commentary on 
Romans," Harvard Theological Review 107, no. 3 (2014). 
 213 E.g. PArch 3.4.1-2 (SC 268, 198-206); ComRm II.9.371 (Bammel 164). Cf. Bagby’s discussion 
on Origen’s distinction of the body qua body, and the body qua flesh: "Volitional Sin in Origen's 
Commentary on Romans," 351-55. 
 214 ComRm II.9.569-575: “Often it is discussed by the Apostle where he points out through 
specific examples that men are of dual aspects [esse]; the one he usually calls the outer man and the other, 
the inner man. He says that the one is according to the flesh [carnem] and the other is according to the 
Spirit [spiritum]” (Scheck 1.163; Bammel 174). Cf. ComRm I.7.42-60 (Bammel 58-59). Origen also uses 
this distinction between “inner man” and “outer man” in his interpretation of Romans 7. When Paul adopts 
the persona of a weak Christian and says that “I do not do the good I want to do”, the “I” is referring to the 
inner man – that aspect of the person (the soul’s alignment with the spirit) which knows the good and 
desires the good. Origen is not suggesting that the person is not responsible for the evil that they do. 






and spirit) is made in the image of God, while our external person (or body) is made from 
the dust of the earth.215 Origen also connects Paul's comments in Romans 2 about two 
types of Jews with this idea: the external person is linked with an outward Jew while the 
internal person is linked with being a Jew in secret.216 
 One way Origen benefits from occasionally framing his tripartite anthropology as 
a dualistic struggle within the soul is that it allows him to draw upon the Jewish “Two 
Ways” tradition; the “Two Ways” are linked to the flesh/spirit dynamic.217 The two 
choices set before the soul are choices of life or death, Christ or the devil.218 Related to 
this, it is important to note that Origen envisions the struggle of the soul to be more than a 
mere intra-person phenomenon; he is explicit that the struggle of the “Two Ways” has a 
cosmic dimension.219 If a person's soul is sitting on the center of a seesaw with the 
opposite seats holding the person's spiritual desires and fleshly desires, then cosmic 
powers of good and evil are helping to support each opposing side in the battle to win the 
soul's choice. The devil and his cohorts support the desires of the flesh against the spirit, 
and patron angels (as well as God himself) support the spirit's struggle.220 The human 
                                                          
 215 ComRm II.9.565-578 (Scheck 1.163; Bammel 174-175). Cf. Dial 16.11 where Origen reiterates 
the dual creation story of the inner man and outer man in Genesis, and then remarks, “There are, therefore, 
two human beings in each of us” (Daly 69-70; SC 67, 88). This interpretation of the text also serves as an 
anti-gnostic polemic, for certain gnostic groups would explain the two creation stories as the creation of 
two different classes of people. It should be noted that Origen interpreted Genesis 1-2 in a variety of ways, 
and the above example is simply one among many. Origen also used Genesis 1-2, for example, to defend 
his view of the pre-existence of souls – cf. Peter W. Martens, "Origen's Doctrine of Pre-Existence and the 
Opening Chapters of Genesis," Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 16, no. 3 (2013). 
 216 ComRm II.9.565-578 (Scheck 1.163; Bammel 174-175). 
 217 Cf. Matt. 7:13-14; Didache 1. 
 218 ComRm I.21.72-74: “The soul therefore makes its own decision [arbitrio] whether it wants to 
choose life, that is Christ, or to turn aside to death, the devil” (Scheck 1.95, Bammel 89). 
 219 Origen links “Two Ways” with the idea of 2 angels by mentioning where the Epistle of 
Barnabas teaches that “there are two ways, one of light and the other of darkness, over which preside 
certain angels, the angels of God over the way of light and Satan's angels over the way of darkness” – 
PArch 3.2.4 (Butterworth 217; SC 268, 170). cf. Barn 18.1.  
 220 PArch 3.2.1-3 (SC 268, 152-168); 3.3.4-5 (SC 268, 192-196). On patron (guardian) angels in 






soul remains intermediate and must choose between the summons of either side.221 
Origen is careful to note that despite the intimidating spiritual battleground that is arrayed 
both for and against us, the duty of choice remains up to the soul.222 No matter how great 
the force on each end of the seesaw, the soul is able to sway the balance by taking a step 
either forward or backward. In fact, Origen grants the soul certain powers of dissuasion 
against the cosmic forces by asserting that it is possible for the soul to cause these powers 
to leave. For instance, if the soul repeatedly spurns the help of the good angels in favor of 
the bad, the good powers will abandon the soul (at least for a time) and hand it over to the 
desires of its flesh.223 
 All throughout Origen’s discussions on moral autonomy – whether in the context 
of the tripartite person, or in the context of the dual nature – Origen insists upon one 
unmistakable idea: in order for moral autonomy to be genuine, the soul requires a binary 
moral power. It can choose life or death, spiritual desire or fleshly desire, improvement or 
regression, the way of Christ or the way of the devil. According to Origen, the soul’s 
rational power over binary differentiation is precisely the condition which establishes 
                                                          
 221 ComRm I.21.58-60: “…all the good angels support the spirit as it struggles against the flesh and 
attempt to summon the human soul, which is intermediate, to itself” (Scheck 1.94-95; Bammel 89). 
 222 ComRm I.21.65-67: “But out of both sides’ support, the duty of choice is preserved. For the 
matter is not done by force [ui] nor is the soul moved in either of the two directions by compulsion 
[necessitate]” (Scheck 1.95; Bammel 89). Cf. PArch 3.2.4: “We must bear in mind, however, that nothing 
else happens to us as a result of these good or evil thoughts which are suggested to our heart but a mere 
agitation and excitement [incitamentum provocans] which urges us on to deeds either of good or of evil. It 
is possible for us, when an evil power has begun to urge us on to a deed of evil, to cast away the wicked 
suggestions and to resist the low enticements and to do absolutely nothing worthy of blame; and it is 
possible on the other hand when a divine power has urged us on to better things not to follow its guidance, 
since our faculty of free will [liberi arbitrii] is preserved to us in either case” (Butterworth 217; SC 268, 
170). 
 223 ComRm I.21.79-82: If the soul continues to turn away from the spirit and towards the desires of 
the flesh, and to those beings which support the desires of the flesh, “it shall doubtless be forsaken and 
abandoned by those beings which, by their support, were encouraging it to be joined with the spirit. They 
withdraw from it or hand it over to the desires of its own heart, by which it is united and joined to the flesh” 





genuine moral autonomy and genuine moral responsibility.224 This ability of 
differentiation (movement towards and away from the good) is the condition which 
derives directly from Origen’s dual hermeneutic of God’s fairness and goodness. 
 
Greek Vocabulary and Expressions of Moral Autonomy 
 Scripture may be sufficient for establishing the reality of moral autonomy, but 
Origen also borrows Greek philosophical terms and concepts in order to give greater 
detail to the inner workings of freedom of choice. The issue of moral responsibility and 
personal agency had long been discussed under the Greek phrase τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or “what 
depends on us”. I.M. Bugár has noted that by Origen's time, however, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, or 
“autonomy” appears to emerge as the technical term for this issue, although τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν 
continues to be used as well.225 Along with τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν Origen uses the term τὸ 
αὐτεξούσιον frequently, probably influenced in part by Epictetus226, and perhaps also by 
Alexander of Aphrodisias.227 It is used by other Christian authors familiar to Origen as 
well, such as Justin Martyr,228 Irenaeus,229 and Clement of Alexandria.230 According to 
                                                          
224 Thus, the following formula is a common-place in Origen: “There is therefore no nature which 
may not admit good or evil, except the nature of God, which is the source of all good, and that of Christ; for 
Christ is wisdom, and wisdom certainly cannot admit folly – PArch 1.8.3 (Butterworth 70; SC 252, 226). 
Cf. PArch 1.3.8: “God the Father bestows on all the gift of existence; and a participation in Christ, in virtue 
of his being the word or reason, makes them rational. From this it follows that they are worthy of praise or 
blame, because they are capable alike of virtue and wickedness” (Butterworth 38; SC 252, 162). 
 225 I. M. Bugár, "Where does Free Will come from? Some Remarks Concerning the Development 
of the Concept of Human Autonomy before Origen," in Origeniana Nona: Origen and the Religious 
Practice of his time, ed. G. Heidl and R. Somos, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 
(Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 626; Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception," 166-67. The heading for First 
Principles Book III in Greek begins “Περί αὐτεξουσίου...” 
 226 Dissertationes II, 2, 3; IV, 1, 56; 62; 68; 100. Cited in Bugár, "Where does Free Will come 
from?," 626. Bugár believes that the Stoic Epictetus appears to be one of the first to use τὸ αὐτεξούσιον as a 
technical term. On Origen’s familiarity with Epictetus, see below n237. 
 227 De fato 14: 182, 24; 18: 188, 21; 19: 189, 10. Cited in ibid. On Origen’s familiarity with 
Alexander, see below n238. 
 228 Apologia II, 7, 5; Dialogus 88; 102; 141. Cited in ibid., 627. 
 229 Haer. I, 6, 1; IV, 37, 2 (fr. 21); IV, 39, 3 (fr. 26); V, 4, 1 (fr. 4 Pap. Jena); V, 28, 2 (fr. 22); V, 





Susanne Bobzien, the shift in popularity from τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν to τὸ αὐτεξούσιον denotes a 
strengthening of the concept. An action that is in my own power (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) is not 
merely an action that is done through me with my consent, but it is an action that depends 
on my decision whether to do or not to do.231 English translations commonly render the 
term as “free will”, but this can be misleading, since τὸ αὐτεξούσιον does not imply an 
independent mental faculty called the “will.”232 I have avoided using expressions such as 
“free will” and “freedom of the will”, opting instead for “freedom of choice,” “free 
choice,” or simply “moral autonomy” when referring to Origen’s discussions of τὸ 
ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τὸ αὐτεξούσιον.233 
 Bobzien has also demonstrated that although 3rd century authors often used the 
same vocabulary and expressions when discussing moral autonomy, they did not always 
agree on their meaning.234 Virtually everyone who disavowed fatalism in Origen's day 
would have been comfortable with the notion of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τὸ αὐτεξούσιον in the 
general sense that moral responsibility requires that an action be up to us to do or not to 
do. But precisely what was meant by the expression “able to do or not to do” differed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 230 Stromata I 17.83, 2; II 19, 99, 3; V 1, 3, 2; 13, 83, 1; 5; 14, 133, 8; Paedagogus I, 6, 33; I, 9, 
76, 3; II, 5, 31, 2. Cited in ibid. 
 231 Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception," 166-67.  
232 When these terms were used in the 2nd-3rd centuries, the rational mind was always the subject of 
the free choice; there was never mention of a special faculty of the mind which stands distinct from one's 
rational center and which somehow has the freedom to make choices independently from one's rationality 
and emotions (Alexander of Aphrodisias is an exceptional case as we will see below). 
233 The comparable concept of liberum arbitrium (“free choice” or “free will”) was used around 
the same time by Latin speakers and is similar in meaning to τὸ αὐτἐξούσιον. It can be found in various 
Christian writers such as Tertullian (e.g. De anima 20-24). Rufinus will often use liberum arbitrium when 
translating Origen. Throughout this dissertation I will similarly transpose liberum arbitrium into “free 
choice” or “moral autonomy.” 
 234 “The historical treatment of the question of freedom and determinism is exacerbated by the fact 
that all key terms and phrases used to describe the problems involved are hopelessly vague or ambiguous. 





among various schools and authors.235 This means that different authors understood 
genuine moral responsibility to require different sets of conditions. By necessity236 
Origen was drawn into this larger discussion the moment he sought to ground moral 
responsibility in anything more than the bare declarations of Scripture. Origen was well-
versed with many models of moral psychology which had already been articulated by 
various Stoics, Peripatetics, and Middle Platonists. I do not intend to undertake the 
enormous task of surveying all of the possible sources that may have influenced Origen, 
but instead I will outline two starkly opposing formulations of moral autonomy that 
Origen knew – those of Epictetus the Stoic (1st century AD)237 and of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias the Peripatetic (fl. 200 AD).238 I offer the following presentations as useful 
foils for better understanding Origen’s own views on moral autonomy.239  
                                                          
 235 Bobzien has convincingly demonstrated that the meaning of the expression τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν is 
notoriously tricky to nail down. It can be used in what she calls a “one-sided, causative” meaning, in that it 
is up to me if something happens, but the not-happening of the thing was never up to me. And it can also be 
used as a “two-sided, causative” meaning, in that it depends on me whether something happens or does not 
happen. To further complicate matters, both the one-sided and the two-sided causative meanings can each 
entail either determinism or indeterminism, depending on the author, and the problem is that authors are 
often not clear on how they are using it – ibid., 139-42. 
 236 Pardon the pun. 
 237 Origen mentions reading Epictetus in Cels 6.2 (SC 147, 180) and he notes that Epictetus had 
been more popular in his day than Plato in his. Origen also uses many of the terms and concepts Epictetus 
had written about throughout his discussions on moral autonomy. For example, Frede notes that Origen's 
discussion of moral freedom in book III of First Principles “could have been taken straight from a late Stoic 
handbook” and that “some of Origen's explications of scriptural texts become intelligible only against the 
background [of Epictetus],” Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought: 113. Bobzien 
remarks that Epictetus had a large influence on many 3rd century Christian and Platonist writers: Bobzien, 
"The Inadvertent Conception," 161. Origen also mentions having read Chrysippus in Cels 1.64 (SC 132, 
254); 5.57 (SC 147, 156); 8.51 (SC 150, 286).  
238 On Origen's familiarity with Alexander, see Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre 
arbitre: 84. In the context of Origen's remarks on Judas the betrayer and Judas' “possible” future choices, 
Junod remarks: “On trouve une doctrine assez similaire chez Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, et il est 
vraisemblable qu'Origène s'en est inspire” (84). B. Darrell Jackson has noted that Origen appears to follow 
Alexander in the use of certain technical prepositions when describing the classification of plants, animals, 
and humans: B. Darrell Jackson, "Sources of Origen's Doctrine of Freedom," Church History 35, no. 1 
(1966): 21. Others who have found a connection between Origen and Alexander are: Beatrice Motta, Il 
Contra Fatum di Gregorio di Nissa nel dibattito tardo-antico sul fatalismo e sul determinismo, Studi sulla 
tardoantichità (Pisa and Rome: Fabrizio Serra Editore, 2008), 118; Ilaria Ramelli, "Alexander of 
Aphrodisias: A Source of Origen's Philosophy?," Philosophie Antique 13 (2013). In a recent book Mark 





Epictetus vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias 
 Epictetus followed standard Stoic reasoning which claimed that we have moral 
responsibility for our choices if we are the ones who make them.240 Our choices stem 
from our intellect and our disposition. People experience sensations (αἴσθησει) which 
produce in us mental impressions or representations (φαντασία). These impressions do 
not get transmitted to the mind in a neutral way; rather, the φαντασία are filtered through 
a person’s disposition and character and so appear before the intellect as a rational 
impression. That is to say, many times the impressions already predispose the mind 
towards a certain course of action.241 It is then up to our intellect or reason (λόγος) to 
judge the impressions and either assent to them (συγκατάθεσις) or decline to give our 
assent. When a person assents to the impression, an impulse to action (ὁρμή) is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
III.1.10-11 where God's 'act' that leads to Pharaoh's hardening of heart is mentioned, Origen's argument is 
directed against Alexander of Aphrodisias for whom any divine entities were completely blind” – Mark 
Elliot, Providence Perceived: Divine Action from a Human Point of View, vol. 124, Arbeiten zur 
Kirchengeschichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), 15. 
239 Origen was also familiar with a wide variety of philosophical options among the so-called 
Middle Platonists, and his views reveal varying degrees of similarity depending on the author. The reason I 
do not include them here is not that they are irrelevant or unimportant, but because there is such a wide 
diversity among the syncretistic views of Platonist authors. I have chosen to use Epictetus and Alexander as 
representative models of moral psychology that stand near the “poles”, so to speak, within the spectrum of 
1st-3rd century views of moral psychology (and because Origen was familiar with both). Thus, I must stress 
again that the following presentations of Epictetus and Alexander are meant as foils to better highlight 
those issues Origen found most important. I do not mean to suggest that Origen was faced with something 
as simple as an “either-or” option. I recommend to the reader Benjamin Blosser’s helpful monograph which 
attempts to trace the (complicated) continuity and discontinuity between Origen’s views of the body and 
soul and that of various Middle-Platonist writers – Blosser, Become Like the Angels. 
240 The standard compilation of Epictetus’ teaching is found in the 4-volume work called the 
Discourses, which claims to be transcribed copies of Epictetus’ words by one Arrian of Nicomedia. The 
standard Greek edition of the Discourses is: Epictetus, Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano Digestae (Greek 
text) (Leipzig: Teubner, 1916). A number of English translations have been made; an important translation 
is the Loeb edition: Epictetus: The Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, trans. 
W. A. Oldfather, 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1925–1928). 
Cf. A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
241 A. A. Long notes that these are called hormetic impressions, in that they are “a prima facie 
stimulus to action” – "Stoic pyschology," in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe 





generated.242 According to A. A. Long, it is probably more accurate to describe the Stoic 
view of reason as being the mind in its entirely, because reason actually transforms the 
other faculties: for humans, impressions become rational impressions, assent is rational 
assent, and impulses become rational impulses.243 
 Epictetus believed the principal task of humans was in learning how to use one’s 
impressions correctly.244 Thus, moral autonomy for Epictetus is to be found in the 
process of assent, broadly construed.245 Michael Frede remarks that in Epictetus’ writings 
we see the notion of a will made more explicit than it had been in previous philosophers, 
in that Epictetus narrows the idea of what is “up to us.” Centuries earlier, the Stoic 
Chrysippus had defined an action as “up to us” if assenting to the impulse which 
produces that action was in our power.246 Epictetus, however, argued that the action itself 
was never in our power, because even if we assented to the impression that was linked to 
a particular action, our action might be thwarted in some way by an outside force. Indeed, 
any action that is not part of God’s providential plan will be thwarted according to 
Stoicism. Therefore, the only thing that is truly up to us is the internal mental event where 
we give our assent to the impression.247 According to Frede, it is precisely this narrowing 
of what is up to us (from physical action to mental event) that appears to have led 
Epictetus to strengthen and broaden the mental event of assent compared to earlier 
                                                          
242 This can be a confusing point, given that both hormetic impressions and impulses pertain to an 
intention or predisposition to action. Impulses, however, are the outcomes of assent. If the mind declines to 
assent, the faculty of impulse remains inactive – ibid. 
243 Ibid., 574. “Reason is not something over and above the other three. It is the mind in its 
entirety” – ibid., 575. 
244 Epictetus, Diss. I.1.7, II.1.4, II.22.29, IV.6.34, as cited in ibid., 577. 
245 Epictetus links assent with προαίρεσις in Diss. I.17.21-3. 
 246 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought: 45. 
 247 Epictetus, Diss. I.1.7. Origen not only follows Epictetus in insisting that human freedom is 
found in the reaction to the external impressions, but in PArch 3.1.4 (SC 268; 26-28) he even uses the same 
example of the chaste man and the seductive woman to illustrate this principle. Cf. Jackson, "Sources of 





Stoics.248 Epictetus goes beyond describing choice as merely a person's reason giving 
assent to an impression. Instead, Epictetus insists that reason can interact with the 
impressions – it can judge them, dwell on them, try to weaken them, and of course, 
finally give assent to them. 
Despite reason’s power over the impressions, it is nevertheless true that in the 
Stoic view our choices are constrained by something within us – namely, our character or 
disposition. As such, the choices we make are predetermined by our current attitudes, 
beliefs, and intellect. Our mind does not judge outside stimuli directly, but only after the 
stimuli have first filtered through our character and have been received in us as a rational 
impression. The current state of our mind (including our experiences, memories, and 
beliefs) is the determining factor for the choice we make. This entails that the choice 
made by the agent would always be exactly the same provided it was made in exactly the 
same circumstances by the same agent with the same disposition and state of mind. The 
fact that choices are predetermined by one's character does not take away one’s moral 
autonomy in the moment of choice, nor does it take away one’s moral responsibility for 
having made that choice. And this is because our choices come from us and not from 
another. It is our own self and the current state of our own character which causes the 
choice. Our dispositions are attributed to us because they are formed through the 
composite result of a lifetime's worth of our own choices. 
 In the company of other academic philosophers, Alexander of Aphrodisias 
insisted that the Stoic depiction of human choice was not sufficient to establish moral 
responsibility. One purported weak spot in the Stoic view which was often targeted was 
the following: The Stoics believed that we are responsible for our choices in that they are 
                                                          





up to us, we are the ones doing them (they occur through us), and they stem from our 
intellect and disposition. However, our dispositions are the cumulative effect of a lifetime 
of decisions and experiences, and so at any given point we do not seem to have control 
over the initial makeup of our disposition itself. This raises the question: are we free at 
the beginning of the process?249 Who or what is responsible for our initial disposition? If 
we did not have causal control over the beginning state of our disposition, then how does 
it make sense to hold us responsible for any choice that occurs further down the line, 
since all such choices are caused by that disposition? Their critics would concede that the 
Stoics are correct to say that autonomous choices must be made through us and not 
through another, but they argued that moral responsibility requires more than this; if we 
have no control over our own constitution (the thing which causes the choice), then how 
is it reasonable to assign praise or blame?250 It appears that the Stoics never had a clear 
answer to this question.251 
                                                          
 249 This vulnerability of Stoicism on this point is addressed by: Bobzien, Determinism and 
Freedom in Stoic Philosophy: 290-301; Frede, "Stoic Determinism," 192-200; Bugár, "Where does Free 
Will come from?," 632-33. 
 250 Alexander targets the Stoics on this point in De Fato 181.7-182.20 (Sharples 58-60) and 
199.12-24 (Sharples 79). Alexander writes: “...For, doing away with men’s possession of the power of 
choosing and doing opposites [τὸ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς αἱρέσεώς τε καὶ πράξεως τῶν 
ἀντικειμένων], they say that what depends on us is what comes about through us. For since, they say, the 
natures of the things that are and come to be are various and different…, and the things that are brought 
about by each thing come about in accordance with its proper nature – those by a stone in accordance with 
that of a stone…and those by a living creature in accordance with that of a living creature – nothing of the 
things which are brought about by each thing in accordance with its proper nature, they say, can be 
otherwise, but each of the things brought about by them comes about compulsorily, in accordance not with 
the necessity that results from force but with that resulting from its being impossible for that which has a 
nature of that sort to be moved at that time in some other way and not this, when the circumstances are such 
as could not possibly have been present to it” (181.13-26; English – Sharples 58-59, Greek – Sharples 190). 
The standard treatment of Alexander’s De Fato is by R. W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate: 
Text, translation and commentary (London: Duckworth, 1983). Citations of both the original Greek as well 
as the English translations are page numbers from Sharples. The Greek texts reproduced by Sharples are 
facsimiles from the edition by I. Bruns in Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1-2 (Berlin, 1887 and 1892) – see 
Sharples 29-32 for further information on the manuscript tradition and Bruns’ text. 





 Alexander articulated a different view of free choice and moral responsibility. 
Alexander argued that praise and blame further required one’s choice to not be 
predetermined or constrained by a person's disposition, character or even intellect. He 
agreed with Epictetus that a choice can only be “up to us” (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) if it is done through 
us, but Alexander added two additional conditions for human moral freedom. First, a 
person's choice must not have any predetermining causes (such as fate, or infallible 
divine foreknowledge), and second, the agent must have the power to choose other than 
his choice, even if the agent has the exact same disposition and desires in that moment of 
choice.252 Thus, Alexander appears to be the first to insist that choices are only “up to us” 
when the very same intellect, with identical beliefs and motivations might have chosen 
the opposite. That is to say, our choices are not only separable from our character and 
disposition, but they are even separable from our reason – we can decide against what 
appears to us to be the most reasonable course of action.253 Bobzien concludes that here, 
apparently for the first time, we see an implied volitional center which is distinct from 
and can operate wholly independently from a person’s own beliefs and rationality.254 
 We might expect Origen to be attracted to Alexander's notion of moral 
responsibility given how neatly it could be used in his own anti-gnostic polemics. After 
all, it must be admitted that there is some similarity between the Stoic idea that one's 
disposition (which one has no control over at one's birth) necessarily determines one's 
future choices, and the valentinian idea that one's constitution (which one has no control 
                                                          
 252 Fat. 180.26-8, 181.5-6, 13-14, 184.18-19, from "The Inadvertent Conception," 159n44. 
Unfortunately, Alexander never systematically presents his view of free choice, but rather it must be 
cobbled together from a variety of passages, each of which on its own is not sufficient to demonstrate his 
view (his most important work on the subject being De Fato). Bobzien has undertaken the confusing task 
of synthesizing Alexander's thoughts on the subject (which do not always appear to be consistent), in ibid., 
133-75. I am thankful for Bobzien’s analysis and I rely on her conclusions here. 
 253 ibid., 171. 





over at one's birth) necessarily determines one's future choices. At their root, both 
Stoicism and Valentinianism appear to employ an internal determinism,255 whose origins 
could only, it seemed, be traced back to an external power. In some ways Alexander had 
developed a notion of moral responsibility that seemed tailor-fit to counteract the fixed-
nature determinism of the Valentinians, given that he used it against Stoic character 
determinism. And yet, as we will see, Origen does not align with Alexander, but instead 
he articulates a view of moral responsibility that is much closer to that of Epictetus.256 It 
is possible that Origen may have simply been uncomfortable with the inherent 
awkwardness of Alexander’s notion of indeterminist choice. When choice is unlinked 
from internal causation altogether (whether beliefs, character, or disposition), it is unclear 
how a choice arises in the first place.257 Essentially, what Alexander suggests is that our 
choices do not even have to be tied to our own motivations, and this would appear to 
make human choice random, inexplicable, and completely non-rational.258 In any case, 
                                                          
255 I use the term “internal determinism” in the sense that each person’s choices are predetermined 
and unchangeable on the basis of a causal principle inside of them (whether nature or character), and not 
from any outside force or external causal chain in the moment of choice. 
256 It is worth noting that Kathleen Gibbons argues that Clement of Alexander also did not believe 
in indeterminist choice: “It might be tempting to interpret Clement as an incompatibilist – that is, as 
someone who understands autonomy to require indeterminacy in human choice . . . Yet the idea that human 
action must be caused indeterministically in order to ascribe to human beings responsibility for their actions 
is not itself a view that Clement seems to be aware of” – Kathleen Gibbons, The Moral Psychology of 
Clement of Alexandria: Mosaic Philosophy, ed. Mark Edwards and Lewis Ayres, Studies in Philosophy and 
Theology in Late Antiquity (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 141. On this point see 
also ibid., 131-32. On Clement’s somewhat confusing stance on freedom of choice, especially as it relates 
to how a person initially comes to faith, see Karavites, Evil, Freedom, and the Road to Perfection in 
Clement of Alexandria: 143. 
 257 Origen views sin as a breakdown or failure of reason. Making choices based on the correct 
goals laid down by reason is to advance towards the good. Abusing our reason by departing from what we 
know to be right is sin. Thus, moral autonomy is inherently connected to one's beliefs. Cf. PArch 1.5.2 
(Butterworth 44; SC 252, 176). Although Origen requires binary possibilities for moral autonomy to be 
genuine, this is not the same as Alexander’s requirement for the power to do otherwise (in the form of 
indeterminate choice). 
 258 Bobzien states: “It remains unclear what the independent decision making faculty would be 
which has the power over choosing opposites: it can hardly be one of the non-rational parts of the soul. But 
if it is a, or the, rational part, the difficulty arises how it can - as Alexander suggests - decide against the 
course of action that appears as the most reasonable to the agent” – Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception," 





Origen was almost certainly motivated to reject Alexander’s model because Origen’s 
robust view of divine providence, and especially Origen’s affirmation of divine 
foreknowledge, was incompatible with it. That discussion must be set aside for the 
moment, but when we return to it in the following chapters we will see that Origen's 
understanding of God's providential and infallible plan of universal salvation would not 
work with an indeterminist notion of choice. 
 
Origen Adopts the Stoic Model of Impression and Assent 
 Origen describes the mechanics of human choice using the typical late Stoic 
model found in Epictetus. He does so in First Principles Book 3,259 and he also gives a 
slightly altered version in his treatise On Prayer.260 While not identical, his treatments of 
the topic in both writings are consistent, and even complementary.261 In First Principles 
                                                                                                                                                                             
says in another place: “There are several points that suggest that at this time Alexander is almost an isolated 
case, and that concepts of freedom to do otherwise are a rather marginal phenomenon without a clear 
philosophical context”, ibid., 167. 
 Peter van Inwagen has highlighted the inherent awkwardness of indeterminist choice by posing the 
following thought experiment: “[Suppose someone named Jane is about to make a choice.] Let us suppose 
that a certain current-pulse is proceeding along one of the neural pathways in Jane’s brain and that it is 
about to come to a fork. And let us suppose that if it goes left, she will make [choice A], and that if it goes 
to the right, she will [make choice B]. And let us suppose that it is undetermined which way the pulse will 
go when it comes to the fork: even an omniscient being with a complete knowledge of the state of Jane’s 
brain and a complete knowledge of the laws of physics and unlimited powers of calculation could say no 
more than…it might go to the left, and it might go to the right…Now let us ask: Is it up to Jane whether the 
pulse goes to the left or to the right? If we think about this question for a moment, we shall see that it is 
very hard to see how this could be up to her…If it goes to the left, that just happens. If it goes to the right, 
that just happens. There is no way for Jane to influence the pulse. There is no way for her to make it go one 
way rather than the other…And it seems to follow that if, when one is trying to decide what to do, it is truly 
undetermined what the outcome of one’s deliberations will be, it cannot be up to one what the outcome of 
one’s deliberations will be. It is, therefore, far from clear that incompatibilism is a tenable position” – Peter 
van Inwagen, Metaphysics (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 264.  
259 PArch 3.1.2-3 (SC 268, 18-24). 
 260 PEuch 6.1 (GCS II, 311.16-312-10). In both places Origen discusses the different principles of 
motion in irrational and rational beings. Cf. Cels IV.81-87 (Chadwick 248-253; SC 136, 384-402) where 
Origen also speaks about differences between rational and irrational creatures. 
 261 P.J. Van Der Eijk investigates the argument made by some that that On Prayer contains a more 
elaborate presentation of “free will” than First Principles: Van Der Eijk, "Origenes' Verteidigung des freien 
Willens in de Oratione 6, 1-2," 341. Van Der Eijk concludes that the texts correspond to one another to a 





Origen describes how external impressions or sensations (τῶν ἔξωθεν or αἴσθησις) give 
rise to images or mental impressions in the mind (φαντασίαι).262 In non-rational animals 
these images immediately call forth impulses to act (ὁρμαι).263 For example, if a hungry 
animal sees a piece of meat, then the mental impression would essentially be: “That is 
tasty meat that I should go eat right now”, which then produces an impulse the animal 
immediately follows. Rational animals, however, do not automatically perform what our 
impressions tell us to. Origen states that reason must first judge the impressions and 
choose those which lead to good impulses, while rejecting those that lead to bad 
impulses.264 Reason is able to examine the impressions we receive, judge them, and then 
finally approve or reject them. Origen's order of impression – judgment – assent – 
impulse is the typical late Stoic formula for human choice. It is also clear that Origen is 
indebted to Epictetus' broadening of the earlier Stoic concept of assent (συγκατάθεσις); 
thus, we see Origen describing rational beings as not merely assenting to the impression 
or not, but also interacting with the impression by judging it, dwelling on it, trying to 
weaken it, and finally giving or withholding assent to it.265 Origen notes that while it is 
outside our power to control the external impressions (ἔξωθεν οὐκ ἐφ ἡμῖν ἐστι) which 
produce in us impressions, it is precisely in our interaction with these internal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
between the accounts, merely elaborations on certain points (347-348). For another analysis of the 
similarities and differences of the two treatments, see David Hahm, "A Neglected Stoic Argument for 
Human Responsibility," Illinois Classical Studies 17, no. 1 (1992). 
262 PArch 3.1.3 Greek (Butterworth 160, SC 268, 24): “Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑποπεσεῖν τόδε τι τῶν ἔξωθεν, 
φαντασίαν ἡμῖν κινοῦν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, ὁμολογουμένως οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν.” 
 263 PArch 3.1.2 Greek: “Now living things are moved from within themselves when there arises 
within them an image [φαντασίας] which calls forth an impulse [ὁρμὲν]” (Butterworth 159; SC 268, 20). 
 264 PArch 3.1.3: After saying that the mental impression and impulse is not in our power, Origen 
says that “to decide to use what has happened either in this way or in that is the work of nothing else but the 
reason [λόγου] within us, which, as the alternatives appear, either influences us towards the impulses that 
incite to what is good and seemly or else turns us aside to the reverse” (Butterworth 160; SC 268, 24). Cf. 
Clement, Strom 2.20.110.4-111.2. 
 265 For example, Origen believes that a chaste man who has undergone a great amount of 
instruction will have stronger reason, and this reason will allow him to gradually weaken the desire to sin 





impressions (that is, 'assent' broadly construed) that our moral autonomy (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) is 
upheld.266  
 Origen also follows Stoic lines of thought in his acknowledgment that even bad 
moral choices are the product of one's reason.267 The Stoics had long insisted that the 
non-rational desires described by Aristotle were actually rational, for all desires 
(including inappropriate ones) represent a belief. Aristotle did not view the mind as 
making a choice between competing motivations (i.e. a choice between rational and non-
rational motivations). Instead, the mind either chooses to act according to its rational 
motivation (and so a choice has taken place), or sometimes the non-rational motivations 
override the rational ones with the result that the mind acts against its choice. Although 
the action is still ours in such cases (Aristotle calls it voluntary), it is not a choice. Reason 
was overrun; it was an akrasia action.268 Origen, on the other hand, follows the Stoics by 
insisting that even passions are judgments assented to by the reasoning faculty.269  
                                                          
 266 E.g. PArch 3.1.5 Greek: “Reason therefore shows that external things do not lie within our 
power [ἔξωθεν οὐκ ἐφ ἡμῖν ἐστι]; but to use them in this way or the other, since we have received reason as 
a judge and investigator of the way in which we ought to deal with each of them, that is our task” 
(Butterworth 163; SC 268, 32).  
 267 Origen also makes it clear that even when an outside impression felt like it was impossible to 
resist, that there was no external coercion and one's choice was never overridden, but rather an internal 
assent must have been involved – a subtle, rational assent to the impression which may have happened too 
quickly for the person to realize: “But if anyone should say that the impression from without is of such a 
sort that it is impossible to resist it whatever it may be, let him turn his attention to his own feeling and 
movements and see whether there not an approval, assent and inclination of the controlling faculty towards 
a particular action on account of some specious action” – PArch 3.1.4 (Butterworth 161; SC 268, 26). 
 268 Aristotle, EN 7, 1145b21-1146b5. For a fuller discussion of the two main types of akrasia 
(weakness and precipitancy) in Aristotle and later Greek philosophers, see Christopher Bobonich and Pierre  
Destrée, eds., Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus (Leiden: Brill, 2007).  
 269 On the Stoic understanding of passions as cognitive judgments, see Michael Frede, "The Stoic 
Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul," in The Norms of Nature, ed. Malcolm Schofield and G. Striker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 93-110; Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind: 103-20. 
Passions are described in a variety of ways in the Stoic sources. Sometimes they are described as a 
mistaken opinion, and sometimes they are described as irrational motions of the soul which are directly 
caused by mistaken opinions. In either case, passions are the result of the reasoning faculty. Cf. Brad 
Inwood, "Stoic Ethics," in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra and 





 Finally, Origen also follows late Stoicism in giving a dual role to human reason. 
The first role of reason pertains to the impressions, for unlike in those non-rational 
animals human impressions are rational impressions – that is, they have been filtered 
through and colored by our dispositions and intellects and are therefore products of our 
reason (albeit almost spontaneously or unconsciously so). For human beings, impressions 
constitute personalized mini-judgments about how we should act. They are thoughts with 
propositional content, and as such constitute the first movement of one's reason.270 
Origen also shares with Stoicism a second role for reason which takes place in the 
moment of assent or choice. This is when the intellect judges the rational impressions and 
decides whether to assent to them or not. Reason is involved throughout the entire 
process, but the agent's assent is the primary motion for the rational choice. 
 The above analysis demonstrates that Origen's debt to late Stoicism in the matter 
of human psychology is significant.271 At the same time, however, it is just as important 
to recognize that Origen felt free to alter and expand upon the model of choice which he 
had appropriated from the Stoics. First, Origen altered the Stoic impression-assent model 
by envisioning it taking place within the confines of his own tripartite anthropology. 
This, in turn, allowed him to make an additional change to the Stoic view regarding the 
potential for moral progress. That is to say, Origen's insistence upon the consistent 
motivating impressions from the spirit aspect of the individual injected optimism into the 
moral project – an optimism not found in Stoic thought. We will look at each of these two 
alterations in turn. 
                                                          
 270 On reason’s role in the impressions, see above n208. 
271 Chadwick has noted several areas where Origen reveals significant dependency on Stoicism – 
Henry Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa," The Journal of Theological Studies 48, no. 189-190 
(1947). Chadwick’s goal was to correct for some of the more sweeping claims that Origen was 
predominantly influenced by Platonism, and he demonstrated that Origen has strong affinities with 





Origen's Alterations to the Stoic Model: 1) Tripartite Anthropology 
 Origen first alters the Stoic conception of moral choice when he combines it with 
his biblical tripartite anthropology of spirit, soul, and body. By doing so, Origen 
implicitly identifies the rational impressions (φαντασίαι) of the Stoic model with the 
rational desires of the spirit and the body as they seek to influence the soul. We may 
illustrate this using Origen's own example of a man who sees a beautiful woman and is 
then immediately filled with a strong urge to sin.272 First, we may interpret this 
illustration from Origen's Stoic perspective: the urge to sin might feel to the man like an 
external force acting upon him from the outside, but it is actually the man's very own 
reasoned judgment (albeit a nearly spontaneous and subconscious judgment) which 
produces the mental push or impetus in his mind towards the sinful action. It is simply 
the man's own disposition in its current state, based on the man's overall habits, beliefs, 
and past experiences, which has produced this hormetic impression. This impression is 
the initial or low-level movement of reason; it is the outside image which immediately 
becomes colored by the man’s own character when it presents itself to the man’s reason 
for judgment. The second role that reason plays in Origen's Stoic model is in the man's 
interaction with the rational impression that is inclining him to sin. Specifically, the man's 
intellect may dwell on it, judge it, and decide to assent to it or not. This is reason's 
leading role, and if the man assents to the impression, the impulse moves to fruition and 
is the cause of the man's action. 
 We can also look at this same illustration of the beautiful woman from Origen’s 
tripartite model. The impression/desire to sin with the beautiful woman turns out to be the 
                                                          





rational inclination of the person's body or flesh.273 But this means that at the very same 
time there must also be an opposing rational inclination coming from the man's spirit, for 
the spirit always opposes the desires of the body. Collectively, these are the first or low-
level movements of reason, and they come from two directions on either side of the soul. 
Standing in between, the soul must judge the merits of the body's rational inclination to 
sin while comparing it to the counter-inclination coming from the spirit not to sin, and 
then finally the man's soul must make a final choice between the two. This choice is the 
second or high-level movement of reason.274 In both Origen’s Stoic model and in his 
tripartite model, reason is involved throughout the entire process.275 Just as in Epictetus, 
                                                          
 273 Although the impressions are rational in character (and therefore they are ours), this is not to 
deny that external powers such as demons can make our own impressions even stronger, cf. PArch 3.2.1-3 
(SC 268, 153-168); 3.3.4-5 (SC 268, 192-196). 
 274 PArch 3.1.3 Greek: Deciding to use the impressions “in this way or in that is the work of 
nothing else but the reason [λόγου] within us, which, as the alternatives appear, either influences us towards 
the impulses that incite to what is good and seemly or else turns us aside to the reverse” (Butterworth 160; 
SC 268, 24). 
 275 There is one exception to this general rule, however, and that concerns the Stoic notion of 
preliminary passions or pre-passions (propatheia). In Stoic thought pre-passions were involuntary affective 
responses of the body which were to be distinguished from actual emotions. They were involuntary 
reactions such as turning pale or trembling at an unexpected shock. Pre-passions are not impulses – in fact, 
they take place prior to any impulses. If we turn pale, for example, we have the ability to refuse to give 
assent to the proposition that something frightening has occurred, but we did not have the ability to prevent 
turning pale in the first place – see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism: 176. Pre-passions 
are therefore pre-rational, and thus not passions at all; they are independent of judgment and emotion, and 
because they are involuntary they may happen to even the wise – Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of 
Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 67. Origen 
and other early Christian writers borrowed this concept, but they altered or developed it in certain ways. 
Sorabji argues that Origen makes a major shift by connecting the Stoic idea of pre-passions with “bad 
thoughts” which may come from demons or simply from our own bodies. As with pre-passions, Origen 
views such thoughts as merely “agitation and excitement” (commotio sola et incitamentum), and so if we 
resist them we will have done nothing worthy of blame – ibid., 346-51. One of the most important texts on 
this point is PArch 3.2.4 (Butterworth 217; SC 268, 168-172): “We must bear in mind, however, that 
nothing else happens to us as a result of these good or evil thoughts which are suggested to our heart but a 
mere agitation and excitement [incitamentum provocans] which urges us on to deeds either of good or of 
evil. It is possible for us, when an evil power has begun to urge us on to a deed of evil, to cast away the 
wicked suggestions and to resist the low enticements and to do absolutely nothing worthy of blame; and it 
is possible on the other hand when a divine power has urged us on to better things not to follow its 
guidance, since our faculty of free will [liberi arbitrii] is preserved to us in either case.” 
 My sense is that Origen is sometimes confused where pre-passions end and rational impressions 
begin. He is aware of the distinction in general, for he finds the distinction useful for navigating tricky 
exegetical questions in a few places. As Richard Layton has shown, Origen uses the distinction between 





then, here in Origen we have something at least resembling the notion of a “free will”, in 
that reason is given a dual role – reason (the soul) has the ability to operate distinctly 
from the rational impressions of spirit and body and judge between them. Yet, this 
second movement of reason in the soul is still caused by the man's own intellect and 
disposition; he cannot make his final choice from a vantage point outside of the 
constraints of his rationality (as is the case in some notions of an independent will). 
Unlike Alexander, Origen never speaks of choice in an indeterminist sense where choice 
is freed from the constrictions of a person's intellect and character.  
 Now, apart from his rejection of the Stoic notion of a material soul there does not 
seem to be any logical inconsistency between Origen’s use of the Stoic model and his use 
of the tripartite schema when they are viewed side-by-side. But it is also true that Origen 
has altered Stoicism in significant ways by claiming that rational impressions do not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of anger, it conflates both the involuntary aspect (the originating propatheia) as well as the voluntary 
impulse – Richard Layton, "Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions," Vigiliae Christianae 54, 
no. 3 (2000): 266. However, when discussing the various impulses and “first movements” in First 
Principles Origen does not ever instruct the reader how to tell these apart (even though he assures us we are 
not to blame for the first movements or pre-passions). My hunch is that this becomes an ambiguous point 
for Origen precisely because he links together two separate ideas: first, Origen understands that either 
external or internal influences may initially cause a pre-passion (e.g. a demon, or our own body). Second, 
external forces may strengthen the impulsive-impressions which were originally generated by our own 
body. The combination of these two beliefs means that when a soul feels an impulsive temptation, there is 
no way to know whether this was merely a pre-passion caused by a demon (and thus not part of our 
disposition proper), or a fully formed rational impression originating from our own body (and thus more 
accurately described as caused by our disposition proper). 
 Sorabji mentions that Jerome will later add the idea that some fault attaches to pre-passions, even 
though it is not a matter for accusation (in other words, there are degrees of sin) – Jerome, Comm. on Matt. 
5.28; cited in Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: 353. Sorabji may be correct that Jerome is the first to 
explicitly ascribe some fault to a person's pre-passions. However, I think Origen may implicitly hold a 
similar view given his blurring of pre-passions with “bad thoughts.” Bad thoughts seem to necessitate a 
movement of the intellect, for thoughts have cognitive properties and they are a product of our own 
disposition. If so, then people retain some measure of culpability for their pre-passions but probably only 
insofar as these are the understandable outgrowths of the set of moral choices that preceded them – that is 
to say, only insofar as these thoughts possess an element of cognition. The viewpoint that we are in some 
sense culpable for our pre-passions would not have made any sense to the Stoics, given that they viewed 
pre-passions as involuntary bodily reactions only. But once Origen began to broaden the idea of pre-
passions into “bad thoughts,” it began to allow for at least a degree of culpability, for it is difficult to 
envision how bad thoughts could be entirely pre-rational. On Origen's discussion of Jesus and pre-passions 





come from the same place within the agent (the individual's singular disposition). Instead, 
they come from different originating points (spirit or body); they come from the same 
agent, but not from the same place within that agent. In fact, Origen does not envision the 
impressions coming from the soul at all but rather they come from the other two aspects 
of the person, leaving the soul to be merely the investigator and judge of the impressions. 
Thus, we may say that the “soul” in Origen's model is actually more like the assenting 
power in the Stoic model, rather than like the entire Stoic “soul.” From the Stoic point of 
view, the danger of Origen’s alterations is that it would seem to threaten the unity of the 
person.276 Nevertheless, Origen felt comfortable with the more elastic tripartite 
anthropology he inherited from Scripture, and he even went so far as to entertain the idea 
held by some Christians that the individual had two different souls (one heavenly and one 
lower),277 or the idea that the individual was composed of a unified soul attached to a 
body that had its own sinful desires.278 Although he discusses the merits of both 
possibilities, Origen refrains from endorsing either view.279  
                                                          
 276 Origen's view of the spirit and body warring against one another (with the help of outside 
powers, no less) would almost certainly have sounded too much like an internal war going on between the 
parts of a person. The Stoics were more arduous than Origen in emphasizing the unity of reason within the 
person, such that the single rational element operates in different directions so quickly that it goes 
unnoticed by the agent – see Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic 
Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 383-84. Stephen Bagby notes, following Crouzel, 
that Origen viewed the soul has having an upper element (the governing part) and a lower element (a sinful 
inclination or attraction towards the desires of the body). These are not “parts” of the soul in a technical 
sense but do seem to be alternating aspects of the same soul. As Bagby recognizes, Origen himself is not 
entirely clear on this point and that makes it difficult to conclude with any great confidence how Origen 
viewed these two elements of the soul relating to one another. See Bagby, "Volitional Sin in Origen's 
Commentary on Romans," 340-62. Blosser comes to a similar conclusion and notes that when Origen 
speaks of the upper and lower parts of the soul that he is speaking of moral tendencies, or “a single soul 
with two possible lifestyles open to it” Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 35. Cf. the discussion above on a 
person’s “dual nature”. 
 277 Origen’s discussion of the belief in two souls is found in PArch 3.4.1-3 (SC 268, 198-210). 
Origen does not immediately dismiss this possible view out of hand as he does with the Platonic model of a 
tripartite soul. Cf. Clement, Strom. 6.134.1. 
 278 PArch 3.4.4-5 (SC 268, 210-216). “Let us now see what answer is given to the above 
arguments by those who maintain that there is in us a single movement and a single life of one and the 





 Origen’s tripartite model is a modification of the Stoic view, even though Origen 
uses many of the same concepts and technical vocabulary. This adaptation allowed 
Origen to include things in his moral psychology that a strict Stoic model would not 
appear to allow. For example, Origen had a decidedly non-Stoic view of how impressions 
could be affected by the outside world. Origen envisioned a person's impression 
generators to be, in a sense, like sponges in that they serve as open conduits to the outside 
world of fantastic forces. Not only do the spirit and body generate rational impressions 
based on their own disposition and desires, but they are also constantly soaking up and 
relaying additional impulsive information from angels, demons, and even God himself. 
Presumably this would have made Stoic philosophers uncomfortable, for Origen was 
granting angels and demons the ability to insert rational impressions (that is, 
propositional statements with an impulsive direction) directly into the governing power 
for its consideration. Stoic authors spoke of impressions as highly personal movements of 
the soul, for they were generated by nothing more than the agent's own disposition, habits 
and past experiences. In effect, by inviting additional outside agents to partake in the 
cognitive process by which an agent receives impulsive-information from the sensory 
world, Origen appears to compress the identity of self into a smaller space. By making 
this move, moral autonomy is tightly focused solely on the assenting power of the soul 
alone. Judging and assenting to impulses becomes the only psychological feature of 
moral choices which an agent can consistently claim as one's own, for Origen does not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
PArch 3.4.4 (Butterworth 234; SC 268, 210). Blosser believes this view to be a “Middle Platonic” version 
(he mentions Antiochus of Ascalon) of the Stoic belief in a unified soul: Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 
29-31. 
 279 PArch 3.4.5: “We have brought forward...the arguments that can be used in discussion 
concerning each opinion in turn. It is for the reader to choose which of them deserves the preference” 






offer any suggestions for how a person is able to tell whether a rational impression comes 
from the person’s own beliefs and disposition, or whether this rational impression is a 
belief implanted by a foreign power.280 This feature of Origen’s moral psychology 
appears to be the result of synthesizing his tripartite model with the Stoic mechanism of 
choice. 
 
Origen's Alterations to the Stoic Model: 2) Greater Potential for Moral Progress 
 The second way Origen distinguishes himself from late Stoicism was made 
possible by the first. Origen found a benefit in distinguishing between two species of 
impressions: those coming from the spirit and those coming from the body. By dividing 
impulsive-impressions into two categories, Origen promoted a greater optimism 
regarding the potential for moral progress inside every person. This is because Origen is 
able to claim that the (relatively independent) positive motivating impressions of the 
spirit will always be a real and viable option for the soul. For the Stoic, on the other hand, 
it is difficult to see how a damaged and corrupt disposition could ever begin to produce 
positive impressions instead of negative ones, given that the impressions are always 
formed by a singular, corrupt disposition; hence, moral progress on the Stoic system is 
difficult, and the Stoic sage is practically unheard of. On Origen's view, however, moral 
progress is always a real possibility no matter how corrupt a character might become, 
precisely because the spirit always gets a chance to present its perfect desires to the soul. 
Kathleen Gibbons describes this point: 
                                                          
 280 While the view that foreign powers have the ability to exert this type of influence directly into 
the mind might sound unsettling, it should be noted that Origen believes that it is precisely the same 






In his own constructive thought, we actually find [Origen] taking a much 
stronger position on what self-determination requires than what we find in, 
for instance, the Stoics – that is, that regardless of one's established 
character, one always has available to one the motivations necessary to 
cause one to change one's character for either the better or worse . . . in the 
case of the Stoics, the claim that inherited natural constitution plays a role 
in shaping or even determining one's character does not necessarily 
preclude change or moral progress. In the Stoics, however, the fact that we 
find few, if any, sages among human beings reveals that there is in general 
a causal limitation on the kind of bootstrapping that reason is capable of 
once it has been misdirected by human education or the nature of things. 
Origen, however, stakes out a stronger position in his view that human 
beings, whatever their previous decisions, are capable of revising their 
characters. Neither natural constitution, nor education, nor even one's past 
choices will prevent such revision.281 
 
I think Gibbons is exactly right here. According to Origen, the soul always draws upon 
two types of impressions from the spirit and the body. The spirit (often strengthened by 
helping angels) continually attempts to guide the soul with rational impressions towards 
the good. In fact, Origen calls the spiritual impressions a person's conscience 
(conscientiae).282 Origen describes the spirit or conscience as “free” in that it constantly 
rejoices in good works but is itself never convicted of bad deeds.283 It is true that the 
influence of the spirit can be weakened through neglect, but it can never be lost 
entirely.284 Thus, no matter how depraved a soul might become, and no matter how 
                                                          
 281 Gibbons, The Moral Psychology of Clement of Alexandria: 140. Gibbons makes the remark 
about Origen almost in passing, as her main emphasis on the article is Clement of Alexandria. However, in 
a more recent article she gives an expanded treatment on this theme – see her "Human Autonomy and its 
limits in the Thought of Origen of Alexandria." 
 282 Commenting on Romans 2:14 Origen says that a person's conscience (or the law written on our 
hearts) should be identified with the spirit rather than the soul – ComRm II.7.48-52 (Scheck 2.132-133; 
Bammel 137). 
 283 ComRm II.7.48-52: “And so I perceive here such great freedom [of conscience] that indeed it is 
constantly rejoicing and exulting in good works but is never convicted of evil deeds [Quia ergo tantam eius 
uideo libertatem quae in bonis quidem gestis gaudeat semper et exultet, in malis uero non]” (Scheck 2.133; 
Bammel 137). 
 284 Patron angels may abandon the spirit if too often scorned – ComRm I.21.74-101 (Bammel 89-
91). In addition, at times God may “abandon” sinners by withdrawing from them his remedial punishment, 
but this is only a temporary and strategic withdrawal in order to bring about a fuller healing later, once they 





tainted a person's character may become due to continual destructive choices, the soul 
will nevertheless always have at its disposal positive rational impressions coming from 
the spirit element. It is hard to overstate how significant this is, for it implies that fallen 
individuals will always contain within themselves one “unfallen,” untainted, never 
convictable, always available element in which positive impressions will be generated.285 
Even when the agent's disposition has descended into an evil and corrupt state, it retains 
one aspect which can produce positive impressions – impressions which are not isolated 
from the rest of the agent's disposition (indeed, it remains part of the agent’s collective 
disposition) but which must remain untainted by it.286 This appears to me to be a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
spirit continues to wage war against the body (however weakly) by producing positive impressions for the 
soul, for only in this way does the soul retain free choice. 
 285 In a recent article Kathleen Gibbons acknowledges this point but raises the question as to how a 
“superlatively vicious person” could be the determining factor for his own moral improvement – Gibbons, 
"Human Autonomy and its limits in the Thought of Origen of Alexandria," see especially 686-90. That is to 
say, even if a wicked person has positive motivating impulses coming from the spirit, how will these ever 
defeat the much stronger negative impulses experienced by those who have become habituated to sin. 
Gibbons never defines what she means by a “superlatively vicious person” (she uses Judas as an example, 
but I disagree that Origen would label Judas in this way). It is not clear to me, for example, that Origen 
believes that God, through his providence, would ever allow such a worst-case scenario for a sinner (not 
even the devil). However, for the sake of argument if we grant that Origen would allow such a possibility, I 
believe there is an answer to Gibbons’ question. It is true that a wicked person’s negative impulsive-
impressions are much stronger than the competing positive impulsive-impressions from the spirit (because 
of habit, etc.). However, this is only true if we isolate the person’s impressions from the influence of 
outside powers. But there is no reason to do this, for Origen stresses that the soul is bombarded by 
impressions which have been strengthened or influenced from the outside (by either good or evil powers). 
This is what warrants Origen’s repeated emphasis that God’s contributions to our own sanctification are 
always greater than our own; a person’s spirit aspect rarely works independently in its fight to persuade the 
soul. Most of the time guardian angels and even the Holy Spirit himself strengthen the spirit’s desires. 
Thus, even if we grant that a superlatively vicious person might only generate anemic positive desires to 
compete against the more robust negative desires, God can certainly choose to make up the difference, so to 
speak, and level the playing field. And Origen frequently alludes to such events: e.g. PArch 3.5.8: speaking 
about the various ways God leads people to salvation without violating their moral autonomy, whether 
through instruction or punishment, Origen also suggests that some are “pressed into salvation and whose 
conversion is as it were compelled and extorted; who they are for whom God even provides special 
occasions for salvation…” (Butterworth 244; SC 268, 234). I would argue that this explanation 
demonstrates that Origen believes grace can persuade even “superlatively vicious” sinners, if God chooses 
to strengthen the person’s spirit with overwhelming evidence or some other form of motivation. 
 286 This is what allows Origen to say about all rational natures (including the devil), “There is 
therefore no nature which may not admit good or evil, except the nature of God...” – PArch 1.8.3 





remarkable conceptual step to make by someone who is comfortable using Stoic 
categories. 
 We must recall that Origen, like the Stoics, believed that choices were tied to a 
person's character and intellect. Both believed (unlike Alexander) that people could not 
make decisions independent of their character and intellect. One's character, at any given 
moment, dictated the types of choices that one could make. This view resulted in a 
difficulty for Stoics. On the one hand, the Stoics tried to affirm the possibility of moral 
improvement. But on the other hand, it is difficult to see how moral improvement is 
possible for someone with a vicious disposition since all choices must be predetermined 
by the person's disposition at the moment of choice. Bobzien notes that Chrysippus did 
not seem to be worried about this potential problem, and we do not have any evidence for 
a Stoic solution to it.287 However, Origen's conceptual move allows him to bear fruit on 
precisely this point. No matter what the rest of a person's character and disposition might 
look like, a God-given divine element always persists inside the person and can stimulate 
moral improvement.288 This is no external force. Rather, the spiritual element is itself a 
feature of one's own personality and character. The disposition of every person will 
always have this feature, and thus all people will permanently retain the possibility to 
make moral improvement (even significant improvement), for at least one aspect of their 
                                                          
 287 “There is no evidence at all that Chrysippus or any other early Stoic grappled with the problem 
of character determination and moral responsibility, let alone the problem of character determination and 
free will” Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy: 291.  
 288 Cf. PArch 1.3.6: “That the activity of the Father and the Son is to be found both in saints and in 
sinners is clear from the fact that all rational beings are partakers of the word of God, that is, of reason, and 
so have implanted within them some seeds [semina], as it were, of wisdom and righteousness, which is 
Christ” (Butterworth 34-35; SC 252, 154). ComRm III.3 (Scheck 1.204; Bammel 223): “Over and above 
the power of reason God has ensured that man should know what he ought to do and what he ought to 





own character serves as the intellectual and rational warrant for such a move.289 The 
possibility for good or evil choices, made possible by the person’s own good and bad 
rational desires, is a principle condition which establishes moral autonomy in Origen's 
theology.290 And moral autonomy establishes moral responsibility – that is, meaningful 
praise and blame.291 
 For this reason, Origen’s model of the moral quest is more optimistic when 
compared to the typical Stoic anthropological model.292 It allows Origen to assert:  
                                                          
 289 Henri de Lubac states this principle very well. He writes that the fundamental idea expressed 
by the spirit is that: “the pneuma that is 'in man', in every man, assures a certain hidden transcendence of 
man over himself, a certain opening, a certain received continuity between man and God. Not that there is 
the least identity of essence between the one and the other . . . Would man, therefore, be after all 
impeccable? No. But the center of moral freedom and choice is not the pneuma” Henri De Lubac, Theology 
in History, trans. Anne Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 141-42. At the same time, however, 
I wonder if de Lubac goes too far by saying that the spirit element is not part of the individual's personality 
(142). While it is true that the soul is responsible for moral autonomy, I am not convinced that moral 
autonomy should be conflated with one's personality. Instead, all of a person's intellect, disposition and 
impulsive impressions should be considered part of one’s personality and identity, for Origen would insist 
that a person's choice is causally linked to one’s personality in total. Suppose I desperately want to eat an 
extra piece of cake, even to the point of distraction, and yet somehow my soul chooses to align with my 
competing spiritual desire to exercise restraint. In such a case, it would seem artificial to dismiss my robust 
desire for cake as something not truly part of personality or disposition. Rather, it would seem to be an 
integral part of the whole. 
290 To be more precise, the condition which makes moral autonomy genuine is the soul’s power 
over binary differentiation (movement towards and away from the good). If souls are always embodied (as 
I have argued in this chapter), then this binary differentiation is preserved and actuated through the 
competing desires of spirit and body. However, if Origen does allow for a wholly incorporeal existence for 
creatures at either the very beginning or the very end (as some scholars believe), then the principle needs to 
be understood as simply the power of binary differentiation towards and away from the good – a power 
which much of the time, but not necessarily all the time, manifests itself through the competing desires of 
spirit and body. In such hypothetical cases of disembodied existence, presumably the binary options would 
be better articulated as persevering in the good versus failing to persevere in the good (whether through 
sloth, satiety, inattentiveness, etc.). In either case, the most important aspect is the soul’s rational power 
over binary differentiation. This principle also contains the presupposition that the power of choice (assent) 
is not caused by an external agent but is caused by the soul alone (i.e. moral autonomy requires that the 
choice not be somehow forced or performed under compulsion, presumably by God or some other foreign 
power) – cf. ComRm I.21.65-67: “But out of both sides’ support, the duty of choice is preserved. For the 
matter is not done by force [ui] nor is the soul moved in either of the two directions by compulsion 
[necessitate]” (Scheck 1.95; Bammel 89). It must wait until Chapter 5 to outline Origen’s interpretation of 
“force” and “compulsion”. 
 291 Cf. PArch 1.3.8: “God the Father bestows on all the gift of existence; and a participation in 
Christ, in virtue of his being the word or reason, makes them rational. From this it follows that they are 
worthy of praise or blame, because they are capable alike of virtue and wickedness” (Butterworth 38; SC 
252, 162). 
 292 The end goal for Stoicism was to become a perfect sage, and only in this way achieve true 





Again, to throw the blame simply on our constitution is absurd, for 
education can take the most intemperate and savage of men and, if they 
will follow her exhortation, can change them, so that the alteration and 
change for the better is very great, the most licentious men often becoming 
better than those who formerly seemed not to be by their very nature, and 
the most savage changing to such a degree of gentleness...293 
 
Nevertheless, this robust moral potential should not be taken as an endorsement of the 
inherent goodness of human beings. While the net result of Origen's innovation to 
Stoicism was a greater confidence in moral potential, Origen credited this ongoing 
influence of the spirit upon the soul to God as unmerited grace, rather than a 
pronouncement on raw human potential as such.294 
 And here we arrive at a crucial point which relates this discussion to Origen’s 
universalism: despite enabling greater potential in the moral quest, the ongoing and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
status (which is basically everyone) are in the category of the impious, the mad, and the foolish. Cf. John 
Sellars, Stoicism (New York: Routledge, 2014), 35-41.  
 293 PArch 3.1.5 (Butterworth 162-63; SC 268, 30). It should be noted that the same logic that 
allows Origen to be more optimistic about the ongoing possibility of moral progress, despite one's nature, 
also allows him to assert that moral degeneration will always remain a real possibility despite one's nature. 
The Stoics envisioned the perfect sage as one who can no longer fail to make the correct moral judgment 
given that he fully understands the will of nature (or God) to perfection. Origen describes the descent of 
morally wise people into licentiousness in this same passage: PArch 3.1.5 (Butterworth 163; SC 268, 30-
31). 
 294 The biggest gift that God gives to strengthen our spiritual impulse is the Holy Spirit himself. 
The gift of the Father is existence; the gift of the Son is rationality; but the grace of the Holy Spirit (saved 
just for believers) is one of the primary forces in our moral progress of sanctification – PArch 1.3.8 
(Butterworth 38; SC 252, 162). Origen summarizes this idea at the end of Book 1, Chapter 3: “That this 
may come to pass, and that those who were made by God may be unceasingly and inseparably present with 
him who really exists, it is the work of wisdom to instruct and train them, and lead them on to perfection, 
by the strengthening and unceasing sanctification of the Holy Spirit, through which alone they can receive 
God. In this way, then, through the ceaseless work on our behalf of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, 
renewed at every stage of our progress, we may perchance just succeed at last in beholding the holy and 
blessed life [sanctam et beatam uitam]” (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164). Cf. PArch 1.8.3: “But if any other 
nature is holy [apart from God, Christ and the Holy Spirit], it is so because it is made holy by the reception 
or inspiration [assumptione uel inspiratione] of the Holy Spirit; the possession of this quality does not arise 
from its own nature, but is an accidental addition to it...” (Butterworth 70-71; SC 252, 228). N.B.: the 
reception of the Holy Spirit as God's gift is not to be conflated or confused with God's gift of spirit (or 
conscience) – the one is an external gift (accidental), while the other is a creational gift and a necessary part 
of the person's own identity: “The Spirit of God, even when it is present in us, is one thing, and the pneuma 
proper to every man, that which is in him, is something else . . . The Apostle clearly affirms that this spirit 
(this pneuma) is different from the Spirit of God, even when the Holy Spirit is present in us, over and above 






untainted impulsive-impressions from the spirit are not by themselves sufficient to 
account for Origen’s belief that everyone will voluntarily choose to be restored to God at 
some point in their future. After all, Origen believes that the further one aligns with the 
bodily aspect, the harder it becomes to resist it in the future, even if the spirit’s untainted 
impulses are present.295 Thus, even though Origen insists that there will never be a time 
when the soul loses all positive motivations towards the good, it becomes difficult to see 
how a soul which has been steeped in vice (e.g. the soul of the devil) might ever respond 
favorably to the relatively weak motivations originating from the spirit in the presence of 
the competing powerful ones from the body?296 Part of the answer to this question is that 
God's providential-grace knows, in advance, precisely which situations the soul must find 
                                                          
 295 E.g. PArch 3.1.4: Even though one man might sin with a licentious woman because he has less 
instruction and inclines towards pleasure, “on the other hand the same experiences may happen to one who 
has undergone more instruction and discipline; that is, the sensations and incitements are there, but his 
reason, having been strengthened to a higher degree and trained by practice and confirmed towards the 
good by right doctrines...repels the incitements and gradually weakens the desire” (Butterworth 162; SC 
268, 28). 
 296 This seems to be the argument made by: Lisa R. Holliday, "Will Satan Be Saved? 
Reconsidering Origen's Theory of Volition in Peri Archon," Vigiliae Christianae 63, no. 1 (2009). Holliday 
concludes that Origen appears to have a contradiction in First Principles. On the one hand, Origen insists 
that all rational creatures will retain the capability to choose the good. But on the other hand, given Origen's 
view that continual sin leads to strong habit, it is unclear what could ever prompt the devil to desire the 
good even if he was capable of it. Holliday overstates her case when she says that the devil's habitual 
sinning means that the devil can no longer have any desires for the good (23), for as we have seen above, 
the spirit component constitutes a consistent source of internal positive desires. Thus, even the devil must 
retain at least some desire for the good. Despite this flaw, Holliday's argument does raise a relevant 
question. Even if we suppose that the devil could choose the good based on certain low-level desires which 
persist, there does not seem to be a compelling reason to believe that the devil would ever act upon his 
good desires, given how weak they are compared to his strong and habituated desires to do evil. If the devil 
will always follow his strongest desires (for that will seem the most reasonable to him), then it seems 
extremely unlikely that the devil will ever find himself in a situation where the spirit's desires seem more 
reasonable. While still theoretically possible, the odds would be astronomically low. This logic leads 
Holliday to conclude that Origen believes that the devil will probably not be saved in the apocatastasis. 
Holliday's argument is understandable, but incorrect, because it does not take into account three features of 
Origen’s thought: first, Origen believes that patron angels as well as God Himself can step in at any time to 
strengthen the weakened desires of the person’s spirit and so presumably tip the balance; second, Origen 
understands that one of the central roles for divine punishment is to make it so that the soul begins to hate 
what it used to crave (on this point see below, Chapter 3); and third, Holliday does not consider the role of 
God's providence in ordering the universe in such a way that every soul (including the soul of the devil) 
finds itself in the precise existential moment (even if the odds of such a moment are astronomically low) 
where the soul chooses to follow the spirit's desires and turn towards God. This argument will be defended 





itself in so that it will freely respond to the correct motivating impressions instead of the 
wrong ones.297 But the demonstration of that claim must wait until Chapter 5.298  
 
Conclusion 
 Origen's doctrine of moral responsibility first stems from his understanding of 
Scripture, and then is given greater detail and nuance through his use of Stoic models and 
technical vocabulary. Origen uses philosophy to expand Scripture's teaching on this point 
for its additional utility in his polemics against various fatalistic soteriologies. According 
to Origen, the largest threats came from gnostic fixed-nature determinism and Christian 
predestinarians. 
 Origen's presentation of moral autonomy is largely Stoic in nature, and it is 
noteworthy that he elects not to use the indeterminist notion of choice taught by 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. But neither does Origen feel compelled to stay within the 
bounds of Stoic thought. In order to protect the goodness and justice of God, Origen 
modifies the typical late Stoic paradigm of impression and assent. First, Origen 
superimposes his tripartite anthropology of spirit, soul and body over top the Stoic model 
of impression and assent. The resulting picture is that the soul receives competing rational 
impressions (desires) from the body and the spirit to entice the soul to either virtue or 
                                                          
 297 E.g. PArch 3.5.8: “But how, consistently with the preservation of free will in all rational 
creatures, each person ought to be dealt with, that is, who they are whom the Word of God...instructs; who 
they are whom he puts off for a time...who they are for whom God even provides special occasions for 
salvation...from what causes or on what occasions these things happen, or what the divine wisdom sees as it 
looks into these men or what movements of theirs will lead God to arrange all these things thus, is known 
to God alone…” (Butterworth 244; SC 268, 234). A more extensive treatment of Origen’s view of divine 
foreknowledge is found below in Chapter 5.  
298 In Chapter 5 I will argue that Origen believes that there is at least one possible arrangement of 
salvation-history which will result in the salvation of all rational souls. His belief on that point appears to 
depend on his view here – that even the most stubborn of sinners will always possess within themselves 





vice. The soul must then judge the competing impressions to see which is worthy of the 
soul’s assent (choice).299 Origen's tripartite anthropology is not Platonic, for he upholds 
the unity of the person. Thus, Origen held to a dual role for a person's rational capacities. 
First, the agent's body and spirit continually produce rational and cognitive impressions 
for the soul to peruse. Second, the soul retains the ability to judge the various rational 
impulses to see which ones are true and worth pursuing.300 With this model we have 
something that resembles later notions of a will, and yet to call it a will is to wrongly 
suggest that Origen envisions some center of pure volition that stands outside of or 
independent of one's faculties of reason.301 His view resists any such description because 
for Origen, moral choices are the direct products of one's current rational activities in 
total. The combination of the biblical and Stoic models allows us to describe the 
conditions Origen sets for genuine moral autonomy: first, the choice must originate from 
within the agent (the soul) and not from outside of the agent. And second, the choice 
must be made in the presence of competing rational inclinations; which is to say, moral 
autonomy requires that the soul possesses rational power over binary differentiation.  
 The second way that Origen’s view stands apart from the Stoic view is that 
Origen’s view allows greater optimism within the moral quest. Although Origen upholds 
                                                          
299 Origen’s view is reminiscent of the ever-popular “good angel / bad angel” trope in modern 
media. One recalls, for example, Donald Duck’s perpetual struggle between good and evil as illustrated by 
an angel and a demon sitting on each of his shoulders. These were not technically angels, but were instead 
two miniature versions of himself – both of which looked and talked like Donald, though one had a halo 
while the other held a pitchfork. Each whispered competing suggestions into Donald’s ears as to what he 
should do, but Donald ultimately had to decide which of his internal voices to align with. 
 300 In an interesting way Origen actually envisions a triple role for reason, give that there are two 
competing rational impressions presented to the rational soul. There are two stages or movements of 
reason, but at least three rational judgments taking place (albeit only one appears to take place 
consciously). 
 301 Thus, Charles Bigg was wrong to conclude that the Alexandrines [Clement and Origen] were 
driven by their determinist opponents “to make Will an independent faculty, knowing both good and evil 
and choosing between them, selecting and in fact creating its own motive” – Bigg, The Christian Platonists 





the Stoic view that our choices arise from our character, Origen also insists that every 
human character, no matter how tainted, retains at least some degree of positive rational 
motivation which originates from the spirit aspect. Remarkably, these cognitive 
motivations are permanently untainted, and thus preserve a permanent potential for moral 
progress. By itself, however, this universal potential for moral renewal does not 
guarantee universal actual moral progress. Thus, Origen’s belief in universal salvation 
requires an additional theological move in order to turn the potential into an actual. 






STAGES OF SALVATION-HISTORY 
Introduction: 
 The two elements that create and shape all existence in Origen's thought are God's 
providence (πρόνοια / providentia) and creaturely free choice.302 In the previous chapter I 
outlined Origen's understanding of free choice. In the next two chapters I will discuss 
Origen's view of God's providential power; this is the power that enables, guides, directs, 
arranges, and even places certain constraints upon the exercise of individual moral 
autonomy. This chapter will examine the role of God's providence in general, by looking 
at the stages of cosmic, salvation-history in Origen’s theology. The next chapter will 
focus specifically on Origen’s final stage, the apocatastasis. These two chapters lead to 
my argument in Chapter 5 which recounts the way that divine providence directs the 
moral freedom of creatures in pursuit of the apocatastasis. 
 Origen understands God's providence to be the force which sustains and 
actualizes the unfolding of history through a series of subsequent stages of salvation-
history.303 Before this unfolding happens in time, God's providence is also responsible for 
setting the overall goal of cosmic history. God first selects, in advance, the goal of history 
                                                          
 302 This was one of the main arguments Koch affirmed throughout his influential study, Koch, 
Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus. Daniélou also 
identified these as the two essential tenants of Origen’s theology: Daniélou, Origen: 211. 
303 The cosmic history of redemption is the divine οἰκονομία (Latin – dispensatio). Origen 
understands the divine economy as a sort of metanarrative or overarching plan of redemption and 
restoration – it is the way the Triune God acts externally. Origen does not use the word “soteriology”, yet 
his understanding of οἰκονομία functions as his soteriology in that it comprises his system of salvation. For 
a discussion of Origen’s conception of οἰκονομία see Paul Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy: 
Creator and Creation in Early Christian Theology and Piety (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 90-
99. Cf. Joseph Trigg, Origen (New York: Routledge, 2002), 25-32; John A. McGuckin, The Westminster 






and then God designs the shape history will take to reach that goal. This planning is an 
atemporal and primordial feature of God's providence which takes place in the mind of 
God. Once God creates and history begins, God’s providence is responsible for the 
unfolding of the design into various epochs which actualize the telos God designed for 
history. While a comprehensive treatment of God’s providential role in salvation-history 
is beyond the scope of this study, an overview is necessary in order to set the context for 
our later discussion of the apocatastasis.304  
 
An Overview of Cosmic History: A Drama of 6 Acts 
 Origen is famous for depicting the biblical themes of creation, fall and redemption 
as occurring in various ages or epochs of cosmic history. While it is common (and not 
necessarily wrong) in scholarship to describe three stages – the life of the pre-existent 
soul, the soul's earthly life, and the soul's resurrected life after death – I find it more 
helpful to expand this outline into six distinct stages in Origen's thought. These are: 1) 
God's initial creation of rational minds and their union with him, 2) The falling of the 
Intelligences away from God through failure to persevere in goodness, 3) God's creation 
of a new, material ecosystem called “heavens and earth” and his subsequent placement of 
fallen souls into it according to merit, 4) The moral quest of each rational soul as it seeks 
to turn away from sin and back towards God through progress in the virtues, a quest 
aided by God through various means, 5) The death, resurrection, and purification of 
humans as the continuation of the moral quest in the afterlife, and finally 6) The last stage 
                                                          
304 Many aspects of Origen’s cosmic history continue to be debated by scholars today. While I 
note these debates in passing, I do not intend to give an exhaustive treatment of those which do not factor 
into my central argument. The primary reason for this overview is to set the appropriate background and 
context for Origen’s final stage – the apocatastasis. Scholarly debates pertaining to this final stage of 
Origen’s providential plan of cosmic history will be analyzed in much greater detail, given that my 





where each individual soul is ultimately restored to God, becoming like him so that God 
is finally “all in all.” Given that God's providence or οἰκονομία is responsible for the 
organizing and the unfolding of each stage in cosmic history, each stage leading up to the 
final one will be briefly outlined below.305 
 
1) Creation 
 The initial creation of contingent (non-eternal) creatures poses a difficulty for 
Origen. Because God is eternal, God's providential power is not simply a power that is in 
God but this power is God, and as such there could never be a time when this power was 
not actualized: Origen describes it this way: “We can therefore imagine no moment 
whatever when that power was not engaged in acts of well-doing”, which is to say that 
Origen understands that God has “always [been] dispensing his blessings among them by 
doing them good in accordance with their condition and deserts.”306 This leads Origen to 
conclude that there must always have been existing creatures who were the subject of 
God's providential goodness, since there could be no time that God was not “Creator, nor 
                                                          
305 Most of Origen’s discussions of salvation-history are, unsurprisingly, found in his most 
systematic work: First Principles. The most recent critical edition of this text is by Crouzel and Simonetti, 
Origèn: Traité des Principes. Citations will list SC volume and page (for additional information see the 
bibliography). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations from Peri Archon are from Butterworth, 
Origen: On first principles: being Koetschau's text of the De principiis. Critical editions of Origen’s other 
works will be noted throughout as they are cited. For a helpful guide and listing of Origen’s critical editions 
(PG, GCS, SC), see McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen: 41-44. For other works that I cite 
only in passing, I do not give full bibliographic information but only standard section citations. 
 306 PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170). Rufinus uses a variety of Greek and Latin 
terminology when speaking about God’s “power” at this point in his translation: “Hanc ergo beatam et 
ἀρχικήν, id est principatum omnium gerentem <δύναμιν> dicimus trinitatem. Hic est bonus deus et 
benignus omnium pater, simul et εὐεργετικὴ δύναμις et δημιουργική, id est bene faciendi uirtus et creandi ac 
prouidendi” (SC 252, 168). Interestingly, after talking about God’s creating power and sustaining power, 
Rufinus uses the plural form “uirtutes” when he states that these “virtues” (Butterworth – “powers”) are 





Benefactor, nor Providence.”307 But how can creatures both be created yet be without a 
beginning? Origen finds an answer in the Son of God, or God's Wisdom:  
In this Wisdom, therefore, who ever existed with the Father, the Creation 
was always present in form and outline, and there was never a time when 
the pre-figuration of those things which hereafter were to be did not exist 
in Wisdom.308  
 
Although Origen does not use the term here, we may note that this is a form of God's 
foreknowledge (or at least includes God’s foreknowledge). But this goes beyond a simple 
foreknowledge, (or the type of foreknowledge where God knows what will happen in the 
future), something Origen often affirms elsewhere. Instead, this foreknowledge involves 
God's providential care being fully actualized within God's own mind. The creaturely 
minds have not yet been created, and so this implies that God's “dispensing of blessings 
among them” is not happening in history but only through God's pre-planning.309 This is 
a providential, grace-filled and beneficent type of foreknowledge. It is an active and 
strategic foreknowledge, of which we will have more to say in the Chapter 5.310 
                                                          
 307 PArch 1.4.3-4 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170). 
 308 PArch 1.4.4 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170): “In hac igitur sapientia, quae semper erat cum 
patre, descripta semper inerat ac formata conditio, et numquam erat quando eorum, quae futura errant, 
praefiguratio apud sapientiam non erat.” Origen gives a similar answer in PArch 1.2.2-3 (SC 252, 114). At 
PArch 3.5.3 (SC 268, 222), however, Origen addresses the same question but offers a different answer. He 
similarly claims that God's nature could never have been at ease and so God must have always exercised 
power and displayed goodness. But when trying to reconcile this view with the fact that this world had a 
beginning in time, Origen suggests that there were other worlds before this one, just as there will be other 
worlds after this one. We may note that this answer seems less satisfactory than his first answer, given that 
this is sidestepping the question rather than answering it. After all, the same question regarding the 
beginning of this world can be posed to the previous one, or to the one before that. Unless Origen affirms 
that there have been an infinite number of worlds in the past (which he does not ever do), the question 
remains as to how God's providence could be fully actualized before the first moment of creation. The 
question is tentatively resolved, however, in PArch 1.4.4 (SC 252, 170). 
 309 PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170). Origen criticizes the idea held by some that souls 
could be unbegotten “in whom they would have it that God implanted not so much the principle of 
existence [subsistendi] as the quality and rank of their life [uitae qualitatem atque ordinem]” – PArch 1.3.3 
(Butterworth 30; SC 252, 146). Thus, the “existence” of these souls must reside simply in God's 
foreknowledge of them. 
310 In Chapter 5 we will see that Origen speaks about three types of divine foreknowledge: simple 
foreknowledge (knowledge of what will happen in the future), foreknowledge of future possibilities (what 





 When God created the intelligent Minds (νοῦς / mens) that he had eternally 
foreseen, chronological history begins.311 God created beings with no initial diversity 
among them (aequales…ac similes), for since God created solely out of his goodness, and 
since there is no variation or change in God himself, there could be nothing in God which 
could account for creating diversity.312 The goodness in the newly created Minds was not 
a necessary feature but was an accidental property (accidentem), and the created Minds 
enjoyed having it only so long as they were partakers of God's essential goodness.313 
Therefore, God also made these beings rational, so that by preserving the goodness God 
had given them through their own free choices, such goodness might become their 
own.314 However, for moral autonomy to choose the good, it must also be possible to 
choose the bad, for in every being except God rationality requires the possibility of 
both.315 Thus, because rational beings were created with the ability of differentiation 
(movement towards and away from the good), it was required that their incorporeal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
creaturely freedom (what any creature would freely do if placed in any hypothetical state of affairs). In this 
chapter I simply use the umbrella term “foreknowledge”. 
 311 PArch 4.4.1: “...the statements we make about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit must 
be understood as transcending all time and all ages and all eternity […supra omne autem tempus et supra 
omnia saecula et supra omnem aeternitatem intellegenda sunt ea, quae de patre et filio et spiritu sancto 
dicuntur]” (Butterworth 316; SC 268, 402). On Origen's beliefs regarding God's timelessness and 
transcendence of time, see Panayiotis Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, Supplements 
to Vigiliae Christianae (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 21-38. 
 312 PArch 2.9.6 (SC 252, 364). 
 313 PArch 1.6.2 (SC 252, 198); 1.8.3 (SC 252, 228); 4.4.8 (SC 268, 422). 
 314 PArch 2.9.2 (SC 252, 354). 
 315 PArch 1.8.3: “There is therefore no nature which may not admit good or evil, except the nature 
of God, which is the source of all good, and that of Christ; for Christ is wisdom, and wisdom certainly 
cannot admit folly” (Butterworth 70; SC 252, 226). Chapter 2 brought to light that Origen required two 
conditions for choices to be free (i.e. two requirements for genuine moral autonomy): first, the choice must 
be made by the agent alone and not from something outside of the agent. And second, the soul must have 
the possibility to choose otherwise – not in an absolute sense like that of Alexander, but rather in the sense 
that the soul must be able to choose between the competing inclinations of the spirit and the body. If the 
soul chooses to move towards the good, it must be the case that the soul had the capability to choose the 
bad instead. Similarly, if the soul chooses to move towards the bad, it must be the case that the soul also 
had the capability to choose the good instead. This binary condition does not require that the soul have 
power over an unlimited number of choices, nor does it require that the choice be made independent of the 
soul’s desires or intellect. It merely requires that the soul have power over two types of choices (a choice 





minds be linked with something that could reflect such movement. In this way Origen 
understands moral autonomy to require a corporeal body, even though moral autonomy 
itself operates from an incorporeal intelligence.316 God does not require a body, for only 
God is pure goodness and not capable of a movement away from it;317 only the Triune 
God is fully incorporeal.318 Even in their pre-earthly lives, then, rational beings had a 
tripartite nature of body, soul and spirit.319 It is true that Origen will speak at times of 
rational creatures as “incorporeal in respect of their proper nature”320, but in such cases 
he is either speaking about the incorporeal soul (which he views as the most essential part 
of the person), or by his own admission he is simply using “incorporeal” according to a 
more popular and colloquial sense of the word as meaning something like “invisible” or 
“not earthly”.321 
 Thus, at this first stage of cosmic history all tripartite beings were one with God, 
created to live and rejoice and contemplate God, not as a necessary part of their nature 
but as an accidental feature given their close proximity to God. God created them with 
the capability to do good or evil so that through their own free choice they would 
                                                          
 316 PArch 2.2.2: “logical reasoning compels us to believe that, while the original creation was of 
rational beings [rationabiles naturas], it is only in idea and thought that a material substance is separable 
from them, and that though this substance seems to have been produced for them or after them, yet never 
have they lived or do they live without it; for we shall be right in believing that life without a body 
[incorporea] is found in the Trinity alone” (Butterworth 81; SC 252, 248). 
 317 PArch 1.8.3 (SC 252, 228). 
 318 PArch 2.2.2 (SC 252, 248). 
 319 On this highly debated and controversial claim, see the discussion in Chapter 2 (especially 
n192 and n193). 
 320 PArch 1.7.1: “quae omnes secundum propriam naturam incorporeae sunt, sed et per hoc 
ipsum, quod incorporeae sunt, nihilominus factae sunt” (Butterworth 59; SC 252, 208). 
 321 E.g. PArch 1.7.1: All things were made through Christ “whether they are 'visible', that is 
corporeal, or 'invisible' (inuisibilia) which I take to be none other than the incorporeal and spiritual powers” 
(Butterworth 59; SC 252, 208). Origen also distinguishes a technical definition from a more common 
definition of “incorporeal” in PArch praef 8: “Now [a daemon's] body is by nature a fine substance and thin 
like air, and on this account most people think and speak of it as incorporeal; but the Savior had a body 
which was solid and capable of being handled. It is customary for everything which is not like this to be 





persevere in perfect goodness and make it their own. This “perennial choir of praise” was 
the pre-existent heavenly Church.322 
 
2) Falling Away From Union With God 
 Stage two represents one of the most inexplicable phases of Origen's cosmic 
history. Due to a mysterious slacking of fervor, which Origen describes as a weariness or 
laziness in preserving the good, all of the Intelligences (except for one – Jesus) fall from 
their original perfect station with God into varying degrees of evil.323 It is unclear why 
the Intelligences grew lazy and turned away from the good, and it is equally unclear why 
they did so in diverse ways, given the fact that God had created them without initial 
diversity.324 As each mind departed from God they descended into evil and became souls 
(Greek – ψυχή, Latin – anima).325 The degree of evil they fell into dictated the degree of 
movement away from the good.326 The degree of evil also corresponded to a change in 
the makeup of their corporeal bodies (since diversity can only be reflected in diverse 
bodies).327 The material that bodies are composed of, “which is so great and wonderful as 
to be sufficient for all the bodies in the world” is a created thing which stands at “the call 
and service of the Creator in all things for the fashioning of whatever forms [formas] and 
                                                          
 322 John A. McGuckin, "Origen of Alexandria on the Mystery of the Pre-existent Church," 
International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 6, no. 3 (2006): 211. 
 323 PArch 2.9.2: “sed desidia et laboris taedium in seruando bono et auersio ac neglegentia 
meliorum initium dedit recedendi a bono” (Butterworth 130; SC 252, 354); Parch 2.9.6 (SC 252, 366). On 
Jesus' soul, see M. Eichinger, Die Verklärung Christi bei Origenes (Vienna: Herder, 1969), 89-90. 
 324 On this point, cf. Boys-Stones, "Human Autonomy and Divine Revelation in Origen," 495-96. 
Boys-Stones notes that when Origen sought to give an answer to the inexplicable mystery of why people 
are born into diverse stations, that Origen ends up pushing the inexplicable mystery back one level to an 
inexplicable Fall. 
 325 PArch 2.8.3: “Ex quibus omnibus illud uidetur ostendi, quod mens de statu ac dignitate sua 
declinans, effecta uel nuncupata est anima ; quae si reparata fuerit et correcta, redit in hoc, ut sit mens” 
(Butterworth 125; SC 252, 348). 
 326 PArch 2.8.4 (SC 252, 348). 
 327 PArch 2.1.4: In this passage Origen finds it necessary to discuss the bodily nature given that 





species [species] he wished.”328 Bodies which were once glorious experienced a form of 
“cooling” as they departed from participation in God's “fire”.329 It should be noted that 
this cooling and alteration of bodies took place before God created the material heavens 
and earth. The resulting diversity that emerges from the first fall is not the new material 
world, for that has not been created yet; rather, this diversity provides God with the 
blueprint of the world he is about to create.  
 
3) Creation of Heaven and Earth and Placement of Souls According to Merit 
 Once souls had descended into varying degrees of evil with the corresponding 
alterations to their ethereal bodies, God created a material world in which to train and 
rehabilitate the fallen souls. The diversity of the first fall became God's blueprint for the 
complex arrangement of creatures into this material world:  
From this source, it appears, the Creator of all things obtained certain 
seeds [semina] and causes of variety and diversity, in order that, according 
to the diversity of minds, that is, of rational beings . . . he might create a 
world that was various and diverse.330  
The merit accrued and lost in the first fall dictated each creature’s position in the new 
world, but on this point Origen allows for an exception: some souls were brought to even 
lower stations than what they deserved, “even against their will,” so that they might “be 
of service to the whole world.”331 While this does, in some sense, undercut Origen's usual 
insistence on God's perfect justice, this idea fits with another recurrent theme in Origen's 
thought – namely that the Church is ‘in it together.’ The restoration is not simply a 
                                                          
 328 PArch 2.1.4 (Butterworth 79; SC 252, 242). 
 329 PArch 2.8.3: “Sicut ergo deus ignis est, et angeli flamma ignis, et sancti quique apiritu feruent 
: ita e contrario hi, qui deciderunt a dilectione dei, sine dubio refrixisse in caritate eius ac frigidi effecti 
esse dicendi sunt” (Butterworth 123; SC 252, 344). 
 330 PArch 2.9.2 (Butterworth 130; SC 252, 356). 





project about individuals where God finds a way to reunite with each recalcitrant soul on 
a one-to-one basis – rather, all of creation will be involved in the pedagogical restoration, 
with those in the front ranks educating and encouraging those in the lower ranks, until 
every soul has been restored.332 
 Thus, God created the material heaven and earth as an act of secondary 
creation.333 The material world became a temporary feature of history through which God 
abruptly halted the descent of souls into evil, and then placed them into a penal hospital – 
“penal” in the sense that God is just and so human sufferings and struggles in this life 
correspond to past transgressions, and “hospital” in the sense that the purpose of any 
suffering and punishment is restorative and pedagogical rather than punitive and 
vindictive. The diversity of primordial sins became the foundation for a new universe334 
full of diversity, as some souls were placed in positions of greater difficulty or misery 
than others. While it is true that each soul was placed into its own unique position within 
the new ecosystem according to a complicated hierarchy of merit, Origen does 
distinguish between three broad categories or classes of beings within the new 
arrangement. There are the “supercelestial beings” (planets and stars) with bodies of a 
                                                          
 332 E.g. PArch 2.1.2 (SC 252, 238). The distinction between the personal and the collective aspects 
of the final restoration will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
333 Origen interprets Genesis 1:1 (“God made the heaven and earth”) both literally and 
allegorically. In its historical sense it refers to the material heavens (or material firmament) and to the 
material earth – e.g. PArch 2.11.6-7 (Butterworth 152-153; SC 252, 406-412) and PArch 3.5.1 (Butterworth 
237-238; SC 268, 218-220). But Origen also interprets Genesis 1:1 allegorically to refer to the primordial 
creation of minds and bodily matter – e.g. PArch 2.9.1 (Butterworth 130; SC 252, 352-354): “These then 
[minds and bodily matter] are the objects which we must believe were created by God in the beginning, that 
is, before everything else. And it is this truth which we may suppose to be indicated also in that beginning 
which Moses somewhat obscurely introduces when he says, ‘In the beginning God made the heaven and 
the earth’. For it is certain that these words refer not to the ‘firmament’ nor to the ‘dry land’, but to that 
heaven and earth from which the names of the ones we see were afterwards borrowed.” Cf. Martens, 
"Origen's Doctrine of Pre-Existence and the Opening Chapters of Genesis," 525-28. 
 334 The term universe here is meant to highlight that when Origen speaks about the new material 






finer quality.335 There are those souls who become human beings who are made to live on 
earth in earthly bodies.336 And then there are the “invisible powers” (inuisibiles uirtutes), 
which include both helpful powers who God entrusts to manage things on Earth (angels), 
along with nefarious powers who occupy a lower station (demons).337 Although invisible, 
these powers retain corporeal bodies, but of an aerial or ethereal nature.338 All non-
rational entities such as plants and animals are merely contingent things339 – they were 
created on Earth without having any sort of pre-existent life, and thus are a relatively 
unimportant feature of cosmic history for Origen.340  
                                                          
 335 PArch 2.9.3: “esse supercaelestia” (Butterworth 131; SC 252, 356). For more on this common 
view in antiquity see Alan B. Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991). 
 336 PArch 2.9.3 (SC 252, 358). 
 337 PArch 2.9.3 (SC 252, 358). 
 338 PArch praef 8 (SC 252, 86). Origen calls their bodies “incorporeal” but only in the sense of 
being invisible and non-earthly; the bodies are nevertheless material. 
339 Everything that providence made in the material world (including irrational animals) is solely 
for the benefit of God’s rational creatures: e.g. Cels IV.75-78 (Chadwick 243-246; SC 136, 370-380). 
 340 PArch 2.9.3: “As for dumb animals and birds and creatures that live in water, it seems 
superfluous to inquire about them, since it is certain that they should be regarded as of contingent and not 
primary importance” (Butterworth 132; SC 252, 358). This seems to conflict with First Principles 1.8.4 in 
Koetschau’s edition (specifically, a Greek fragment included by Koetschau) which discusses how rational 
beings might descend far enough to lose their reason and be born again as an irrational animal (or even of a 
plant!). This fragment is from Gregory of Nyssa who does not explicitly name Origen as the author. 
Koetschau identifies it as Origen largely because of Jerome’s testimony that Origen had taught a similar 
view (see Butterworth 72n8). However, this fragment should be considered suspect for a number of 
reasons. First, it insinuates that rational beings can lose their rationality. Origen explicitly denies this 
possibility elsewhere in First Principles – e.g. 1.8.3 (SC 252, 226-228). Cf. the discussion on the 
permanency of rationality above in Chapter 2. Second, this passage states that those beings who become 
irrational animals and plants may rise back up through stages to rational life once again. Yet, Origen 
believes that the movement of souls (whether ascending or descending) only occurs through rational 
choice. It would appear to be impossible for an irrational animal's soul to begin ascending once its reason 
was extinguished, for the principle by which ascent is possible would no longer exist. If we compare this 
suspect passage to the more genuine comment by Origen at PArch 1.6.3 (SC 252, 202), we can see his 
thought more clearly. Here Origen raises the possibility (for the reader to judge) that the devil's long 
wickedness might turn into a sort of necessary nature. But it is clear that Origen himself is not convinced 
by this possibility when he says a few lines later that in his opinion “every rational nature [unamquamque 
rationabilem naturam] can, in the process of passing from one order to another, travel through each order 
to all the rest . . . with the use of its power of free will” – PArch 1.6.3 (Butterworth 57, emphasis added; SC 
252, 204). In all probability, the suggestion that the devil's wickedness might turn into a type of nature is 
probably an alteration by Rufinus who wanted to defend Origen by leaving the salvation of the devil as an 
open question. Ultimately, there does not seem to be any persuasive reason to believe that Origen taught the 
transmigration of rational souls into animals. Origen concludes his discussion on this topic in PArch 1.8.4 
by saying that such an opinion “ought certainly not to be accepted” (Butterworth 74; SC 252, 232). 





 What led Origen to affirm the pre-existence of souls and so affirm the material 
world as a secondary creation? What was his motivation for doing so? One temptation is 
to point to Platonism.341 It is true that Origen paints a picture that has certain similarities 
to the famous Myth of Er in Republic 10.342 However, a more likely influence for Origen 
was Philo. Philo had previously written that some souls had descended to earth to become 
bound in human bodies, but who also had the possibility to ascend and return once more. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the opposite of what Origen wrote” (74n3). In effect, Koetschau gives primacy to an anonymous fragment 
that does not sound like Origen over one that both sounds like Origen and is stated to have come from him. 
Further corroborating evidence may be found elsewhere in Origen’s corpus. By the time Origen wrote 
Contra Celsum he was firmly against the idea that souls could be placed into animal bodies. A remark by 
Celsus leads Origen to scoff: “This view is even worse than the myth of transmigration [μετενσωμάτωσιν], 
that the soul falls from the vaults of heaven and descends as far as irrational animals, not merely the tame 
but even those which are very wild” – Cels I.20.12-19 (Chadwick 21; SC 132, 126). That this is preserved 
in the Greek lends support to the reliability of Rufinus’ translation on this point. In their commentary of the 
fragments often associated with First Principles, Crouzel and Simonetti investigated this passage and have 
also concluded that Koetschau was wrong to include it – (SC 253, 119-125, especially 124). The integrity 
of the argument at this point in editions of First Principles would be better served by relegating this 
fragment to an appendix. I sympathize with the suggestion by Ronnie Rombs that any new English 
translation of First Principles should put all such dubious fragments in an appendix (especially those from 
unfriendly witnesses), and only leave the Greek in the main text when it comes from the Philocalia – 
Ronnie J. Rombs, "A Note on the Status of Origen's De Principiis in English," Vigiliae Christianae 61, no. 
1 (2007). 
Citations of Contra Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Borret, Origène: Contre 
Celse - Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes. Unless otherwise noted, any English translations 
of Contra Celsum are from: Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum. 
341 In his provocatively titled book Origen against Plato, Mark Edwards tried to overturn the long-
standing view that Origen relied heavily upon Platonism. His book has many strengths, especially his 
analysis of Origen’s views on the transmigration of souls into other animal and human bodies, but Edwards 
goes too far in trying to argue that Origen did not believe in the pre-existence of souls altogether (except in 
a sort of technical in utero sense) –  Edwards, Origen Against Plato: 91f. Edwards interprets Origen's 
remarks about the soul growing bored and defecting away from God to lower modes of existence as a 
picturesque description of the moral life of the soul in a normal human life, as if they are simply “the trials 
of the soul on earth as it tries to persevere in the life of faith” (92). Those passages where Origen explicitly 
affirms pre-existence in a previous world Edwards dismisses as not genuine to Origen (91). Edwards 
overstates his case, for there is simply too much evidence that Origen affirmed a pre-existent life before the 
creation of the material world, a life which is responsible for the diversity in the current world – e.g. PArch 
2.1.3 (SC 252, 240); 2.8.3 (SC 252, 344-346); 2.8.4 (SC 252, 348); 3.3.5 (SC 268, 194); Cels V.29 (SC 
147, 86-88). Similarly, Marguerite Harl had previously suggested that the pre-existence Origen refers to is 
simply the existence of beings in God's foreknowledge, but before their actual creation – Harl, "La 
préexistence des âmes dans l'œuvre d'Origène," 253. A full treatment of this debate in scholarship is not 
possible here, but for a helpful orientation, see Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 158f. 





Philo also mentions angelic beings who were never tempted to descend to an earthly 
life.343  
 At the same time, we must remember that even if Origen was inspired to some 
degree by Platonism on this point (or more likely Platonism as filtered through Philo) his 
motivation for this belief was different from Plato's. After all, as Crouzel has noted, we 
do not see any real interest in the Forms or Ideas in Origen’s conception of the pre-
existence.344 In fact, in one place he outright disavows such a notion.345 Origen differs 
from Platonist teaching yet again by not teaching any sort of necessary dualism. Thus, 
there is no necessary link between sin and earthly embodiment (after all, the worst 
sinners bypassed earth completely and became demons).346 The creation of a material 
world to hospitalize sinners was a free decision made by God. Even though Origen was 
influenced by Philo on this point, this does not explain Origen’s motivation for using this 
concept, given that Origen was willing to reject Greek philosophy just as readily as he 
                                                          
343 E.g. Philo, De Somniis 1,138-140. Gerald Bostock argues that Philo was Origen’s most 
influential source on this point, but he cautions that this does not mean that Origen derived this doctrine 
solely from Greek philosophy. Rather, Philo was influenced by Jewish teachings as well, such as the idea 
of the pre-existence of the Messiah and of the patriarchs which can be found in apocryphal writings such as 
Enoch 70.4 and 2 Enoch 23.5: “Origen does not base his doctrine of pre-existence on Plato but on Philo and 
on an interpretation of the Bible inspired by Judaism” – Gerald Bostock, "The Sources of Origen’s 
Doctrine of Pre-Existence," in Origeniana Quarta: Internationalen Origenskongresses, ed. Lothar Lies 
(Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 262. Although Origen rarely mentions Philo’s name (which is 
unsurprising since Origen rarely mentions any of his sources), David Runia’s important monograph reveals 
that Origen was significantly influenced by Philo’s writings and methods – Runia, Philo in Early Christian 
Literature: A Survey: 157-83. Even so, Runia is careful to say that Philo’s contributions do not affect the 
overall structure of Origen’s thought (164). Runia also notes that Origen scholars hold widely divergent 
points of view regarding the precise nature of Origen’s debt to Philo, and that this disagreement probably 
stems from a larger (and prior) disagreement over whether to categorize Origen as primarily a philosopher 
or a man of the Church (169f). Cf. Thümmel, "Philon und Origenes."; Rogers, Didymus the Blind and the 
Alexandrian Christian Reception of Philo: 31-34; 166-71. 
 344 Crouzel, Origen: 207-09. 
 345 PArch 2.3.6: “We have already said that it is difficult to explain this other world [that Jesus 
refers to when he says he is not of this world]; and for this reason, that if we did so, there would be a risk of 
giving some men the impression that we were affirming the existence of certain imaginary forms 
[imagines] which the Greeks call 'ideas' [ἰδέας]. For it is certainly foreign to our mode of reasoning to 
speak of an incorporeal world that exists solely in the mind's fancy or the unsubstantial region of thought; 
and how men could affirm that the Savior came from thence or that the saints will go thither I do not see” 
(Butterworth 90; SC 252, 266). 





was to appropriate it. We saw a clear example of this in our discussion of Origen's 
alterations to Stoic psychology in chapter 2. Thus, after asking what possible sources 
might lie behind Origen’s doctrine of pre-existence, the more important question is to ask 
why Origen included this concept in his theology.  
 Origen's main motivation may be seen all throughout his discussions of pre-
existence souls, and that is to insist, contra the gnostics, that even though God is 
responsible for arranging souls in a diverse way on Earth, this was based on a prior 
diversity which God was not responsible for.347 By making this argument Origen believes 
he can rule out any injustice on God's part. He can also rule out chance (fortuita), 
multiple creators (diuersi creatores), and diverse natures (diuersae naturae).348 Origen 
admits that this is mysterious teaching which the Church has not ruled on decisively,349 
but the Bible touches on the nature of this “secret” (arcani) when it speaks about Jacob 
and Esau.350 Origen uses the brothers as a test-case for his hypothesis. When Scripture 
says that God loved Jacob and hated Esau before they were born and before they had any 
opportunity to do either good or evil, Origen insists that this is only referring to Jacob and 
Esau’s moral actions in their earthly lives. The diversity of merit that each accrued in 
their primordial lives did, in fact, determine the way God later treated Jacob and Esau in 
their earthly lives.351 
                                                          
347 PArch 2.9.6: “Et haec extitit, sicut et antea iam diximus, inter rationabiles creaturas causa 
diuersitatis, non ex conditoris uoluntate uel iudicio orinem trahens sed propriae libertatis arbitrio” (SC 
252, 364-366). 
 348 PArch 2.9.6 (Butterworth 134-35; SC 252, 366). 
 349 PArch praef 5 (SC 252, 84). 
 350 PArch 2.9.7 (Butterworth 135; SC 252, 366). 
 351 PArch 2.9.7: “As, therefore, when the scriptures are examined with much diligence in regard to 
Esau and Jacob, it is found that there is 'no unrighteousness with God' in its being said of them, before they 
were born or had done anything, in this life of course [in hac scilicet uita], that 'the elder should serve the 
younger', and as it is found that there is no unrighteousness in the fact that Jacob supplanted his brother 





 Origen considered everything in Greek philosophy to be fair game if it could be 
used to strengthen Christian theology, and as long as it did not contradict the Church's 
Rule of Faith.352 Origen found that Philo’s notion of pre-existent souls provided a 
convenient way to discredit the views of Marcionites and Valentinians; thus, Origen's 
goal was that of theodicy. Practically every time he spoke of this doctrine he explicitly 
used it to defend God from charges of unfairness or injustice for people who were born 
into unequal stations or who were born with unequal intellects and characters.353 
 Origen may have had one additional (although similar) motivation for adopting 
this view given his familiarity with Stoic psychology. His doctrine of pre-existent souls, 
whose past sins determined their starting station in life, was a way to bypass a 
problematic feature of Stoic teaching – character determinism. In the previous chapter, 
we saw that Origen could have avoided the dangers of character determinism by adopting 
Alexander of Aphrodisias' indeterminist notion of choice, but this would have taken away 
God's ability to make definitive plans for the future. Instead, Origen followed Stoic lines 
of thought by insisting that all choices derive from one's character. Souls make choices 
based on what their current character and intellect deem to be most reasonable at that 
specific moment. But this opened Origen up to the same difficulty found in the Stoic 
system – namely, that we do not appear to have direct control over our own natures.354 If 
                                                                                                                                                                             
deserved to be loved by God to such an extent as to be worthy of being preferred to his brother...” 
(Butterworth 135, emphasis added; SC 252, 368). 
 352 Cf. the discussion in Chapter 2 on this point. 
 353 E.g. PArch 2.9.5 (SC 252, 361-362), where Origen uses the teaching of pre-existence to rule 
out the gnostic teaching that there is a diversity in the natures of souls. Again, in PArch 2.9.6-8 Origen uses 
pre-existence to defend the justice of God. PArch 2.9.8: “Herein is displayed in its completeness the 
principle of impartiality, when the inequality of circumstances preserves an equality of reward for merit [In 
quo profecto omnis ratio aequitatis ostenditur, dum inaequalitas rerum retributionis meritorum seruat 
aequitatem]” (Butterworth 137; SC 252, 372). 
 354 To be clear, although the Platonists rejected the Stoic view of providence, this does not mean 
they understood moral autonomy to require indeterminate choice. That appears to be an innovation by 





our choices directly follow from our intellect and character, and if we had no power over 
the starting point of our intellect and character, then this appears to depict our moral 
choices as ultimately products of something external to us (whatever it was that created 
our initial dispositions). To be sure, our choices would spring from inside of us, yet that 
internal motion would itself be predetermined by an external cause. Origen must have 
recognized the similarities between this view and the gnostic view of fixed constitutions, 
given that his entire literary career demonstrates a great sensitivity to this topic. Thus, in 
order to reconcile the Stoic model of choice with his fundamental theological principles – 
the justice and goodness of God – Origen found himself needing to make this additional 
Platonic (or Philonic) alteration to the Stoic scheme: the pre-existence of souls.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Stones, "'Middle' Platonists on Fate and Human Autonomy," Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies II, 
no. 94: Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC - 200 AD (2007). Boys-Stones makes a convincing argument 
in this article that 'Middle' Platonist authors shared the same view as the Stoics regarding the determinism 
of prior causation (including character determinism): “There is, in general, no evidence that any Platonist of 
the period had any desire to deny the General Causal Principle in their efforts to save human autonomy. 
Our evidence is only that they did not believe it could be done on Stoic premises” (440, emphasis in 
original). Platonist authors only seemed to differ in regards to where the initial deterministic causal chain 
originated – Stoics said God, while Platonists said God along with random matter (440f). This difference 
would prevent Platonists from agreeing with the Stoic belief that everything that happens is planned and 
intended by God, given the fact that random matter was equally responsible in beginning the causal chain 
(442). 
It should be noted that there are still disagreements between scholars on these points. A recent 
article that illustrates the scholarly debate over what Stoics thought of “Fate” (versus free will) is: Susan 
Sauvé Meyer, "Chain of Causes: What is Stoic Fate?," in God and Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). In this article Meyer disagrees with both Bobzien and Boys-
Stones who interpret the Stoic “chain of causes” (fate) as a temporal sequence of cause and effect stretching 
into the past. Instead, Meyer insists that the Stoics viewed the “chain of causes” as the sympathetic 
interrelationship of all corporeal causes – a “mutual causal relationship” – and that this chain is something 
that exists in the present moment, and does not primarily refer to a cause and effect chain that stretches into 
the past and future. Thus, she concludes, opponents of Stoicism were not worried about “alternative 
possibilities” or “determinism” (88). I find Meyer most convincing when she argues that the “chain of 
causes” (or fate) encompasses the atemporal and immediate interrelationship between all causes in the 
cosmos, understood through the Stoic notion of “sympathy.” However, this does not seem to undercut the 
arguments by Bobzien and Boys-Stones which assert that the chain of causes also has a temporal aspect. 
After all, Meyer admits that Stoics also discuss “antecedent causes” quite frequently (85-87), which does 
denote a temporal aspect. More importantly, I disagree with Meyer’s claim that opponents of Stoicism were 
not concerned with alternative possibilities. The discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias in Chapter 2 





 Origen's adoption of this Platonic doctrine was strategic, for Origen found himself 
with an urgent and biblical question of theodicy: Is God just or not? One could answer in 
the way of Marcion and state that the reason people are born into unequal situations of 
misery is the fault of a bad and capricious deity. The gnostic answer was to say that 
people have different stations in life based on different fundamental constitutions. Origen 
rejected both of these options, as well as the similar Stoic view. Origen only had one 
deity to ascribe causes to, and this deity must be both good and fair; this deity created all 
with the same nature. Also, Origen could not merely appeal to Scripture, for his 
opponents were quick to make similar appeals to the same holy texts. Therefore, the 
theological move that made the most sense to Origen was to adopt the idea of a 
primordial fall, and this became a central feature of his theodicy. 
 
4) Moral Progress (Part 1): Initial Repentance and the Pursuit of Virtue 
 The goal for all rational creatures is to turn away from sin and grow in the virtues, 
both in the earthly life and in the life to come. This is the moral quest. The final goal of 
the quest is reunion with God which will only be achieved after a long period of continual 
ascent in and towards goodness. The ascent is powered by the soul choosing to turn away 
from the desires of the flesh and instead aligning with the desires of the spirit. Because a 
person's free choice is always dependent on their intellect and character, the main way 
God cooperates with rational creatures during this time is by strengthening their reason 
and disciplining their character. God does this by employing a wide swath of pedagogical 





his Incarnation, death, and Resurrection.355 Christ’s atonement makes possible the 
justification of each sinner, which is a crucial element in the moral quest.356 Christ also 
frees us from the devil who was holding us; Christ’s blood was the price that was 
demanded.357 The moral quest may be described as a pedagogical quest guided by the 
Logos himself,358 and so Origen views soteriology as pedagogical soteriology.359  
                                                          
355 The role of Jesus’ Incarnation, death, and Resurrection in Origen’s thought is complicated, 
given that he never systematically addresses it in his extant writings. The various titles or aspects (ἐπίνοια) 
of Jesus that Origen lists in ComJn 1.52-57 (SC 120, 88-90) are the various ways that Jesus meets the 
current condition of fallen souls in order to heal them – cf. Cels II.64.1-5 (SC 132, 435); PArch 1.2.1-13 
(SC 252, 110-142). Each individual soul needs a specific type of help from God, and Jesus applies the 
various cures in a plethora of ways. For a sampling of texts where Origen speaks about the effects of 
Christ’s Incarnation, death, and Resurrection, see Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace: 108-52. 
Citations from Origen’s Commentary on John (by book and section) are from the most recent critical 
edition: Blanc, Origène: Commentaire sur Saint Jean. Unless otherwise noted, English translations from 
ComJn are from Ronald Heine’s 2 volume set: Heine, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, 
Books 1-10; Commentary on the Gospel According to John, Books 13-32. 
356 Origen understands the justification of the sinner to be a requirement for salvation. According 
to Origen, the two factors in our justification are our faith and Christ’s blood. Origen insists that “neither 
does our faith justify us apart from the blood of Christ nor does the blood of Christ justify us apart from our 
faith. Of the two, however, the blood of Christ justifies us much more than our faith” – ComRm IV.11.66-
70 (Scheck 1.298; Bammel 352). The moment Jesus died on the cross he reconciled “men to God through 
his blood, provided that they keep the covenant of reconciliation inviolate by sinning no longer” – ComRm 
IV.12.68-71 (Scheck 1.301; Bammel 357). Jesus’ death was the “beginning of reconciliation. His 
resurrection and life, however, conferred salvation to believers” – ComRm IV.12.72-74 (Scheck 1.301; 
Bammel 357). Finally, Jesus’ death on the cross was more than a payment to the Devil; it is also a powerful 
teaching tool, for “he gave men an example which teaches us to resist sins even to the point of death” – 
ComRm IV.12.66-68 (Scheck 1.301; Bammel 357). There has been considerable scholarly debate on how 
to best understand Origen’s view of “faith and works” in the process of justification. Important 
contributions to this question include: Harnack, History of Dogma, 2: 321f; Boyd, "Origen on Pharaoh's 
hardened heart: a study of Justification and Election in St. Paul and Origen."; M. F. Wiles, The Divine 
Apostle: The Interpretation of St Paul’s Epistles in the Early Church (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967), 105-16; T. Heither, Translatio Religionis: Die Paulusdeutung des Origenes in seinem 
Kommentar zum Römerbrief, Bonner Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte (Cologne: Böhlau, 1990), 238ff; 
Caroline P. Hammond Bammel, "Justification by Faith in Augustine and Origen," The Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History 47, no. 2 (1996); Thomas P. Scheck, Origen and the History of Justification: The 
Legacy of Origen's Commentary on Romans (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 13-
62. Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Romans (along with page numbers) are from the critical 
edition by Bammel, Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung Rufins, 1, 
2, 3. All English translations (listed by volume and page) are from Scheck’s 2-volume work: Scheck, 
Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5; Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans Books 6-10. 
357 ComRm II.9 (Scheck 1.161; Bammel 172). 
358 PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 243-44; SC 268, 232-234): “But this subjection will be accomplished 
through certain means and courses of discipline and periods of time… by word [verbo], by reason, by 
teaching, by the exhortation to better things, by the best methods of education, and also by such merited 
and appropriate threatenings…” Origen begins his list with “word” (Rufinus translates λογος as verbo 
here). Origen is referring to the Word, the Son of God. A few lines later Origen explicitly refers to the 





 I will be brief here, for although Origen has a great deal to say about defeating 
bodily passions and pursuing virtue, much of it is not directly relevant to the scope of this 
study. During the discussion in Chapter 2 on Origen's tripartite anthropology I 
highlighted the importance of human free choice and its general role in the moral quest. 
In Chapter 5, I will focus on how God arranges and cooperates with human choices (in 
this world and the next) in order to ensure a final restoration. Much more could be said on 
this topic given that practically all of Origen's theology revolves around it. Yet, in 
keeping with my narrower focus on the way God's providence interacts with human 
moral autonomy, I conclude this section by noting that for Origen the moral quest of 
returning to God begins in one’s earthly life, but it does not end there. The degree of 
progress (or regress) in this life is important, but from the perspective of cosmic history 
one’s earthly life is brief, and therefore any progress made here is only a fraction of the 
overall distance the soul needs to travel.360 
 
5) Moral Progress (Part 2): Bodily Death, Resurrection, Purification and Ascent 
Death and Resurrection: 
 Origen understands the second and longer part of the moral quest to begin after 
one's earthly life ends. We can subdivide this next stage even further by first examining 
Origen's views of Death and Resurrection, and then his views on Purification and Ascent. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
359 This is perhaps the most well-known feature of Origen’s theology – for discussion of Origen’s 
pedagogical soteriology, cf. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum 
Platonismus; Karen Jo Torjesen, "Pedagogical Soteriology from Clement to Origen," in Origeniana Quarta 
4, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1985); Jacobsen, Christ-The Teacher of Salvation: A Study 
on Origen's Christology and Soteriology. 
360 Cf. ComRm X.10 (Scheck 2.275-276; Bammel 813): “And now, we shall nonetheless say that 
Paul and if there are those who are like him are said to be perfect in comparison with others; but no human 
being can be called or be perfect in comparison with the highest knowledge or to the perfection that exists 





For Origen, death is only the end of one's earthly body and is the beginning of a new 
stage of existence, for “things which were made by God for the purpose of permanent 
existence cannot suffer a destruction of their substance [substantialem uero 
interitum].”361 The Resurrection that occurs after death is a transformation in the 
substance of the earthly body into something ethereal and invisible, yet not 
incorporeal.362 The resurrected body is not the same as the old rotted body, even if they 
are linked by a certain “life-principle” that preserves a consistent bodily essence.363 Souls 
must continue to have bodies in the afterlife because it is the body which allows for 
movement. But our bodies must also be suited to the nature of the environment we are in, 
and so after death when we are in the “purer, ethereal and heavenly regions” (αἰθερίους 
καί οὐρανός τόπους), our bodies must be likewise.364 Just as in the previous stages of 
cosmic history, God grants new bodies in the Resurrection in accordance with a person's 
merit.365 The new ethereal bodies will continue to change by degrees according to the 
                                                          
 361 PArch 3.6.5 (Butterworth 251; SC 268, 244). Origen rules out annihilationism here. 
 362 Origen’s view of the resurrection body is one of the most hotly debated aspects of Origen’s 
theology. For example, Charles Hill argues that Origen believes in an intermediate period after death and 
before resurrection where souls exist without bodies – Charles Hill, Regnum Caelorum: Patterns of 
Millennial Thought in Early Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001), 176-89, 
especially 81-84. On the other hand, Mark Edwards insists that Origen envisions no such intermediate state, 
and no incorporeal existence for individuals whatsoever – Mark J. Edwards, "Origen's Two Resurrections," 
Journal of Theological Studies 46 (1995). However, I and many other scholars follow Crouzel’s argument 
that in Origen the resurrected beings have an ethereal body that is closely linked with their earthly body – 
Crouzel, "L'Apocatastase chez Origène." Daley has written a helpful orientation on the main contours of 
this debate – Brian Daley, "Resurrection," in The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. John McGuckin 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004). Cf. A. Le Boulluec, "De la croissance selon les 
stoïciens à la résurrection selon Origène," Revue des Études Grecques 88 (1975); Watson, "Souls and 
bodies in Origen's Peri Archon."; Brian Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: a Handbook of Patristic 
Eschatology (New York: Cambridge University, 1991), 51-56; Hennessey, "Origen of Alexandria: The 
Fate of the Soul and the Body after Death."; Edwards, "Origen's Two Resurrections."; John David Dawson, 
"Spiritual Bodies," in Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001); Somos, "Origenian apocatastasis revisited?." Cf. discussion on this debate above in 
n193. 
 363 PArch 2.10.3: “Ita namque etiam nostra corpora uelut granum cadere in terram putanda sunt ; 
quibus insita ratio ea, quae substantiam continet corporalem…” (Butterworth 141; SC 252, 380). 
 364 Cels VII.32.20 (SC 150, 86). 





progress or regress of each soul through long periods of time until all rational souls have 
been restored to God.366 This continuation of the moral quest does not take place in some 
other realm, but instead it takes place in the very same material heavens and earth in 
which other people continue to live out their earthly lives.367 Origen did not believe in 
reincarnation, or that individuals who had died would once again be born into new 
bodies.368 
Purification and Punishment: 
 Resurrection bodies are sufficiently incorruptible that they cannot be dissolved by 
fiery punishments.369 This is important because immediately following the Resurrection 
                                                          
 366 PArch 3.6.7: “The bodily nature, however, admits of a change in substance [substantialem 
recipit permutationem], so that God the Artificer of all things, in whatever work of design or construction 
or restoration he may wish to engage, has at hand the service of this material for all purposes, and can 
transform and transfer it into whatever forms and species he desires, as the merits of things demand” 
(Butterworth 253; SC 268, 250). 
367 Resurrected creatures continue to live (and rise upwards through) the “heavens” – PArch 2.10.3 
(Butterworth 141; SC 252, 380). PArch 2.11.6: “We may speak in some such way also about the abode in 
the air. I think that the saints as they depart from this life will remain in some place situated on the earth, 
which the scripture calls ‘paradise’. This will be a place of instruction and, so to speak, a lecture room or 
school for souls in which they may be taught about all they had seen on earth and may also receive some 
indications of what is to follow in the future” (Butterworth 152; SC 252, 408). 
368 Origen refers to this concept as metensomatoseos (“transmigration”). When commenting on 
John the Baptist in ComJn 6.64f, Origen notes that some people try to defend the doctrine of 
“transmigration” (μετενσωματώσεως) by saying that John’s soul is actually Elijah’s re-born (Heine 186; SC 
157, 176). In ComJn 6.66 Origen insists that someone who belongs to the Church (τις ἐκκλησιαστικὸς) must 
repudiate the doctrine of μετενσωματώσεως and call it false (Heine 186; SC 157, 176). Given that we have 
here Origen’s explicit denial of this doctrine, preserved in the Greek, it is probably safe to conclude with 
Edwards that “We may take it as a rule, then, that a single soul can experience only a single human life” – 
Edwards, Origen Against Plato: 99. At the same time, however, Origen appears to suggest at least a 
hypothetical possibility of a future falling away after the apocatastasis, which could result in another 
earthly life for souls who need to be rehabilitated again – cf. PArch 2.3.4 where Origen says that if future 
falls were to occur, that future cycles would not be identical to previous ones as the Stoic believed “…but 
worlds may exist that are diverse, having variations by no means slight, so that for certain clear causes the 
condition of one may be better, while another for different causes may be worse, and another intermediate. 
What may be the number or measure of these worlds I confess I do not know; but I would willingly learn, if 
any man can show me” (Butterworth 88; SC 252, 260). Such an eventuality would not be an example of 
metensomatoeos, but it would mean that a soul could (hypothetically) experience more than one earthly life. 
As such, I would correct Edwards’ statement by saying that Origen believes a soul can experience only a 
single human life per each cycle of salvation-history (in case there is more than one cycle), with each cycle 
leading to a restoration. (I will advance the argument in Chapter 4, however, that Origen viewed the 
apocatastasis to be permanent). 





is a time of purifying punishments. Taking his cue from Isaiah 50:11, Origen says that 
when scripture speaks of eternal370 fire it is a fire that belongs to the sinner:  
These words seem to indicate that every sinner kindles for himself the 
flame of his own fire [quod unusquisque peccatorum flammam sibi ipse 
proprii ignis], and is not plunged into a fire which has been previously 
kindled by some one else or which existed before him . . . when the soul 
has gathered within itself a multitude of evil deeds and an abundance of 
sins, at the requisite time [conpetenti tempore] the whole mass of evil 
boils up into punishment and is kindled into penalties; at which time the 
mind or conscience, bringing to memory [memoriam] through divine 
power [diuinam uirtutem] all things the signs and forms of which it had 
impressed upon itself at the moment of sinning, will see exposed before its 
eyes a kind of history of its evil deeds [historiam quandam scelerum 
suorum ante oculos uidebit expositam], of every foul and disgraceful act 
and all unholy conduct. Then the conscience is harassed and pricked by its 
own stings, and becomes an accuser and witness against itself.371   
Here we see Origen's understanding of post-Resurrection punishment as an extension of 
individual memory, which is enabled or heightened in intensity by God’s power. Having 
to experience shameful and painful memories of one's past sins is a just punishment, for 
the memories are quite literally of the person's own making.372 Nevertheless, at the same 
time God's providence is responsible for this process in at least two ways. First, God 
himself came up with this plan of purification and this role for memory in his strategic 
planning of salvation-history. Second, the actual process of the purifying pain is induced 
                                                          
370 Origen believes that “eternal” (αἰώνιος / aeterna) has several different meanings, including the 
designation of a long (but finite) length of time. E.g. ComRm VI.5 (Scheck 2.16; Bammel 477-8). 
 371 PArch 2.10.4 (Butterworth 141-42; SC 252, 384). Cf. ComRm II.5 (Scheck 1.121; Bammel 
122): “We have already repeatedly said concerning wrath that anyone who is struck in his soul by the 
awareness of sin is someone tormented by wrath.” ComMatt 10.2: “[In the last days when God’s angels 
gather all things that cause a stumbling block to souls which they will cast into the burning furnace of fire], 
then those who become conscious that they have received the seeds of the evil one in themselves, because 
of their having been asleep, shall wail and, as it were, be angry against themselves.” – (Patrick 415; SC 
162, 146-8). Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Matthew are from the most recent critical edition: 
Robert Girod, Origène: Commentaire sur l'Évangile selon Matthieu, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les 
Éditions du cerf, 1970). English translations are from: John Patrick, "Origen's Commentary on the Gospel 
of Matthew," in Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Allan Menzies (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1896; 
reprint 1999). 
 372 Origen frequently emphasizes that punishment is distributed in a way that perfectly accords 
with God’s justice, e.g. PArch 2.9.8: God arranges the universe “on the principles of a most impartial 





by God at the “requisite time” (conpetenti tempore) and through the “divine power” 
(diuinam uirtutem).373 To those who might doubt whether memory could be that 
powerful, Origen suggests they look at well-known examples of people whose memories 
of grief, or lust, or regret are so intense and painful that the person is willing to take his 
own life rather than continue experiencing it.374 The theme of punishment through 
memory might also help to explain Origen's comments elsewhere about Jesus restoring 
his people to a point where they may “forget” (ἀμνηστίαν) the sins that they have 
previously committed.375   
 Despite the severity of punishments that each soul will face in varying degrees, 
Origen insists that God is our great and loving physician. And as our physician, these 
punishments are not vindictive, but rather they serve as medicine. Just as a surgeon in 
severe cases needs to cut with the knife or burn with fire to get at the underlying disease, 
so God also administers strong and painful medicine, not simply as a judgment, but also 
as a tool for healing.376 Thus, Origen calls punishments in the afterlife “penal remedies” 
(poenalibus curis), which helpfully depicts their dual nature as both just judgments and 
restorative medicine.377 Origen understands divine punishment to work in this way in all 
                                                          
 373 Cf. Cels V.15, where Origen describes God’s punishments as purifying, beneficent, and 
strategically applied (SC 147, 51-52). 
374 PArch 2.10.5 (SC 252, 384-386). 
 375 Cels V.32.6 (Chadwick 288; SC 147, 94). Origen held that through water baptism God would 
forgive (and forget) the sins committed before baptism, while any sins committed after baptism (or all sins 
for people who were never baptized) will need to be purified in the afterlife. All of those who sin after 
baptism will need to be baptized in fire – HomJer 2.3.1-22 (SC 232, 246). Citations from Origen’s 
Homilies on Jeremiah are from the most recent critical edition (including volume and page): Pierre Nautin, 
Origène: Homélies sur Jérémie, 2 vols., vol. 1, 2, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1976). 
Unless otherwise noted, all English translations are from John Clark Smith, Origen: Homilies on Jeremiah 
and 1 Kings 28, FOTC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998). 
 376 PArch 2.10.6 (SC 252, 386-388). 
 377 PArch 2.10.6: “...God our physician, in his desire to wash away the ills of our souls, which they 
have brought on themselves through a variety of sins and crimes, makes use of penal remedies of a similar 
sort, even to the infliction of a punishment of fire on those who have lost their soul's health” (Butterworth 





cases, including those instances where God exercises judgments on people during their 
earthly lives. This understanding, therefore, serves as an interpretive principle for Origen 
when he exegetes thorny passages in Scripture where God is described as abandoning 
people or giving them up to their sins. God’s strategy of abandonment might seem 
counterintuitive: how does letting people sin even more produce the desired result? After 
all, Origen knows that the more one sins the easier it is to keep sinning, so why should 
allowing an increase in sin lead to a greater likelihood of repentance? The answer for 
Origen lies in the importance of a soul’s self-awareness of its own broken condition. By 
allowing people to wallow in sin they will finally reach a point where they become aware 
of it and begin to hate their sin.378  
 In fact, every temptation should lead to greater self-awareness, for by examining 
the things we are tempted by we gain knowledge of what we are like. In this way 
temptations are good things, for they reveal the secret things of the heart if people pay 
attention to them.379 When people do not discipline themselves to pay attention to their 
temptations, then God allows them to become fully saturated in evil and misery, so that 
they may finally arrive at self-awareness. At this point a person begins to hate what they 
crave, even as they continue to crave it.380 God will sometimes even allow the evil to 
continue for such a long period that it becomes incurable by one's own efforts.381 Only 
                                                          
 378 Cels V.32.15: God gives certain people over to their sins “in order that by being sated with sin 
they might hate it…” (Chadwick 289; SC 147, 94). PArch 3.1.17, Greek: “[When God abandons sinners,] 
he helps them by not helping them [βοηθῶν αὐτοῖς οὐ βοηθεῖ τούτου αὐτοῖς λυσιτελοῦντος]” (Butterworth 
191; SC 268, 102). 
 379 PEuch 29.17 (GCS II, 391.24-29). Citations from Origen’s On Prayer are from the Berlin-
Leipzig critical edition (GCS), and are listed in the format of Origenes Werke volume (II), page number, 
and line number: Koetschau, Buch V-VIII gegen Celsus, Die Schrift vom Gebet. Unless otherwise noted, 
English translations are from Greer, Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book 
IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers. 
 380 PEuch 29.14 (GCS II, 389.1-25). 





then will God enter with his remedy, for if he had applied the remedy any earlier the 
person would not have understood the evil they were engaging in and it would have led to 
greater failings in the future. God's remedy comes in the form of a beneficent healing fire, 
not to be confused with the fiery punishment people experience of their own doing. God's 
fire frees them “from all the filth and blood by which they had been so stained and 
defiled that they could not even think of being saved from their own destruction.”382 By 
delaying the healing remedy, God ensures that the patient desires it, for God does not 
want goodness to belong to anyone by necessity but only willingly.383 When the person 
reaches their limits and begins to hate their sin, God steps in to heal the person. This is a 
painful process, but it is not punishment; it is simply a medicine of purification that is 
painful in its application.384 Thus, there are two types of pain people experience in the 
afterlife, both of which Origen describes as a type of metaphorical “fire”, and yet only 
one is a punishment; the other is healing. People will suffer these “fires” in varying 
degrees according to their works.385 Both are designed as necessary parts of the process 
by which God restores all souls to himself.386  
                                                          
 382 PEuch 29.15 (Greer 159; GCS II, 390.14-17). 
 383 PEuch 29.15 (Greer 160; GCS II, 390-391). 
 384 PEuch 29.15: “But in the fire and the prison they do not receive ‘the due penalty of their error,’ 
but they gain a beneficence for cleansing them of the evils in their error [ἐν δὲ τῶ πυρὶ καὶ τῆ φυλακῆ 
ἀντιμισθίαν τῆς πλάνης ἀλλ᾿ εὐεργεσίαν ἐπὶ καθάρσει τῶν ἐν τῆ πλάνη κακῶν μετὰ σωτηρίων λαμβάνοντες 
πόνων]” (Greer 159; GCS II, 390.13-14). 
385 HomJer 12.3.9-14: “He who is about to punish spares no one. Not even if someone were called 
a prophet, he has sins, and will not be filled when the threats are spoken. Not even if someone were called a 
priest and believed that he had a stature of a more honorable name among the people does God spare him 
to the point that he does not punish him who has sinned” (Smith 114-115 italics in original; SC 238, 20). 
 386 Cf. HomNum 27.10.3: “For just as physicians put bitter [substances] in medicines with a view 
to the health and healing of those who are sick, so also the physician of our souls, with a view to our 
salvation, has willed that we suffer the bitterness of this life in various temptations, knowing that the end of 
this bitterness gains the sweetness of salvation for our soul” (Scheck 177; SC 461, 315). Because 
punishments are medicinal and pedagogical, Origen understands all punishments to be temporary rather 
than eternal. Citations from Origen’s Homilies on Numbers are from the newest critical edition: Louis 
Doutreleau, Origène: Homélies sur les Nombres, 3 vols., vol. 1, 2, 3, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les 
Éditions du Cerf, 1996-1999). English translations are from Thomas P. Scheck, Homilies on Numbers: 






 Once people die, and once they receive their new bodies and are purified by God, 
the moral quest continues.387 God's purifying fire and the painful memory of past sins 
spur the soul upward level by level. Individuals continue to exist in the material world – 
only now they live in the air above the earth, which scripture calls paradise 
(paradisum).388 For example, people who died in the flood did not get taken out of the 
heavens and earth, but instead got moved out of the earthly regions and into the air.389 
The initial starting place (or “stage” or “mansion”) each soul finds itself in corresponds to 
how much progress was made in the person’s earthly life. Those who make greater 
progress in their earthly lives benefit by resuming their moral quest with a higher 
advantage.390 In essence, this abode in the air functions as a “school for souls” (schola 
animarum), where all are to be instructed about God's providence;391 each Mind's 
intelligence will grow as it learns why certain events happened on earth, how God has a 
plan for everything, and also about future things to come.392  
                                                          
 387 Origen knows that people only make varying degrees of progress in life, and so the moral quest 
or the ascent back to God must continue after death. This raises a question: what is the purpose of the 
earthly stage of life if it is not sufficient for restoring us to God, no matter how hard we try? That is to say, 
clearly the moral quest does not seem to logically require an earthly existence, since the majority of the 
quest takes place after the soul's earthly existence. Why bother with the intermediate step at all? The 
answer for Origen seems to be that there is something about bodily temptations on earth (even morally 
neutral temptations like the need to eat and drink) which impose a unique training opportunity for the soul. 
By training ourselves to turn away from unhealthy bodily desires, we begin to train ourselves to turn away 
from improper mental desires. E.g. PArch 3.6.8: “It seems to me, therefore, that as in this earth the law was 
a kind of schoolmaster to those who by it were appointed to be led to Christ and to be instructed and trained 
in order that after their training in the law they might be able with greater facility to receive the more 
perfect precepts of Christ...” (Butterworth 254; SC 268, 252). 
 388 PArch 2.11.6 (Butterworth 152; SC 252, 408). Cf. Philo De Somniis 1,138-141. 
 389 Cels VI.59.5-14 (SC 147, 324-326). 
390 PArch 2.3.7 (Butterworth 93-94; SC 252, 272-274); HomNum 1.3 (Scheck 4-5; SC 415, 40-48). 
391 PArch 2.11.6 (Butterworth 152; SC 252, 408). 
 392 PArch 2.11.6-7 (SC 252, 407-412). PArch 2.11.5: “He will learn the judgement of divine 
providence [diuinae prouidentiae] about each individual thing; about things which happen to men, that they 
happen not by chance or accident, but by a reason so carefully thought out, and so high above us, that it 
does not overlook even the number of hairs on our head” (Butterworth 151; SC 252, 406). This passage 





 Before the coming of Christ there was a limit in how high souls were able to 
ascend. Certainly, Old Testament saints like Abraham and Samuel would have risen 
higher than those who had died with many sins. Yet, there was a terminus ad quem, for 
no one could pass the fiery swords of the cherubim who guarded the Tree of Life. All had 
to wait until the coming of Jesus Christ who opened up the passage through the fire; with 
Christ’s work accomplished the barrier has been lifted.393 Henceforth, continual 
pedagogy will facilitate the soul's upward progress past the planets and through the 
heavens;394 the soul learns about each level that it passes through as it follows after the 
trailblazer Jesus Christ who was the first to ascend in order to show the way.395 But this 
will take place over many ages, with some individuals achieving the goal before 
others.396 In a homily on Numbers 33 Origen links the exodus of the Israelites with the 
soul's ascent to God.397 He identifies forty-two stages the Israelites passed through on 
their way to the Promised Land and Origen suggests that the soul will similarly travel 
                                                                                                                                                                             
history – indeed, the entire history of the universe – can be divided into the categories of either God’s 
providence or human moral autonomy. 
393 Hom1R (1S) V.9.36-10.13: “In fact, before the sojourn of my Lord Jesus Christ, it was 
impossible for someone to come near to where the Tree of Life was . . . So Patriarchs and Prophets and 
everyone wait for the coming of my Lord Jesus Christ, in order that he might open up the way . . . [but now 
after Christ] we pass through, and we have something further” (Smith 331-333; SC 328, 204-206). Origen 
preached from the Septuagint (1 Kings 28), but modern bibles label this as 1 Samuel 28, as does the 
Sources Chrétiennes title. Citations from Origen’s Homilies on 1 Kings (1 Samuel) are from the critical 
edition by Pierre Nautin and Marie-Thérèse Nautin, Origène: Homélies sur Samuel, Sources Chrétiennes 
(Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1986). English translations are from Smith, Origen: Homilies on Jeremiah 
and 1 Kings 28. 
 394 PArch 1.6.3 (SC 252, 202-204). 
 395 HomNum 27.3.1-2: “Thus the one who ascends, ascends with him who descended from there to 
us, so that he can reach the place from which that one descended…come now and let us begin to ascend 
through the things by which Christ descended…” (Scheck 171; SC 461, 282-286). The language used by 
Origen here is reminiscent of the Ascension of Isaiah. 
396 The fact that some souls arrive at their destination before others is an important point that will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 397 Origen finds a double spiritual meaning in the exodus, both representing the soul's ascent to 
God after death, as well as representing the sinner's turning away from the pagan life to the Christian life in 





through forty-two stages after death.398 Perhaps, suggests Origen, Jesus Christ will be the 
doorway both in and out of each stage.399 Temptation must be resisted at each subsequent 
stage so that the soul does not relapse, yet it becomes easier to resist them at each stage. 
In Origen's words:  
[The soul], when it is about to ascend to heaven after the resurrection, 
neither suddenly nor unseasonably, ascends to the heights, but is led 
through “many stages,” through which it is enlightened stage by stage, and 
it always receives an increase of splendor, illumined at each stage by the 
light of wisdom, until it reaches the Father himself.400  
While the intellectual power of the mind advances, the person's body grows more and 
more spiritual until it develops into the glory of a “spiritual body” (spiritalis corporis).401 
The entire process is governed by God's providential oversight to the advantage of each 
individual soul, so that all may arrive at their final destination of rest (requiem).402 
  
Conclusion 
 This brief overview of Origen’s vision of salvation-history provides the necessary 
backdrop and context for my analysis of Origen’s universalism, to which we now turn. 
This chapter has demonstrated that at every stage of salvation-history divine providence 
instructs, guides, and enforces the direction of history towards one specific end: the 
eventual restoration of every fallen soul. The next chapter will demonstrate that Origen 
believed this telos has been predetermined by God. 
  
                                                          
 398 HomNum 27.3.1 (Scheck 171; SC 461, 284). Cf. ComRm VI.5 (Scheck 2.14-15; Bammel 475): 
“…after someone has been set free from sin, he must, first of all, serve righteousness and all the virtues 
together, so that from there he might ascend, by means of progress, to the point that he becomes a slave to 
God…there is an order in the level of advancement and there are degrees within the virtues.” 
 399 HomNum 27.2.3 (Scheck 170; SC 461, 280). 
 400 HomNum 27.6.1 (Scheck 173; SC 461, 296). 
 401 PArch 3.6.6 (Butterworth 252; SC 268, 246). 







Introduction and Scope 
 In this chapter I will examine the often-debated final stage of Origen’s cosmic 
history. My examination will be focused in the following ways: Origen was not the first 
nor the last ancient writer to make use of the theme of apocatastasis403 or the various 
elements that often relate to the idea of universal salvation.404 However, it is outside the 
                                                          
 403 Origen used the actual term ἀποκατάστασις infrequently, even though he frequently talks about 
the concept of a final restoration in other ways. Origen uses the term itself in the following places: ComJn 
1.91 (Heine 52; SC 120, 106); PArch 3.1.15-19 (Greek – Butterworth 188; SC 268, 92), where Origen does 
not use the term eschatologically, but to refer to the “restoration of sight [ἀποκατάστασιν τῆς ὁράσεωσ]”; 
HomJer 14.18.17-29: commenting on Jeremiah 15:19 (“If you will return, I will also restore you”), Origen 
writes, “These words again are said to each person whom God exhorts to “return” to him. But for me there 
seems to be evident here a mystery in I will restore you. No one is restored to a certain place unless he was 
once there, but the restoration [ἀποκατάστασις] is to one’s own home . . . Thus he says here to us who turn 
away that if we return, he will restore us [ἀποκατάστασει]” (Smith 155-56; SC 238, 108-110). Rufinus 
frequently translates Origen’s Greek with the expressions restituere (e.g. PArch 2.1.1, SC 252, 236) and 
consummatio (e.g. PArch 1.6.1, SC 252, 194). 
 Citations from Origen’s Commentary on John (by book and section) are from the most recent 
critical edition: Blanc, Origène: Commentaire sur Saint Jean. Unless otherwise noted, English translations 
from ComJn are from Ronald Heine’s 2 volume set: Heine, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, 
Books 1-10; Commentary on the Gospel According to John, Books 13-32. The most recent critical edition 
of First Principles is by Crouzel and Simonetti, Origèn: Traité des Principes. Citations will list SC volume 
and page (for additional information see the bibliography). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations 
from Peri Archon are from Butterworth, Origen: On first principles: being Koetschau's text of the De 
principiis. Citations from Origen’s Homilies on Jeremiah are from the most recent critical edition 
(including volume and page): Nautin, Origène: Homélies sur Jérémie, 1, 2. Unless otherwise noted, all 
English translations are from Smith, Origen: Homilies on Jeremiah and 1 Kings 28. 
 404 The term “ἀποκατάστασις” is only found once in the New Testament (Acts 3:21), but is found 
in several pre-Christian sources. An early notion of apocatastasis is found in Stoicism, pertaining to the 
idea of the return (ἀποκατάστασις) of the planets to their rightful places, which issues forth a conflagration 
that returns the cosmos back to its primal element (fire), after which follows the rebirth of all existing 
things – see Maria-Barbara Von Stritzky, "Die Bedeutung der Phaidrosinterpretation für die 
Apokatastasislehre des Origenes," Vigiliae Christianae 31, no. 4 (1977). Von Stritzky also examines 
parallels between Origen and various Platonists, including Plotinus. On Origen and the Stoic view of 
apocatastasis, cf. Edward Moore, Origen of Alexandria and St. Maximus the Confessor: An Analysis and 
Critical Evaluation of Their Eschatological Doctrines (Boca Raton, FL: Dissertation.com, 2004), 25. 
Origen explicitly rejected the Stoic notion on the basis that repeating world cycles, which were identical 
down to every detail, would constitute a rejection of moral autonomy – e.g. PArch 2.3.4 (SC 252, 258-260); 
Cels IV.67-68 (SC 136, 348-352). Platonists believed that souls were immortal and lived on without the 
body after death. However, this would not be an individualized life, but rather souls would be subsumed in 
the World Soul from which they came given that matter was the source of all differentiation. But Platonists 





scope of this study to trace the conceptual history of this topic, if such an undertaking is 
even possible.405 It must be stressed, however, that “universal salvation” does not mean 
one thing in the abstract. Different authors who claim to believe in universal salvation 
understand this concept to entail varying features. It is not my goal to sort through such 
issues here, as interesting as they may be.406 Neither will I expound on the many facets of 
Origen’s eschatology in general. Instead, my examination of Origen's understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
bodies – cf. Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 223-29. At any rate, Philo was convinced that not many 
people would attain such a blessed end – see Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesim I, 16, as cited in ibid., 
227n30. Clement of Alexandria should be considered one of Origen's most important sources on the topic 
of universal salvation, for Clement appears to have held a similar view concerning the necessity of all souls 
finally being reunited with God. His language resembles Origen’s (e.g. Strom. 2.2, 7.2, 10.56; Fragments 
from Cassiodorus 1.3). Andrew Itter notes that when Clement employs the actual term ἀποκατάστασις, he 
uses it to describe the restoration of the gnostic elect rather than of the whole universe. Yet, Clement also 
seems to imply that the restoration of the whole will be facilitated by the restoration of the gnostic – 
Andrew Itter, Esoteric Teaching in the Stromateis of Clement of Alexandria, vol. 97, Supplements to 
Vigiliae Christianae (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2009), 200. Cf. A. Méhat, "« Apocatastase » : 
Origène, Clément d’Alexandrie, Act. 3, 21," Vigiliae Christianae 10 (1956); Ilaria Ramelli, "Origen, 
Bardaisan, and the Origin of Universal Salvation," Harvard Theological Review 102, no. 2 (2009). Outside 
of Alexandria, however, the predominant view was of non-universal salvation and, by implication, an 
eternal Hell – e.g. Justin Martyr, First Apology 8, 12, 21, 52. Second Clement 6.7, 17.7; Tertullian, Apology 
18.3, 44.12-13; Irenaeus, Haer. 1.10.1, 4.28.2. 
 Citations of Contra Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Borret, Origène: Contre 
Celse - Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes. Unless otherwise noted, any English translations 
of Contra Celsum are from: Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum. 
 405 This was recently attempted by Ilaria L. E. Ramelli in her large monograph – Ramelli, The 
Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: a critical assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena. One 
commends her courage at tackling such a large topic; in her own words, “My analysis will extend to the 
whole of the Patristic age, from the New Testament - and indeed the whole of the Bible . . . to John the Scot 
Eriugena, whose thought was nourished by the best of Greek Patristics” (2). Cf. the critical review of her 
book by Michael McClymond, "Origenes Vindicatus vel Rufinus Redivivus? A Review of Ilaria Ramelli's 
The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis (2013)," Theological Studies 76, no. 4 (2015). An outdated history 
of Universalism, (yet still helpful for the breadth of texts it covers), is Hosea Ballou, Ancient History of 
Universalism (Boston: Universalist Publishing House, 1872).  
406 So, for example, even the staunch defender of Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, who also affirmed a 
form of universal salvation, nevertheless differs from Origen regarding the doctrine of the final state in key 
details. Morwenna Ludlow has written a very helpful monograph on Gregory’s universalism: Morwenna 
Ludlow, Universal salvation: eschatology in the thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), see especially 77-112. Ludlow does not spend much time comparing 
Gregory to Origen, but my sense is that while Gregory is clearly indebted to Origen on this topic, he 
nevertheless argues for it in different ways. Gregory also denies the pre-existence of souls which had 
formed an important context for Origen’s universalism. Thus, when I refer to “apocatastasis” or “universal 
salvation”, the reader should understand that I am only speaking of Origen's view of the universality of 
salvation (and its accompanying features), and I am not intending to give definition to the umbrella term 
“universalism” itself, for this would artificially restrict many of the eschatological doctrines found in other 
Patristic authors. For a standard work analyzing the various eschatological beliefs in Patristic authors, see 





universal salvation primarily concerns questions of its predetermined or foreordained 
character. Did Origen believe in a final restoration of all souls, or only for some? Is this 
final restoration something Origen merely hoped for, or did he believe it to be an 
infallible fact? Once achieved, is it permanent, or will there be never-ending cycles of fall 
and restoration? While various other details about Origen's view of the final state may be 
discussed along the way, my focal point will be on the degree to which Origen's 
eschatology may be described as a species of determinism (in the sense of a teleological 
predetermination that is unalterable by human moral autonomy).407 
 My reasons for exploring Origen's universalism from this angle are twofold: first, 
disagreements in contemporary scholarship on this specific point are numerous, and that 
alone makes this aspect of God's providence interesting to investigate. But more 
importantly, the central argument of my project (developed in the next chapter) relies on 
a particular understanding of Origen's view of the apocatastasis, and thus it must be 
properly defended here given the wide diversity of scholarly opinions. Specifically, in 
this chapter I will argue that although Origen is hesitant to speak of his views on 
universal salvation for pastoral, pedagogical, and defensive reasons, that he nevertheless 
believes in a definite, guided, pre-arranged, and permanent final restoration of all souls to 
God. As such, I will further argue that the apocatastasis constitutes a form of teleological 
foreordination or unalterable certainty in Origen's theology. If true, this means that the 
entirety of God’s providence in Origen’s theology functions as salvific grace. Each of 
these points will need to be defended. I will begin by examining Origen's teachings on 
                                                          
407 It is also not my intention here to judge the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of Origen’s views. It is 
sufficient to note that as far as Origen was concerned, many matters of eschatology had not yet been settled 
by the Church and therefore could be appropriately explored – PArch praef 5-7 (SC 252, 82-84). As for the 





the subject – both those places in his corpus where he affirms a universal restoration and 
those places where he seems to contradict it. 
 
Origen's Conflicting Statements Regarding a Final Restoration 
 Throughout his writings, Origen makes statements which appear to contradict one 
another. At times, he clearly states that God will save all souls in a final restoration so 
that the end will be like the beginning. However, at other times he suggests that some 
wicked souls, such as the devil, might not ever be saved. Some of Origen's clearest 
affirmations of universal salvation are found in First Principles. Here Origen asserts that 
the end of the world will come when every soul has paid the penalties for its sins, and 
then “the goodness of God will restore [reuocet] his entire creation to one end [unum 
finem], even his enemies being conquered and subdued.”408 As some are liable to 
misunderstand what “subdued” (subditis) means in this context,409 Origen explicitly 
defines this subjection as something positive and restorative: 
If therefore that subjection by which the Son of God should also be 
understood to be salutary and useful; so that, just as when the Son is said 
to be subjected to the Father the perfect restoration of the entire creation is 
announced [perfecta uniuersae creaturae restitution], so when his enemies 
are said to be subjected to the Son of God we are to understand this to 
involve the salvation of those subjected and the restoration of those that 
have been lost.410 
The last enemy that will be subdued in this restorative way is death (Mors) itself. Death 
(or the devil) will be destroyed, for there cannot be any sadness or evil at the final end. 
But this final enemy is only “destroyed” in a very qualified sense:  
                                                          
 408 PArch 1.6.1 (Butterworth 52; SC 252, 194-196). Origen’s interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:26 is a 
cornerstone text for his understanding of universal salvation. Cf. ComJn 6.296-297 (SC 157, 354-356). 
409 PArch 3.5.7: “But the heretics, not understanding, I cannot tell why, the apostle’s meaning 
contained in these words, deprecate using the term subjection [subiectionis] in regard to the Son…” 
(Butterworth 243; SC 268, 230). 





For the destruction of the last enemy must be understood in this way, not 
that its substance [substantia] which was made by God shall perish, but 
that the hostile purpose and will [ut propositum et voluntas inimical] 
which proceeded not from God but from itself will come to an end. It will 
be destroyed, therefore, not in the sense of ceasing to exist, but of being no 
longer an enemy and no longer death. For to the Almighty nothing is 
impossible, nor is anything beyond the reach of cure by its Maker.411 
The reason that the devil will be the final enemy is because the devil was originally the 
first enemy. In one sense, Origen states that everyone who chooses to live an evil life is a 
“Satan,” but among these, the “Adversary” is the first rational being who fell from the 
pure contemplation of God,412 and the one who appears to have fallen the furthest in 
wickedness.413 It is significant that Origen singles out the worst sinner when stressing the 
salvation of all souls, for by emphasizing that not even the devil himself is beyond God's 
restorative grace, then certainly everyone will be saved. 
 Origen reminds his readers that this “subjection” will not take place by force but 
through the exercise of each creature's free choices as they ascend back to God, and 
therefore this will occur over a long and complicated process of divine education, 
rewards, threats, and punishments.414 It will happen in stages and by degrees, with some 
arriving first and some arriving later, until the very last enemy is restored to God and can 
no longer be called an enemy.415 Then the end must be like the beginning and in the final 
“consummation and restitution” (consummatione ac restitutione) God will be all in all.416  
                                                          
 411 PArch 3.6.5 (Butterworth 250-51; SC 268, 244). 
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 Many passages in First Principles reflect Origen's belief in the final salvation of 
all fallen souls,417 but this view is also found throughout Origen's other writings, albeit 
sometimes less explicitly. In his Commentary on John Origen repeats his assertion that in 
the “so-called restoration” (ἀποκαταστάσει) when all enemies are subjected to God, the 
last enemy to be destroyed will be death, and there will no longer be any enemies.418 And 
again, he affirms that although the whole world was once an enemy to God, God in Christ 
is reconciling the whole world back to himself – not all at once, but by stages, until Death 
itself is overcome.419 When replying to Celsus Origen declares that God's providence 
cares for the universe, both as a whole and to each individual part: “providence will never 
abandon the universe. For even if some part of it becomes very bad because the rational 
being sins, God arranges to purify it, and after a time to turn the whole world back to 
Himself.”420 God does this through the Logos: 
But we believe that at some time the Logos will have overcome the entire 
rational nature, and will have remodeled every soul to his own perfection, 
when each individual simply by the exercise of his freedom will choose 
what the Logos wills and will be in that state which he has chosen. And 
we hold that just as it is unlikely that some of the consequences of 
physical diseases and wounds would be too hard for any medical art, so 
also it is unlikely in the case of souls that any of the consequences of evil 
would be incapable of being cured by the rational and supreme God. For 
since the Logos and the healing power within him are more powerful than 
any evils in the soul, he applies this power to each individual according to 
God's will, and the treatment is the abolition of evil.421  
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Holliday, "Will Satan Be Saved? Reconsidering Origen's Theory of Volition in Peri Archon." Holliday’s 
argument, however, fails to account for the permanence of each soul's spiritual desires, and it fails to 
account for the role of God's providence in placing each creature in precisely the necessary circumstances 
that makes the desires of the spirit seem most reasonable in the moment of choice. See my discussion of her 
argument above in Chapter 2, n296. 
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In his Commentary on Romans Origen likewise affirms that God's love will draw all 
things to himself such that God will be all in all, and every soul will be so suffused by 
love for God and neighbor that a soul's freedom of choice will never again choose to 
depart from this union.422 
 While a strong thread of universal salvation runs all throughout Origen's writings, 
there are also a few places where Origen appears to deny its reality. Speaking in a homily 
on Jeremiah 18, Origen warns that in the present life we are like clay which can be 
refashioned by God to rid us of our evil, but that at the end of this life we pass through 
fire which hardens our clay. During that time if our clay is crushed because of evil, it will 
not be remade.423 Origen is not afraid to talk about the eternal fire (ignem aeternum) that 
awaits the Devil and his minions.424 He will say that although others might enjoy 
conversion at the end of the age when all Israel will be saved, for Satan “there will not be 
any conversion at the end of the age.”425 Origen's starkest rejection of a universal 
salvation can be found in his “Letter to Friends in Alexandria,” which he wrote around 
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Homélies sur Josué, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1960). English translations are from 
Barbara J. Bruce, Origen: Homilies on Joshua, FOTC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2002). 
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232AD after his banishment from Alexandria by Bishop Demetrius.426 In this letter 
Origen responds to critics who claim he taught that the Devil would be saved:  
Let them pay heed, who do not wish to pay attention to the precept: 
"slanderers will not possess the kingdom of God." According to them, I 
say that the father of malice and perdition, and of those who are excluded 
from the kingdom of God, that is, the devil, will be saved. Not even a 
deranged and manifestly insane person can say this.427 
In the same letter Origen expands this thought by asserting that all sinners (whether guilty 
of large sins or lesser ones) will be excluded from the Kingdom of God.428 
 Given the divergence of Origen’s statements, it is not surprising that scholars 
have arrived at different conclusions when trying to make sense of Origen’s belief 
concerning a final restoration. In the last century especially, the doctrine that was once 
widely attributed to Origen began to be questioned and re-examined, perhaps as part of 
the (so-called) modern effort to rehabilitate Origen's name and distance him from the 
anathemas of the Fifth Ecumenical Council at Constantinople in 543.429 Some follow 
Henri Crouzel who concluded that universal salvation is merely a great hope for Origen 
rather than a statement of fact.430 A similar position is to say that Origen believed in the 
                                                          
 426 This is preserved by both Jerome and Rufinus: Jerome, Apologia adversus libros Rufini 2.18 
and Rufinus, De adulteratione librorum Origenis 7.1-67. Both Jerome and Rufinus report Origen's words 
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 427 Translation in ibid., 140-41. 
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Origen: 264-65; Henri De Lubac, Du hast mich betrogen, Herr (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1984), 84-85; 





universal offer of salvation rather than in the certainty of universal salvation.431 Others 
say that Origen believed in universal salvation for all except for the devil and his 
demons.432 Another position is to argue that Origen never believed in universal salvation 
in the first place,433 while a few admit that Origen may have once held such a view but 
that he changed his mind or softened his stance in his later years.434 Still others remain 
                                                                                                                                                                             
World and His Legacy, ed. Charles and William L. Petersen Kannengiesser, Christianity and Judaism in 
Antiquity (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 311-12; Scheck, Origen: Homilies 1-
14 on Ezekiel: 13; Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 253-60. 
431 Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace: 169; Babcock, "Origen's Anti-Gnostic Polemic 
and the Doctrine of Universalism," 57. 
 432 Holliday believes that Origen probably did not envision the salvation of the Devil because 
although the Devil retained the capability of choosing the good, he became so habituated to sin that he 
would never do so. However, she stresses that Origen's views on this subject are somewhat contradictory – 
Holliday, "Will Satan Be Saved? Reconsidering Origen's Theory of Volition in Peri Archon," 22-23. Brian 
Daley recognizes Origen’s “strong conviction” of universal salvation, yet at the same time Daley suggests 
that Origen may have remained undecided regarding the question of Satan’s final salvation – Daley, The 
Hope of the Early Church: a Handbook of Patristic Eschatology: 58-59. Edwards also suggests that 
Origen’s universalism need not extend to the devil based on his argument that, contrary to the prevailing 
opinion, Origen viewed humans and demons to be separate races – Edwards, Origen Against Plato: 
100n64. 
 433 Michael Domeracki, "Origen and the Possible Restoration of the Devil," Journal of the 
Canadian Society for Coptic Studies 6 (2014): 34, 37. Domeracki believes that Origen was, in essence, an 
annihilationist in that rational creatures who continually choose evil will eventually be destroyed (36). 
There are several weak points in Domeracki's argument. For example, Domeracki cites Origen's 
Commentary on Matthew 10.12-13 where Origen writes that at the end of the age the angels will separate 
the wicked from the righteous. Domeracki concludes from this that “The fact that Origen hopes that there 
will be more righteous beings than unrighteous ones at the end demonstrates that he did not envision 
universal salvation” (34). This, however, is an inaccurate interpretation of Origen's comments at this place 
in the commentary. Origen frequently speaks about the end of the age (or the end of an age) and the 
beginning of punishment, but he often is not referring to the “final end.” In the Matthew commentary 
Origen is speaking about the beginning of the next age in his understanding of cosmic history. The 
punishment is a temporary and remedial process by which the soul is purified, instructed and so 
jumpstarted on the next leg of the moral quest. Perhaps the most serious problem with Domeracki's 
treatment of this issue is his failure to interact with the recent essays by Tom Greggs and Mark Scott who 
have made convincing arguments that Origen's denials concerning the devil have to do with the devil’s evil 
activities rather than the devil’s substance. Domeracki lists Greggs in his bibliography, but I could find no 
mention or interaction with any of his arguments. I discuss the works of Greggs and Scott below. 
 434 Augustus Neander, General History of the Christian Religion and Church, Vol. 2, trans. Joseph 
Torrey (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1851), 404-05; Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church: 
242-56. Heine writes: “There is a basis for thinking that in his later life Origen did think there were 
limitations on the redemptive work of God. It seems to me a defendable, but not an unquestionable, 
conclusion that in Caesarea Origen was in the process of rethinking his view of the ultimate salvation or 
restoration of all beings” (256). This also appears to be John McGuckin's view, McGuckin, The 





convinced that Origen did consistently hold to a belief in universal salvation.435 Perhaps 
the best illustration of the contemporary uncertainty on this question can be found by 
looking at various entries in The Westminster Handbook to Origen: in writing the article 
on “Apokatastasis”, Frederick Norris concludes that Origen did not believe the devil 
would be saved and therefore he did not teach the strongest form of universalism.436 
Norris adds that Origen purposefully kept his options open without coming down on 
either exclusive salvation or universal salvation.437 Elizabeth Dively, on the other hand, 
writing the entry on “Universalism,” concludes that Origen did believe in a final and 
infallible universal salvation which necessarily includes the devil.438 Similarly, writing 
the article on “Demonology” Fiona Thompson argues that Origen believed that God will 
save everyone in the end, including the devil and his minions.439 Clearly, the case has not 
been made for a single position to the satisfaction of all parties. 
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McGuckin (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 61.  
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 However, in recent years two important Origen scholars, Tom Greggs440 and 
Mark Scott,441 have made a convincing case that Origen was (and remained) committed 
to a belief in universal salvation. Their analyses demonstrate that the various ways Origen 
speaks of the final destiny of rational souls is logically consistent and coherent. Greggs 
argues that what appears to be contradictory statements made by Origen can be explained 
by examining the different genres they are found within and the different audiences 
Origen was speaking to. A common theme found in Origen’s writings pertains to the 
strategic and cautious pedagogy of the Church's mysteries.442 It is well-known that 
Origen often distinguishes between wise Christians and simple Christians – the simple 
are those who are not able to safely understand the deeper truths of Christianity. For 
example, at one place in his Romans commentary Origen compares 1 Corinthians 15:22 
(“For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive”) with Romans 5:12 
(“Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death through sin, and 
so death spread to all men because all sinned -- for sin...”).443 Origen asks why Paul was 
not willing to finish the phrase in the Romans passage with the statement: “so in Christ 
all will be alive”. Origen concludes that Paul's reason was strategic: Paul pretends not to 
finish the statement because he “wanted to show by this that the present time is one of 
effort and work, in which merits may be procured through good conduct.”444 In other 
words, Paul did not want simple Christians to hear that their salvation had already been 
                                                          
 440 Greggs, "Exclusivist or Universalist? Origen the 'Wise Steward of the Word' (CommRom. 
V.1.7) and the Issue of Genre."; Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation: Restoring Particularity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); "Apokatastasis: Particularist Universalism in Origen." 
 441 Mark S. M. Scott, "Guarding the Mysteries of Salvation: The Pastoral Pedagogy of Origen's 
Universalism," Journal of Early Christian Studies 18, no. 3 (2010); Journey Back to God: Origen on the 
Problem of Evil. 
 442 Cf. Stamenka Antonova, "Mysteries," in The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. John 
McGuckin (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004). 
 443 ComRm V.1.20-65 (Scheck 1.304-305; Bammel 359-362). 





predetermined by God, for this would encourage laziness in their moral quest in the here-
and-now. Origen explains: 
For it is a custom of the Apostle Paul, when he is disclosing anything 
about the kindness of God in his ineffable goodness, in turn to roughen up, 
as it were, at least in some measure because of certain negligent hearers, 
what he said and to put some fear into those who are remiss . . . [Paul was] 
afraid for them, lest any of them, “despising the riches of God's goodness 
and patience and forbearance by their own hard and impenitent heart, 
should store up wrath for themselves on the day of the righteous judgment 
of God” . . . Paul is thus acting as a wise steward of the word [prudens 
dispensator uerbi]. And when he comes to the passages in which he has to 
speak about God's goodness, he expresses these things in a somewhat 
concealed [occultius] and obscure [obscurious] way for the sake of certain 
lazy people...445 
Paul purposefully obscures his teaching on universalism at this point in order to prevent 
lazy Christians from slacking in enthusiasm for moral improvement. In other words, 
Origen understands Paul to write with pedagogical and pastoral strategy. Greggs views 
this as the “hermeneutical key” to unlocking Origen's own views on universal salvation 
given his sometimes contradictory remarks.446 I believe Greggs is correct, for it is a 
common occurrence for Origen himself to back away from teaching the full implication 
of certain doctrines because such things could be misused by the simple.447 Origen is 
trying to emulate Paul in this regard by similarly being a “wise steward of the word.”448 
A few examples of similar cautious remarks by Origen will bring this into sharper focus. 
When asked about the nature of the human soul while standing in front of a diverse 
audience, Origen responded in a guarded way:  
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And since we have come to a mystical subject, I appeal to you not to make 
me guilty on your account of casting pearls before swine and holy things 
to the dogs . . . I am worried about speaking; I am worried about not 
speaking. For the sake of the worthy, I want to speak so as not to be guilty 
of defrauding of the Word those able to hear it. Because of the unworthy, I 
hesitate to speak, for the reasons mentioned...449 
Perhaps the most common theological topic where Origen shows this reticence to say 
everything he believes about a subject is when he is speaking about Hell and divine 
punishment in the afterlife, and whether these punishments are temporary rather than 
eternal. For instance, when speaking of God's punishment in Contra Celsum Origen 
writes:  
The Logos, accommodating himself to what is appropriate to the masses 
who will read the Bible, wisely utters threatening words with a hidden 
meaning to frighten people who cannot in any other way turn from the 
flood of iniquities. Even so, however, the observant person will find an 
indication of the end for which the threats and pains are inflicted on those 
who suffer . . . But we have been compelled to hint at truths which are not 
suitable for the simple-minded believers who need elementary words 
which come down to their own level . . . Probably, just as some words are 
suitable for use with children and are appropriate for their tender age, in 
order to exhort them to be better, because they are still very young, so also 
. . . the ordinary interpretation of punishments is suitable because they 
have not the capacity for any other means of conversion and of repentance 
from many evils, except that of fear and the suggestion of punishment.450 
Origen will frequently pull-back from offering a full explanation as to how God's 
punishments are finite and temporary (as they must be if all are to be restored). And his 
reasons are pastoral – those who are weak or young in their faith must not be encouraged 
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to use the deep mercies of God as an excuse to continue in sin.451 Mark Scott gives a very 
helpful overview of Origen's pedagogical and pastoral strategies in this regard, especially 
as it pertains to the difficult topic of Hell and punishment in the afterlife.452 Origen 
always seems to write with two types of readers in mind: the simple believers who need 
the fear of God's wrath to resist temptations, and the spiritually advanced Christians who 
no longer need fear as a motivator, but are able to safely plumb the depths of God's 
mysteries and mercies. After all, Origen was well-acquainted with both types of 
Christians through his teaching and preaching duties. Eusebius informs us that Origen 
decided to turn over instruction of beginner students to an associate, so that he could 
devote himself to teaching the advanced.453 Yet, even while teaching the advanced, he 
was preparing homilies to preach to average Christians. 
 The above explanation goes far in explaining many of Origen's conflicting 
statements (especially those dealing with Hell and punishments), but it does not fully 
explain Origen's explicit denial that he taught the salvation of the devil. On this point, the 
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best explanation was highlighted by Ronald Heine, and then later expanded by Mark 
Scott. In the introduction of his translation of Origen's Commentary on John, Heine 
discusses Origen's comments regarding the devil. Although some believed that the devil 
was not a creation by God, Origen insists that “insofar as he is the devil, he is not a 
creation of God, but to the extent that it falls to the devil 'to be,' being made [εἶναι, 
γενητὸς ὤν], since there is no creator except our God, he is a creation of God.”454 In other 
words, the word “devil” (διαβόλός) is a label that does not denote a substance created by 
God, but which reflects the evil actions pursued by one particular substance. The original 
good soul that was Lucifer became known as the devil because of his choices. Later in 
the commentary when Origen turns to John 13:3 – “the Father has given all things into 
his hands”, Origen links the “all things” with the “all who will be made alive in Christ” of 
1 Corinthians 15:22.455 Thus, says Heine, Origen understands “all things” to include 
God's enemies and the devil himself.456 Heine concludes that the proper way to 
understand how the devil will be restored to God is to keep in mind Origen's important 
distinction between the word “devil” – a label which simply denotes evil actions with no 
substance of its own – and the rational soul who was created by God that began to carry 
that label. Thus, Heine suggests that 
[Origen] may have argued that insofar as he is the devil, he is destroyed, 
as are also all the other evil powers, but insofar as he has being, that being, 
properly changed through ages of disciplinary chastisement in which he is 
'treated as he deserves,' will finally be restored to its original state.457  
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 Mark Scott follows Heine's interpretation of Origen on this point, noting that this 
view corresponds to many other fundamentals of Origen's theology. God upholds the 
existence and being of his creatures but takes steps to eradicate their diseases. Universal 
salvation requires the eradication of all sin on both an individual and a cosmic level. The 
devil qua devil will not be saved – indeed, cannot be saved – for evil cannot be preserved 
and joined to God. But the soul who is sometimes called the devil can and will be healed 
by God, even while the “devil” aspect will be destroyed and cease to exist.458 Such a view 
is already envisioned by Origen in First Principles when he writes: 
For the destruction of the last enemy must be understood in this way, not 
that its substance which was made by God shall perish, but that the hostile 
purpose and will which proceeded not from God but from itself will come 
to an end. It will be destroyed, therefore, not in the sense of ceasing to 
exist, but of being no longer an enemy and no longer death.459 
And Origen continues to employ this interpretation late in his career within his 
Commentary on Romans.460 Given this view, Origen would feel justified in denying that 
the “devil” will be saved, for to say otherwise would be to suggest that enemies of God 
will reach salvation even while remaining actively aligned against God. Origen would 
find such a teaching not only repulsive, but also dangerous, given that simple Christians 
would inevitably conclude that their own sins are not obstacles to their salvation. Origen, 
the pastor, recognizes how disastrous this view could be for the health of the soul. After 
all, even though Origen might understand divine punishment to be temporary rather than 
eternal, he recognizes it as excruciatingly painful and urges his listeners to do everything 
in their power to avoid it. 
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460 ComRm V.3 (Scheck 1.337; Bammel 403): “[When Christ’s last enemy – death – is destroyed] 
He is destroyed in that he would no longer exercise dominion. But if he no longer exercises dominion, it is 





 The evidence firmly points to the fact that Origen believed in a final restoration of 
all souls. Not only does he explicitly affirm this in various writings at both the beginning 
and end of his career, but there are also good reasons for those occasional statements 
which appear to contradict this belief.461 However, it is also important to recognize that 
this understanding of Origen's eschatology does not simply rest on a series of proof-texts 
plucked from his writings; rather, Origen's entire theological system (all six stages of 
cosmic history) attests to this belief as well.462 We have seen that Origen believes divine 
providence always acts in strategic ways to rehabilitate every soul, whether through 
embodiment on Earth, or through rewards, or through punishments. Punishments are 
always temporary and must be remedial. That punishments are restorative is something 
Origen is even willing to admit when speaking to the “simple” Christians sitting in the 
pews. For example, in a homily on Jeremiah 13 Origen states that God's punishments are 
for the good of the one being punished, for “it is necessary that you a sinner, attended by 
God, taste something more bitter so that, once disciplined, you may be saved.”463 And 
again: 
                                                          
461 In fact, it makes the most logical sense to view his apologetic refusals to state the teaching 
clearly and unambiguously as corroborating evidence of his universalism rather than as evidence against it. 
462 J. Christopher King has convincingly argued that Origen understood the Song of Songs to be 
“the eschatological ‘spirit’ of Scripture made wholly manifest in textual form”, which is to say this is the 
very Song Jesus sings to his Church at her final consummation and restoration. King states: “In the Song, 
Origen finds himself standing, however unworthily, in the midst of the eschatological ‘perfect mystery’ 
plainly revealed; and so to the text itself he attributes a maximal and real presence of all that characterizes 
the ‘spirit’ of Scripture-perfection, pedagogical finality, eschatological fullness, and the unobstructed vision 
of the Logos” – J. Christopher King, Origen on the Song of Songs as the Spirit of Scripture: The 
Bridegroom's Perfect Marriage-Song (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 29. That the Song of 
Songs stands as the centerpiece of Origen’s vision of the final end is significant for our purposes because 
Origen believes this text also teaches the eventual perfection of all things – the entire rational creation 
(including the last enemy of death) – ComCt prol. 4.17-20 (SC 375, 158-160). King discusses this passage 
at ibid., 234-39. Cf. Chênevert, L’ Église dans le commentaire d’Origène sur le Cantique des Cantiques. 
Citations from Origen’s Commentary on the Canticle of Canticles are from the newest critical edition: Luc 
Brésard, Henri Crouzel, and Marcel Borret, Commentaire sur le Cantique des Cantiques, 2 vols., vol. 1, 2, 
Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1991-1992). 





And just as when you punish the servant or son who is punished by you 
but do not want simply to torment him, rather it is in order that you 
convert him by pains, so God, too, disciplines by the pains from sufferings 
those who have not been converted to the Word, who have not been 
cured.464 
Given that Origen rules out annihilationism,465 the fact that punishments are non-eternal 
in his system appears to logically necessitate that the apocatastasis must occur in the 
future.466 As mentioned above, Origen does sometimes speak of “eternal” punishment 
(αἰώνιος / aeterna). However, Origen understands “eternal” to have several possible 
meanings, including merely the designation of a long stretch of time.467 
 Throughout his life Origen maintained his belief in an ultimate and final 
restoration of all rational souls back to God. Because Scripture declares it, Origen affirms 
this view as a fact about the future, and not simply as a hope or speculation. Nor was 
Origen inconsistent on this teaching as some have claimed, but rather he viewed himself 
as a “wise steward of the word”, tailoring his message to his audience for the best 
possible effect. For Origen, it is a fact about the future that all souls must be restored to 
God in the end, for evil is “nothing” (οὐδέν) and God will not allow it to be eternal.468 
Even God's enemies will be subdued and destroyed, but only in the technical sense of 
destroying their ongoing status of “enemy”. Origen tried to refrain from speaking too 
                                                          
 464 HomJer 12.3.55-59 (Smith 116; SC 238, 22). 
 465 E.g. PArch 3.6.5: “but things which were made by God for the purpose of permanent existence 
cannot suffer a destruction of their substance. Those things which in the opinion of the common people are 
believed to perish have not really perished, as the principles of our faith and of the truth alike agree” 
(Butterworth 251; SC 268, 244-246). 
 466 Clement of Alexandria's view of divine punishment is very similar in this respect, lending 
further credibility that he, like Origen, believed in the final salvation of all rational souls (e.g. Strom. 6.6, 
7.3). 
467 “Now concerning eternal [aeterna] life…In the Scriptures “eternity” [aeternitas] is sometimes 
recorded because the end is not known, but sometimes because the time period designated does not have an 
end in the present age, though it does end in the future. Sometimes a period of time or even the length of 
one man’s life may be designated as eternity…” – ComRm VI.5 (Scheck 2.16; Bammel 477-8). Cf. Horn, 
"Ignis Aeternus. Une interprétation morale du feu éternel chez Origéne."; Crouzel, "L’Hadès et la Géhènne 
selon Origène," 300; Ramelli, "Αὶώνιος and αἰών in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa." 





openly about this doctrine for fear that some would misunderstand it and abuse it. History 
proves that Origen was right to worry, for despite his caution some of his opponents 
concluded that Origen taught the salvation of the devil qua devil, a mischaracterization 
which appalled Origen. Although Origen believed all souls would one day be restored, 
this would only happen through the proper stages of the moral quest, both in this life and 
in the life to come. 
 
The Question of the (Im)Permanency of the Apocatastasis 
 One further aspect of the apocatastasis needs to be explored, and that pertains to 
whether Origen understood it to be a permanent state, or whether he allowed for the 
possibility of future falls and future restorations. The confusion arises because in various 
places Origen appears to affirm both options.469 For example, in First Principles 1.3.8 
                                                          
469 Origen’s two ways of speaking about this topic have led one scholar, Stefan Svendsen, to argue 
that Origen somehow held both positions at the same time. Svendsen argues that Origen alternated between 
teaching the permanence of the apocatastasis and teaching the possibility of future falls. Thus, according to 
Svendsen, Origen holds “mutually incompatible” positions which are both central to his theology. 
Svendsen concludes by stating that this “question pinpoints an insoluble tension in Origen’s otherwise 
highly coherent and rational theological worldview” – Stefan Nordgaard Svendsen, "Origen and the 
Possibility of Future Falls," in Essays in Naturalism and Christian Semantics, ed. Engberg-Pedersen T. and 
N.H. Gregersen, Publikationer fra det teologiske fakultet (København: Centre for Naturalism & Christian 
Semantics, University of Copenhagen, 2010), 114. Svendsen makes at least two errors which lead him to 
this conclusion: first, he places too much weight on a passage from Justinian, an unfriendly witness who 
distorts Origen’s more nuanced position (105). Second, Svendsen seems to confuse Origen’s teaching – 
that souls may possibly fall back into the sins they have left behind – with the notion that souls may 
possibly fall into sin after the final restoration. Origen regularly teaches the former (for souls may rise and 
fall in the ongoing moral quest to reach the final stage), but it is less clear if Origen teaches the latter. For 
example, Svendsen appears to misinterpret On Prayer 29.14 because of this confusion. Here Origen 
describes the possibility of a soul falling back into the same sin that God had earlier delivered it from. 
Svendsen assumes that Origen is speaking about the potential for a soul to fall away after the final 
restoration has taken place, but Origen is not speaking of that here. Instead, Origen is simply talking about 
the ongoing ascent of the soul as it eradicates sin and pursues God. Origen is warning his readers that even 
if you completely eradicate a particular sin (given that God causes you to start hating it) and you begin 
making progress in the virtues towards God, that if you are not careful it is quite possible that you may 
begin to desire that sin once again (causing another fall into sin). The context of On Prayer 29.14 affirms 
this (see especially 29.13 on how God administers punishments in such a way that souls, now freed from 
sin, may progress with better speed and surety). Finally, Svendsen does not seem to realize that Origen 
discussed two distinct stages of the final restoration – only one of which allowed for the possibility of 





Origen writes that when souls finally attain to the “holy and blessed life” (sanctam et 
beatam uitam), “we ought so to continue that no satiety [satietas] of that blessing may 
ever possess us”.470 Origen then remarks:  
But if at any time satiety [satietas] should possess the heart of one of those 
who have come to occupy the perfect and highest stage, I do not think that 
such a one will be removed and fall from his place all of a sudden. Rather 
must he decline by slow degrees, so that it may sometimes happen, when a 
slight fall has occurred, that the man quickly recovers and returns to 
himself. A fall does not therefore involve utter ruin, but a man may retrace 
his mind on that which through negligence had slipped from his grasp.471 
 
In another place Origen speaks about those who think the bodily nature will be destroyed 
when all are restored to God. The difficulty with this view, he suggests, is that the bodily 
nature would have to be re-created if souls once again fell away from God:  
It will be seen to be a necessity that, if bodily nature were to be destroyed, 
it must be restored and created a second time. For it is apparently possible 
that rational creatures, who are never deprived of the power of free-will 
[liberi facultas arbitrii], may once again be subject to certain movements. 
This power is granted them by God lest, if they held their position for ever 
irremovably, they might forget that they had been placed in that final state 
of blessedness by the grace of God and not by their own goodness.472 
 
At times, Origen also speaks of multiple worlds and ages. There have been many ages 
before the current one, and there will be many more after it.473 God has also created many 
worlds, although Origen admits not knowing how many there have been.474 Along with 
                                                          
470 PArch 1.3.8 (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164). 
471 PArch 1.3.8 (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164). 
472 PArch 2.3.3 (Butterworth 87; SC 252, 258). 
473 E.g. PArch 2.3.5: “But after the present age, which is said to have been made for the 
consummation of other ages [consummation saeculorum], there will yet be further ‘ages to come’; for we 
learn this plainly from Paul himself when he says, ‘that in the ages to come he might show the exceeding 
riches of his grace in kindness towards us’…I think, therefore, that the indications of this statement point to 
many ages” (Butterworth 88-89; SC 252, 262). Cf. PArch 3.5.3: “God did not begin to work for the first 
time when he made this visible world, but that just as after the dissolution of this world there will be 
another one, so also we believe that there were others before this one existed” (Butterworth 238-9; SC 268, 
223). 
474 PArch 2.3.4: “but worlds may exist that are diverse, having variations by no means slight, so 





these passages we may mention several Greek fragments by the ‘unfriendly witnesses’ 
Justinian and Jerome who accuse Origen of teaching that future falls will take place after 
the restoration of all things.475 On the basis of this evidence, many scholars have 
concluded that Origen did not believe in a permanent apocatastasis, but that there would 
be unending cycles of fall and restoration.476  
On the other hand, there are places where Origen writes as if the apocatastasis 
will be permanent. After writing that there will be multiple “ages”, Origen states his 
belief that there is something greater than the ages, and that when the universe reaches its 
perfect end, the consummation of all things, then things will no longer be in an age.477 
                                                                                                                                                                             
worse, and another intermediate. What may be the number or measure of these worlds I confess I do not 
know; but I would willingly learn, if any man can show me” (Butterworth 88; SC 268, 260). 
475 Justinian: Ep ad Menam, fr. 16 and fr. 20, and Jerome: Ep 124 ad Avitum 5 and 10. These are 
cited in Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: a Handbook of Patristic Eschatology: 237n28. 
476 For example, the 19th century historian Augustus Neander argued that Origen never had a final 
end in view, but that there would always be recurring falls and restorations. Neander criticized Origen on 
this point for overly emphasizing creaturely freedom: “in the case of Origen, this doctrine [of apocatastasis] 
lost its full meaning by reason of the consequences which he was pleased to connect with it. His theory 
concerning the necessary mutability of will in created beings led him to infer that evil, ever germinating 
afresh, would still continue to render necessary new processes of purification and new worlds destined for 
the restoration of fallen beings . . . Into such a comfortless system was this profound thinker betrayed by 
carrying through with rigid consistency his one-sided notion of the creature’s freedom and mutability, and 
thus marring the full conception of redemption” – Neander, General History of the Christian Religion and 
Church, Vol. 2: 404-05. Hugh Ross Mackintosh also understood Origen to believe in additional falls after 
the restoration – Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future: the Christian doctrine of eternal life 
(New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915), 198n3. Einar Molland suggested that although Origen spoke of 
multiple falls in First Principles, that he may have changed his mind by the time he wrote Commentary on 
Romans – Molland, The Conception of the Gospel in the Alexandrian Theology: 163-64. Chadwick wrote 
that the logic of Origen’s theology made future falls possible: “…it was precisely this point [the free will of 
rational beings] which led Origen to postulate the possibility, if not the necessity, of a cycle of worlds” – 
Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa," 41. Chadwick also (tentatively) disagreed with Molland’s 
suggestion because he believed that places in Contra Celsus (a late work just like the Romans commentary) 
implied evil might again resurface after the final consummation (e.g. Cels IV.69 and VI.20) – ibid., 42-43. I 
think Chadwick is wrong here – the two passages in Contra Celsus only show Origen’s reluctance to enter 
into a discussion about the possibility of evil in the final state. This hesitation would accord just as well 
with my argument (below) that Origen envisioned a 2-stage apocatastasis, where evil may occur in the first 
stage but not in the latter. It is understandable that Origen would display a reluctance to bring up this 
tangential topic, for it would require him to outline a substantial argument to ensure that he would not be 
misunderstood. More recently, Edward Moore has written that “the idea of repeated falls away from God is 
a corollary of Origen’s firm position on the absolute freedom of the will of souls” – Moore, Origen of 
Alexandria and St. Maximus the Confessor: An Analysis and Critical Evaluation of Their Eschatological 
Doctrines: 171. I disagree with Moore for reasons which will become clear. 





God will simply be all in all. At that time “all consciousness of evil [will have] departed” 
because “evil nowhere exists.”478 All rational minds “will no longer be conscious of 
anything besides or other than God, but will think God and see God and hold God and 
God will be the mode and measure of its every movement.”479 Origen’s most explicit 
declaration of the permanency of the apocatastasis is found in his Romans commentary, 
for he pointedly asks and answers the very question under discussion:  
We certainly do not deny that free will [liberum arbitrium] always will 
remain in rational creatures, but we affirm that the power of the cross of 
Christ and of his death which he undertook at the end of the ages is so 
great that it suffices for the healing and restoration not only of the present 
and the future but also for the past ages...Now precisely what it is that 
would restrain the freedom of will in the future ages to keep it from falling 
again into sin, the Apostle teaches us with a brief statement, saying, 'Love 
never falls away.' For this is why love is said to be greater than faith and 
hope, because it will be the only thing through which it will no longer be 
possible to sin. For if the soul shall have ascended to this state of 
perfection, so that it loves God with all its heart and with all its mind and 
with all its strength, and loves its neighbor as itself, what room will there 
be for sin?…[And if neither life, nor death, nor angels, nor powers can 
separate us from the love of God] how much more impossible shall it be 
for the freedom of the will [libertas arbitrii] to separate us from his 
love!480 
 
Here we must highlight an important point: if the all-encompassing love experienced in 
the consummation will prevent any future falls, then Origen must not think that the end 
will be the same as the beginning, because the beginning state of rational creatures 
                                                          
478 PArch 3.6.3 (Butterworth 248; SC 268, 241). 
479 PArch 3.6.3 (Butterworth 248; SC 268, 241). 
480 ComRm V.10.187-202, 215-222 (Scheck 1.375-7; Bammel 450-452). Origen’s argument here 
is reminiscent of an earlier one in First Principles where he attempted to explain how Jesus was able to 
have genuine moral autonomy: “But if the above argument, that there exists in Christ a rational soul, should 
seem to anyone to constitute a difficulty, on the ground that in the course of our discussion we have often 
shown that souls are by their nature capable of good and evil, we shall resolve the difficulty in the 
following manner” – PArch 2.6.5 (Butterworth 112; SC 252, 318-320). Origen’s answer is that the soul of 
Christ so loved righteousness, that eventually “all susceptibility to change or alteration was destroyed, and 
what formerly depended upon the will [arbitrio] was by the influence of long custom [usus] changed into 
nature [naturam]. Thus we must believe that there did exist in Christ a human and rational soul, and yet not 
suppose that it had any susceptibility to or possibility of sin” – ibid. As this discussion will demonstrate, 
Origen believes the same thing will happen to all rational souls, but only after they have clung to 





allowed for a fall. At most, we can say that Origen believes the end is like the beginning, 
but not identical to it. A few lines later Origen affirms this point using Lucifer as an 
illustration:  
[Lucifer] was able to fall with respect to the kindness of the Son of God 
before he could be bound by chains of love [caritatis uinculis 
stringeretur]. But after the love of God shall have begun to be shed abroad 
in the hearts of everyone through the Holy Spirit, what the Apostle has 
declared will become settled, “Love never falls away.”481 
 
It turns out that the end will be better than the beginning for this very reason – the 
rational nature will no longer ever choose to fall away from beatitude. This is an explicit 
affirmation of a permanent apocatastasis. Contrary to those who have suggested that 
Origen changed his mind on this point between the writing of First Principles and 
Commentary on Romans,482 I believe there are clues in First Principles to suggest that 
Origen already believed in a permanent final state in the earlier work. A major clue is that 
in First Principles Origen likewise insinuates that the end will be better than the 
beginning, rather than identical to it. This emerges when he distinguishes between the 
image and likeness of God:  
Now the fact that [Moses] said, ‘He made him in the image of God’, and 
was silent about the likeness, points to nothing else but this, that man 
received the honour of God’s image [imaginis] in his first creation, 
whereas the perfection of God’s likeness [similitudinis] was reserved for 
him at the consummation [consummatione].483 
 
Origen bases this exegesis on the fact that Genesis 1:26-28 first says “Let us make man in 
our own image and likeness”, but then Genesis goes on to say, “And God made man; in 
the image of God made he him.” According to Origen, this reveals that although both the 
likeness and image are planned for humanity, humanity was initially only created with 
                                                          
481 ComRm V.10.227-233 (Scheck 1.377; Bammel 452-3). 
482 See above, notes 434 and 469.  





the image.484 Origen clarifies that the Image of God is God’s reason (the logos),485 which 
all rational creatures have, but the likeness of God means that one has attained perfection 
(perfectio).486 In the blessedness of the first creation, creatures enjoyed only the 
potentiality for likeness of God, but in the final consummation creatures will enjoy a 
fully-realized likeness of God.487 The same distinction Origen draws here in First 
Principles is found in his later Romans commentary in the same language:  
This is perhaps the case, in that, when it was proposed that he become the 
image and likeness [imaginem et similitudinem] of God, that man was 
indeed made in the image of God in the beginning, but the likeness was 
postponed so that he might first trust in God and thus become like him and 
might himself hear that everyone who trusts in him becomes like him.488 
 
Thus, Origen remained consistent in his belief that the end would be better than the 
beginning (and not identical to it), given that souls will reach a point where they will 
become perfect in love, something that was only given to them as a potentiality in their 
first creation. My contention is that this idea – the postponement of the similitudinem – 
serves as the exegetical underpinning of Origen’s assertion in the Romans commentary 
that Lucifer fell from God before he could be bound by “chains of love.” In other words, 
I believe that in the Romans commentary the fulfillment of the similitudinem serves as 
the exegetical foundation for Origen’s insistence there that the apocatastasis is 
permanent. If this is true, it makes it unlikely that Origen’s remarks in ComRm V.10 
about a permanent final state are a modification from his earlier position in First 
                                                          
484 PArch 3.6.1 (Butterworth 245; SC 268, 236). Origen also gives this interpretation of Genesis 
1:26-28 in Cels IV.30 (Chadwick 205; SC 136, 254) and ComRm IV.5.158-165 (Scheck 1.264; Bammel 
307). Cf. Henri Crouzel, Thèologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène (Paris: Aubier, 1956). 
485 Cels IV.85 (Chadwick 251; SC 136, 396). 
486 PArch 3.6.1 (Butterworth 245-6; SC 268, 236). 
487 PArch 3.6.1: “The purpose of this [the delayed likeness] was that man should acquire it for 
himself by his own earnest efforts to imitate God, so that while the possibility of attaining perfection was 
given to him in the beginning through the honour of the ‘image’, he should in the end through the 
accomplishment of these works obtain for himself the perfect ‘likeness’” (Butterworth 245; SC 268, 236). 





Principles, for the exegetical underpinning was already solidly in place in the earlier 
work. How can never-ending falls occur when the end is described as categorically better 
than the beginning? 
 But if Origen did believe that the final consummation would be permanent, even 
as early as First Principles, then how are we to explain the passages already mentioned 
where Origen talks about the possibility of falling away from the blessed state because of 
satiety (satietas), and how do we explain Origen’s frequent assertions of multiple ages 
and worlds?489 The answer to this riddle, I argue, is that Origen has a “2-stage” 
understanding of the final consummation: the first stage is personal while the second 
stage is collective, and it is not always clear which stage he is referring to in a given 
passage.490 The first stage occurs whenever an individual person completes their 
                                                          
489 E.g. PArch 1.3.8 (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164); PArch 2.3.3 (Butterworth 87; SC 252, 258). 
490 This idea has been proposed before in a general sense. As early as 1901 Fairweather mentioned 
it in passing without further analysis: “At last, having passed through all gradations, and being purged from 
every defilement, the soul rises in the pure ether to God, and passes into the heavens as a follower of Him 
who has said ‘I will that where I am there ye may be also’. In this way many may reach the kingdom of 
God before the final consummation of the world” – Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology 204 
(italics added). Fairweather does not talk about this in conjunction with the question of whether or not the 
apocatastasis is permanent. More recently, Celia Rabinowitz has explored this idea in greater depth. What I 
am calling a “2-stage apocatastasis” she describes as “two currents” in Origen’s writing: future/cosmic and 
present/individual – Celia E. Rabinowitz, "Personal and Cosmic Salvation in Origen," Vigiliae Christianae 
38 (1984): 319. I agree with Rabinowitz’s general point that Origen distinguished between personal and 
collective (or cosmic) salvation, and that personal salvation takes place before the final collective salvation 
(321). However, I disagree with her conclusion that the apocatastasis is a restoration to an identical state as 
in the beginning (321). As I have argued, Origen envisions the apocatastasis to be a return to something 
better than the beginning, given that souls gain the “likeness” of God. Thus, Rabinowitz is incorrect in 
asserting that the apocatastasis “implies a cyclical interpretation of history” (321). A further weakness of 
her essay is that she does not seem to recognize that Origen links an individual’s personal salvation with 
subjection to Christ, and the collective salvation with subjection to the Father (I discuss this point below). 
Overall, my main disagreement with her is that I believe Origen’s idea of a “2-stage” apocatastasis is the 
key for reconciling his statements about multiple falls with his statements about a permanent apocatastasis. 
Given her comments on Origen’s “cyclical” interpretation of history, Rabinowitz believes in repeated and 
unending falls. More recently, Tzamalikos recognized these two stages in Origen’s eschatology and has 
offered a helpful analysis of them – Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History & Eschatology: 264ff. 
Tzamalikos has offered an argument similar to my own in that creatures who arrive at the first stage (what 
he labels “eternal life”) can fall from this condition, but that once Christ himself subjects himself to the 
Father, no further falls will occur (265). Like Tzamalikos, I also believe that the transition from subjection 
to the Son to subjection to the Father is the principal demarcation of stages 1 and 2 (see below). Much of 





ascension and is reunited with Jesus in the blessed realm. Origen describes this 
momentous event happening at separate times for each person, with some arriving earlier 
and some later.491 But there is a difference between a few souls arriving at their final 
salvation, and the moment when all souls have arrived; there is a sense in which the souls 
who arrive into salvation first are nevertheless lacking something, in that they must wait 
with expectation and impatience for those who will arrive later.492 Stage 2 only occurs 
when the last soul has successfully been restored, so that God is not merely all-in-several, 
but “all-in-all”. Yet, the difference between the first and second stages is not merely one 
of arithmetic, for there is a fundamental change that occurs at this point. Arrival at the 
first stage is described as reunion with Christ. The inauguration of the second stage, 
however, occurs when Jesus hands over all that which is his, and with the rest of creation 
willingly subjects himself to God the Father. In First Principles 3.6.9 we see Origen 
distinguishing both stages within the final consummation: 
This, then, is how we must suppose that events happen in the 
consummation and restitution of all things [consummation ac restitution 
omnium], namely, that souls, advancing and ascending little by little in due 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the “timeless life” of God in the final state, which I do not intend to interact with here. Overall, however, 
I agree with Tzamalikos’ main point that there are two stages of the “end”, and that rational creatures are 
able to fall away from God only in the first stage. While we arrive at similar conclusions, however, the 
argument I develop here does not stem from nor rely on a certain conception of time in the final state. That 
is to say, our conclusions are similar, but we reached them by different methods. 
491 PArch 3.6.6: “[Being given a spiritual body will not happen all of a sudden], but gradually and 
by degrees, during the lapse of infinite and immeasurable ages, seeing that the improvement and correction 
will be realised slowly and separately in each individual person. Some will take the lead and hasten with 
swifter speed to the highest goal, others will follow them at a close interval, while others will be left far 
behind; and so the process will go on through the innumerable ranks of those who are making progress and 
becoming reconciled to God from their state of enmity, until it reaches even to the last enemy, who is called 
death, in order that he, too, may be destroyed and remain an enemy no longer” (Butterworth 251-2; SC 268, 
246-8). Cf. the discussion of the moral ascent in the afterlife in Chapter 3. 
492 E.g. HomLev 7.2: “Nor have the apostles too yet received their joy; but they too are waiting for 
me to become a sharer in their joy. Nor do the saints themselves immediately receive the full reward of 
their merits; they too wait for us, even though we are slow and lazy. For they do not have full joy as long as 
they grieve for our errant ways and mourn our sins.” – Translation in: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Origen: 
Spirit and Fire, a Thematic Anthology of His Writings, trans. Robert J. Daley (Washington, D.C.: The 





measure and order, first attain to that other earth493 and the instruction that 
is in it, and are there prepared for those better precepts to which nothing 
can ever be added. For in the place of ‘stewards’ and ‘governors’ Christ 
the Lord, who is King of all, will himself take over the kingdom; that is, 
he himself will instruct those who are able to receive him in his character 
of wisdom, after their preliminary training in the holy virtues, and [Christ] 
will reign in them until such time as he subjects them to the Father who 
subjected all things to him; or in other words, when they have been 
rendered capable of receiving God, then God will be to them ‘all in all.’494 
 
Again, in First Principles 3.6.6 Origen describes people arriving at the “highest goal” 
(summa) faster than others, with Death arriving last of all. Origen then goes on to say: 
“When therefore all rational souls have been restored to a condition like this [the summa 
just referred to], then also the nature of this body of ours will develop into the glory of a 
‘spiritual body’.”495 In one sense, Origen describes individual restorations to God to be 
part of the final consummation and restitution, for he describes the “highest goal” or 
“summa” as an event taking place in the consummation. But in another sense, the final 
final consummation occurs as a secondary event which follows when the very last enemy 
is restored. And it is at that moment where Jesus subjects himself (and all those with him) 
to the Father, just as all rational souls had previously become subject to Christ. Thus, 
                                                          
493 In PArch 3.6.8 Origen is discussing the “heaven and earth” that was created in the first 
creation: “Now if we interpret correctly the passage which Moses writes in the forefront of his book 
namely, ‘On the beginning God made the heaven and the earth’, as referring to the beginning of the entire 
creation, it is appropriate that the end and consummation of all things should consist of a return to this 
beginning” (Butterworth 253; SC 268, 252). It is to this first creation (this first “earth”), then, that Origen is 
referring to at this point in PArch 3.6.9. Cf. Chapter 3, n333 for Origen’s interpretation of the phrase 
“heaven and earth.” 
494 PArch 3.6.9 (Butterworth 254, emphasis added; SC 268, 252-254). Cf. ComRm VI.5 (Scheck 2. 
14-15; Bammel 475): “…after someone has been set free from sin, he must, first of all, serve righteousness 
and all the virtues together, so that from there he might ascend, by means of progress, to the point that he 
becomes a slave to God. I grant that servitude to righteousness is servitude to God. For Christ is 
righteousness, and to serve Christ is to serve God. Nevertheless, there is an order in the levels of 
advancement and there are degrees within the virtues. And this is the reason that Christ is said to 
reign…until the fullness of the virtues is accomplished in each individual; but when the measure of 
perfection has been fulfilled, at that time it is said that he hands over ‘the kingdom of God, even the 
Father,’ so that now ‘God might be all in all.’” 





subjection to Christ denotes the first stage of salvation, while subjection to the Father 
denotes the final stage of salvation: 
[At the consummation of the age], by his including in himself all those 
whom he subjected to the Father and who through him come to salvation, 
he himself with them and in them is also said to be ‘subjected’ to the 
Father, when ‘all things’ shall ‘subsist in him’ and he shall be the ‘head of 
all things’ and in him shall be the ‘fullness’ of those who obtain salvation. 
This then is what the apostle says of him: ‘When all things have been 
subjected unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subjected unto him 
that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all.496 
 
With these two stages in mind, I will suggest an answer to the riddle that has so puzzled 
scholars. When we understand that Origen’s teaching of the “highest goal” (summa) in 
the consummation actually represents stage 1 rather than stage 2, we can begin to make 
sense of the passage used by scholars to argue that Origen believes in a contingent and 
impermanent apocatastasis. As mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, First 
Principles 1.3.8 reads: 
But if at any time satiety should possess the heart of one of those who 
have come to occupy the perfect and highest stage [summo perfectoque 
constiterunt gradu], I do not think that such a one will be removed and fall 
from his place all of a sudden. Rather must he decline by slow 
degrees…497 
  
Summo (from summos) is a synonym of summa. When Origen suggests here that souls 
may fall away from the “highest goal (or stage),” it is essential to remember that Origen 
will later define this “highest stage” as subjection to Christ (in First Principles 3.6.6). 
Thus, Origen is speaking here about the possibility of minor falls occurring during stage 
1 of the consummation, and not stage 2. That is to say, some individual souls who have 
arrived at the highest stage in the consummation and who have been subjected to Jesus, 
                                                          
496 PArch 3.5.6 (Butterworth 242-3; SC 268, 230), emphasis added to highlight the temporal 
sequence. Cf. ComMatt 10.3 (SC 162, 148-152). Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Matthew are 
from the most recent critical edition: Girod, Origène: Commentaire sur l'Évangile selon Matthieu. 





temporarily retain the possibility to fall away again (albeit slightly) while they wait for 
the rest of the souls to arrive. Stage 1 is not the final end, for Christ must reign in them 
until they have been “rendered capable of receiving God.”498 They must persevere at this 
highest stage until they (and all others) enter a phase where they will never fall away 
again. Origen’s Romans commentary describes this final phase as being bound by 
“chains of love,” while in First Principles 2.11.7 Origen describes it as two levels of 
perfection. It is worth quoting this passage at length: 
And so the rational being, growing at each successive stage…advances as 
a mind already perfect to perfect knowledge [iam perfecta perducitur]… 
And it attains perfection, first that perfection by which it rises to this 
condition, and secondly that by which it remains therein [potiturque 
perfectione, primo illa, qua in id ascendit, secundo qua permanet], while 
it has for the food on which it feeds the problems of the meaning of things 
and the nature of their causes. For as in this bodily life of ours we grew 
first of all bodily in that which we now are, the increase being supplied in 
our early years merely by a sufficiency of food, whereas after the process 
of growth has reached its limit we use food not in order to grow but as a 
means of preserving life within us; so, too, I think that the mind, when it 
has come to perfection, still feeds on appropriate and suitable food in a 
measure which can neither admit of want nor of superfluity. But in all 
respects this food must be understood to be the contemplation and 
understanding of God, and its measures to be those that are appropriate 
and suitable to this nature which has been made and created. These 
measures will rightly be observed by every one of those who are 
beginning to ‘see God’…499 
 
This passage not only distinguishes between stage 1 and stage 2 of the consummation, 
but it is also clarifies why Origen felt comfortable describing stage 1 of the 
consummation as the “highest goal” (summa). After all, it is natural to ask: why is stage 1 
the highest goal if stage 2 is even better? The answer is that the difference between stage 
1 and 2 is not one of distance. In terms of distance (i.e. the soul’s ascent towards God 
through a series of stages or spheres), stage 1 denotes the highest and final destination. 
                                                          
498 PArch 3.6.9 (Butterworth 254; SC 268, 254). 





This is also why Origen has no problem calling stage 1 “perfection.” The transition to 
stage 2 is not a transition of movement or ascent; rather, the transition is all about 
persevering in this highest plane by persevering in perfection of the virtues. By 
persevering at the highest and final stage the soul eventually undergoes a type of 
transformation, which Origen describes in First Principles 2.11.7 as a change from one 
type of perfection (perfectione) to another.500 
                                                          
500 In 2011 Sebastian Guly argued that Origen did not understand the apocatastasis to be a 
homogenous experience for all the souls involved. Although Guly affirms Origen’s universalism, he 
believes that Origen teaches that among souls there will be a hierarchy within the apocatastasis – Guly, 
"The Salvation of the Devil and the Kingdom of God in Origen's Letter to Certain Close Friends in 
Alexandria." Guly appears to be pursuing an argument similar to the one developed by Bigg (although 
perhaps unconsciously so, given that he does not mention Bigg) – see Bigg, The Christian Platonists of 
Alexandria: Being the Bampton Lectures of the Year 1886: 233-34; 93. Guly’s is a curious argument, and I 
am not aware of any scholars who follow his view (nor am I even aware of scholars who discuss his view). 
Essentially, Guly believes that Origen speaks of the “Kingdom of Christ” or “Kingdom of the Father” as 
universal Kingdoms, but that Origen understands “Kingdom of God” or “the “Kingdom of the Heavens” to 
be non-universal in membership. I have a number of concerns as to the way Guly develops this argument. I 
mention it at this point because I believe the common-denominator behind most of the problems in Guly’s 
presentation stem from his misunderstanding of the two stages of the apocatastasis as I have outlined them 
here. For example, regarding souls who stand higher than other souls in the ascent and who teach and rule 
over souls who are yet further down in their quest to reunite with Christ, Guly believes this indicates that 
some will experience the beatitude in a more restricted way (205-206). But the passages that Guly cites are 
clearly referring to the fact that some souls arrive at their final destination quicker than other souls, and thus 
they (temporarily) stand in a position of pedagogical authority over souls who are slower. If we must speak 
of a “hierarchy,” then the hierarchy is merely one of speed – that is, some souls will experience beatitude 
longer, which is not the same thing as suggesting that some souls will experience beatitude differently. 
There is a hierarchy of souls, but only a temporary one – the distinguishing factor is not between souls who 
reach beatitude with different states of virtue, but rather souls who reach perfect beatitude faster than 
others. But even this claim is not without its problems, for Origen does not speak about the highest level of 
beatitude beginning at different times for each soul. Stage 1 may begin at different times for each soul, but 
Stage 2 (the highest perfection) begins for all in the same moment when Christ subjects himself to the 
Father. 
Guly makes a similar mistake in his interpretation of First Principles 2.3.7 (210). Here Origen 
speaks of a new heaven and earth which take the place of the current heaven and earth. After they die, those 
who made the most progress in their earthly lives will be placed into the next heaven, while those who 
made less progress will be placed into the next earth. So far there is nothing surprising here, for Origen 
always insists that a soul’s progress in life will determine its starting point in the afterlife. Guly, however, 
assumes that Origen is speaking of a static condition when he describes this demarcation. But Origen does 
not speak this way. In fact, even in the very same text Guly cites Origen goes on to affirm: “In this way, 
therefore, there seems to be opened a road for the progress of saints from that earth to those heavens, so 
that they would appear not so much to remain permanently in that earth as to dwell there in the hope of 
passing on, when they have made the requisite progress, to the inheritance of the ‘kingdom of heaven’” – 
PArch 2.3.7 (Butterworth 94; SC 252, 274). My hunch is that Guly is led to the wrong conclusion because 
he prioritizes Origen’s statements regarding permanent punishments that sometimes arise in his homilies, 
and he feels that in this way he can reconcile them with Origen’s universalism (see especially 207-212; 





With the preceding elements defined, I may now reconstruct Origen’s view of the 
final consummation. At varying speeds, all souls must ascend from the earth through the 
heavens by means of a series of stages or intervals. At each stage, creatures increase in 
knowledge and in the virtues as they follow after Christ who leads the way. Souls arrive 
at the highest and final stage when they reach moral perfection – which Origen also 
describes as subjection to Christ, given that Christ is the plenitude of virtues.501 The souls 
who arrive at this highest stage must persevere there, and must discipline themselves so 
that they do not fall away from this initial perfection. Although sin has ceased, Origen 
allows that stage 1 may involve a number of mini-falls – somehow caused by satietas – 
but even so he does not imagine that any falls at this point would be as drastic as the 
initial Fall.502 Finally, once the last soul (Death) also arrives at the final stage and once all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
because he is afraid simple Christians would abuse this truth. Guly also inaccurately points to different 
levels of punishment in the afterlife as evidence of different levels of beatitude (219), but here he again 
conflates a genuine Origenist teaching with something not taught by Origen. Origen did believe in different 
levels of punishment in the afterlife – including the possibility of a punishment such as abandonment where 
intellectual life is all but snuffed out. However, these are all temporary punishments, which means that the 
divergent modes of experiencing intellectual life by souls will be temporary as well. Most of Guly’s 
mistakes can be traced to an inaccurate understanding of the various stages that occur within the 
apocatastasis. There will be distinctions between levels of punishment, between the speeds at which souls 
attain their final reunion with Christ, and between the initial starting placements in the moral quest that 
souls enjoy after death. But none of these distinctions are static or permanent. Our discussion above of the 
“image and likeness” reinforces this notion. All souls were originally alike (no diversity), for all were 
created in the image of God. However, no souls originally had the likeness (which is perfection). Origen 
tells us that one day all souls will have the likeness added to the image once the apocatastasis begins. If this 
is true, then it does not seem possible to argue that souls were originally identical in their experience of 
goodness when they only shared the “image” in common, but that when they share both the image and 
likeness in common they will no longer be the same but will have different experiences of beatitude. 
501 Cf. ComRm VI.5.64-77 (Scheck 2.14-15; Bammel 475): “…after someone has been set free 
from sin, he must, first of all, serve righteousness and all the virtues together, so that from there he might 
ascend, by means of progress, to the point that he becomes a slave to God. I grant that servitude to 
righteousness is servitude to God…Nevertheless, there is an order in the levels of advancement and there 
are degrees within the virtues. And this is the reason Christ is said to reign, certainly according to this, that 
he is righteousness, until the fullness of the virtues is accomplished in each individual; but when the 
measure of perfection has been fulfilled, at that time it is said that he hands over “the kingdom to God, even 
the Father,” so that now “God might be all in all.” Origen frequently describes Christ as all of the virtues, 
and so states that serving Christ means the soul must be serving all the virtues – e.g. ComRm VI.11 (Scheck 
2.45; Bammel 520-521) and PArch 4.4.10 (Butterworth 327; SC 268, 426-428). 
502 PArch 1.3.8 (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164): “I do not think that such a one will be removed and 





souls have sufficiently persevered in their perfection so as to be permanently transformed 
(or “bound by chains of love”), then Christ will give everything over to the Father; only 
then will Christ truly be called “Solomon”, for there will be eternal peace when God is all 
in all.503 At this point all possibility of multiple ages disappears into something “greater 
than the ages”, which is “no longer in an age”;504 no more falls can take place, for perfect 
love prevents the possibility despite the ongoing presence of moral autonomy.  
This conclusion does leave us with one final puzzle. Chapter 2 demonstrated that 
Origen had two requirements for genuine moral autonomy: first, the assent (choice) must 
be performed by the soul and not an agent external to the soul, and second, the soul must 
have the capability for binary possibilities (movement towards or away from the good). 
However, we have found an exception to this general rule when looking at the final stage 
of the apocatastasis, for once souls are within this state Origen appears to deny the 
possibility of binary movement. In fact, Origen may have allowed for an exception to be 
made at both extremes of the moral ladder, for he speaks in a similar way of those who 
reach the utter bottom stratum of evil. Origen describes the condition of the worst sinners 
in the following way: “God in such cases will reasonably overlook the evil as it increases 
to a certain point, even disregarding it when it progresses so far in them as to become 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Origen understands moral progress and moral regress to have momentum. In the case of moral progress, 
Origen believes that the closer one gets to God, the easier it is to obey, for afflictions and temptations begin 
to pale in comparison to the glory of God’s righteousness – e.g. Cels 6.20 (Chadwick 333; SC 147, 228-
230). The same is also true in reverse. The further one aligns with sin and wickedness the harder it is to 
escape it, for persistent sinfulness turns into habit which is even harder to resist – e.g. Cels 3.69 (Chadwick 
174; SC 136, 158.16).  
503 ComCt prol. (SC 375, 160): “Cum vero ad perfectionem omnium ventum fuerit et sponsa ei 
perfecta, omnis dumtaxat rationalis creatura, iungetur, quia pacificavit per sanguinem suum non solum 
quae in terris sunt, sed et quae in caelis, tunc Solomon tantummodo dicitur, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et 
Patri, cum evacuaverit omnem principatum et potestam. Oportet enim eum regnare, donec ponat inimicos 
suos sub pedibus suis et novissimus inimicus destruatur mors. Et ita pacificatis omnibus Patrique subiectis, 
cum erit iam Deus omnia in omnibus, Solomon tantummodo, id est solum pacificus, nominabitur.” 





incurable.”505 Only then can God heal certain sinners in a lasting way. Admittedly, 
Origen is not entirely clear on this point. For instance, regarding sinners who descend to a 
state which may be called “incurable”, it is unclear whether Origen means that the spirit 
aspect of the person no longer sends positive desires to the soul, or whether Origen means 
to say that the body’s desires reach a point of strength (and habit) which so overshadows 
the spirit’s desires, that the soul will never choose the spirit’s desires even if they remain 
present. Regardless, I am not convinced that Origen’s two exceptions at the extreme 
“poles” of the moral life threaten his standard arguments for moral autonomy in any 
irrevocable or irretrievable way. The primary reason for this is that whether the soul finds 
itself in the incurable state or in the incorruptible state, the soul has voluntarily chosen to 
enter such a condition. By way of analogy, if a man was locked into a room by an outside 
agent, his freedom would be violated. But if he voluntarily locked himself inside the 
room and threw away the key, no such violation appears to have taken place. Both the 
souls who enter bliss to be “wrapped in chains of love” and the souls who become 
incurable in evil reach this state through their own exercise of moral autonomy. 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that these situations appear to be the exceptions as to 
how Origen normally envisions moral autonomy to function. Thus, on the one hand, he 
desires to affirm the ongoing reality of moral autonomy within the apocatastasis; yet on 
the other hand, Origen’s very language – “chains of love” – reveals his awareness that the 
situation may not be as straightforward compared to every other moment of the soul’s 
moral history. 
                                                          
505 PEuch 29.13 (GCS II, 388.5-10). Citations from Origen’s On Prayer are from the Berlin-
Leipzig critical edition (GCS), and are listed in the format of Origenes Werke volume (II), page number, 
and line number: Koetschau, Buch V-VIII gegen Celsus, Die Schrift vom Gebet. Unless otherwise noted, 
English translations are from Greer, Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book 





So far in this chapter I have argued that Origen believed in universal salvation for 
every rational being, a destiny which will be achieved in the apocatastasis, and I have 
also argued that Origen viewed the apocatastasis (once fully completed) to be a 
permanent state. This analysis raises two significant implications for Origen’s theology. 
The first implication is that Origen’s universalism introduces teleological 
predetermination or inevitability into his system – that is, Origen believes in an outcome 
that not only relies on creaturely free choice to find its fulfillment, but which also cannot 
be stopped by any exercise of that free choice. The second implication is that Origen’s 
universalism radicalizes the role of God’s grace in cosmic history. In the remainder of 
this chapter I will discuss each of these topics in turn. 
 
Universalism as Teleological Predetermination 
 We have seen that Origen understood the future fulfillment of the apocatastasis to 
be fixed; he knew it to be a fact about the future.506 The testimony of Scripture on this 
point (especially 1 Corinthians 15:22) as well as the logic of Origen’s theological system 
makes this eschatological event a certainty for him. God will win in the end. God will 
infallibly bring about a final restoration in which every rational soul freely chooses to 
exercise their moral autonomy to permanently join with God. The infallibility of this 
future event raises an interesting, yet confusing matter: this destiny meticulously depends 
on creatures using their freedom of choice correctly. Yet, at the same time this destiny 
cannot be thwarted by the moral autonomy of any creature given that it is a fixed and 
                                                          
506 Even if my above argument about the permanency of the apocatastasis is incorrect in that 
Origen does allow for repeated falls after each restoration, it does not change the fact that God 





certain future event.507 While it is true that in any individual moment of choice sinful 
creatures may use their freedom of choice to resist God’s healing efforts, it is also true 
that no creature has the freedom of choice in regard to one’s final destiny. Thus, Origen’s 
view sets a hard limit on the extent of moral autonomy.508  
We know that Origen was aware that universal salvation entails teleological 
certainty and foreordination, for he almost always goes on the defensive after mentioning 
it. For example, in First Principles 3.5.6-7 Origen is careful to insist that the fixed 
outcome of salvation he just finished affirming poses no threat to the integrity of moral 
autonomy. Origen makes a distinction between his version of teleological foreordination 
and coercion: 
But this subjection [subiectio] will be accomplished through certain means 
and courses of discipline and periods of time; that is, the whole world will 
not become subject to God by the pressure of some necessity [necessitate 
aliqua] that compels it into subjection, nor by the use of force [per uim], 
but by word, by reason, by teaching, by the exhortation to better things, by 
the best methods of education, and also by such merited and appropriate 
threatenings as are justly held over the heads of those who contemptuously 
                                                          
507 In some sense, phrases such as “teleological inevitability” or predetermination can be thought 
of as a nuanced form of “determinism.” I hesitate to call it such only because the term “determinism” 
means different things to different people. Determinism is often understood as requiring that all events are 
fixed and causally predetermined. If so, Origen’s view cannot be described as deterministic, given that he 
only believes one event to be fixed – each person’s final destiny. I believe that a case could be made that 
Origen’s view constitutes a form of “teleological determinism”, but only if that is carefully defined. At any 
rate, Origen never describes his views in this way given that the term “determinism” is a recent label. The 
OED traces it back to a work from 1846 – "determinism, n.." http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/51252 
(accessed April 05, 2017). Despite its recent provenance, however, philosophers recognize that 
deterministic thought interested philosophers since early antiquity – cf. Frede, "Stoic Determinism," 180. 
Frede identifies the most common “determinisms” which usually are labeled as “physical determinism,” 
“ethical determinism,” “logical determinism,” and “teleological determinism.” She notes that these four 
types are already present in Aristotle (180). Again, while Origen’s thought is not deterministic regarding 
the first three categories, I believe he could fairly be described as a teleological determinist. Cf. Taylor, 
"Determinism, A Historical Survey." 
508 It may be helpful to contrast Origen with someone like Irenaeus on this point. Like Origen, 
Irenaeus believed that God’s light shines on everyone, and that God’s light will never enslave anyone by 
necessity (Haer. 4.39.3). However, Irenaeus believes that the rejection of “necessity” implies that sinners 
retain the power to resist God permanently (Haer. 4.39.4). Origen does not understand the rejection of 
“necessity” to require this additional power to self-determine one’s final destiny. Cf. Chapter 5 on how 





neglect to care for their own salvation and advantage and their spiritual 
health.509 
Here Origen states that the final subjection of the whole world will take place, but that 
this predetermined event will not be a forced event from the perspective of each soul’s 
ability to make decisions. While each soul’s final destiny is fixed, this destiny must not 
be understood as divorced from the free choices of each soul in the interim, for indeed the 
predetermined telos will only occur through creatures exercising their moral autonomy in 
the correct way. The reason Origen goes on the defensive here is because he was 
constantly on guard against specific types of deterministic thought which he found 
incompatible with moral autonomy; he does not want his readers to think he is suggesting 
a determinism of this type (and he knows it may sound like he is). These heretical 
determinisms include those surveyed in Chapter 2: gnostic fixed-nature determinism 
(where certain people are saved by nature regardless of choice), simplistic Christian 
predestinarianism (where salvation is determined by the arbitrary mercies of God with no 
respect to a person’s choice), Stoic character determinism (a system where almost no one 
is able to become morally virtuous because of the defects in their character, a character 
which originally derives from a cause external to themselves and not from their own 
choice), and various forms of astral fatalism510 and “Idle-Argument” fatalism511 (where 
one’s future is fated to occur without respect to one’s present choices). In all of these 
                                                          
509 PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 243-44; SC 268, 232). 
510 E.g. Phil 23.1.9-15: “…many who are supposed to have embraced the Faith are distracted at the 
thought that human affairs may be governed by necessity, and cannot possibly be otherwise than is ruled by 
the stars in their different groupings. And a consequence of this opinion is the complete destruction of Free 
Will [ἐφ ἡμῖν]; and a further result is that praise and blame are unmeaning…” (Lewis 173; SC 226, 132). 
Citations from the Philocalia 21-27 are from the critical edition by Junod (listed by chapter, section, and 
line): Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre. English translations are by Lewis, The 
Philocalia of Origen: A compilation of selected passages from Origen's works made by St. Gregory of 
Nazianzus and St. Basil of Caesarea. 






cases the common denominator that Origen rejects is not that they each represent some 
form of predeterminism or divine foreordination. Rather, Origen rejects these because he 
understands them to be incompatible with his notion of moral autonomy, and 
incompatible with the concept of moral culpability (praise and blame). For Origen, praise 
and blame only make sense in a context where the soul has the ability to choose between 
competing good and bad inclinations, and then experience the consequences of these self-
determining choices. The various determinisms listed above fail to meet this criterion, for 
in each of these one’s moral choices are insufficient or malformed in some way. In the 
case of gnostic and Stoic determinism, the moral choice is ultimately predetermined by a 
foreign power, and so cannot accurately be called ours. In the case of Christian 
predestinarianism and astral determinism, one’s choices might be real, but they have no 
self-determining power – they are not linked with the individual’s outcome. That is to 
say, one can try one’s best to be morally good, and yet fail to find salvation if not fated to 
do so or not chosen by God’s arbitrary mercy. Or, one can be as evil as possible, and yet 
still find salvation if fated to do so or if chosen by God’s random mercy. For Origen, in 
all of these cases moral autonomy is malformed or denied. However, Origen envisions 
his own teleological foreordination as being actuated through the free decisions made by 
moral agents, and not in spite of them.512 
 The fact that Origen understood his eschatology to be a predetermined event is 
also the reason why he was so reticent to speak of it to ordinary Christians. Origen spent 
much of his career trying to dismantle the popular forms of determinism which were 
incompatible with moral autonomy. Given that ordinary Christians were being tempted 
                                                          
512 Cf. Cels IV.3: Origen notes here that even if it were possible for God, through his divine 
power, to make it so that people would not sin, this would not be appropriate, “for if you take away the 





from all sides, Origen felt the wisest course was to keep his eschatological view hidden 
from all but the wise. Origen was convinced that if understood correctly, his version of 
universal salvation did not threaten moral accountability. But at the same time, Origen 
did not think it was worth the risk to teach it openly.513 And as we mentioned above, 
Origen’s fears came true, for his nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
providence and human free choice was misunderstood by his opponents who claimed that 
he taught the salvation of the devil qua devil. They believed that Origen taught that God 
was automatically and mechanically going to save someone as wicked as the devil. This 
is moral fatalism, for if the devil’s deeds have no self-determining power, then the devil’s 
future fate is entirely divorced from his deeds. His opponents became convinced that 
Origen’s predetermined soteriology rendered the moral quest obsolete. 
 Although Origen himself was adamant that universal salvation did not require the 
coercion of moral autonomy, this of course begs the question: exactly how does Origen 
think it is possible for God to achieve this predetermined outcome of cosmic history, 
which is completely facilitated through the free and contingent decisions of creatures, yet 
without God somehow coercing those who might choose to consistently resist him? If 
there is no coercion, why is there not at least a hypothetical possibility that the final 
restoration might never take place? What gives Origen the ability to state universalism as 
a fact about the future? Is Origen incoherent here, as some scholars have understood him 
to be? Does he simply assert the truth of creaturely free choice and the truth of infallible 
                                                          
513 Cf. Phil 23.10.23-28: “For the knowledge of the future makes us relax in the struggle against 
wickedness, and the apparent certainty of wickedness enervates us, and the result is that because we do not 
wrestle against sin we soon become subject to it. And at the same time it would be an obstacle in the way of 
a man’s becoming good and upright, if the knowledge that he will certainly some day be good reached him 





providence without realizing the ostensible logical incongruity of these two positions?514 
In fact, Origen did have a solution to these questions, and that solution is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
 
Providence as Saving Grace 
Origen’s predetermined soteriology has another significant implication. The fact 
that God will infallibly save everyone means that the entirety of divine providence – 
literally everything that God does – may be described as saving grace. While other 
Christian authors may hold a distinction between God’s providential activities and God’s 
more targeted gifts of grace in his plan to redeem sinners, Origen does not.515 When 
properly understood, Origen’s theological categories of providence and grace collapse 
into the same aspect of God, or what I am calling providential-grace. As such, everything 
becomes grace. This helps to explain why Benjamin Drewery never found a formal or 
comprehensive definition of grace (charis) in Origen’s writings when he went looking for 
                                                          
514 It is important to note that there is no intrinsic incompatibility between a deterministic 
worldview and belief in moral autonomy (or “free will”). After all, most determinists (then and now) 
concurrently believe in some version of human free will; that is, most determinists are compatibilists. 
“Determinism” and “free will” are not definitional opposites. Nevertheless, I frame the question in this way 
for an important reason: Origen himself normally discussed various deterministic views as prima facie at 
odds with moral accountability, praise and blame. In some ways, Origen is an early example of someone 
discussing these issues from the perspective of the “free will problem” – that is, an intuition held by some 
that determinism and moral accountability are not logically compatible. Other viewpoints, such as 
Stoicism, had no such intuitions. Therefore, given Origen’s own leanings in this regard it is appropriate to 
ask how Origen reconciled his predetermined eschatological views with his belief in moral accountability. 
515 Origen does distinguish God’s will from God’s providence. While nothing happens outside of 
God’s providence, the category of God’s will is narrower: “…nothing happens in heaven or earth without 
his providence; not, without his will. For many things happen without his will; nothing without his 
providence. For providence is that by which he attends to and manages and makes provision for the things 
which happen. But his will is that by which he wishes something or does not wish it” – HomGen 3.2 (Heine 
89; SC 7bis, 114-116). Citations from Origen’s Homilies on Genesis are from the revised version (1976 – 
SC 7bis) of Doutreleau’s original critical edition (1944 – SC 7): Louis Doutreleau, Origène: Homélies sur 
la Genèse, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1976). English translations are from Heine, 





it.516 We may distinguish between two general types of God’s providential-grace in 
Origen’s system – grace which cooperates with individual moral autonomy, and grace 
which does not. 
 One type of God’s providential-grace is a cooperative grace, and this is witnessed 
in the unfolding of salvation-history. When minds fell away from God, God enacted a 
strategic plan of redemption which would unfold through cosmic history, and the 
unfolding of this history requires the constant cooperation between divine and creaturely 
volition. Everything that God does in cosmic history is geared toward teaching souls to 
come home in the most effective way possible, “for in no other way can the soul reach 
the perfection of knowledge [scientiae perfectionem] except by being inspired with the 
truth of the divine wisdom.”517 Each soul must choose to make the ascent to God, but no 
soul is able to do so by oneself – only through the indwelling of the Lord and his constant 
help is such a thing possible.518 Since human nature is unable to find God on its own, 
God responds to all of our efforts, even the most feeble ones, with a great deal of 
assistance: “And He is found by those who, after doing what they can, admit that they 
need Him, and shows Himself to those whom He judges it right to appear.”519 Then 
God’s knowledge arises in the soul by a certain divine grace (θείᾳ τινὶ χάριτι), or a certain 
sort of divine inspiration (ἐνθουσιασμοῦ).520 And throughout the long cosmic history, 
through a variety of means individually tailored to match the diverse needs of fallen 
                                                          
516 Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace: 17. Drewery found his task challenging: “but my 
difficulty has been that no single feature of Origen’s thought is ultimately irrelevant to my quest” – ibid., 
200. 
517 PArch 4.2.7 (Butterworth 283; SC 268, 328). 
518 In PArch 3.2.5 Origen describes the many limitations of human nature, and he declares that the 
only way we can persevere in the contest is because God gives us his uirtutem [Butterworth – “power”] to 
work in us and speak through us (Butterworth 219; SC 268, 176). 
519 Cels VII.42.32 (Chadwick 430-31; SC 150, 114). The expression “after doing what they can” is 
“τὸ παρ᾿ αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν”. Cf. Cels IV.50 (Chadwick 225; SC 136, 312-314); PEuch 29.19 (GCS II, 393.1). 





souls, God’s grace successfully motivates each soul to ascend back home to God’s side. 
Since each soul’s needs are different, the remedies must be different as well. For 
instance, while mercy and patience will be effective if administered to one soul, that same 
mercy shown to another soul will simply increase its intransigence.521 We simply do not 
come to God in the same way, but each one comes according to one’s proper ability.522 
This is why Origen emphasized the many titles of Jesus in his Commentary on John, for 
each of his titles describes a different way Jesus motivates souls of varying stations.523 It 
is a central theme in Origen’s theology that God’s grace meets sinners where they are, 
and supplies the instruction and motivation needed for their present condition.524  
Another reason that God’s grace cooperates with sinners in unequal ways is 
because God prefers to dispense saving grace in a way that accords with his justice. Thus, 
it is not merely the case that God’s grace feels pleasant to one person and unpleasant to 
another because God knows what sort of grace is needed motivate them. God also makes 
this decision based on what each person deserves: “For we must believe that God rules 
and arranges the universe by judgment at all times.”525 Similarly, instead of preventing 
creatures from making evil choices, God’s providential plan incorporates all evil choices 
                                                          
521 Origen uses this example when discussing why God intentionally acted in such a way so that 
Pharaoh’s heart would be hardened, PArch 3.1.16-17. PArch 3.1.17 Greek: “In dealing with such persons, 
therefore, the eternal God, the perceiver of secret things, who knows all things before they come to be, in 
his goodness refrains from sending them the quicker help and, if I may say so, helps them by not helping 
them, since this course is for their profit” (Butterworth 191; SC 268, 100-102). Irenaeus, on the other hand, 
explains that God abandoned Pharaoh because God foreknew that Pharaoh would not believe. For Irenaeus, 
God’s abandonment is strictly punishment and not saving grace – Haer. 4.29.1-2. 
522 HomGen 1.7 (Heine 56; SC 7bis, 42): “But all who see are not equally enlightened by Christ, 
but individuals are enlightened according to the measure in which they are able to receive the power of the 
light . . . We do not, however, all come to him in the same way, but each one ‘according to his ability’”. Cf. 
Cels II.64.1-5 (SC 132, 434). 
523 ComJn 1.52-57 (SC 120, 88-90). 
524 Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus: 69-
70. 





into his singular plan of grace.526 Thus, God’s providential plan of universal salvation 
does not just cooperate with and rely on an individual’s good choices, but also an 
individual’s evil choices. The providential plan is one of grace, but it is a grace that does 
not contradict God’s inherent fairness and justice.527 
Despite the unequal way that God’s grace is experienced by his creatures, it must 
be remembered that all of God’s actions are acts of saving grace. For example, unlike 
many other Christian theologians of the early Church Origen understands even the 
torments of Hell to be saving grace – Hell itself is a “penal remedy”, a strategy of 
providential-grace to bring the beloved back to God’s side. For “in [God’s] gracious 
compassion he provides for all and exhorts all to be cured by whatever remedies they 
may, and incites them to salvation.”528 It further reinforces the fact that all such acts of 
God are acts of salvific grace when we know that the end has been predetermined, and 
cannot fail to come to pass. This is a radical conception of divine grace. It is a grace 
which permeates everything, and which cannot be separated from God’s other acts of 
                                                          
526 HomNum 14.2.1 (Scheck 80; SC 442, 164-166): “In the meantime we ourselves say that by a 
certain dispensation [dispensatione] and by the wisdom of God, things in this world are arranged in such a 
way that absolutely nothing escapes God’s purposes, whether it is evil or good. But let us explain what we 
are saying more clearly. God did not make evil; yet, though he was able to prohibit its being invented by 
others, he does not prohibit it, but he uses it for necessary causes [necessarias causas] with those very ones 
who are its source”. Citations from Origen’s Homilies on Numbers are from the newest critical edition: 
Doutreleau, Origène: Homélies sur les Nombres, 1, 2, 3. English translations are from Scheck, Homilies on 
Numbers: Origen. 
527 Although every action by God reflects his grace and his justice, Origen gives the greater 
emphasis to God’s grace. A recurring theme in Origen is that although God treats with us fairly and 
punishes us when we deserve it, our punishments are never commensurate with our actions. God holds 
back on account of his mercy – e.g. ComRm III.5.204-243 (Bammel 245-247). Similarly, although God 
treats us fairly in the dispensing of his grace by giving more to those who merit it, at the same time the 
grace that God gives is similarly never commensurate with whatever merit preceded it. Instead, it is always 
much greater – e.g. Origen’s discussion of gifts, wages, and merits in ComRm IV.1.153-249 (Bammel 277-
282). Thus, God’s providence could never be described as a type of karma system. A better way to describe 
Origen’s view is that God will never treat his creatures less than fairly, but he almost always treats his 
creatures with something much better than perfect fairness. 





providence. All pronoia is charis in Origen’s system.529 Although this is technically a 
cooperative effort, God does the greater share: “our perfection does not come to pass 
without our doing anything, and yet it is not completed as a result of our efforts, but God 
performs the greater part of it.”530 And so even though the moral autonomy of souls is 
necessarily involved, Origen believes it is appropriate to attribute all of salvation to God, 
as “the efforts of God’s providence are very much in excess” of our own contributions.531 
 If the first type of divine grace is cooperative, the second type of God’s 
providential-grace is one that God enacts unilaterally. Two important examples of this 
type of grace are God’s choice to create, and God’s sovereign plan to restore what he had 
created. 
 Origen describes God’s first act of creation as grace. Origen departs from 
Platonism on this point by his insistence that the material world is not co-eternal with 
God, but rather was created ex nihilo by God as an act of volition.532 Therefore, existence 
itself is due to the grace of God, rather than to any sort of necessity as was believed by 
most Platonists.533 Origen writes: “Plainly it is a gift of God that we exist; it is the grace 
                                                          
529 Drewery comes to a similar conclusion: “I have dealt at length with Origen’s doctrine of 
Providence because it seems to me that for him πρόνοια and οἰκονομία are χάρις, when the work of God 
the Father is especially under consideration, and more particularly when Origen looks at the philosophical 
implications of his theology . . .” – Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace: 106. Drewery again 
remarks, “The definition of Grace...which the numerous references of Origen seem to suggest is all the 
more impressive because he never consciously formulates it. It underlies not only his overt use of χάρις, but 
a whole range of most illuminating ‘grace-words’ or synonyms, and justifies us in seeking the true content 
of Grace in Origen in his whole presentation of the work of God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit for us and 
within us” (201). 
530 PArch 3.1.19 Greek (Butterworth 199; SC 268, 120). 
531 PArch 3.1.19 Greek (Butterworth 199; SC 268, 122). 
532 PArch 1.3.3 (SC 252, 146-148); 2.1.5 (SC 252, 244); ComRm IV.5.183-189 (Bammel 308-
309). 
533 ComRm X.38.1-10 (Scheck 2.303-304; Bammel 850): “The grace of God and the grace of our 
Lord Jesus Christ should be taken to be one and the same grace. For just as the Father gives life to whom he 
wills and the Son gives life to whom he wills...so also the grace that the Father gives, this the Son also 
gives. One should know, of course, that all that human beings have from God is grace. For they have 
nothing as a debt...Therefore, whatever he who was not and is has, by receiving it from him who always 





[gratia] of the Creator who willed us to exist.”534 Besides giving the gift of existence, 
God also gifted moral autonomy itself, so that the goodness that minds enjoyed at their 
first creation as pure gift might become their own when they persevered in it.535 For 
Origen, the creation of immortal and rational minds was an unmerited and undeserved 
gift of God’s grace, which did not entail any creaturely cooperation.536 
 The second place where God’s saving grace does not cooperate with the moral 
autonomy of his creatures is in the construction of God’s providential plan of salvation. 
That is to say, even though all of cosmic history unfolds as the cooperation between God 
and his creatures, the original plan or telos of cosmic history is something that God 
decided unilaterally.537 God’s decision to plan and then actuate in time an infallible 
universal salvation for all souls is a stunning gift which reflects God’s deep love and 
mercy – a gift so marvelous, in fact, that Origen decides only the wise are discerning 
enough to be told of it, for others would no doubt take advantage of it.538 God’s creatures 
had no say in this divine decision. Instead, this prior decision by God to enact a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
who did believe in a beginning to the universe such as Plutarch and Atticus – Tzamalikos, Origen: 
Cosmology and Ontology of Time: 122. Tzamalikos also notes that Philo’s position on this point is unclear, 
given that in Philo we see both statements that creation out of nothing is impossible (e.g. De Aeternitatae 
Mundi 2.5; De Specialibus Legibus 1.266), as well as statements condemning the view that the cosmos has 
always existed (e.g. de Orificio Mundi 7) – Philo references cited in ibid., 143. 
534 ComRm IV.5.13-18 (Scheck 1.259; Bammel 300). 
535 PArch 2.9.2: “For the Creator granted to the minds created by him the power of free and 
voluntary movement [Voluntarios enim et liberos], in order that the good that was in them might become 
their own, since it was preserved by their own free will [id uoluntate] (Butterworth 130; SC 252, 354). 
536 On the other hand, God’s second creation (what I label stage three of cosmic history) does rely 
on each individual’s moral autonomy, given that the God stations each individual according to their prior 
merit. 
537 Winrich Löhr has made the suggestive remark (but without any further explanation on his part) 
that Clement and Origen’s anti-gnostic stance led them to stress the divine pedagogy of the soul, and that 
this position led them to “adopt a synergistic stance – but it is a very sophisticated synergism that deserves 
serious attention even from those theological quarters that would normally feel more at home with 
Augustine’s views” – Löhr, "Gnostic Determinism Reconsidered," 386. Löhr appears to sense where the 
logic of Origen’s thought leads, but he seems hesitant to characterize it as a form of determinism given 
Origen’s emphasis on moral autonomy. 
538 Origen notes that when Paul wants to disclose anything about the kindness and ineffable 
goodness of God, especially on this point, Paul first “roughens” it up so that lazy Christians will not abuse 





foreordained and inescapable universal salvation becomes the matrix, or the arena in 
which God and creatures will eventually cooperate in the unfolding of salvation.539 As 
much as Origen values moral autonomy, he does not understand it to have any role in 
God’s prior decision to save everyone. If I may be forgiven for anachronism, Origen’s 
understanding on this point might be characterized as God electing for salvation, in 
advance, the entire race of fallen souls.540  
 To summarize, Origen’s conception of providence-grace is vast. In his system, 
there is no chance. Rather, providential-grace is responsible for the entire ordering of the 
                                                          
539 On this point, we may contrast Origen’s view with the Christian predestinarian view Origen 
illustrates in PEuch 5.1-6 (GCS II, 308-311). Both Origen’s view and the predestinarian view may be 
characterized as deterministic grace soteriologies, given that in Origen’s view everyone is saved by this 
deterministic grace, while in the predestinarian view only some are saved by grace. The main difference 
between these two views is in how God achieves the predetermined end. The predestinarian view divorces 
the individual’s final salvation from any notion of merit, and from the moral progress in general (similar to 
a naïve view of fate), while Origen’s view explicitly does not. 
540 Origen does not (and would not) use the term “predestination” in this context because 
predestination is a term used in Scripture in a way that differentiates between two groups of people – those 
who God has chosen and those he has not. Thus, Origen will interpret the biblical passages speaking about 
predestination to refer not to matters of ultimate salvation (since universal salvation necessarily denotes a 
singular group) but rather to God treating people differently in their earthly lives according to prior causes. 
In ComRm VII.5-7.7 (Scheck 2.83-92; Bammel 582-593) Origen discusses those whom God has foreknown 
(praescitt) and predestined (praedestinauit). He states that Paul meant that “those who are foreknown by 
God are those upon whom God had placed his own love and affection because he knew what sort of 
persons they were,” and on this basis he predestined them (Scheck 2.89; Bammel 590). Thus, Origen 
understands predestination to rely on foreseen merits, rather than a prior decision by God to save people 
which was not informed by future merits. In addition, Origen would refrain from using the language of 
“predestination” to describe the apocatastasis because naïve Christian predestinarians had already made 
such terminology problematic for him.  
Neither does Origen use the term “election” to describe universal salvation However, there does 
not seem to me to be any inherent conceptual disagreement with Origen’s view of universal salvation and 
later views of election, unless one insists that all notions of election must require the particular Augustinian 
element of God compelling the will by his immediate healing of the will – which I see no reason to do. If 
one sets the issue regarding terminology aside, and if one does not insist that the concepts of election or 
predestination always require the presence of a separate reprobate group (as it seems to in Scripture), then I 
would argue that Origen’s universalism is a form of universal predestination or universal election. Origen 
understands God to have decided, in advance and without recourse to individual merit, to infallibly elect 
everyone who exists for a future salvation, even though God need not have done so. If my readers find my 
anachronistic borrowing of future concepts of predestination unhelpful, they should feel free to disregard 
the comparison here. But such a comparison might be helpful for some to better understand the 
predetermined nature of Origen’s soteriology. N.B.: some contemporary Reformed theologians use the 
concept of predestination to refer to more than simply God’s prior decision to save certain people, and they 
broaden it to describe God’s deterministic plan to regulate all of life, including the entirety of human 
choices. I am not using predestination (or election) in this broader way, but simply as a term to describe 





world and its administration, which includes everything that ever happens to people in the 
world. For the most part God’s creatures are currently blind to the inner mysteries and 
depth of divine providence, but after we have been restored to God we will “learn more 
clearly the reasons for all things that happen on earth.”541 There is a hidden and divine 
purpose for all things, no matter how big or small, and part of the pedagogical journey in 
the afterlife is to gradually attain knowledge of all of God’s hidden purposes. This 
includes things that might appear unimportant to us now, such as learning God’s purpose 
in creating diversity among animals, and it also includes things of larger import, such as 
learning God’s purpose in creating a diversity of human races.542 Even these details are 
part of God’s plan of saving grace, for Origen believes that everything that exists is part 
of God’s single plan of salvific grace. Each soul will be instructed on these matters until, 
He will learn the judgment of divine providence about each individual 
thing; about things which happen to men, that they happen not by chance 
or accident but by a reason so carefully thought out, and so high above us, 
that it does not overlook even the number of the hairs of our head, and that 
not of the saints only but probably of all men.543 
In all things, God’s providence works per a strategic plan to achieve the final restoration 
of every rational soul. For Origen, everything is saving grace.544 
 
                                                          
541 PArch 2.11.5 (Butterworth 150; SC 252, 404). 
542 PArch 2.11.5 (Butterworth 150; SC 252, 404). 
543 PArch 2.11.5 (Butterworth 151; SC 252, 406). 
544 The fact that everything can be thought of as salvific grace is probably why Origen sometimes 
seems to not give enough emphasis or priority to certain watershed moments in the Christian journey, such 
as the events of conversion or justification. While Origen does view these events as necessary and 
important stages in the soul’s ascent to God, it is also true that Origen does not prioritize them above other 
stages of the ascent to God as much as many other theologians do. For an examination of the loose and 
various ways Origen speaks about conversion, see Smith, "Conversion in Origen." For a helpful discussion 
of Origen’s view of justification, see Scheck, Origen and the History of Justification: The Legacy of 






 Origen’s view of God’s providence and God’s plan of salvation (οἰκονομία) is 
remarkable in its scope. The beginning of the plan lies in the timeless life of the Triune 
God who from all eternity planned to create and then to bless morally autonomous 
creatures. Even before he creates God knows that his creatures will fall away, and thus 
God also designs a plan, in advance, which will eventually restore all souls back to 
himself. The two key features of God’s plan are its infallibility and its ability to operate 
in such a way that does not violate creaturely moral autonomy. Thus, even before 
creating a single rational Mind God has already decreed that none will perish or 
successfully persist in evil. God’s plan of universal salvation thus acts as a teleological 
certainty – a teleological predetermination – which governs and overshadows the entire 
unfolding of cosmic history. 
 God’s preplanning of universal salvation and God’s subsequent act of creation are 
examples of God’s unilateral grace – no creatures cooperated with nor merited these 
blessings. Everything that occurs afterwards, however, proceeds through the interaction 
of God’s providence and individual free choice. The interaction between these two 
volitions constitutes the unfolding of God’s plan of redemption in history. Origen gives 
God’s providence greater priority and emphasis, however, and we can easily see why: 
given that every detail of cosmic history takes place in the comforting shadow of a fixed 
eschatological universal salvation, everything that God does is part of the divine plan to 
realize that end. Thus, all providential activities down to the last detail – including Hell 
itself – are instances of saving grace. Understanding this both radicalizes our 





view of moral autonomy. Origen may insist on the integrity of moral autonomy in any 
isolated moment of free choice, but moral autonomy does not have the power to choose 
to resist God forever. There is a sense in which Origen limits the scope of moral 
autonomy when compared to other writers – moral autonomy is self-determinative in the 
moment, and yet moral autonomy does not enjoy a permanent power for self-
determination. 
 The above analysis raises challenging questions about Origen’s understanding of 
freedom of choice. Specifically, we are left wondering how God can infallibly achieve 
the apocatastasis without violating moral autonomy in the process, for by all appearances 
it seems we must admit at least a hypothetical ability for a rational soul to choose to resist 
God forever. But if any such possibility is allowed, then God’s plans to save everyone are 
not truly infallible and foreordained. Was Origen aware of this awkwardness? In the next 
chapter, we will synthesize Origen’s understanding of freedom of choice (as outlined in 
chapter 2) with his understanding of providence-grace. There I will demonstrate that 
Origen recognized the paradoxical quality of his soteriology, and that he provided a 







GOD’S PROVIDENTIAL ARRANGEMENT OF  
FUTURE VOLUNTARY POSSIBILITIES 
Introduction and Method 
 Chapter 1 demonstrated the confusion within current scholarship on the following 
point: Origen declares that God will ensure universal salvation, yet each moment of 
choice is determined by the soul alone.545 Chapter 2 then outlined Origen’s understanding 
of moral autonomy or freedom of choice. Here it was disclosed that for moral autonomy 
to be genuine (for a choice to be free) the soul alone must give or withhold assent to the 
competing impulsive desires originating from the person’s spirit aspect and flesh aspect. 
As long as the soul has rational power over binary differentiation (good and evil), and as 
long as the soul performs the assent rather than an agent outside of the soul, moral 
autonomy is upheld. Chapters 3 and 4 mapped out Origen’s pedagogical soteriology. 
                                                          
545 I also pointed out that scholarship has also been confused on the related question of how moral 
autonomy can be preserved once “inside” a final and permanent restoration, given that moral autonomy 
appears to necessitate at least the possibility to sin. It is interesting that Origen’s answer to this related 
question is very different when compared to his explanation of moral autonomy’s role in reaching the 
apocatastasis. In Chapter 4 we showed that Origen’s belief in a permanent apocatastasis does not conflict 
with moral autonomy, but only because Origen appears to change the definition and function of moral 
autonomy when it is performed within the apocatastasis. In the same way that the soul of Jesus became so 
habituated to righteousness, that finally his “susceptibility to change was destroyed”, so too, the 
fundamental nature of glorified saints is altered by their continuous union with God – PArch 2.6.5 
(Butterworth 112; SC 252, 318-320). We may remember that Origen requires moral autonomy to allow for 
binary possibilities – e.g. PArch 3.1.3 (Butterworth 160; SC 268, 24). Thus, in this case Origen “solves” the 
proposed contradiction between moral autonomy and a permanent apocatastasis by simply redefining the 
very concept of moral autonomy such that the troublesome requirement of “ability to sin” is absent. This 
solution, however, does not solve the primary question as to how God can infallibly ensure that morally 
autonomous creatures will arrive at the apocatastasis in the first place. Origen only redefines moral 
autonomy post-arrival to the apocatastasis, and so the tension between God’s foreordination and creaturely 
free choice remains an important question to be answered in all instances leading up to the final restoration. 
This question is the focus of this chapter. 
Citations from Peri Archon are from the most recent critical edition by Crouzel and Simonetti, 
Origèn: Traité des Principes. Unless otherwise noted, all English translations are from Butterworth, 





Chapter 3 outlined Origen’s stages of cosmic salvation-history and emphasized that 
throughout every stage divine providence instructs, guides, and enforces the direction of 
history towards a specific end. At the same time, however, Origen insists that the moral 
quest requires voluntary choices (genuine moral autonomy) at every moment in the 
ascent towards that end. Chapter 4 investigated the nature of the end – the apocatastasis. 
Here I argued that Origen believed in a definitive and permanent universal restoration of 
all rational souls, even though Origen often hid this teaching for pastoral and pedagogical 
reasons. In Chapter 4 I made two secondary arguments that are important to repeat here. 
First, Origen’s universalism radicalizes Origen’s conception of divine grace. This is 
because every divine action – even the consignment of a soul to punishment in Hell – is 
an aspect of God’s saving grace; every moment of a soul’s life features into God’s unique 
plan of salvation for that soul. Second, Origen’s universalism is an example of divine 
foreordination and unalterable certainty in Origen’s theology. And it is this point which 
begs the question: whence comes Origen’s confidence in a foreordained and unalterable 
universal salvation if every stage of the moral ascent requires genuine freedom of choice? 
 Chapter 5 answers this final question. This chapter’s argument may be 
summarized as follows: Origen understands the scope of God’s foreknowledge to include 
the knowledge of how each rational soul would freely choose in any hypothetical state of 
affairs. This means that God can manufacture external circumstances in such a way that 
guarantees a soul will freely respond in the way God wants it too. Thus, by using such 
knowledge in his original planning of salvation-history, God was able to preselect which 
free choices would be performed in history. At the same time, however, moral autonomy 





God’s foreordained plan of universal salvation, God preselects only those choices which 
God foreknows will eventually and infallibly lead to a future apocatastasis. 
 Because Origen typically hides his doctrine of universal salvation for pastoral 
reasons, it is not possible to point to one specific passage in his writings to demonstrate 
the truth of this argument. Instead, Origen’s viewpoint must be extrapolated and teased 
forth from various hints he left in his writings.546 It is my goal to introduce and analyze a 
series of passages which, collectively, showcase my argument. I will begin by analyzing 
passages that establish Origen’s general principles regarding this topic. We will see that 
these general principles bring into sharp focus questions concerning language of 
necessity and divine foreordination. Origen’s answers to such questions will be drawn 
from his discussions on the nature of divine foreknowledge. With these elements in place, 
I will discuss two final passages which tie these themes together and provide an apt 
illustration of my central argument – namely, that God manufacturers the necessary 
conditions which he foreknows will lead to a soul’s voluntary repentance and eventual 
beatitude. 
 
                                                          
546 At this point, it is important to reaffirm that I am not forcing a solution upon Origen. It may 
look like I am doing so given that I am, admittedly, extrapolating what Origen believed, a belief Origen 
himself never states explicitly in his extant writings. However, on the topic of how God achieves a 
foreordained universal salvation without violating moral autonomy, we know the reason why Origen was 
unwilling to discuss the topic publicly. Chapter 4 demonstrated that Origen went out of his way to avoid 
speaking about universal salvation for pastoral reasons alone. Apparently, Origen did not feel it necessary 
or even important to pass along his belief through his writings. For assorted reasons, however, Chapter 1 
demonstrated that modern scholarship is fascinated by the very teaching Origen chose to leave unwritten. 
My contention in this chapter is that Origen did work out a specific way in which moral autonomy is 
upheld in the context of a foreordained universalism, and that even though Origen was too wary to entrust 






God’s Ordering of Salvation-History 
Cels 6.57, Chadwick 373 (SC 147, 320-22)547 
[Celsus wonders why God cannot persuade everyone, and Origen replies 
that] The persuasion of a man is similar to the relationships which are 
called ‘reciprocal’ [ὡσπερεὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀντιπεπονθότων ἐστίν], like a 
man who has his hair cut who is active in that he offers himself to the 
barber. Because of this there is need not only for the action of the one who 
persuades but also for submission, so to speak, to the one who persuades 
or for acceptance of what he says. That is why we may not say that people 
who are unconvinced fail to be persuaded because God is incapable of 
convincing them. The reason is rather that they do not accept [μὴ 
δέχεσθαι] God’s persuasive words . . . even if the persuasive words are 
given by God, yet the act of assent to them is not caused by God [τό γε 
πείθεσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπὸ θεοῦ], is clearly taught by Paul when he says: 
‘The persuasion is not from him who calls you.’ 
 
This text highlights two helpful introductory points. First, it demonstrates that Origen 
understands salvation to require a subjective component. Salvation may be planned by 
God, initiated by God, made possible by the redemptive workings of God, and 
encouraged by God, but at the same time it requires voluntary assent (a reciprocal 
response) by each creature. Despite everything that God does, restoration will not happen 
apart from voluntary submission to the will of God.548 
If the first point is that an assent is necessary, the second point to notice is that 
God does not directly cause the assent. Origen’s moral psychology has no room for a 
willing (that is, an assent) that is somehow directly manufactured by God. This also rules 
out fixed natures, for if one’s nature programs (predetermines) one’s assent, then the 
creator of that fixed nature would be the direct cause of the assent. Origen will sometimes 
                                                          
547 Citations of Contra Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Borret, Origène: Contre 
Celse - Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes. Unless otherwise noted, any English translations 
of Contra Celsum are from: Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum. 
548 Cf. PArch 3.5.6 (Butterworth 242; SC 268, 228): “[Jesus took the form of a servant and became 
obedient even unto death] in order to teach them obedience who could in no other way obtain salvation 





go so far as to describe God compelling, pressing and extorting a person’s assent,549 but 
Origen remains firm on the point that each rational creature retains ultimate control over 
their choice at the moment of choice.550 Reaching the apocatastasis requires the voluntary 
faith, repentance, conversion, and ascent to holiness by each creature – all of which falls 
under the purview of each soul’s moral autonomy. 
PArch 2.1.2, Butterworth 77 (SC 252, 236-238) 
But God who, by the unspeakable skill of his wisdom [ineffabilem 
sapientiae suae artem], transforms and restores all things [transformans ac 
reparans profectum], whatever their condition [quae quoquomodo fiunt], 
to some useful purpose and the common advantage of all [ad utile aliquid 
et ad communem omnium], recalls these very creatures, so different from 
each other in mental quality, to one harmony of work and endeavor; so 
that, diverse though the motions of their souls may be, they nevertheless 
combine to make up the fulness and perfection of a single world, the very 
variety of minds tending to one end, perfection [ut diuresis licet motibus 
animorum, unius tamen mundi plenitudinem perfectionemque 
consumment, atque ad unum perfectionis finem uarietas ipsa mentium 
tendat]. For there is one power [Vna namque uirtus est] which binds and 
holds together all the diversity of the world and guides the various motions 
to the accomplishment of one task [quae omnem mundi diuersitatem 
constringit et continent atque in unum opus uarious agit motus], lest so 
immense a work as the world should be dissolved by the conflict of souls. 
It is for this reason, we think, that God, the parent of all things, in 
providing for the salvation of his entire creation [salute uniuersarum 
creaturarum suarum] through the unspeakable plan of his word and 
wisdom, has so ordered everything [per ineffabilem uerbi sui ac sapientiae 
rationem ita haec singular dispensasse] that each spirit or soul, or 
whatever else rational existences ought to be called, should not be 
compelled by force against its free choice to any action except that to 
which the motion of its own mind lead it, – for in that case the power of 
free choice would seem to be taken from them, [non contra arbitrii 
libertatem ui in aliud quam motus mentis suae ageret cogerentur, et per 
hoc adimi ab his uideretur liberi facultas arbitrii] which would certainly 
alter the quality of their nature itself – and at the same time that the 
                                                          
549 These terms will be discussed below in the discussion of PArch 3.5.8. 
550 We may also note that this text argues against Ramelli’s proposed solution of “ethical 
intellectualism” (see above, Chapter 1). Origen’s argument here presupposes that moral choices are not 
wholly caused by the act of God granting true knowledge. If receiving true knowledge did automatically 
precipitate the correct choice, then it would be true to say that the only reason people do not convert is 






motions of their wills [diuersi motus propositi] should work suitably and 
usefully together to produce the harmony of a single world . . . 
 
In this passage Origen affirms God’s plan to bring restoration to all creatures (God 
“transforms and restores all things…providing for the salvation of his entire creation”).551 
Additionally, we read that this restoration necessarily involves the motion of their souls 
(motibus animorum), guided by God, by which Origen has in mind individual choices 
concerning repentance, conversion, and the rejection of sin. Origen is aware that a 
foreordained universal salvation – one which logically requires that all creatures 
eventually make the correct choices – appears to threaten moral autonomy. Thus, even 
though he acknowledges that God guides the exercise of moral autonomy, Origen 
immediately stresses that despite how this may sound, no soul will be forced to choose 
the way God wants it to. Each soul will only act in ways that its own inclinations 
motivate it to act. 
The last sentence in the passage is significant, for here Origen mentions God’s 
arrangement or ordering (dispensasse) of creaturely moral autonomy. God has a plan to 
restore every soul. Every soul has its own motions or choices. God’s plan, therefore, 
entails that he orders and arranges the free choices of each soul in such a way as to form a 
unified whole and to ensure a future apocatastasis (“in providing for the salvation of his 
                                                          
551 “omnium transformans ac reparans profectum… salute uniuersarum creaturarum suarum.” 
Rufinus typically uses the verb form restituere “to restore” (and its variations) when translating Origen’s 
comments about universal salvation – e.g. PArch 2.1.1, (SC 252, 236). Rufinus also uses consummatio – 
e.g. PArch 1.6.1 (SC 252, 194). This passage is admittedly more ambiguous, yet its construction and 
structure clearly echo places where Origen is more explicit: e.g. PArch 1.6.1 where Origen says that “the 
goodness of God will restore [reuocet] his entire creation to one end [unum finem], even his enemies being 
conquered and subdued” (Butterworth 52; SC 252, 194). Our passage here in PArch 2.1.2 has a similar 
structure, for Origen repeats that the “wisdom of God” will “transform and restore all things” … “to one 
end, perfection.” Another parallel passage is PArch 3.5.7 where Origen depicts universal salvation as the 
“perfect restoration of the entire creation [perfecta uniuersae creaturae restitution]” (Butterworth 243; SC 
268, 232). The places where Origen explicitly affirms universal salvation signal to the reader what Origen 
has in mind in passages such as PArch 2.1.2 where he speaks with more ambiguity. For more on the 





entire creation . . . [God] has ordered everything . . . that the motion of their wills should 
. . . produce the harmony of a single world”). To be clear, God does not arrange the free 
choices of creatures in a way that would force them to do something they would not 
otherwise choose to do. But although creatures exercise free choice, God uses an 
unspeakably complex plan of arrangement of these free choices so that, when combined, 
the full set of free choices results in God’s foreordained universal salvation. Origen does 
not reveal how this process works in this passage, but it is important to see that he grants 
divine providence a certain measure of authority and control over creaturely moral 
autonomy. We will have to explore further to discover what Origen means by God’s 
“arrangement” and “ordering” of moral autonomy. A similar passage is found in Book 3 
of First Principles: 
PArch 3.5.8, Butterworth 243-44 (SC 268, 232-234) 
But this subjection will be accomplished through certain means and 
courses of discipline and periods of time; that is, the whole world [omnis 
mundus] will not become subject to God [subiectionem] by the pressure of 
some necessity [necessitate] that compels [cogente] it into subjection, nor 
by the use of force [uim], but by word, by reason, by teaching, by the 
exhortation to better things, by the best methods of education, and also by 
such merited and appropriate threatenings552 as are justly held over the 
heads of those who contemptuously neglect to care for their own salvation 
and advantage and their spiritual health . . . But how, consistently with the 
preservation of free will [arbitrii libertate] in all rational creatures, each 
person ought to be dealt with, that is, who they are whom the Word of 
God discovers to be prepared and capable and so instructs; who they are 
whom he puts off for a time; who they are from whom the word is utterly 
hidden and who are destined to be far away from the hearing of it; who 
again they are that despise the word when it is declared and preached to 
                                                          
552 Here Origen lists all of the various strategies God employs in God’s pedagogical soteriology. 
Without repeating our discussion of God’s pedagogical soteriology from Chapter 3, it is worth noting here 
that the first term in Origen’s list is the most important, and it is what enables the rest of the list to function. 
The word here is verbo, which is Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s original Greek λογος. While it is true that 
God persuades using words – words of revelation, words of his prophets, and the words of the didaskaloi – 
the most appropriate sense of “word” here is, of course, the Word, the Son of God. A few lines later Origen 






them and consequently are visited with God’s corrections and 
chastisements553 and pressed into salvation and whose conversion is as it 
were compelled and extorted [perurgeat ad salutem conversionemque 
eorum quodammodo exigat et extorqueat]; who they are for whom God 
even provides special occasions for salvation, so that sometimes a man has 
obtained an assured salvation when his faith was revealed by a mere 
answer; from what causes [causis] or on what occasions these things 
happen, or what the divine wisdom sees as it looks into these men [in his 
intro inspiciens] or what movements of theirs [motus propositi] will lead 
God to arrange all these things thus [eorum uidens haec uniuersa 
dispenset], is known to God alone and to his only-begotten Son,554 through 
whom all things were created and restored [reparata]… 
 
In this passage Origen outlines the various pedagogical tools God employs throughout 
salvation-history to achieve the final restoration of all rational creatures. Because every 
creature uses their freedom of choice in a unique way, God must use individualized 
methods to meet their individual needs in order to facilitate their successful return to 
beatitude. We are assured that none of God’s methods violate moral autonomy, yet even 
so Origen’s language here is unusually striking. Phrases such as “pressed into salvation 
and whose conversion is as it were compelled and extorted” is as strident language as 
Origen will ever use to describe a voluntary conversion process.555 Such language and 
imagery are unusual for Origen because he is normally on the defensive against 
                                                          
553 Once again Origen’s words demonstrate that “ethical intellectualism” is not a complete 
description of Origen’s moral psychology. Sometimes those who know the truth must be further 
incentivized before they will convert – thus, Origen refers to a variety of semi-rational means of 
persuasion, such as punishments, fear, etc. 
554 Here Origen emphasizes that only God knows the specific mechanics of how each person will 
be restored to salvation without violating moral autonomy. However, it would be incorrect to interpret this 
text as if Origen were insisting that we cannot know, in general, how moral autonomy is preserved in the 
context of a foreordained universal salvation. As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, Origen does believe he 
knows how moral autonomy can be upheld. Instead, Origen is stating that on an individual level, there is no 
way for us to know in advance how God will achieve the restoration of this or that sinner (let alone 
ourselves). Only God is able to look inside a sinner (intro inspiciens) and then make a customized plan of 
salvation. Origen admits that there is no way for creatures to be privy to that level of information until after 
the fact. 
555 Another rare example may be found in Cels I.46 (Chadwick 42; SC 132, 196): “Even if Celsus, 
or the Jew that he introduced, ridicule what I am about to say, nevertheless it shall be said that many have 
come to Christianity as it were in spite of themselves, some spirit having turned their mind suddenly from 
hating the gospel to dying for it by means of a vision by day or by night. We have known many instances 






heterodox determinisms, especially determinisms related to the topics of faith and 
conversion. As such, we must be careful not to read more into Origen’s statements here 
than is warranted. Even with the forceful language Origen is careful to begin and end this 
passage with a strong affirmation of moral autonomy.  
 As in the last passage, here Origen writes about God’s prior arrangement 
(dispenset) of creaturely free moral choices in the unfolding of salvation-history (“what 
movements of theirs will lead God to arrange all these things thus”). The reason that God 
needs to plan the unfolding of salvation-history in advance is because of the diversity 
among creatures. The same sermon that will move one sinner to conversion will instead 
move another sinner to further intransigence. Similarly, preaching to one sinner early in 
life will ensure his quick conversion, but preaching to another sinner early in life will 
have the opposite effect. Because of the diversity in moral psychology among God’s 
creatures, God must know the appropriate moment to apply the correct methods. Each 
instance of divine pedagogy and divine grace is applied in precisely the correct time and 
place and degree to ensure its efficacy. God looks into sinners (intro inspiciens) in order 
to discover what customized plan of action will result in their voluntary repentance. What 
must be emphasized is that God does this internal examination of each creature’s moral 
autonomy beforehand. That is to say, God acquires this information through his 
foreknowledge, and then on the basis of that information God proceeds to arrange and 
construct his detailed plan of salvation-history. 
 At this point, important questions begin to emerge as to the nature of God’s prior 
arrangement of creaturely free choice. What is God arranging specifically? What type of 





govern moral autonomy and place limits upon it? How is God able to actively arrange the 
free choices of his creatures without imposing necessity, compulsion, or force upon them 
(necessitate, cogente, uim), for Origen disavows all three in this passage? The answers to 
these related questions may be gleaned by investigating Origen’s understanding of the 
concept of “necessity” and Origen’s understanding of divine foreknowledge.  
 
Origen and Language of “Necessity” 
One of Origen’s most important discussions of foreknowledge is found in 
Philocalia 23,556 where he argues that although God has foreknowledge, such 
foreknowledge does not entail the type of future necessity that contradicts moral 
responsibility.557 Origen admits that many of the Greeks believed that the notion of divine 
foreknowledge imposes necessity on all events, and that consequently they felt they must 
reject the idea of divine foreknowledge altogether: 
                                                          
556 This section of the Philocalia was originally from Origen’s Commentary on Genesis, now lost. 
557 A parallel treatment of divine foreknowledge by Origen along with his corresponding 
discussion about language of “necessity” is found in Cels II.20 (Chadwick 84-87; SC 132, 336-345). This is 
important for it establishes continuity in Origen’s thought from the beginning of his writing career to the 
end. Origen has another discussion about divine foreknowledge in ComRm III.7.5-6 (Scheck 2.83-92; 
Bammel 582-593). However, this discussion is different in that Origen does not treat foreknowledge in the 
philosophical way that he does in Philocalia 23 and Cels II.20. Rather, in this discussion Origen defines 
foreknowledge as “to receive in affection and to unite with oneself” based on the Scriptural euphemism of 
“to know” (as in “the man knew his wife”) – ComRm VII.6.35-101 (Scheck 2.88-91; Bammel 589-592). 
Though they are different the two discussions are not contradictory. Origen believed that Paul used the term 
“foreknowledge” at this point in the epistle according to Old Testament custom, and not according to the 
technical sense used in Greek philosophy. Additionally, Origen does mention the philosophical definition 
of foreknowledge at one point in this discussion – see ComRm VII.6.85-89 (Scheck 2.90; Bammel 591). It 
appears that confusion on this passage in the Romans commentary led Charles Bigg to incorrectly 
conclude: “Origen, in fact, held that man is free in such a sense that God Himself cannot foresee what he 
may choose to do” – Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria: Being the Bampton Lectures of the Year 
1886: 244. 
Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Romans (along with page numbers) are from the critical 
edition by Bammel, Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung Rufins, 1, 
2, 3. Unless otherwise noted, all English translations (listed by volume and page) are from Scheck’s 2-
volume work: Scheck, Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5; Origen: Commentary 





[These Greeks] tell us that if God from everlasting knows that a certain 
person will be unjust, and will do certain unjust deeds, and if the 
knowledge of God be infallible [ἀφευδὴς], and if he that is foreseen to 
have such a character will certainly [πάντως] be unjust and will do these 
unjust deeds, his injustice is necessitated [κατηνάγκασται], and it will be 
impossible [ἀδύνατον] for his conduct to be other than what God knew it 
would be. But if his conduct could not be different, and no one is to be 
blamed for not doing impossibilities, it is no use for us to accuse the unjust 
. . . and they say that consistently with God’s foreknowledge our Free Will 
[ἐφ ἡμῖν] cannot be possibly maintained.558 
 
Although Origen disagrees with this claim, it is important to remember that Origen does 
agree with the idea that if a person’s conduct could not have been otherwise, then that 
person should not be praised or blamed. By its very nature moral autonomy requires 
various possibilities of expression.559 These alternate possibilities stem from Origen’s 
belief that the soul is always faced with multiple (and competing) rational inclinations 
and motivations which originate from the person’s spirit and body. The soul stands 
                                                          
558 Phil 23.7 (Lewis 180; SC 226, 152-154). Citations from this section of the Philocalia are from 
the most recent critical edition by Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre. Unless otherwise 
noted, all English translations are by Lewis, The Philocalia of Origen: A compilation of selected passages 
from Origen's works made by St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Basil of Caesarea. 
Here Origen is wading into an already well-established Greek debate regarding divine 
foreknowledge and (what is called by contemporary scholars) the issue of “logical determinism.” Questions 
pertaining to logical determinism have to do with whether or not statements about the future have truth 
value in the present – e.g. if it is raining today, then was it true yesterday to say that today would be rainy? 
If so then the future appears fixed by logical implication of the truth value of the language we use – cf. R. J. 
Hankinson, "Determinism and indeterminism," in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. 
Keimpe Algra, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 516-17. This debate was often highly 
technical and often hinged on the proper and improper use of tensed language itself. For analysis on the 
arguments for and against logical determinism, see Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame: 
Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 91-103. Questions 
regarding God’s foreknowledge of future events are one variation of this larger debate. The troubling 
conclusions regarding logical determinism led some, like Alexander of Aphrodisias, to reject divine 
foreknowledge altogether (De fato 30) – cf. Bugár, "Where does Free Will come from?," 625. Origen 
upholds logical determinism (in the form of infallible divine foreknowledge), but he denies that this entails 
causal determinism. Instead, as we will see below, Origen insists that divine foreknowledge does not cause 
future events, but rather future events cause God’s foreknowledge of them.  
559 E.g. Cels V.21 (Chadwick 280; SC 147, 66): “While as for us who say that the universe is 
cared for by God in accordance with the conditions of the free will of each man, and that as far as possible 
it is always being led on to be better, and who know that the nature of our free will is to admit various 
possibilities (for it cannot achieve the entirely unchangeable nature of God)…”. Also PArch 1.5.2 
(Butterworth 44; SC 252, 176): “Every rational creature is therefore susceptible of praise and blame; of 
praise, if in accordance with the reason which he has in him he advances to better things; of blame, if he 





midway between the other two aspects of the person and must choose between them.560 
Therefore, at any moment of choice both virtue and vice are viable options which the 
agent could assent to. Moral praise requires that the person could have chosen incorrectly 
instead, and moral blame requires that the person could have chosen correctly instead.561 
Like the Greeks he mentions here, Origen believes that an absence of alternative 
possibilities would introduce an unacceptable force of necessity on a person’s ability to 
make free moral choices. Such necessity would constitute a denial of moral autonomy 
and it would destroy any possibility for moral culpability. Where Origen disagrees, 
however, is with the claim that infallible divine foreknowledge leads to this type of 
necessity. Throughout Philocalia 23 Origen insists that the future event causes God to 
have foreknowledge of it, rather than that God’s foreknowledge causes the event.562  
Origen uses Judas Iscariot as an illustration to make his point about alternative 
possibilities. Origen states that in the case of Judas “no blame would have attached to him 
if he had of necessity [ἐπαναγκὲς] been a traitor, and if it had not been possible for him to 
be like the other Apostles.”563 A point of confusion, however, stems from the ambiguous 
and imprecise nature of language with the terms such as “necessity”, “certainly”, etc. 
(this is true in Greek as well as in English). Trying to wade into the language difficulty, 
Origen states:  
                                                          
560 PArch 2.8.4: “…it appears as if the soul were some kind of medium [medium] between the 
weak flesh [carnem infirmam] and the willing spirit [spiritum promptum]” (Butterworth 127-128; SC 242, 
348). 
561 This is Origen’s primary argument throughout PArch 3.1 (SC 268, 16-254). 
562 Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 156): “…we shall make a still stronger statement, nevertheless 
true, that the future event is the cause of God’s peculiar knowledge concerning it.” This appears to be the 
typical view of divine foreknowledge by theologians in the early Church – e.g. Tatian remarks in Oratio ad 
Graecos VII (ANF 2.67-68): “And the power of the Logos, having in itself a faculty to foresee future 
events, not as fated, but as taking place by the choice of free agents, foretold from time to time the issues of 
things to come” – "Tatian's Address to the Greeks," in Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, 
Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, ANF 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994). 





For if any one interprets the words certainly will be [πάντως ἔσται – 
“surely, doubtless, certainly”] in the sense that what is foreknown will of 
necessity be [ἀνάγκην εἶναι – “compulsory, forced”], we do not agree with 
them; for we shall not say that, because it was foreknown that Judas would 
be a traitor, there was any necessity [ἀνάγκη] for Judas to be a traitor.564 
 
A bit later Origen draws the same distinction between “certainly” and “by necessity” but 
uses the related verb form καταναγκάζω (“to compel”) instead of ἀνάγκη: “Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ 
πάντως ἀκούει ἀντὶ τοῦ κατηναγκασμένως.”565 Origen also uses the adverb form: 
ἐπαναγκὲς (“necessarily”).566 All the terms he uses for necessity are meant to convey 
compulsion and force, which is the physical imagery Origen has in mind when he states: 
“though God knows before that a man will sin, He does not put a finger on him when he 
does sin.”567 We are to imagine, then, that whatever happens necessarily, or out of 
compulsion, would be akin to God laying a finger on a man to force him to choose. Thus, 
one of Origen’s main points is to draw attention to the distinction between a choice which 
will certainly (infallibly) occur, and a choice which will necessarily occur because of 
force. The latter category presupposes and contains the former, in that choices brought 
about by divine compulsion will also certainly happen. But the former category does not 
automatically entail the latter, for just because something will certainly happen does not 
require that it will happen by force. In Origen’s words:  
If any one will explain the “certainly will be” as only meaning that some 
particular events will occur, but that things might have turned out 
differently, we assent to this as true; for God cannot possibly lie; and when 
                                                          
564 Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 156). Cf. Cels II.20 (Chadwick 86; SC 132, 344): “If by 
assuredly [πάντως] he means ‘necessarily’ [κατηναγκασμένως], we will not grant that to him; for it was also 
possible for it not to happen. But if by assuredly he means simply that ‘it will come to pass’ (and nothing 
prevents that from being true, even if it is possible for it not to happen), then my position is in no way 
affected.” Origen uses the same technical vocabulary to make this distinction in both the earlier work and 
the later work. 
565 Phil 23.13 (Lewis 186; SC 226, 172). 
566 Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 158). 





things may possibly happen or not happen, we may contemplate either 
contingency [φρονῆσαι τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι].568 
 
We are told that a “necessary” choice is problematic because it is a forced choice. 
But what does Origen mean by forced? We may use Origen’s discussions concerning 
moral autonomy found in other texts to clarify this point. Origen believes that there are 
two specific features that must be present for a choice to be free rather than forced. First, 
the assent to the choice must come from the rational soul and not from outside of the 
rational soul.569 Second, in the moment of choice the soul must be adjudicating between 
multiple rational impressions, so as to allow for multiple possibilities or outcomes (good 
and evil).570 Origen departs from Stoicism in regards to this second point.571 Thus, a 
                                                          
568 Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 159). Origen has a similar discussion between the idea of an 
infallible future occurrence and a necessary future occurrence in Phil 25.2 (Lewis 210-211; SC 226, 218-
222), which is from his Commentary on Romans Book 1. At one place in this passage Origen admits the 
complexity of the topic when he says: “The subject of possibilities, however, belongs to the science of the 
skilled logician; so that if a man will cleanse the eye of his mind, he may thus be able to follow the subtle 
arguments, and may understand how, even in the course of ordinary events, there is nothing to prevent the 
possibility of a given circumstance issuing many ways, though, in fact, there will be only one out of the 
many, and that not necessitated” (Lewis 211; SC 226, 220-222). 
569 Two places Origen makes this distinction are in PArch 3.1.2-3 and PEuch 6.1-2. In PEuch 
Origen demarcates rational living beings (that is, those with moral autonomy) from other living and non-
living things by stating that their motion is a motion “through” themselves (δἰ αὐτῶν) (GCS II, 312). 
Therefore, Origen states that those Christians who deny moral autonomy believe that “since we are in no 
way moved by ourselves but by something moving outside ourselves, we may be said to do what we 
suppose we are doing only because of that external cause” (Greer 93; GCS II, 312). For analysis of the 
similarities and differences between the parallel passages in PArch and PEuch, see Van Der Eijk, 
"Origenes' Verteidigung des freien Willens in de Oratione 6, 1-2."; Hahm, "A Neglected Stoic Argument 
for Human Responsibility." 
Citations from Origen’s On Prayer are from the Berlin-Leipzig critical edition (GCS), and are 
listed in the format of Origenes Werke volume (II) and page number: Koetschau, Buch V-VIII gegen 
Celsus, Die Schrift vom Gebet. Unless otherwise noted, English translations are from Greer, Origen: An 
Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of 
Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers. 
570 E.g. PArch 3.1.3 (Butterworth 160; SC 268, 24): “To be subject, then, to a particular external 
impression which gives rise to such or such an image is admittedly not one of the things lying within our 
power [ἐφ ἡμῖν]; but to decide to use what has happened either in this way or in that is the work of nothing 
else but the reason within us, which, as the alternatives appear, either influences us towards the impulses 
that incite to what is good and seemly or else turns aside to the reverse.” Origen understands the competing 
rational impressions (or desires) to originate from the person’s body and spirit, and the soul must choose 
between them at each moment of choice. There are only two definite times this feature of moral psychology 
is not a necessary requirement for a choice to be free, and they are in the peculiar cases of the final state of 
beatitude and the moral autonomy of Jesus (cf. PArch 2.6.5-6, SC 252, 318 and PArch 3.6.3, SC 268, 240-





choice is free and not forced if the soul is the one making the motion (its own assent to its 
impression/desire) instead of another agent, and if the soul had alternative 
impressions/desires it may have followed instead. 
Where does universal salvation fit into this discussion? Some events πάντως ἔσται 
– that is, they certainly will come to pass, they surely will come to pass, and they 
doubtless will come to pass. And yet such events will not ἀνάγκην εἶναι – that is, they 
will not certainly come to pass through coercion or force. In Origen’s theology, universal 
salvation is an example of an event that will certainly and infallibly occur, and yet it will 
not occur by necessity or force.572 People will πάντως voluntarily choose to submit to 
God, but not by ἀνάγκην.  
But here we must press further. Origen does not view the apocatastasis as an 
accidental feature of salvation-history. We may imagine a sense in which it might have 
been. That is, God might have foreseen that all souls will return to him as a matter of 
coincidence or good-fortune, without God in any way predetermining and then enforcing 
this outcome. After all, this is how Origen describes Judas’ choice: Judas’ treachery was 
“certain” to occur but need not have occurred if Judas had chosen differently. In the same 
                                                                                                                                                                             
longer receive any sinful or incorrect desires, since God will be all in all. That these are the exceptions to 
his normal rule can be seen in Origen’s careful explanation as to how Jesus could be said to possess moral 
autonomy: “But if the above argument, that there exists in Christ a rational soul, should seem to anyone to 
constitute a difficulty, on the grounds that in the course of our discussion we have often shown that souls 
are by their nature capable of good and evil, we shall resolve the difficulty in the following manner…” 
(PArch 2.6.5, Butterworth 112; SC 252, 318). 
571 The Stoics understood there to be alternate possibilities in the sense of physical capabilities – a 
man who chooses to run away from an attacker had the physical capability to stand and fight, even if it is 
also true that the man would never have chosen to do so given his character and intellect at the moment of 
choice. The Stoics believed, therefore, that in every successive world-cycle, each person would act in 
exactly the same ways, and history would repeat itself over and over. Origen believed this idea threatened 
moral autonomy – cf. PArch 2.3.4 (SC 252, 258-260). Origen believed moral autonomy requires more than 
just a physical capability, in that it must also possess a mental (or dispositional) capability. 
572 E.g. Cels VIII.72 (Chadwick 507; SC 150, 340): “But we believe that at some time the Logos 
will have overcome the entire rational nature, and will have remodelled every soul to his own perfection, 
when each individual simply by the exercise of his freedom will choose what the Logos wills and will be in 





way, it might have been the case that not all souls were predetermined to return to God, 
but through his foreknowledge God happened to discover, as it were, that this would be 
the outcome. In such a scenario, there would be no apparent conflict between 
universalism and freedom of choice, for God would have foreseen but not foreordained 
the outcome (just as God did with the choice of Judas). But is this what Origen means 
when he writes about the apocatastasis? No, Origen describes it as something more. 
Origen writes about universal salvation as something which was planned by God from 
the very beginning – before creation itself. Thus, we must recognize a further subdivision 
within the category of “certain events”. Origen described “certain” events as events 
which will infallibly occur, but not through force. All of Origen’s examples of such 
events in Philocalia 23 relate to events that might have been otherwise, such as Judas’ 
betrayal. But the apocatastasis is foreordained by God. There is no question as to whether 
it will occur or not, since God decided it would occur. And so even though it does not 
happen through force, it takes on a stronger sense of “certainly will happen” than the sin 
of Judas. The alternate possibility (a failed apocatastasis) is no possibility at all. How can 
we account for the difference between two events, both of which will “certainly” occur 
(and neither by force), but at the same time only one might not have occurred? The 
answer to that question can be found in Origen’s multilayered understanding of God’s 
foreknowledge, to which we now turn. 
 
God’s Three Types of Foreknowledge 
As already mentioned, Origen’s main point in Philocalia 23 is to rescue divine 





“necessity,” which in turn begets fatalism. Throughout his discussion Origen alludes to 
three types or aspects of God’s foreknowledge.573 The first type of foreknowledge Origen 
speaks about (or the first way he speaks about foreknowledge) is a simple foreknowledge 
of what will happen in the future – that is, God knows everything that will eventually 
come to pass: 
When God planned the creation of the world, inasmuch as there is nothing 
without a cause, His thoughts traversed the whole course of the future, and 
He saw that when a certain thing takes place another follows . . . and going 
on thus to the end of all things He knows what will be, but is not at all the 
cause of the occurrence of any particular event.574 
 
God has this knowledge simply because of who he is; Origen understands such 
knowledge to be part of the definition of the idea of God.575 Simple foreknowledge is not 
to be confused with any notion of providential planning; instead, Origen describes this 
type of foreknowledge as predictive. Origen gives an example of a man who is hurrying 
along upon a slippery surface. Observers have foreknowledge that the man will slip due 
to his own negligence, but the observers are not on that account responsible for the man 
slipping, for they did not plan or intend for it to occur. Instead, they observed that it 
would occur. Importantly, Origen expands this illustration to say that just as people can 
foresee the action of the man slipping, God can foresee a person’s choices (whether 
sinful or righteous), on account of God having foreseen what the person will be like.576 
Yet, it is the future choice which causes God’s foreknowledge and not the other way 
                                                          
573 Origen never explicitly states that there are three types of foreknowledge, even though it is 
clear that he speaks about foreknowledge in several ways – this numbering is mine. 
574 Phil 23.8 (Lewis 180; SC 226, 154-156). 
575 Phil 23.4 (Lewis 176; SC 226, 142): “That God knows long before every detail of the future, is, 
apart from Scripture, from the very conception of God clear to him who understands the power and 
excellence of the Divine understanding.” 
576 Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181, SC 226, 156): “[Origen gives the example of the man who will slip, and 
then says] just so, we must understand that God having foreseen what every one will be like, also perceives 





around, given that God “does not put a finger on him when he does sin.”577 Thus, the first 
type of divine foreknowledge Origen speaks about is simple knowledge of what will 
happen in the future, a knowledge made possible through God’s awareness of all causes 
(since everything that happens, happens due to a cause). Origen describes this type of 
foreknowledge as something static, in that it is merely predictive. As such, he insists that 
simple foreknowledge cannot pose a threat to moral autonomy.578 
 The second type of foreknowledge Origen describes is God’s foreknowledge of a 
person’s capabilities or possibilities. As just mentioned, Origen initially speaks of divine 
foreknowledge as God’s simple awareness of what will happen in the future (be it a 
choice or an action), but when Origen begins to differentiate “necessity” from 
“certainty,” he is led to expand the range of God’s foreknowledge. In his illustration of 
Judas, for example, it becomes apparent that God does not simply have foreknowledge of 
what Judas will choose, but God also has foreknowledge of what Judas might have 
chosen differently:  
If it is possible for Judas to be an Apostle like Peter, it is possible for God 
to think of Judas continuing an Apostle as Peter did. If it is possible for 
Judas to be a traitor, it is possible for God to contemplate his becoming a 
traitor. And if Judas proves to be a traitor, God by his foreknowledge of 
the two aforesaid possibilities (only one of which can be realised), 
inasmuch as His foreknowledge is true, will know before that Judas is 
going to be a traitor; but though God knows this, it might have been 
otherwise; and the knowledge of God would say, “It is possible for Judas 
                                                          
577 Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181, SC 226, 156): “…we shall make a still stronger statement, nevertheless 
true, that the future event is the cause of God’s peculiar knowledge concerning it.” Cf. Cels II.20 
(Chadwick 85; SC 132, 336-338). 
578 On Origen’s understanding, not only does simple foreknowledge not pose a threat to moral 
autonomy, but by itself it would be unable to exert any sort of providential control over salvation-history. 
At the very least, simple foreknowledge would have no ability to plan certain outcomes for contingent 
events, and as such simple foreknowledge is not a sufficient foundation for Origen’s universalism. Cf. a 
related argument in John Sanders, "Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control than 





to do this, but also possible for him to do the opposite; but of the two 
things possible I know that he will do this one.”579 
 
Thus, God has foreknowledge of all of a person’s future possibilities, whether or not 
those possibilities are ever realized in history (and most will not be). God foreknew that 
Judas was going to have the capability of loyalty as well as of treachery. But then 
afterwards in God’s foreknowledge (at least logically, if not temporally “afterwards”), 
God also foreknew which of the possibilities (ἐνδεχομένων) Judas was going to choose. 
So here we see Origen distinguishing between two moments or levels or logical stages of 
divine foreknowledge: if simple foreknowledge is God knowing what will happen, then 
the second type of foreknowledge is God knowing what could have happened differently. 
We may note that God’s foreknowledge of what could have happened differently 
contains significantly more information than his foreknowledge of will happen, given that 
there are many things that people could choose to do but end up not. Most possible 
choices will never become actualized on the future timeline of choices and events. The 
reason Origen believes this second type of divine foreknowledge is necessary for God to 
possess (and so Origen’s purpose in distinguishing it), is because it protects the notion 
that free choices must have alternate possibilities towards good or evil, which as we 
stated, is one of the conditions Origen requires for genuine moral autonomy.580 
                                                          
579 Phil 23.9 (Lewis 181-182, SC 226, 158). 
580 It is worth asking the question: what does alternate “possibility” or “capability” mean for 
Origen? Something has “possibility” or “capability”, according to Origen, if no external power was 
coercing someone to choose one way, and if their nature allows it (Origen uses an example of a man who 
does not have the capability to fly). In the case of a sinful action, then, God ‘did not have his finger on him’ 
in his moment of choice, and therefore he had the possibility to do otherwise. And similarly, although man 
does not have the capability to fly, he does have the capability to choose either to sin or not. Thus, a natural 
ability according to the nature of one’s species is one component which Origen requires in defining 
“alternate possibilities”, and he shares this in common with the Stoics. However, Origen requires more than 
a purely physical capability to do otherwise, for physical capability alone would appear to result in 
something like Stoic character-determinism, a notion which Origen explicitly rejects. He believed that the 
Stoic notion of repeating world cycles, cycles which were identical down to every detail, would constitute a 





Logically speaking, God’s foreknowledge of future possibilities comes before 
God’s foreknowledge of the actual future timeline. That is, God first knows what could 
happen, and then God knows what will happen. But how is God able to go from knowing 
future possibilities to future realities? If Jesus foreknows that Judas could choose either A 
or B, then what gives Jesus the additional ability to know that Judas is going to choose B? 
The answer, according to Origen, is that Jesus knew the current makeup of Judas’ 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Unlike the Stoics, Origen believes that the soul must also have the emotional or dispositional capability to 
do otherwise. This capability is grounded in his understanding of the competing rational desires issuing 
from spirit and body. One way Origen benefits from this adaptation of Stoic moral psychology is that it 
allows him to make souls responsible for the very beginning of their dispositions and characters in a way 
that Stoics typically could not. This is best illustrated by the first Fall away from God. Origen is explicit 
that there was no initial diversity among creatures in God’s first creation – PArch 2.9.6 (SC 252, 364). And 
yet, creatures with identical intellects and identical dispositions fell away in varying degrees from God. 
This could not happen on the typical Stoic view of character-determinism, for if souls were truly identical 
in regards to their characters and dispositions, they would always make identical choices. 
Despite the fact that Origen broadens the Stoic notion of alternative capabilities, it is important to 
see that Origen never gives the soul absolute “possibility to do otherwise” in the sense of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, for even if the soul has the capability over binary options, these options are still inexorably 
tied to the disposition’s two distinct impression generators (spirit and body). The soul does not have some 
sort of mystical, abstract power of choice that allows it to transcend beyond the bounds set by its own 
character and disposition. In other words, the parameters of the soul’s choice continue to be set by the 
(automatic) impressions coming from spirit and body. The difference between Origen and the Stoics is that 
the Stoics were locked into making choices on the basis of one impulsive-impression, while Origen’s soul 
is locked into making choices on the basis of two impulsive-impressions (one of which is guaranteed to 
always be virtuous). Unlike Alexander, Origen never insists that “the possibility to do otherwise” entails 
that if a person were to make the same choice over again, with the exact same character and intellect, then 
the person must have the capability to choose other than what the person’s disposition (broadly speaking) 
prompts him to choose (what we might call “absolute power to the contrary”). In a way, Origen finds 
himself midway between these two positions in that Origen does allow that if time could be rewound, a 
person could choose differently that what they had chosen. Yet at the same time, a person can never choose 
differently than what his disposition is prompting him to choose, and so Origen does not follow Alexander 
on this point (cf. discussion above in Chapter 2). For more on how Alexander strengthens the concept of 
“possibility to do otherwise” (and how he appears to be alone in requiring absolute power to the contrary), 
see Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception."  
It is also important to note that unlike Alexander, Origen’s acknowledgement of a general capacity 
for different future possibilities does not mean that the person’s choice is random or has the same 
likelihood either way. In one sense Origen admits that people have “equal abilities” (ἰσοστάσιον τῶν 
δυνάμεων) to do one thing or the other (Phil 23.10, Lewis 183; SC 226, 162). But for Origen that simply 
means that each choice will be equally unforced. Origen does not insist on “equal abilities” in the sense that 
the chance of one outcome occurring is equal to any other outcome, for this would divorce people’s choices 
from their current intellect and character. That would insinuate that a virtuous person has as much chance 
of sinning as a person habituated to sin, and such a notion goes against large swaths of Origen’s teaching 
on moral psychology. Even here, Origen is careful to say that the one who chooses to sin is able to resist it, 





disposition in that future moment, and therefore Jesus foreknew which choice Judas’ 
disposition would lead him to make:  
[Jesus] knew what was in man; and seeing the traitor’s detestable 
character [μοχθηρὸν ἦθος], and also what through avarice and through 
want of a right and steadfast regard for the Master he would dare to 
do…581  
 
According to Origen’s logic here, God’s foreknowledge of what will happen in the future 
depends on God knowing how a person’s character or disposition will inevitably lead him 
to act in a given moment of choice.582 God foreknew that Judas had the capability to 
choose correctly (i.e. there was no external force acting upon his assent-faculty, and his 
spirit would be sending an appropriate impression or desire to the soul to motivate it to 
make the correct choice). God also foreknew that Judas would nevertheless choose 
incorrectly. And God was able to foreknow which possibility Judas would follow because 
he was able to deduce what the character of Judas’ moral psychology would be like in 
that future moment. By this, I interpret Origen to mean here – for he does not say this 
explicitly – that although God foresaw that Judas would have a desire to act righteously, 
that God also foresaw that that the desire coming from Judas’ body would be much 
stronger than the desire coming from Judas’ spirit. Thus, God could see that Judas’ soul 
would end up aligning with the stronger of his two rational desires.583 
                                                          
581 Phil 23.13 (Lewis 186-187; SC 226, 174). Cf. Cels II.20 (Chadwick 87; SC 132, 344): “For it 
does not follow from the fact that Jesus correctly predicted the actions of the traitor and of the one who 
denied him, that he was responsible for their impiety and wicked conduct. He saw his evil state of mind 
[μοχθηρὸν ἦθος], since according to our scriptures ‘he knew what was in man’ [John 2:25], and perceived 
what he would venture to do as a result of his love of money and lack of the firm loyalty which he ought to 
have had towards his master…” 
582 E.g. Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181, SC 226, 156): “[Origen gives the example of the man who will slip, 
and then says] just so, we must understand that God having foreseen what every one will be like, also 
perceives the causes of his being what he is, and that he will commit these sins, or do these righteous 
deeds.” 
583 Cf. ComRm VII.6.97-101 (Scheck 2.91; Bammel 591-92): “For surely Judas had it within his 
power [potestate] to become like Peter and John had he wanted to; but instead he chose the desire 





This is a significant step to make for the following reason. Once Origen makes 
this the basis on which divine foreknowledge is possible, (that is, God’s foreknowledge is 
grounded on God’s ability to deduce what people will choose on the basis of what their 
future dispositions and rationality look like), then Origen opens the door for God to have 
a third type of foreknowledge.584 If God knows what will happen in the future because 
God knows how a person with a specific character or disposition will choose, then God 
must also know how that same disposition would choose in any hypothetical or 
imaginary scenario. Thus, God foreknows what each person will freely choose in the 
future (type 1); he foreknows the various alternative possibilities that each person could 
have freely chosen in that future if they had wanted to (type 2); and finally, God 
foreknows what each person would freely choose if they were in a different set of 
circumstances altogether, a set of circumstances they will never actually be faced with 
(type 3). In the discussion below, I have labeled this third type “God’s foreknowledge of 
hypothetical voluntary possibilities.” We must now examine this third type of divine 
foreknowledge more closely. 
 
Foreknowledge of Hypothetical Voluntary Possibilities 
 God possesses more than a simple foreknowledge of what the future timeline will 
look like, and he knows more than what alternative possibilities each person will have in 
the making of that timeline. God has additional knowledge, a type of unrealized 
foreknowledge, where God knows what could happen in the future provided that 
                                                          
584 In Cels IV.92 (Chadwick 257; SC 136, 414) Origen also speaks about simple foreknowledge as 





circumstances were altogether different from what they will be. I will use Judas as an 
example: 
Type 1) From the beginning of time, God foreknew that on Friday, Judas will choose 
to betray Jesus. 
Type 2) From the beginning of time, God also foreknew that on Friday Judas had the 
possibility of remaining loyal in addition to the possibility of being 
treacherous.  
Type 3) From the beginning of time, God additionally foreknew how Judas would 
have freely acted if the situation had happened on a Thursday, or if it had 
happened after Jesus gave Judas a more explicit warning, or if it had 
happened after Judas was instructed by better teachers while growing up (etc. 
ad infinitum).  
 
Today, this third aspect of divine foreknowledge is commonly referred to as 
God’s middle knowledge, or God’s knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom. It is God’s knowledge of how creatures would freely respond in any given 
hypothetical state of affairs. As far as I am aware, today it is universally held that the 15th 
century Spanish Jesuit priest Luis de Molina first described and attributed middle 
knowledge to God.585 Middle knowledge (or Molinism) is described in the following way 
in modern philosophy: 
In addition to his natural knowledge (knowledge of necessary truths over 
which he has no control) and his free knowledge (knowledge of contingent 
truths over which he does have control), God also knows counterfactuals 
of [creaturely] freedom – conditionals specifying, for any free creature 
who might exist and any set of circumstances in which that creature might 
be placed and left free, what that creature would freely do if placed in 
those circumstances. Such conditionals would be contingent (since, 
                                                          
585 Luis de Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, 
praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia (1595): On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, 
trans. A. J. (of part 4) Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). Linda Zagzebski’s remarks 
recount the standard narrative regarding Molina as the originator of the concept of middle knowledge: 
“Molina developed the idea of divine scientia media, or middle knowledge, to explain how God can secure 
infallible knowledge of contingent future human acts. The idea is that God knows what any possible free 
creature would freely choose in any possible circumstance. By combining his knowledge of the 
circumstances he has willed to create with his middle knowledge, God can know the entire future, 
including that part of it consisting of free human acts.” – Linda Zagzebski, "Foreknowledge and Human 
Freedom," in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion: Second Edition, ed. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, 





according to libertarianism, free beings are not necessitated to act in a 
certain way by the circumstances in effect when they freely act), but 
would not be under God’s control (since it is not up to God how one of his 
creatures would freely act); hence, God’s knowledge of such truths would 
be neither natural nor free, but lie in the middle between these two. Given 
his knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom, God could tailor every 
action relating to his free creatures so that God achieves each desired 
goal by putting those creatures into situations in which God sees they will 
freely act in such a way as to realize those ends.586 
 
Strictly speaking, this knowledge is not foreknowledge, given that the vast majority of 
this knowledge pertains to choices and behaviors that will never come to pass in the 
actual future. If God knows what Judas would freely choose to eat for breakfast if he 
lived in Paris during World War II, in what sense does this describe foreknowledge given 
the fact that it does not take place in any real future? Nevertheless, I will continue to call 
it foreknowledge for two reasons: first, whenever Origen alludes to this type of divine 
knowledge, it is either in the context of his discussions of God’s foreknowledge, or he 
describes it as something like foreknowledge. And second, Origen envisions God 
exercising this knowledge in the primordial past, before creation, as part of God’s pre-
planning of salvation-history. Before creation, God used his knowledge of the 
counterfactuals of human free choice by imagining and canvassing through all possible 
future realities. Thus, along with the preceding disclaimer I will designate this as a type 
of divine foreknowledge in the discussion below. 
 Origen uses several illustrations which reveal that God has this third type of 
foreknowledge (or “middle knowledge”).587 For example, Origen recounts how in Luke 
2:34 Jesus denounces the cities of Chorazin and Bethsaida by saying “for if the mighty 
                                                          
586 Thomas P. Flint, "Providence," in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion: Second Edition, ed. 
Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, Philip Quinn (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 333 (italics added). 
587 I must reiterate that nowhere does Origen introduce this knowledge of God as a “third type” of 
divine foreknowledge. The numbering and the division is mine. Nevertheless, I believe the distinction is a 





works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which were done in you, they would have 
repented long ago.”588 Jesus had knowledge that in the hypothetical situation where he 
performed mighty works in Tyre and Sidon, that the people there would have freely 
chosen to repent. But the mighty works never took place in Tyre and Sidon, and so we 
are not dealing with God’s foreknowledge of alternate possibilities (type 2). Instead, this 
reveals God’s knowledge of (what moderns call) counterfactual freedom.589 Another 
example can be found in Contra Celsus where Origen states that by a miraculous divine 
grace God gives knowledge of himself “to those who by God’s foreknowledge have been 
previously determined, because they would live lives worthy of Him after He was made 
known to them.”590 In other words, God has foreknowledge of who would choose to live 
worthy lives after having been instructed about God and similarly God has 
foreknowledge of those who would not. This knowledge leads God to give his grace to 
those who he foreknows would make proper use of it. But this means that God had to first 
imagine a hypothetical world in which he had revealed himself to people who (he 
foresees) did not respond correctly in certain hypothetical futures. And on the basis of 
knowing how creatures would freely respond in those imaginary futures, God then 
actuates the real future where such people are intentionally not given instruction about 
him. 
                                                          
588 Phil 27.11 (Lewis, 235; SC 226, 306). 
589 If God had done mighty works in Tyre and Sidon and the people repented, God would have 
had (type 2) foreknowledge concerning the possibility that they would not have repented. Or, if the people 
had not repented, God would have had (type 2) foreknowledge concerning the possibility that they would 
have repented. But in this example, the mighty works were never performed in the first place. Origen 
speaks in a similar way about God’s foreknowledge concerning the people in Tyre and Sidon in PArch 
3.1.17 Greek (Butterworth 192-195; SC 268, 104-110). 





Origen most often alludes to this third type of divine knowledge, however, when 
he is speaking about God’s remarkable healing or sanctifying strategies for sinners. For 
example, Origen writes: 
The Word of God is a physician of the soul, and uses the most diverse, 
suitable, and seasonable methods of healing the sick; and of these methods 
of healings, some more, some less, give pain and torment to those who are 
under treatment; and the remedies, moreover, seem unsuitable, some times 
not; and further they act speedily or slowly; and are sometimes applied 
when the patients have had their fill of sin, or when, so to speak they have 
only touched it . . . [Thus, some souls] are more slowly healed, because, if 
they were soon rid of their sufferings, they would think little of falling a 
second time into the same evils. The God who designed them knows all 
their different constitutions, and, for that He is an expert in the art of 
healing, it is for Him alone to say what is best to be done for each, and 
when.591 
 
God administers healing to each sinner not simply in accordance with what each sinner 
deserves (though he does do that), but God also administers healing according to what 
will be most effective.592 But in order for God to administer this sort of individualized 
care, God must be aware of how each sinner would hypothetically respond to any given 
plan of treatment. The goal of God’s healing is always voluntary repentance, which 
requires a free moral choice. Therefore, Origen believes that God knows, in advance, 
which healing treatments will result in a successful outcome (the patient making the 
morally correct choice to repent), and which healing treatments will not have a successful 
                                                          
591 Phil 27.4 (Lewis 228, emphasis added; SC 226, 278-280). 
592 Another example can be found in ComRm IX.3 (Scheck 2.206; Bammel 729): Here Origen 
notes that God gives grace for three reasons – sometimes God gives grace as a response to some effort on 
our part, sometimes God gives grace simply because “it will benefit”, and sometimes the Spirit simply 
allots grace where he wills to. Speaking about the second kind of grace, where God gives grace for that 
which benefits, Origen states that “…it can also come to pass that even if the measure of faith in someone 
is great enough to merit receiving a higher grace, if the Holy Spirit, when it looks into the future, judges 
that it will not benefit the recipient, he inevitably apportions it to each one as he wills and as is beneficial. 
After all, we observe that many have received the grace of teaching or exhorting the people and, having 
become puffed up because of this and having turned to arrogance, have fallen into the judgment of the 
devil” (emphasis mine). Origen describes the Holy Spirit looking into the future and judging that a certain 
grace will not benefit the recipient. Yet, Origen cannot mean that the Holy Spirit looks into what is 






outcome (the patient making a morally evil choice and refusing to repent). This is 
knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom – God foreknows how the 
creature would freely respond to a set of circumstances that could potentially occur in a 
possible future. This allows God to discover, as it were, that healing one person slowly 
would eventually result in success, while healing another person at the same speed would 
only make them worse. And so, based on this knowledge God heals one person slowly 
and another with great alacrity.593 
How does God possess this third type of foreknowledge of what people would 
freely do in any given hypothetical situation? Here it is important to remember the 
mechanism by which Origen understands God to have even simple foreknowledge. The 
mechanism is not that God is outside of time (or timeless), and on that account he has 
knowledge of all events as if they were always present to God in his timelessness.594 If 
that were the case, then God’s simple foreknowledge would not need to stem from his 
predictive powers, but from his timeless, observational powers. If God knows the entire 
future timeline because he is eternally present at all points in the timeline, then no 
predictive powers would be needed. If this were true, however, it could not account for 
God’s middle knowledge, for it is not possible to observe a hypothetical event (given that 
the event never occurs in history); this explanation would not clarify how God has the 
additional knowledge of hypothetical contingent choices. Instead, as we have shown 
above in the example of Judas, Origen grounds God’s simple foreknowledge on God’s 
                                                          
593 The clearest example from Origen that demonstrates divine knowledge of the counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom is found in Origen’s exegesis of Pharaoh’s hardened heart. This will be discussed 
below. Cf. Chapter 3 for analysis of God’s strategic use of punishments (including abandonment). God’s 
main purpose in administering punishment is to lead the sinner to genuine self-awareness, and sometimes 
God must allow the sinner to increase in evil and misery in order for the sinner to reach the critical point 
where introspection takes place. 
594 This is all the more important to recognize given that Origen did believe in God’s timelessness. 





ability to deduce what people will choose on the basis of what their future disposition and 
character will look like. As such, God has simple foreknowledge because of his 
predictive powers – powers which God possesses given God’s comprehensive knowledge 
of his creatures, including their characters, habits, rationality, and so on.595 God knows 
each individual so intimately that God knows what each one will freely choose in every 
future situation. But, this same ability allows God to have a third type of knowledge; God 
also knows what each person would freely choose in any hypothetical or imaginary 
future.596  
                                                          
595 Koch had also recognized that Origen believed divine foreknowledge was made possible by 
God’s awareness of each creature’s character and intellect: “Gott hat ein so umfassendes und 
durchgreifendes Wissen von seinem Geschöpf, dass er im voraus weiss, wie jeder Einzelne seine Freiheit 
benutzen will; von diesem Wissen aus richtet er seine Vorsehungslenkung ein, sodass dieselbe genau den 
freien Handlungen der Menschen entspricht, und jedem Einzelnen gerade die Erziehung zuteil wird, 
welcher er bedarf” – Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum 
Platonismus: 288. However, Koch only recognized the first two types of divine foreknowledge in Origen’s 
theology – foreknowledge of future free actions, as well as foreknowledge of alternate possibilities (115-
116). E.g.: “Selbst löst er die Schwierigkeit, indem er anschaulich darstellt, wie Gottes Verfahren gewesen 
ist: am Anfang der Schöpfung musterte er jedes der kommenden Geschöpfe, sah, dass sie in jener Situation 
so handeln würden, und wenn dies geschah, so tun würden. Also weiss er, was geschehen wird, ohne aber 
die Ursache zu sein, so wie einer, der sieht, dass ein anderer unbesonnen und eigenwillig einen glatten und 
gefährlichen Weg einschlägt, darum nicht an seinem Fall schuld ist, weil er im voraus eingesehen hat, dass 
der Betreffende fallen muss” (116). Because he does not recognize the third type, Koch describes God 
more as a reactor to future free choices, rather than as an architect of future free choices. This also 
prohibits Koch from explaining precisely how Origen can believe in a guaranteed universal salvation, for 
there is nothing about God’s providential reaction to foreseen choices which could guarantee everyone’s 
eventual repentance. Koch must instead rely on the fact that all creatures are rational, and God should 
therefore be able to persuade every one of the truth. Hence, he calls Origen an “optimist” – “Dass die 
Erziehung wirklich gelingen wird, dass die Menschen – und dasselbe gilt den übrigen λογικὰ ζῷα – nicht 
beharren werden, Gott zu trotzen und sich fortzuwenden, sondern dass sie aus eigenem, freiem Willen 
zuletzt das Gute wählen werden, davon ist Origenes überzeugt. Er ist entschieden Optimist. Dies hängt 
damit zusammen, dass das Geschöpf nicht nur frei, sondern zugleich vernünftig, λογικόν ist, dass es am 
Logos Anteil hat” (32). 
596 We should remember that Origen is able to hold this view because he does not follow 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ view of moral autonomy. Alexander had said that genuine moral autonomy 
requires the absolute capability to act otherwise than how one acted – which can only be possible if one’s 
choices are not caused by one’s character and intellect. That is to say, Alexander insisted that a choice 
could never be fully predictable, because a choice is not dictated by the person’s current disposition and 
rationality. He insisted that a person could even choose to act in ways that do not seem reasonable to him. 
Of course, this view appears to make divine foreknowledge of future contingent events impossible, and so 
Alexander insisted that although God might foreknow that it is possible for an agent to do a thing or not do 
it, God cannot know if the agent will do it or not – R. W. Sharples, "Alexander of Aphrodisias, de fato: 
some parallels," The Classical Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1978): 261. Origen does not agree with this. One’s 





Now that I have distinguished between the three types of divine foreknowledge 
that Origen attributes to God, I can explain how these categories allow him to solve the 
so-called paradox between God’s infallible plan to save everyone, and the fact that 
salvation requires an unforced and voluntary consent from each person. We saw in 
Chapter 1 that many scholars have concluded that Origen lapses into inconsistency on 
this point. Many others have declared that Origen’s universalism logically undercuts his 
teaching on moral autonomy, and so on those grounds they feel justified in declaring that 
Origen must not have believed in a certain universal salvation at all. On the contrary, 
Origen’s teachings regarding universalism and moral autonomy fit together smoothly 
once filtered through Origen’s understanding of the three types of divine foreknowledge 
(especially the 3rd type – God’s so-called middle knowledge). 
 
Synthesis: God Preselects and Prearranges Only the Set of Free Choices  
That Leads to the Apocatastasis 
  
Origen teaches that God constructed and ordered a plan of salvation-history 
before the creation of any souls. As such, Origen’s universalism is not a historical 
accident, but it is an event foreordained by God, which God then infallibly actuates in 
history. God’s foreknowledge was not static (it was not merely God’s observation or 
prediction of what would take place), but it played an active role. As I pointed out in 
Chapter 3, in a certain sense God’s foreknowledge can be called dynamic and strategic.597 
This needs to be clarified. We may recall that Origen believes that at “no time 
whatever was God not Creator, nor Benefactor, nor Providence [neque conditor neque 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Thus, if God has comprehensive knowledge of a soul’s character, God can foreknow with certainty how 
such a soul would react. 





beneficus neque prouidens].”598 The interesting consequence of this view is that a “pre-
figuration” and “pre-formation” of creatures has always existed in the Wisdom of God, 
even from all eternity, for only in this way may God timelessly be “Creator.”599 
Additionally, Origen says that there was “no moment whatever when that power was not 
engaged in acts of well-doing [benefica bene faceret].”600 Thus, Origen leads us to the 
remarkable idea that from all eternity and before any creation, God was “always 
dispensing his blessings among [his pre-formed creatures] by doing them good in 
accordance with their condition and deserts.”601 Given that the creatures did not yet exist 
outside of God’s own mind (Wisdom), in what way could God be blessing them? The 
answer is that God was actively dispensing blessings upon all rational souls through his 
foreknowledge and planning. The first blessing God bestowed on his pre-formed 
creatures was his plan to eventually create them in the first place.602 God’s second 
blessing for his creatures was his decision to foreordain their future salvation (his 
unilateral decision to not let them perish).603 The third blessing God bestowed upon them 
was his strategic arrangement of their moral autonomy in such a way that his decision 
would infallibly be realized. 
Origen describes this primordial activity with active verbs that are best 
transmitted into English as God’s “ordering”, “fashioning,” “planning”, “arranging,” and 
                                                          
598 PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170). 
599 PArch 1.4.5 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 172). Cf. PArch 1.2.2-3 (Butterworth 16; SC 252, 112-
116). 
600 PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170).  
601 PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170). 
602 ComRm IV.5.13-18 (Scheck 1.259; Bammel 300): “Plainly it is a gift of God that we exist; it is 
the grace [gratia] of the Creator who willed us to exist.” 
603 Origen believed that if God had left creatures alone all would have perished – PArch 3.5.6 
(Butterworth 242; SC 268, 228): “…so in the last times, when the end of the world was near at hand and 





“governing.”604 The ordering and arranging that was taking place in God’s 
foreknowledge was centered upon God’s infallible decision to restore every sinful 
creature. Since God would never violate moral autonomy, God’s unspeakable wisdom 
had to concoct a complex plan for a future timeline which would result in the 
foreordained apocatastasis. This helps to illuminate the ideas expressed in the passages 
we have reviewed above. For example:  
God, the parent of all things, in providing for the salvation of his entire 
creation through the unspeakable plan of his word and wisdom, has so 
ordered everything that each spirit or soul, or whatever else rational 
existences ought to be called, should not be compelled by force against its 




…or what the divine wisdom sees as it looks into these men or what 
movements of theirs will lead God to arrange all these things thus, is 
known to God alone and to his only-begotten Son, through whom all 
things were created and restored…606 
 
When Origen speaks about the divine wisdom looking at the character and moral 
psychology of each creature, Origen is envisioning this taking place in God’s 
foreknowledge before each creature is alive. God not only foreknew each of them, but he 
also foreknew their contingent choices.607 God foreknew that every creature would 
choose to fall away from him,608 and so God foreordained a plan to save each one by 
                                                          
604 Terms already mentioned above are: διοίκησιν; κατατεταχέναι; dispenset (or dispensasse). At 
Phil 23.10 Origen also uses οἰκονομῶν (referring to God’s οἰκονομία): “Thus it is that God Who ordereth 
[οἰκονομῶν] all things for the best, with good reason hides the future from our eyes” (Lewis 183; SC 226, 
162). 
605 PArch 2.1.2 (Butterworth 77, emphasis added; SC 252, 236-238). 
606 PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 243-44, emphasis added; SC 268, 232-234). 
607 Cf. PArch 1.2.3 (Butterworth 16; SC 252, 114): “[wisdom] fashions beforehand and contains 
within herself the species and causes of the entire creation…” 
608 E.g. PArch 4.4.8 (Butterworth 325; SC 268, 422): “…since, then, as we have said, rational 
nature is changeable and convertible, so of necessity God had foreknowledge of the differences that were to 





using his intimate knowledge of each one’s moral psychology. And here is where God’s 
third type of knowledge comes into focus. In his foreknowledge God imagined all of the 
possible hypothetical situations in which his creatures could find themselves throughout 
history. Because God has knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, God 
knew how each of his not-yet-created creatures would freely respond to any one of a 
near-infinite state of affairs. God’s Wisdom canvassed through a near-infinite amount of 
possible future timelines, and on the basis of this knowledge, God then constructed a 
specific universe and timeline that would feature exactly the arrangement that would be 
successful for each soul. For example, perhaps 99.9% of possible futures for the man 
named Saul would lead to an outcome where Saul chooses to remain God’s enemy 
forever. But God figured out the one scenario which he knew would infallibly result in 
Saul freely choosing to repent, and therefore God included those variables into his 
primordial plan of salvation.609 As a result, Saul would be forced to confront the 
                                                          
609 Origen never speculates as to how many different arrangements might include the salvation of 
all people, but he clearly thinks that in many cases God must find ways to overcome incredible feats of 
stubbornness by practically dragging people (albeit voluntarily) into the Kingdom of Heaven. This is why 
Origen will occasionally use stark language, such as when he refers to people who must be “pressed into 
salvation and whose conversion is as it were compelled and extorted” – PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 243-44; 
SC 268, 232-234). But this also leads to a follow-up question: why must there be at least one possible 
future arrangement for each creature, in which they will reach the apocatastasis through their free choices? 
In other words, why is it not possible that God might discover that in the case of some individuals (e.g. the 
devil) there is no possible future circumstances or possible future timeline in which they will choose to 
repent, given how far they fell in the first fall? After all, this would coincide with Origen’s Stoic 
framework, for the Stoics acknowledged that moral progress for an utterly vicious character might be 
impossible (under Stoic character-determinism). I believe two answers may be offered here. The first 
answer to this question lies in the fact that Origen superimposed a tripartite anthropology onto the Stoic 
mechanism of choice. More specifically, Origen taught that the positive desires/impressions which 
originate from the spiritual aspect of the person is a permanent feature of every person’s personality. It 
cannot be tainted nor convicted: ComRm II.7.48-52: “And so I perceive here such great freedom [of 
conscience] that indeed it is constantly rejoicing and exulting in good works but is never convicted of evil 
deeds [Quia ergo tantam eius uideo libertatem quae in bonis quidem gestis gaudeat semper et exultet, in 
malis uero non]” (Scheck 2.133; Bammel 137). Thus, no matter how vicious a character might become, 
there is at least some part of the agent which desires to make the correct choice. God is able to find those 
situations where (with God’s external assistance) the motivating power of the spirit’s desires outweigh the 
motivating power of the body’s desires, even if in the majority of cases the agent’s bodily impressions are 





conditions necessary to elicit voluntary repentance. To be clear, God does not force Saul 
to make the choice, but God does manipulate Saul into the position where he will make 
the free choice.610 
Clearly, this means that God exercises a certain measure of control over moral 
autonomy, at least in the sense that God gets to make the final choice of each person’s 
destiny out of the near-infinite possible destinies they could have otherwise arrived at. 
God gets to choose which arrangement to actualize and which ones to ignore. But 
although God enjoys this control over moral autonomy, it is nevertheless true that God 
does not violate moral autonomy at any given moment of choice – in every instance that a 
person exercises their moral autonomy in actual history, it is based on their own rational 
impressions and the motion of their own soul (their assent). God does not force anyone to 
make their choices in the moments when they make them, but God does insist upon a 
particular future timeline to the exclusion of all others. Only the possible free choices 
God’s foreknowledge preselects get included into his arrangement of salvation-history, 
and are therefore actuated in history. All other possible free choices are set aside, never to 
be actualized. 
The amount of complexity involved in the arrangement to save an individual soul 
is staggering. And this is exponentially so when one considers that God will only actuate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
any number of creatures that he wants, yet God decided to only create the amount of creatures which could 
be sufficiently governed by his providence (see the discussion immediately following). 
610 Origen is explicit on the point that moral autonomy cannot claim any control over prior causes 
and situations – e.g. Phil 23.11 (Lewis 184; SC 226, 164-66): “That, however, many things for which we 
are responsible are caused by a multitude of things for which we are not responsible, even we will allow; if 
they had not occurred, the things I mean for which we are not responsible, certain things for which we are 
responsible would not have been done; but they have been done in consequence of precedent events for 
which we are not responsible, though it was possible for us on the basis of the past to have acted otherwise 
than we did. If any one would have our Free Will detached from everything else, so as to make our 
voluntary choices independent of the changes and chances of life, he has forgotten that he is a part of the 





a future timeline which will save every rational soul. So, for example, out of a billion, 
billion possible futures for the soul named Saul, perhaps in only four-hundred of these 
would Saul ever repent and be saved. Perhaps in all the other possible futures Saul would 
choose to remain an enemy of God forever. But God cannot simply actuate any one of 
those four-hundred possible arrangements, because God must also ensure every other 
soul’s salvation as well. Indeed, there might even be only one future timeline in which 
every soul will repent and ascend to God through their free choice(s). Such complexity 
explains Origen’s frequent descriptions of the “unspeakable skill of God’s Wisdom,” and 
the “unspeakable skill of his plan” when God “binds and holds together all the diversity 
of the world and guides the various motions to the accomplishment of one task.”611 This 
might also help explain Origen’s curious teaching concerning the limits of divine 
Providence in First Principles 2.9.1. In the Latin, Rufinus tones down Origen’s remarks 
about providence when he says that “in the beginning God made as large a number of 
rational and intelligent beings . . . as he foresaw would be sufficient.”612 But in the Greek 
Origen states: 
In the beginning, as we contemplate it, God created by an act of his will as 
large a number of intelligent beings as he could control. For we must 
maintain that even the power of God is finite, and we must not, under 
pretext of praising him, lose sight of his limitations. For if the divine 
power were infinite, of necessity it could not even understand itself, since 
the infinite is by its nature incomprehensible. He made therefore just as 
many as he could grasp and keep in hand and subject to his providence.613 
 
                                                          
611 PArch 2.1.2 (Butterworth 77; SC 252, 236-238). 
612 PArch 2.9.1 (Butterworth 129; SC 252, 352). 
613 PArch 2.9.1 Greek (Butterworth 129, emphasis mine). The passage comes from a Greek 
fragment, identified in the Butterworth edition as: Frag. 24 Koetschau, from Justinian Ep. Ad Mennam 
(Mansi IX. 489 and 525) – Butterworth 129n1. Unlike some other passages from Justinian, this one sounds 





Origen justifies any limitation on God’s power by suggesting that infinite power is 
illogical (an argument found elsewhere in Greek philosophy).614 However, Origen brings 
up the topic of God’s limitations specifically in his discussion of God’s providential 
control of rational creatures (which, for Origen, is identical with God’s universal plan of 
salvation). This is merely a suggestion, but if I am correct then Rufinus had no cause to 
be embarrassed by Origen’s mention of God’s limitation here, and this is because any 
limitation is self-imposed. Theoretically, God could have created more rational souls, but 
it could be that if there were too many then there would be no hypothetical future 
timeline which would guarantee a voluntary salvation for everyone. Each introduction of 
a new rational soul into the equation would make it that much more difficult to discover a 
possible future where the interactions between each soul and God (as well as between 
each soul and other souls) successfully reaches the apocatastasis. Thus, God’s limitation 
may be nothing more than God’s decision to only create souls that he knew he could 
infallibly bring to salvation. 
 Now that we have a better understanding of Origen’s view of divine 
foreknowledge and how it takes an active role in arranging creaturely moral autonomy, 
we will look at two final passages which illustrate and tie together many of features we 
have already discussed. The first comes from Origen’s treatise on prayer: 
PEuch 6.3 and 7, Greer 94, 96-97 (GCS II, 313.1-15; 316.4-8) 
[Prior to this passage Origen defends the notion of moral autonomy, praise 
and blame, against fatalists and predestinarians.] If then our freedom [ἐφ 
ἡμῖν] is preserved, however vast the number of inclinations [ἀπονεύσεις] it 
has to virtue or to vice and, again, to what is becoming or to what is 
unbecoming, it [our ἐφ ἡμῖν], along with everything else from creation and 
from the foundation of the world (cf. Rom. 1:20), will be known to God 
                                                          
614 Origen also elaborates upon God’s limitations in a philosophical or logical sense in Cels III.70 





before it comes to be for what sort of freedom it will be [πρὶν γένηται, τῷ 
θεῷ ἔγνωσται . . . ὁποῖον ἔσται]. And among all the things God foreordains 
in accordance with what He has seen concerning each deed of our freedom 
[ἑκάστου ἔργου ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν], there has been foreordained according to merit 
[ἀξίαν] for each motion of our freedom [ἑκάτῳ κινήματι τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν] 
what will meet it from providence and still cohere with the chain of future 
events. And so, God’s foreknowledge is not the cause of everything that 
will come to be, even of our freedom when we are made active by our own 
impulse [ὁρμὴν]. For even if we entertain the supposition that God does 
not know what will come to be, we do not for this reason lose the power of 
acting in different ways and of willing [θελήσειν] certain things. But if God 
takes the order for the governance of the universe from His 
foreknowledge, then all the more is our individual freedom useful for the 
ordering of the world [πλέον δὲ απὸ τῆς προγνώσεως γίνεται τὸ κατάταξιν 
λαμβάνειν εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς διοίκησιν χρειώδη τῇ τοῦ κόσμου καταστάσει 
τὸ ἑκάστου ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν]… (PEuch 7) Now that we have said that God uses 
the freedom [ἐφ ἡμῖν] of each of us on earth and has ordered 
[κατατεταχέναι]615 our freedom aright for some benefit to those on earth. 
We must suppose that the same conclusion applies to the freedom of the 
sun, the moon, and the stars…616 
 
It is typical for Origen to say that God foreknows our free choices. But in this passage 
Origen goes further. He says that even our inclinations are foreknown by God, regardless 
of whether we end up assenting to them or not – our ἀπονεύσεις are known by God 
before all creation for “what sort of freedom it will be.” This means that God foreknows 
our possible free choices as well as our actual free choices. God chooses to arrange a 
particular order of the future timeline on the basis of his foreknowledge of individual 
freedom (ἐφ ἡμῖν). Specifically, God bases his arrangement of the future around two 
ideas. First, the arrangement is based around individual merit (ἀξίαν). For example, 
rewards and punishments are both motivating tools that can bring people to voluntary 
repentance. But God does not distribute these in a purely utilitarian manner; God prefers 
                                                          
615 Or “has appointed/arranged” or even “has governed” (perfect, active, infinitive of κατατάσσω). 





to mete out pedagogical methods on the basis of what people deserve. God is not only 
good, he is also just.617  
And second, God bases his arrangement around his goal of universal salvation. 
Admittedly, in this text the concept is not mentioned explicitly: Origen uses the more 
cautious remark that God “uses the individual freedom [ἐφ ἡμῖν] of each of us on earth 
and has ordered [κατατεταχέναι] our freedom aright for some benefit to those on earth.” 
Of course, the most important benefit that providence is supervising for those on earth is 
their final salvation, as Origen states in many other places. To understand why Origen is 
not more explicit in this passage we must remember the context of the discussion at this 
point in On Prayer. Leading up to this passage, Origen has been arguing against Christian 
fatalists and Christian predestinarians. We may remember from our analysis of this 
faction in Chapter 2 that the Christian predestinarians taught that one’s final salvation 
was necessitated by God, and that God’s decision could not be altered by anything his 
creatures might do (that is to say, they preached a form of fatalism). As such, any 
discussions about God’s foreordained universal salvation here by Origen would have 
complicated his arguments and confused his readers. It would have been counter-
productive to his main argument, as he would have found himself needing to divert the 
topic into a lengthy discussion about the difference between events that will certainly 
happen, and events that will happen by necessity. For these reasons, Origen chose not to 
draw attention to universal salvation in this passage, and yet he used theological 
                                                          
617 PArch 2.9.6 (Butterworth 134; SC 252, 364-66): “This, as we have said before, was the cause 
of the diversity among rational creatures, a cause that takes its origin not from the will or judgment of the 
Creator, but from the decision of the creature’s own freedom. God, however, who then felt it just to arrange 
his creation according to merit, gathered the diversities of minds into the harmony of a single world…” 
Similarly, Origen writes that “the variety of arrangement has been instituted by God as a result of previous 





shorthand, as it were, to allude to the idea: God orders the possible uses of our freedom 
for the benefit of the world.   
 The final passage I would like to bring forward is arguably the most powerful 
illustration and demonstration of my argument. Origen’s description of how God plans to 
save Pharaoh ties together the different threads we have discussed in this chapter. The 
following passage from First Principles is part of Origen’s larger explanation as to how 
we should understand God’s hardening of Pharaoh’s heart: 
PArch 3.1.13-14 (Greek), Butterworth 181-82, 185 (SC 268; 76-86) 
The man who is abandoned is abandoned therefore by the divine 
judgment, and towards certain sinners God is longsuffering, not without 
reason, but because in regard to the immortality of the soul and the eternal 
world it will be to their advantage that they should not be helped quickly 
to salvation but should be brought to it more slowly after having 
experienced many ills . . . In the same way [as a physician] God, who 
knows the secrets of the heart [τὰ κρύφια τῆς χαρδίας] and foreknows the 
future, perhaps in his longsuffering allows the hidden evil to remain while 
he draws it out by means of external circumstances, with the objective of 
purifying him who owing to carelessness has received into himself the 
seeds of sin, that having vomited them out when they come to the surface 
the sinner, even though he has proceeded far in evil deeds, may in the end 
be able to obtain purification after his evil life and be renewed. For God 
deals with souls not in view of fifty years, so to speak, of our life here, but 
in view of the endless world . . . (3.1.14) For souls are, so to speak, 
innumerable, and their habits are innumerable, and equally so are their 
movements, their purposes, their inclinations and their impulses, of which 
there is only one perfect superintendent [ὧν εἷς μόνος οἰκονόμος ἄριστος], 
who has full knowledge both of the times and the appropriate aids and the 
paths and the ways, namely, the God and Father of the universe.618 
 
This is one of the clearest examples Origen gives of God’s knowledge of the 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. God does not simply foreknow what Pharaoh will 
do in the future. Nor does God merely foreknow the things Pharaoh could have done 
differently at any point in his future (e.g. God’s foreknowledge that Pharaoh could have 
                                                          





repented after each subsequent plague). God also foreknows how Pharaoh would freely 
respond in any hypothetical and unrealized scenario. We may draw this conclusion by 
looking at the logic behind God’s strategy to save Pharaoh: “it will be to their advantage 
that they should not be helped quickly to salvation…”619 When God was determining how 
to infallibly bring Pharaoh to repentance, God looked at a near-infinite amount of 
possible strategies he could employ. God saw what the outcome would be if Pharaoh was 
brought to repentance early, and what the outcome would be if Pharaoh was brought to 
repentance late (and presumably at all points in-between). God discovered through his 
“middle knowledge” that if Pharaoh was brought to repentance too early it would result 
in a future timeline where Pharaoh would not make the necessary sequence of choices to 
be saved in the end. Because of Pharaoh’s unique disposition, motives and impressions, 
God foresaw that in order to bring about Pharaoh’s voluntary and lasting repentance, he 
must first abandon Pharaoh for a time. It is true that God knew that abandoning Pharaoh 
in this instance would motivate Pharaoh to commit even greater sin in the short-term. 
Nevertheless, only through this abandonment would Pharaoh eventually reach a 
disposition where he would freely choose to repent and be saved in a lasting way.620 For 
Pharaoh, this moment would occur after his death in the afterlife.621 Consequently, before 
all creation when God was arranging his plan, God included within his economy of 
                                                          
619 Cf. PEuch 29.16 (Greer 160; GCS II,391.5-10): “Set beside this the question whether God 
hardened Pharaoh’s heart so that he might be able to say what he did when no longer hardened, ‘The Lord 
is in the right, and I and my people are in the wrong’. Nevertheless, he needed to be hardened still more and 
suffer still more, lest by ceasing from the hardening too quickly he should despise the hardening as an evil 
and deserve to be hardened many times more.” 
620 PArch 3.1.17 (Butterworth 191-192; SC 268, 102-104): “…they had not yet fulfilled the 
appropriate time in which to be themselves abandoned by the divine superintendence and to be filled more 
and more with the particular evils whose seeds they had sown and then afterwards to be called to a more 
enduring repentance, such as would prevent them from quickly falling again into the sins into which they 
had previously fallen…” 
621 We must remember that Origen places special importance on the continuation of the moral 





salvation the specific set of future circumstances that God knew would infallibly lead to 
Pharaoh’s free decision to repent at a specific point in the future. And God similarly 
made sure that Pharaoh was never given the opportunity to perform the sequence of free 
choices that would lead to Pharaoh’s ultimate destruction. 
When God’s strategy is understood, it is clear that God’s abandonment of Pharaoh 
is both punishment and grace. We may recall from the above passage in On Prayer that 
Origen believes God bases his foreordained arrangement of salvation-history on two 
things: merit and universal salvation. Both aspects are illuminated here in the example of 
Pharaoh. Pharaoh merited God’s abandonment – it was a commensurate punishment for 
his sin (“abandoned therefore by the divine judgment”). But at the same time, even this 
punishment was tailor-designed by God to infallibly and unswervingly lead to Pharaoh’s 
free choice to repent and be saved at a specific moment in Pharaoh’s future. Thus, God’s 
abandonment of Pharaoh is a feature of saving grace in Origen’s theology. It was a 
necessary part of Pharaoh’s conversion story, for without this manner of “healing” 
Pharaoh would not have reached the apocatastasis. In Origen’s words: 
In dealing with such persons, therefore, the eternal God, the perceiver of 
secret things, who knows all things before they come to be, in his 
goodness refrains from sending them the quicker help and, if I may say so, 
helps them by not helping them, since this course is for their profit.622 
 
God’s abandonment was foreordained grace.623 In a manner of speaking it is true that 
God “caused” Pharaoh to sin, but only in the sense that God set up a situation which he 
                                                          
622 PArch 3.1.17 Greek (Butterworth 191; SC 268, 100-102). 
623 Origen explicitly describes radical strategies such as abandonment and even the hiding of his 
word from people as part of God’s plan of grace and salvation. E.g. PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 244; SC 268, 
234): “But how, consistently with the preservation of free will in all rational creatures, each person ought to 
be dealt with, that is…who they are from whom the word is utterly hidden and who are destined [dispenset] 
to be far away from the hearing of it…” (emphasis mine). Also PArch 3.1.17 Greek (Butterworth 191; SC 
268, 102): “[Those who] were foreseen by the Saviour, according to our supposition, as being not likely to 





foreknew would increase Pharaoh’s (temporary) obstinacy. Pharaoh’s choice was still his 
own. God makes use of evil choices in his arrangement so that even they will directly 
contribute to the soul’s eventual restoration.624 
 This understanding of God’s active role in the superintendence of creaturely 
moral autonomy reinforces our claim in the last chapter that everything that God does 
through his providence should be recognized as grace – that is, according to Origen 
everything that God does is a divine gift that facilitates our healing and salvation. This 
includes teaching and rewards, as well as threats and punishments. It is the answer to the 
question of human suffering, par excellence.625 God does not use these pedagogical tools 
simply because people deserve them; God uses them because he has foreordained a 
specific plan of salvation (customized down to an individual level) by which God 
infallibly enforces his decision to save every soul. This is the unspeakable plan of God’s 
love and God’s Wisdom. It is unspeakable in scope and in complexity. It reaches all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
were therefore destined [ᾠκονομῆσθαι] by the Lord not to hear the deeper teachings more clearly, less after 
having quickly turned and been healed by obtaining forgiveness they should despise the wounds of their 
wickedness as being slight and easy of cure and should very quickly fall into them again.” 
624 Cf. Cels IV.70 (Chadwick 239; SC 136, 356): “I will say that while God preserves the free will 
[ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν] of each man He makes use of the evil of bad men for the ordering of the whole, making them 
useful to the universe; yet such a man is none the less guilty, and as such he has been appointed to perform 
a function which is repulsive to the individual but beneficial to the whole.” HomNum 14.2.1 (Scheck 80; 
SC 442, 164-166): “In the meantime we ourselves say that by a certain dispensation [dispensatione] and by 
the wisdom of God, things in this world are arranged in such a way that absolutely nothing escapes God’s 
purposes, whether it is evil or good. But let us explain what we are saying more clearly. God did not make 
evil; yet, though he was able to prohibit its being invented by others, he does not prohibit it, but he uses it 
for necessary causes [necessarias causas] with those very ones who are its source.” Citations from 
Origen’s Homilies on Numbers are from the newest critical edition: Doutreleau, Origène: Homélies sur les 
Nombres, 1, 2, 3. English translations are from Scheck, Homilies on Numbers: Origen. 
625 I wish to qualify my remark here. The Stoic answer to individual suffering is that God's 
Providence directed the world in the best possible way for the whole, and that this sometimes has ill effects 
(such as suffering) for individuals. God was able to use and incorporate these individual evils for the good 
of the whole – Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa," 38. Origen uses a similar argument when 
defending providence: “But evils which are few in comparison with the orderly arrangement of the universe 
have been the consequence of the works which were His primary intention, just as spiral shavings and 
sawdust are a consequence of the primary works of a carpenter…” – Cels VI.55 (Chadwick 372; SC 147, 
318). While most suffering appears to be an intentional part of the providential plan to save each sinner, 
Origen does leave a bit of room for some undeserved suffering as well that arises as a consequence of the 





things, includes all things, and intertwines all things into one complete plan of grace. And 
Origen believes that it is God’s goal to gradually reveal this unspeakable plan to his 
creatures so that one day they might finally realize that everything has been about grace 
the entire time: 
[When each soul is ascending towards God after death] He will learn the 
judgment of divine providence about each individual thing; about things 
which happen to men, that they happen not by chance or accident, but by a 
reason so carefully thought out, and so high above us, that it does not 
overlook even the number of hairs of our head, and that not of the saints 




Origen frequently describes God as the supremely wise doctor who is in charge of 
restoring all people back to perfect health. By necessity and design, doctors always 
administer their healing arts on an individual and personalized basis. Every disease is 
different, and so every cure must be different; the cure that works for one person might 
act as poison pill for another. God knows in advance which cure each person needs. 
When we put this Origenistic metaphor into the language of moral autonomy, we see that 
God foreknows how each soul’s disposition and character would freely respond to any 
hypothetical situation. In the primordial past God used this knowledge to discover what 
situations and stimuli would cause each soul to respond in the correct way such that they 
would eventually reach complete restoration. God then actuated a future timeline that 
made his prearrangement a reality. At every moment of choice moral autonomy is 
upheld, given that the soul makes the choice in the presence of competing rational 
desires, and God does not make the choice on the soul’s behalf. At the same time, 
                                                          





however, God does unswervingly bring about the situation which the soul needs to make 
the correct choice. This foreordained healing strategy is made explicit by Origen when he 
explains the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart. God knew in advance that the only way 
Pharaoh would freely repent and be saved in a lasting way would be to experience a 
season of abandonment by God. Therefore, the very same God who loved Pharaoh more 
than any other, also intentionally manipulated Pharaoh’s circumstances so that Pharaoh 
would fall deeper into temporary sin – much as doctors might cause temporary harm to 







AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
A large segment of modern scholarship on Origen has done him a disservice by 
insisting that Origen’s universalism undercuts his teachings on moral autonomy. At best, 
those few scholars who have tried to defend both aspects of Origen’s theology do not 
appear to understand how they fit together in Origen’s thought. Ramelli and Tzamalikos 
are outlier examples of scholars who have argued for specific solutions, but they are the 
wrong solutions. Origen was aware of the potential threat to moral autonomy (in the form 
of moral fatalism) posed by an infallible and foreordained universal salvation. This was 
the reason he chose to hide this teaching from most of his students and readers. But 
Origen believed he had a solution which relied on a nuanced understanding of God’s 
foreknowledge. Because freedom of choice depends on a person’s character, disposition 
and intellect in the moment of choice, Origen believed that God is able to foreknow each 
person’s future free choices. On the same basis, Origen believed that God must also be 
able to foreknow how a person would freely choose to respond in any hypothetical state 
of affairs, whether or not those affairs ever come to pass in history. Thus, through his 
imaginative foreknowledge (or “middle knowledge”) God discovered what situation each 
future soul needed to find itself in so that it would freely accept God’s instruction and 
advance towards beatitude. Based on his collective foreknowledge regarding every soul, 
God prearranged and fashioned a future timeline of salvation-history in which each soul 
would inescapably find itself in the exact conditions necessary for their voluntary 





ability to infallibly achieve universal salvation, despite the fact that salvation is dependent 
upon the contingent choices of creatures. This is what elevates Origen’s belief in 
universal salvation beyond a mere hope or naïve optimism. 
There are several implications of this research. First, and most importantly, this 
research fixes the incorrect narrative found in scholarship today that Origen’s doctrines of 
divine providence and human moral autonomy stand opposed, contradictory or 
inconsistent. Similarly, this research critiques those scholars who have redefined Origen’s 
universalism as merely his “hope” that all might eventually be saved – a redefinition that 
has typically gone hand-in-hand with the view that Origen was inconsistent or 
contradictory on these points. 
A second implication of this research is that it allows for better nuance for 
scholars who wish to parade Origen as the quintessential theologian of “free will” in the 
early church. This research should temper and refine some of the more sweeping claims, 
for I have demonstrated that Origen understands God to exercise a measure of control and 
authority over human moral autonomy that seems to have gone unrealized. After all, God 
makes a unilateral decision, in advance, as to which of the possible free choices of his 
creatures he will allow to come into existence, and which of the possible free choices he 
will not allow to be performed. God necessarily rejects the overwhelming majority of the 
free decisions his creatures could have or would have made, given that most of these are 
inappropriate or ill-suited for inclusion into God’s best possible arrangement. Once 
understood, this nuanced view calls into question claims like that of B. Darrell Jackson. 
Jackson wrote that the following Platonic description of divine providence “could have 





. . . seeing that a soul in its successive conjunction first with one body and 
then with another, runs the whole gamut of change through its own action 
or that of some other soul, no labor is left for the mover of pieces but this – 
to shift the character that is becoming better to a better place, and that 
which is getting worse to a worser, each according to its due, that each 
may meet with its proper doom.627 
 
Such a static description of God’s oversight of creaturely moral autonomy is wrong. 
Ironically, Jackson’s view is both too optimistic and too pessimistic: it is too optimistic 
because Origen does not believe that souls are able to progress without constant divine 
aid, and it is too pessimistic for this description would allow the possibility for some 
souls to be in a state of flux forever, and never arrive back to God.  
More recently, Alfons Fürst has similarly portrayed Origen’s teachings on free 
choice as if God is merely a bystander who must continually react to his creature’s 
choices without any ability to foreordain outcomes.628 Mark Scott also grants too much 
power to Origen’s view of moral autonomy with his remarkable claim that each soul 
                                                          
627 Jackson, "Sources of Origen's Doctrine of Freedom," 16-17 (italics mine). Jackson identifies 
the text as: “903d, trans. from Plato, The Collected Dialogues, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns 
(eds.) (New York: Random House, Inc., 1961), p. 1459.” 
628 Fürst writes: “In Origen’s radical concept of freedom, freedom is not simply an anthropological 
reality, but the signature of creation as a whole . . . According to the actions following from the decisions of 
our free will, history will develop, and the universe will go on in as many worlds as necessary according to 
our decisions. God will wait until the last creature uses his freedom according to his true essence (i.e., in a 
good manner, and not a bad one), and all saints, the prophets and apostles, will wait as well until the last 
sinner has turned to God. Thus, all depends on how we act, and by this, our freedom and God’s freedom are 
ensured . . . According to Origen, man is neither drawn by fate nor by God’s will” – Alfons Fürst, "Origen's 
Legacy to Modern Thinking about Freedom and Autonomy," in Origeniana Undecima: Origen and 
Origenism in the History of Western Thought, ed. Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum 
Theologicarum Lovaniensium (Leuven: Peeters, 2016), 9. Such a view makes God out to be some sort of 
cosmic bystander, and insinuates that God does not want to infringe upon creaturely self-determination in 
any way whatsoever. This view does not appreciate that Origen understands God to set hard limits on his 
creatures in regard to their own self-determination. God sets these limits on moral freedom because of his 
love and grace. There are outcomes that God will simply not allow. Therefore, God uses his providence to 
insist upon a certain end – which is precisely the reason Origen states that God arranges the entirety of 
salvation-history before he ever creates the world. God’s arrangement and governance is not done “on the 
fly”, in a moment-by-moment basis, but has been foreordained from the beginning of time, for only in this 
way could God ensure the outcome he wants. To be sure, God’s end is achieved using the free and 
contingent choices of his creatures, but these are the free choices which God has chosen in advance to 
allow his creatures to perform. This does not mean God made them choose what they did, but God made 
them experience the types of experiences which he knew would produce the choices he had originally 





retains control over its own destiny.629 These scholars fail to realize that nowhere does 
Origen state that moral autonomy has such an abstract power in its purview or field of 
operations. Origen understands choice to be an assent to a received inclination or 
impression towards a specific action. As such, it makes no sense to speak of an 
impression for a particular destiny. No such impression or desire could be presented to 
the soul, and the soul could never assent to something so abstract and hidden in the future 
(there would be no proposed action to assent to, and no subsequent impulse which would 
terminate at such an end).630 Origen understands creatures to only have freedom of choice 
in a moment-by-moment basis, in the existential moment of choice. While it is true that 
certain modern libertarian definitions of “freedom of the will” include the requirement 
that one has control over one’s destiny, it is a mistake to ascribe this to Origen. Any 
notion that souls might have their own superintendent ability over the collective telos of 
their own choices is not only foreign to Origen’s arguments for moral autonomy, but also 
at odds with the role and privilege Origen ascribes to God’s providence alone. Any soul 
                                                          
629 Scott writes that Origen “consistently maintains in his writings the freedom of every rational 
being, including the Devil, to choose its eternal destiny” – Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the 
Problem of Evil: 136 (italics mine). Jennifer Heckart similarly claims that Origen’s doctrine of free will 
entails that “we are the masters of our fate and the captains of our souls” – Heckart, "Sympathy for the 
Devil? Origen and the end," 59. While it is true that the soul is the “captain” of our choices, it is not true 
that we are masters of our own fate. Rather, the master of our fate is none other than the one who has 
predetermined it. 
630 The soul might believe (correctly or incorrectly) that its choice is directed towards a particular 
outcome or destiny. But this is not the same thing as choosing the destiny itself in the moment of choice. 
Modern philosophers will sometimes critique the notion of universalism for this same reason – e.g. writing 
about universalism Michael Murray remarks: “[Universalism appears to] infringe on a certain important 
feature of creaturely freedom since it entails that one's choices have no effect on the outworking of one's 
destiny...That is, while it allows human beings to make choices, including choices that are relevant for soul-
making, it does not allow outcomes to vary accordingly, since those who choose to develop characters 
which are self-directed and not God-directed are summarily transformed. More broadly we might say that 
one can choose to cultivate a morally vicious character, but in the end one cannot have such a character” – 
Murray, "Three Versions of Universalism," 58-59. In C. S. Lewis’ popular book The Great Divorce, the 
narrator finds George MacDonald in heaven and reminds him that he had been a universalist while on 
earth. MacDonald states that he has changed his mind. The problem with universalism, Lewis’ MacDonald 
now advises, is that it removes freedom – C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce (New York: Macmillian, 1946), 
124-25. What Murray and Lewis describe as an apparent “infringement” of creaturely freedom, Origen 





may be free to sin and reject God in the moment. But nowhere does Origen grant to the 
soul the power to reject God forever. Logically, that is not the sort of choice that can even 
be made in the moment.  
A third implication of this research is related to the second. If the narrative 
regarding Origen’s view of moral autonomy needs to be refined and toned down in some 
cases, then the narrative regarding Origen’s view of divine providence might need to be 
similarly strengthened. To complicate matters further, Chapter 4 demonstrated that divine 
providence is essentially the same thing as saving grace in Origen’s theology.631 
Everything that God does to his creatures, be it reward or punishment or teaching or 
abandonment, is an essential aspect of God’s plan of salvation for the soul it is directed 
towards. To describe Origen’s view anachronistically by about a hundred years, we could 
reasonably say that everything divine providence does is part of God’s “effective call” for 
each soul who has been foreordained and “elected” for salvation. Since there is no soul 
who has not been foreordained for salvation, there does not appear to be any role for 
providence outside of salvific grace.632 This strengthening of the concept of grace in 
Origen’s theology will affect any description of “grace vs. free will” in Origen’s 
thinking.633 
                                                          
631 This analysis confirms the results of Benjamin Drewery’s detailed study on Origen’s use and 
definition of God’s grace (charis). Drewery never found a formal definition of charis in Origen’s writings, 
given that Origen speaks about grace in such diverse ways – Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace: 
17; 201. In Drewery’s own words: “but my difficulty has been that no single feature of Origen’s thought is 
ultimately irrelevant to my quest” (200). This led Drewery to conclude that for Origen “πρόνοια and 
οἰκονομία are χάρις” (106, italics in original). 
632 One might wonder if God’s providential care over animals and other non-rational entities might 
qualify as an exercise of God’s power not directly related to grace. However, Origen views the creation of 
this world (with everything therein) as God’s reaction to sin. That is to say, the entire reason for the 
creation of the material world, and everything in it, is God’s opening salvo in his plan to facilitate each 
soul’s ascent back to God. It may not be clear how animals and plants factor into the plan of salvation, but 
on Origen’s view they must. 
633 In a short article I. T. Holdcroft offered some conclusions regarding Origen’s doctrine of grace 





A fourth implication of this research is that it contributes to the ongoing debate as 
to how to understand Origen’s doctrine of justification by faith, a doctrine which is 
necessarily interconnected with the themes of freedom of choice and God’s saving 
grace.634 In his Commentary on Romans Origen frequently finds himself trying to explain 
how justification does or does not relate to faith and works. Over the years scholars have 
disagreed over how to best characterize Origen.635 A big reason for the ongoing debate is 
that Origen seems to speak in diverse ways throughout the Romans commentary. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
critical edition’s interpretation of Origen at this point in the commentary. On the Sources Chrétiennes 
reading, Origen describes grace as something happening throughout the entire process, for it implies that it 
was by God’s grace that the pound was multiplied. Conversely, Holdcroft believes the best reading of the 
Greek is that Origen believed that grace was found in the beginning and at the end of the process. He 
writes: “The Greek fragments help to provide the answer to the question whether God’s grace covers the 
whole process from beginning to end, or only the final gift of the pound taken from the one who failed to 
make a profit . . . [Holdcroft concludes that] The grace lay in the initial giving of the pound, and in the final 
unexpected gesture of generosity on the Lord’s part.” From this Holdcroft extrapolates about Origen’s 
doctrine of grace in general: “This is not to imply that Origen is unconscious of what we owe to divine 
generosity – after all, the beginning of the process as well as the final consummation has its origin in the 
benevolence of God – but to point out that somewhere between these points he leaves a gap to be filled by 
human effort” – I. T. Holdcroft, "The Parable of the Pounds and Origen's Doctrine of Grace," The Journal 
of Theological Studies 24, no. 2 (1973): 503-04. I mention this only because this short article appears to be 
quoted surprisingly often when scholars wish to give a shorthand description of the way Origen views 
God’s strategy of grace. That is to say, divine grace is described as something which starts and ends the 
process, but which leaves the middle arena of moral autonomy and moral effort completely up to the 
individual. This is an unfortunate and inadequate description of divine grace in Origen’s theology for many 
reasons, one of which is that it does not account for the superintendent role that grace plays on the selection 
and exercise of moral effort. 
634 The role of justification in the 2nd and 3rd centuries is a neglected field of study. Despite the fact 
that one of Origen’s principle tasks in his Commentary on Romans is unpacking the meaning of 
“justification by faith,” some scholars disregard the 2nd and 3rd centuries as unimportant for this topic, or 
they say that any notion of justification in the pre-Augustinian fathers is either nascent or under-developed. 
So, for example, in his book on the history of justification Alister McGrath confidently states that 
“Justification was simply not a theological issue in the pre-Augustinian tradition” – McGrath, Iustitia Dei: 
33. McGrath is merely adopting the view popularized by the Reformed theologian T. F. Torrance which 
stated that the Apostolic Fathers had abandoned the doctrine of justification in favor of a form of works-
righteousness –  T. F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock Publishers, 1996 (originally published 1948)). Fortunately, there are signs that this popular narrative 
is beginning to be challenged. Cf. D. H. Williams, "Justification by Faith: a Patristic Doctrine," The Journal 
of Ecclesiastical History 57, no. 4 (2006); Brian J. Arnold, Justification in the Second Century, ed. Dale C. 
Allison, Jr., et al., Studies of the Bible and its Reception (Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017).  
635 Important scholarly contributions to this question include: Harnack, History of Dogma, 2: 321f; 
Boyd, "Origen on Pharaoh's hardened heart: a study of Justification and Election in St. Paul and Origen."; 
Wiles, The Divine Apostle: The Interpretation of St Paul’s Epistles in the Early Church: 105-16; Heither, 
Translatio Religionis: Die Paulusdeutung des Origenes in seinem Kommentar zum Römerbrief: 238ff; 
Bammel, "Justification by Faith in Augustine and Origen." The most recent treatment of this question is the 






Sometimes Origen insists that justification is through faith alone apart from any works, 
and he highlights the dying thief on the cross as a proof text.636 At other times, however, 
Origen writes as if faith itself is a work that we are responsible for, and which merits a 
divine response.637 The scholarly debate, therefore, has centered on the question of one’s 
initial faith – the initium fidei. Does Origen believe the initium fidei is the soul’s 
responsibility alone and that God only responds with saving grace after the soul takes this 
crucial first step, or does Origen believe that even the initium fidei itself is a gift from 
God? I do not propose to answer such questions here. However, as far as I can tell none 
of the scholars who have written on Origen’s doctrine of justification situate this question 
into the larger narrative of how God preselects and prearranges the free choices which 
God wants to be performed by his creatures, which includes all such choices that relate to 
faith. Thus, even if a person’s initial faith is the result of a free choice which merits a 
divine response, at the same time it is also true that God had preselected and foreordained 
that free choice, and then God further arranged the parameters of salvation-history such 
that the person would inevitably and unavoidably find themselves in the situation where 
they make this free choice instead of any other free choice. Of course, this does not fully 
answer the many questions surrounding Origen’s teaching on justification, but it is a 
necessary component that has been overlooked. This research recognizes that there is a 
further layer operating behind the scenes which plays a key role in how (and why) a 
person receives justification from God. 
                                                          
636 E.g. ComRm III.6 (Scheck 1.225-230; Bammel 247-252). 





A fifth implication of this research is that it questions the popular narrative that 
the early Church was “of one voice” regarding free will.638 Sweeping claims about “free 
will” are not helpful, given that “free will” does not mean anything in the abstract. 
Different authors argued that moral autonomy had different requirements, and the early 
Church did not speak in a homogenous way on this topic. Moreover, those who voice this 
popular narrative seem to hold the presupposition that free will is definitionally opposed 
to determinism (as in, we are meant to understand: ‘the early church was of one voice in 
upholding free will against determinism’). This is inaccurate. There were a variety of 
viewpoints in antiquity that could be described as a type of determinism, given that 
“determinism” is a modern word with puzzling flexibility.639 And many of these views 
insisted on the reality of moral autonomy and moral culpability within their deterministic 
framework. Determinism and “free will” were not necessarily either / or options, and 
certainly not definitionally so.640 Our study of Origen reveals him to be yet another 
illustration of the dangers of broad and sweeping narratives about the “early church”. 
Origen emphasized moral autonomy, but at the same time Origen’s eschatology may be 
viewed as its own form of teleological determinism (in the sense of a foreordained, 
predetermined, and infallible outcome). The apocatastasis was not only unilaterally 
                                                          
638 E.g. Alister McGrath writes: “While it is true that the beginnings of a doctrine of grace may be 
discerned during this early period, its generally optimistic estimation of the capacities of fallen humanity 
has led at least some scholars to question whether it can be regarded as truly Christian in this respect. The 
pre-Augustinian theological tradition is practically of one voice in asserting the freedom of the human will” 
– McGrath, Iustitia Dei: 34. 
639 “’Determinism’ is a term one often finds in discussions of the history of ideas, and yet is also 
something of a vexed category, in part because of the different implications it carries in various scholarly 
contexts” – Kathleen Gibbons, "Who Reads the Stars? Origen's Critique of Astrological Geography," in 
The Routledge Handbook of Identity and the Environment in the Classical and Medieval Worlds, ed. 
Rebecca Futo and Molly Jones-Lewis Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2015), 230. 
640 Gibbons states the point succinctly: “...many of the authors in antiquity who understood human 
actions as determined were not seeking to deny human choice, but to explain it” – ibid., 243. Cf. Ibid. 242: 
“Here, I have aimed to argue that the problem of determinism in the context of the history of ancient 
religions is something of a red herring...we can consider how debates about causation and volition were 





foreordained by God, but God was also the one who infallibly actuated that outcome. In 
the words of later authors, we might say that Origen believed that God elected the entire 
human race for salvation. As we have shown in Chapter 2, it is true that throughout his 
life Origen argued against a variety of deterministic viewpoints. But his arguments were 
on a case-by-case basis, and he used different philosophical and exegetical arguments 
against each one. He never argued against determinism qua determinism; rather, he only 
argued against deterministic views which denied moral autonomy and resulted in 
fatalism.641 Fatalism was Origen’s nemesis – not the idea of foreordained events.642 
A sixth implication of this research concerns the curious case of 16th century 
discussions on grace, providence, free will, and God’s foreknowledge. What is 
commonly referred to today as God’s “middle knowledge” is said to originate with Luis 
de Molina. Today, the view of middle knowledge (or Molinism) as a viable philosophical 
and theological doctrine has been defended and popularized by well-known philosophers 
such as Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig.643 While Molina’s account is not 
                                                          
641 To rephrase this in terminology more appropriate and faithful to Origen’s own language we 
should say that Origen never argued against infallibly foreordained and “fixed” outcomes; rather, he only 
argued against outcomes that were fixed in the future because of “necessity”, by which he meant that they 
were fixed through the use of external force which overrides the operation of an agent’s own impressions 
and assent.  
642 Origen was so worried about fatalistic views that he also constantly worried about non-
fatalistic teachings which could somehow be misconstrued as fatalistic. Again, this is why Origen kept his 
teaching on the apocatastasis secret – not because his understanding of universalism entailed fatalism, but 
because simple people would mischaracterize it as such. Origen felt like he was adopting God’s own 
strategic pedagogy in this regard. Similarly, even though divine foreknowledge does not cause necessity, 
God “who ordereth all things for the best, with good reason hides the future from our eyes. For the 
knowledge of the future makes us relax in the struggle against wickedness, and the apparent certainty of 
wickedness enervates us…” – Phil 23.10 (Lewis 183; SC 226, 162-164). 
643 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); William Lane 
Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (New York: 
Brill, 1988); Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism, Omniscience (New 
York: Brill, 1990); Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1998); William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine 





identical with Origen’s,644 both develop the notion that God possesses a special type of 
knowledge concerning the counterfactuals of human freedom, and both emphasize that 
this knowledge is specifically what preserves moral autonomy in the context of divine 
foreordination (in Origen’s case the foreordination is to universal salvation, while 
Molina’s discussion centers around a particular view of predestination).645 Molina was 
acquainted with Origen, for he does cite Origen’s Commentary on Romans in a few 
places, but such mentions only seem to be used as evidence for the basic point that divine 
                                                          
644 Origen and Molina differ on how they construe moral autonomy, even if they both affirm 
God’s knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Molina defended a type of libertarian 
freedom, and it would be inaccurate and anachronistic to label Origen as a proponent of libertarian freedom 
(i.e. Origen did not believe in the absolute ability to do otherwise in the typical libertarian sense). In fact, 
for this very reason I would cautiously suggest that Origen’s view of middle knowledge appears to be more 
logically coherent than some current forms of Molinism. For on Molinism, it is unclear what mechanism 
gives God the ability to know what free creatures would do in any given hypothetical situation, given that 
creatures have absolute power to the contrary. In other words, if a creature can choose to act even against 
its own inclinations and rationality in the moment of choice (as libertarianism typically suggests), then even 
a comprehensive and exhaustive knowledge of the person’s heart and mind would not be sufficient 
information for God to be able to predict their choice. On Origen’s view, however, the moral agent always 
chooses on the basis of their current disposition and rationality, and so a comprehensive knowledge of 
one’s disposition would enable God to foreknow their free choices. 
There is a second notable difference between the two systems. On Molinism, it is entirely possible 
that some moral agents would not repent in any hypothetical future situation, what some modern 
philosophers have dubbed “trans-world damnation” – cf. William Craig’s "'No Other Name': A Middle 
Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ," Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989): 
186. See also a response to Craig’s position – Raymond J. VanArragon, "Transworld Damnation and 
Craig's Contentious Suggestion," Faith and Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2001). Origen’s tripartite anthropology 
does not allow for the possibility that some people may reach a point where repentance is no longer 
possible; Origen’s anthropology precludes such a notion because he believes that the untainted desires 
originating from the spirit are permanent. There are always virtuous desires within every moral agent, even 
for every individual choice. This means that God will always have recourse to some situation, no matter 
how rare, by which to entice the soul to genuine repentance and salvation by tapping into these desires. 
Thus, it is unsurprising that while Origen’s use of “middle knowledge” allows for universal salvation, many 
modern proponents of “middle knowledge” affirm an eternal Hell. 
645 For example, note the striking parallel between Craig’s description of Molinism with the 
presentation of Origen’s theology outlined in this chapter: “It might seem that foreknowledge, explained in 
this way, smacks of a divine “sting operation” – it could sound as though God manipulates people by 
leading them into situations in which they are induced to act in a certain way, even if freely, and thus God 
knows what they will do. Such an understanding is, however, needlessly unsympathetic. Two truths must 
be kept in mind: (1) God is a gracious, loving God, not a manipulative tyrant. He loves his creatures and 
wants the best for them. We may trust in the wisdom of his decision concerning which world to create. (2) 
In the circumstances in which people find themselves, they are genuinely free to choose opposite courses of 
action. That God knows what they will do in any set of circumstances does not mean that they are 
compelled by the circumstances to do what they do. God does not determine their choice; they can choose 
freely between alternate courses of action” – Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine 





foreknowledge was not the cause of the foreknown events, but rather that the events were 
the cause of the foreknowledge of them.646 Molina does not seem aware that Origen also 
made use of a category of divine knowledge Molina calls “middle knowledge.” At any 
rate, this analysis of Origen’s theology calls into question whether Molina was as original 
as people claim him to be. 
  
                                                          
646 Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et 
reprobatione concordia (1595): On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia: 180-82, §20-22; 84, 
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